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November 24, 1974 - Ford, Kissinger, USSR Leader Leonid Brezhnev
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1552861
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November 24, 1974 - Ford, Kissinger, USSR Leader Leonid Brezhnev
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Nuclear weapons
Presidential trips
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1974-11-24
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1974
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1974-11-24
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1974
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation
Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
MEMORANDUM
EXEMPTION CATEGORY
(B)
-
5
(1,3)
THE WHITE HOUSE
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON IMP TO DET.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
WASHINGTON
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of
the Central Committee of the CPSU
Andrey A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo
of the Central Committee of the CPSU,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to
the United States
Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to
the General Secretary
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter
President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., U.S.
Ambassador to the USSR
DATE & TIME:
Sunday - November 24, 1974
1:40 - 2:05 p.m.
PLACE:
Okeanskaya Sanatorium
Near Vladivostok
SUBJECT:
Nuclear War
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, See. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidellnes
By KBH NARA, Date 7/25/01
President: Shortly after I became President, Dr. Kissinger briefed me
some on what you and President Nixon discussed. I would like to know
more about what you told President Nixon, and then I would like to ask
some questions. There are some things I have to get straight in my
mind. Then we could go to negotiations, or whatever. But first I need
to know more about what you discussed.
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
GERALD
[Copied From original in kissinger Reports on
Soviet Union, China, and Middle East - Box / -
"USSR - Nov. 23-24,1974 Vladivostok Summit(2)" it
Additional state Department memeons appear in that folder]
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
- 2 -
Brezhnev: This was in the Crimea. As I am at all times, I was guided
by the basic principle that there would be no nuclear war between us or
nuclear war in the world in general. I told President Nixon that there
are some countries which had not joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty
and do not observe it. Therefore a situation could arise where you or
we could be threatened with a nuclear attack. I thought it might be good
for us to conclude a treaty dealing only with a nuclear attack on one of
our countries. In the event of a nuclear attack on one, the other would come
to its aid with all the resources at its disposal.
President Nixon, I recall, said that this was interesting and that he would
look further into it. I had some further talks with Dr. Kissinger on this
[in Moscow on October 26], but for various reasons nothing came of it.
That is where we stand.
In the preamble we could say something like: we are aware of what a
nuclear war would mean in such circumstances and, desirous to avoid
such an event, the two sides, etcetera. We could do it so as to avoid
giving offense to allies -- and in fact it would give a reassurance of
protection to our allies.
President: As I told you, I was briefed on this in general terms. I want
to ask a couple of questions, and then Dr. Kissinger and Minister Gromyko
can discuss it further.
I agree with President Nixon; it is an interesting idea. One question is,
does it mean strategic nuclear attack, tactical nuclear attack, or any
nuclear attack?
Brezhnev: Under the treaty we would each agree not to use nuclear weapons
against anyone.
President: They would be defensive only?
Brezhnev: Yes.
I agree to Dr. Kissinger continuing with subsequent discussions. My
concept is related to any use of nuclear weapons. What is the difference
whether they are tactical or strategic? Because in either case there
would be a nuclear war, and we want to prevent that.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
- 3 -
President: I asked because I wanted to know if it were a tactical nuclear
attack whether it would be an "all-force reaction," and I wondered whether
the response to different kinds of attack should be different. That is of
some importance.
Brezhnev: The important thing is not to have a nuclear attack on us or
our allies. If we entered this kind of an arrangement, nuclear war would
be impossible for decades to come. The basic thing is to talk the general
concept. We can then work on the details and go into it deeper.
President: Let me ask: what about an attack by a nuclear power on a third
party that is not an ally? What would be the situation?
Brezhnev: It is hard to give a precise answer. Perhaps we could agree
to enter consultations as the best course. A lot would depend on who
attacked whom. This proposal hasn't been elaborated in detail. But since
the United States and the Soviet Union are the most important powers, an
agreement like this between us would eliminate nuclear war for many
years to come.
President: We do want to prevent nuclear war, and your country and mine
have a great responsibility. We should talk further. Meanwhile, I think
we should make a major effort to get the laggards to sign the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. There are some laggards.
Brezhnev: I fully agree.
President: Let's have it between Dr. Kissinger and your Ambassador to
work on that.
Brezhnev: We are putting the Non-Proliferation Treaty into the communique.
Let's think about it little by little. It should be discussed energetically.
[The private conversation ended and the principals rejoined the larger meeting.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Returnto
Scowcrott files
1
(Uladivostok Summit
notes)
Transcribed + held in
Sensitive files
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY 10/07
NARA, DATE 5/6/04
GERALD
LIBRARY
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY
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DATE
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY We
, NARA, DATE 5/6/04