Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
1552959
label
February 21, 1975 - Cabinet Meeting
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
1552959
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
February 21, 1975 - Cabinet Meeting
citationUrl
collections
Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
subjects
Syria
Egypt
Soviet Union
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947)
Imports
Middle East conflicts
Petroleum
Trade policy
United States-Soviet relations
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
1552959
coverageEndDate
day
21
logicalDate
1975-02-21
month
2
year
1975
coverageStartDate
day
21
logicalDate
1975-02-21
month
2
year
1975
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
cce61981b909e5a1
ocrText
File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL/XGDS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
President Ford's Meeting with the Cabinet
DATE AND TIME:
Friday - February 21, 1975
11:00 a. m. - 12:30 p.m.
PLACE:
The Cabinet Room
The White House
[The President opened the meeting with a discussion of the Savings Bond
Program, the organization of the White House, and the Domestic Council
The Vice President described the organization and operation of the
Domestic Council.]
President: I want to discuss the import tariff vote, and emphasize how
important it is. Every day that goes by makes us more vulnerable to
outside pressure. We have seen no other plan offered. By the time they
[the Democrats] get together, it probably won't have much substance. We
will talk about compromise, but only if there is some real substance.
Let me turn to the Middle East. Henry has just come back from
STATE QUIDELINES 3/11/04
there. Henry?
Kissinger: It is important to understand what we are trying to do in the
Middle East. We hear a lot of criticisms. Most of them are two-fold:
Why not do it with the Soviet Union? And why not go back to Geneva?
NARA, DATE 5/13/04
Let me stress that we would be happy to work with the Soviet
Union, but the only position they have ever offered is support of the
radical Arab line -- the '67 borders, return of Jerusalem and rights of
DECLARMED
the Palestinians. If we were ready to do that, we could do it directly
without the Soviet Union. Whenever the Soviet Union is willing to make a
moderate proposition or put some pressure on their clients, we will be
S.
delighted to work with them. Until then, this is just a debating option.
A
CONFIDENTIAL/XGDS
BY
GERALD
LISHAMY
CONFIDENTIAL/XGDS
-2-
Secondly, we are happy to go to Geneva, but it depends under
what conditions we go to Geneva. If we go there after a failure of
step-by-step diplomacy, we can't even urge a moderate program
since it will have been shown we couldn't deliver. The Soviet radical
program will be supported by everyone there. If we go to Geneva after
a success, every Arab state will know that only we have delivered. Then
we have a chance to get either a moderate program or hold the Soviet
Union up as the obstructionist. With a failure, we would face massive
pressures from the Europeans and the Japanese to come up with something
to avoid the economic problems and another oil embargo.
This is strategically what is at issue. Tactically, the issue is
whether we can get one more step before Geneva. If we could move
simultaneously in the Sinai and Golan, we could really settle things down.
But the Israeli domestic situation won't permit that now it would require
that some of their settlements be moved.
The problem now is to match specific territorial moves by Israel
with some intangible political moves by the Egyptians. The Israeli
Government has an extraordinarily difficult domestic situation. They
have a very thin majority and a massive leaking problem. The problem
is, can they do what is necessary, and can they present it in such a way
as to present it acceptably to their people? That is a problem.
Sadat is a statesman who understands the need for peace.
Butz: He has implicit confidence in Kissinger.
Kissinger: The problem is that Sadat can do more than he can say. The
problem is working out some de facto arrangements with Egypt and
Israel. The tragedy is that the less he says, the more he can do -- and
Israel needs to demonstrate to its people that they got something.
Then there is the Syrian complication. They have one way or
another been behind every war that has occurred there. They are more
of a problem now that they are more moderate than when they were so
radical that they wouldn't even talk. There is almost no way we can move
with them simultaneously. They are already lining up support to prevent
Sadat from moving. Syria has a real prolem -- they lost 10, 000 men in
the war and have nothing to show for it -- but we must keep Syria quiescent
if we are to succeed.
FORD
CONFIDENTIAL/XGDS
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL/XGDS
-3-
Then the Soviet Union has only one play. Gromyko keeps saying
go back to Geneva, but he has no idea what to do there. Geneva is partly
a matter of prestige for them, but they don't understand the Syrians and
they enshrine the extreme Syrian initial proposals as serious negotiating
positions. The Arabs right now think that one way or another we are
going to help. If we strike out, they will move massively to the Soviet
Union and we will have a huge problem with them, the Soviet Union, the
Europeans and the Japanese.
We have a 50% chance. But we also have to help the Saudis in line.
It is obvious that the President's talks in Vladivostok were a very
positive development. We hear this not only from the Soviet Union, but
from what they have told the Europeans. But there is a slight cooling --
everything is maybe 5% harder. Also they think we have added conditions,
for in the 1972 economic discussions, none of these problems were brought
up that were later added on. Secondly, they are moving massively to the
Europeans. The Europeans have given about $7. 5 billion in credits to them
now. The economic impact is obvious, but there is also a political cost.
While detente was warm, we held the Europeans at bay. They were scared.
Now the danger is they will go running to the Soviet Union and we have lost
control.
We should do something about reversing the trade decision.
Our relations with the Europeans are better than they have ever
been, except that they greatly fear a Middle East crisis. I get the impression
that in energy, the bargaining perception is beginning to swing from the
producers to the consumers. Our cooperation in energy is going well.
President: Thank you, Henry. Our energy policy has foreign policy
ramifications that are equal to the domestic ones. We have now a strong
position at home and abroad and we have to stand together to achieve our
program and confirm that perception. We have to insist on a guaranteed
price and alternative sources.
Morton: How can we ease the burden of the Trade Act?
Kissinger: We should urge Congressional movement, but without any
specific proposals right now. One solution may be to try to separate the
Export-Import from the Trade Bill.
FORD
R
CONFIDENTIAL/XGDS
GERALD
CONFIDENTIAL/XGDS
-4-
Lynn: We now will run into Hill opposition that if we have money to loan,
we should loan it here. It is shortsighted, but it's a fact. It is an illus-
trative problem and your argument will have to be supported with facts
and figures.
President: We should point out that the Europeans have loaned $7.5
billion to them already.
CONFIDENTIAL/XGDS
GERALD a LIBRARY FORD
Ricess Train
25 enitition
wort
E,S, I
2
Cabint ZWT
Comb air ald
*
on
21 Feb 75
P Samings Bends Pergram.
Organin of WH
Dormestic Comment
VP (Describes organing of open of Domestric Camil
P (Descrosed M tariff inti)
E every day makes no more unleverable to antside presome.
We have sun no other plan. By the time they get
Together, it prot ant have hmeh pubstance
We will Calls compromise, but only if there is trone
real substince
K
Important to in would what and topic K do 'ME,
mm an 2. fors: why int -b it w/su, &
why not go back to Genera.
we woul I he hoppy A wesh w/ SU hutchy shyport
< rachiel areh this. If in realy the do that, we
consident directly. whenlern so welling accupt
minde perposation or pressure their lients, the
h Time then this is print a debating ytim
We hoppy to jo t bit abpends ender what
militions. & are go w/a farture, are can't been mg &
or inscheats prog - fine in conldn't deliver rc
for rabial MA any will be my posted & we yourla
that all will human that only me have
chimical, Ese can get ithm instructs prop. 02 hold
Surger distructional w/perhese, me world lace
mazime persons from 5 E new & Jap to couse in
as/ something A annil commine pobr embargo
This is stratgirally what 20 at easine
Touth c per insult is whither me can get
more step hope Genera & me cauld mem
in Simm t Golm an cauld unly
swore things down. But I dringtic it writ
DECLASSIFIED
LO. 12956, SEC. 3.5
NBC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES stateler cw 3/11/04
BY
NARA. DATE 5/13/04
FORD LIBRANT
persit that nmw and signise settlements to he
mored.
Yest amon is to match years territional more w/
intergable was by C E.
It I beat has off downter pit -
heir Thin inagisty N massive leating put.
Part is em they draw whit & present it
in suchacrag to promt it amptably to their
That is a pirh.
Sadat is a statement who c
Butts
He has suphiest confidence in K.
&
Salat cando here Jhon he can any. Prob is
working ant some de facto arranguments w/ E rI,
Tragedy is liza 4 says C mes Lecomdo > x I wed
isto Invorstant they job routhing
Their there is Sequar Tubery have
I every or another breakwind each when
Thong and more of - first how That they an more
invelvets them whenthey so eachine an wouldn't
eventark. alount no any we can nine w/ then
finist, They and already hiving ey suppett pumit
Sudnt from many Synce hason esal push ( Inesson
was) but and must key Syrin privatent if me are
to securd
Ten Sd hn only ( play, keeps sming yo back
To Cambin, Out he has the ihn what to do the
Gruna is party preatings pa them, but they dnt
endustrad Systems T enshier extrame sycrim-inital
positions, properable as knim inget prothims.
The arab eight how think t way onsether are
one going To Log. of we stite ant, they will more
the J & me will have a hage por w/
them, su, Emp, & J.
# We home 50% chames, but me have to help
Santis in him.
It abrows - Vlud talk who a very partnic disport
not ruby from Sd but they hme tolds Enco. Best
there is a shght unding every thing is monght 58
hands. abr they part think and have adder
conditions - has in c 72 even more of
C years are brought up. 2 2d, they one mooning
marrity h Emo. There Nont 7.5 hil events
D Them nmw. Econ inpact hat there
abs pol cost. while and held
Emos ats bay. how damage is they will To
having to SV t and have lost control.
We should do month about in reversing trade
decision
Our relatins / Emo one better chem Thing hour
em been, they greath, from ME various.
I get inpression that in energy, C burgaring
perception is begining to swing from purchase
to empirmers Coery in energy is young well
P
Thanks. Our energy public hns F P compariation
equal the disestioness we home mura strong
position at honer a amond me hme t stom
together to which are prog + cerporan that
perception we have to instrot on guaranteed
price x alt smices,
Wiston
Aun com and age lase c hundred p trade art.
R
We should engl Crug movement chat w/o any
spraifric agains eight has One ihn may he & try
to & sponation X-M from train hill.
6 yan Wi how will him into Arm g paitor that if ml ham
monthly & loon, and shmeld born it here. it
shoutsighted but a fact. A. It is an events
problem & your aryment will hand be arportat
w/ fucts fryines
P
are should pointant Euro home bourd 7,5 5
vono DEPARTMENT