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March 5, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, Congressional Vietnam Delegation
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March 5, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, Congressional Vietnam Delegation
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
CONFIDENTIAL /NODIS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Secretary of State
Senator Dewey F. Bartlett (Oklahoma)
Congressman John J. Flynt, Jr. (Georgia)
Congressman William Chappell, Jr. (Florida)
Congressman Donald M. Fraser (Minnesota)
Congressman Paul N. McCloskey (California)
Congresswoman Bella S. Abzug (New York)
(arrived late)
Congressman John P. Murtha (Pennsylvania)
Congresswoman Millicent Fenwick (New Jersey)
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, National Security
Council
Assistant Secretary of State, Philip C. Habib
DATE & TIME:
Wednesday, March 5, 1975, 11:15 a.m. to
12:50 p.m.
PLACE:
The White House, Cabinet Room
President: Let me say at the outset that I am pleased
to see all of you and I am sorry Bella did
not get here. I think the group's going
to Indochina is a great asset. The ones
who went were a good cross-section of
Congress and your views are indicative of
that cross-section of views. I want to
thank Assistant Secretary Habib for going
and I am sure he was helpful to you. I
ask that you give Dr. Kissinger and me your
observations and any recommendations you
may have.
Flynt:
On behalf of my colleagues I will start
but everyone will participate. We were
manifestly shaken and impressed by what we
saw. Fraser and I did not go to Cambodia.
FORD I RACE LIBRARY
I had an earlier appointment with Big Minh,
who used to be the commander of the forces
in South Viet-Nam. He was going out of town
GE
and I went to see him. I am glad I did
see him as that will be part of my report.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
CONF IDEN THAT NODIS
By ut
, NARA, Date 1/20/00
GDS
CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS
2
The first point I would like to make is that
the questions of Viet-Nam and Cambodia must
be treated separately. There are substantive
differences in each case. The second point
I want to make is that the Cambodian problem
is of extremely short range.
On the Viet-Nam side of the coin, it is of
longer duration. We talk in terms of two or
three years. I would like to see them stand
on their own feet in the next 2-3 years.
That may be overly optimistic. As we have
discovered over the years, publicly and
privately, we have had a common goal. For
years we fought side by side and even as
that changed our objectives were the same.
The history of Viet-Nam has been a series of
mistakes, tragic mistakes. Our task is to
convince the United States public and Congress
not to make the last mistake, not to abruptly
terminate sufficient military and economic
aid which could become the most tragic mistake
in a series of tragic mistakes. In my part
of the country, where we have supported the
situation, involvement has waned and been
replaced by reluctance bordering on opposition.
All of us have the difficult job of con-
vincing Congress and the people that we cannot
drop the ball. We have too much investment
in lives, time and material. I wish we could
report we had solutions. I have no panacea
to suggest, but in concert with my colleagues
I hope we can, by give and take, come up
with a consensus.
President: Do you anticipate making a report to the leaders
of Congress? That would be helpful.
Flynt:
That is our intention, but we are limited
by lack of sufficient staff. We did make a
report to Otto Passman's Committee.
President: Did Otto listen or do all the talking?
Flynt:
He listened because he wanted his colleagues
to hear us.
President: I served twelve years on that sub-committee.
Has he changed?
E
FORD
CONFIDENTIAL /NODIS
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3
Chappell:
No, he still dances around.
Bartlett:
I will try not to cover the same ground as
Mr. Flynt. I see a need for military aid in
Cambodia quickly so that they can expand
the perimeter and hope for a political settle-
ment. Without that hope, there will be a
bloodbath. In South Viet-Nam I consider
the over-all painful options. I have some
concern about the three-year proposal because
it gives the impression that all would be
over in three years. There needs to be some
kind of commitment that takes into account
what comes in from Russia and China, taking
into account the needs for defense. We
should not be pro- or anti-Thieu in the
coming election, but we should insist on the
broadening of the base of the Government to
bring about free elections. This would
require the appointment to the Cabinet of
leaders from the non-Communist group. Cor-
ruption should be ferreted out, there should
be freedom of the press and proper use of
the courts and police. This will help them
to develop their resolve and will strengthen
their capability to develop in peace.
(Mrs. Abzug entered at this point) : I am sorry I am late.
Bartlett:
I remember Mr. Sung said to me that at one
time his dream was that Viet-Nam would be one
nation without communism. That changed to
a South Viet-Nam without communism and now
he is thinking of a South Viet-Nam as a
free institution, with guaranteed rights
and including Communists.
President: Did you find Thieu agreeable to any of these
suggestions?
Bartlett:
All of my conversations on this subject took
place on the last day we were in Saigon.
They included discussions with Professor Huy
and former Prime Minister Ky, both of whom
agreed that Thieu should broaden his Govern-
ment and bring into it all non-Communists.
E.
CONEIDENTIAL/NODIS
LISAARY FOR
CONEIDENTIAL/NODIS
4
Flynt:
Chappell and I talked to President Thieu
about an hour before we left. We were
reluctant to do so but we had been asked to
by several anti-Thieu, anti-communist, but
loyal South Vietnamese--one of whom was
Professor Huy and one was General Minh. As
best we could communicate to President Thieu,
we suggested that he broaden his base and
take advice from people personnally loyal
to South Viet-Nam but not strongly associated
with him. We don't know whether he got the
message.
McCloskey:
I concentrated on the military situation.
This was my fourth time in Viet-Nam and I was
surprised by the success that was evident.
Ninety-eight percent of what I saw was a
success and I was surprised by the capability
of the Vietnamese Army. They are holding off
the North Vietnamese and the VC without the
firepower of the B-52's and U.S. forces. I
saw two regiments near Danang that were
holding an area that five U.S. regiments
previously held. But the South Vietnamese
are outnumbered by the North and the North
has the will to prevail and is putting its
troups down into the South. We were all
impressed that South Viet-Nam would be suc-
cessful if it were independent. The problem
is that the will to fight and the terrain
favors the North. There has been a shift
to the VC in the Delta of 10% of the population.
On Cambodia, we agree to support your request
because we believe that if the perimeter is
cracked people will be butchered. We
talked to the refugees who told us about
people being killed. Atrocity stories about
nails being pounded into their heads. I
cannot tell you whether the perimeter will
hold.
There is a difference in our figures and
those of the Department of Defense on what
is required. They are asking for the same
amount of ammunition that is used in Viet-Nam,
650 tons per day whereas 1/6 of the men are
engaged. That is why we decided to recommend
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
/NODIS
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CONFIDENTIAL
5
$116 million for Cambodia instead of the $222
million requested. It is a close question
of whether we can get through.
President: Logistically?
McCloskey: Both logistically and with votes. I would
like to recommend that you withdraw the
$300 million request for Viet-Nam. Failure
to get it will hurt us in Southeast Asia.
Both sides look at what Congress does. The
estimate is gloomy. The North Vietnamese
are going to win.
President: Whether we aid them or not?
McCloskey: We gave them $3.2 million in 1973, $1.3 million
in 1974 and $1.3 million this year--if all
goes through. There is no possibility of
an increase. We will give you the votes to
phase out the program, but not higher amounts.
People in the South are shooting up ammunition
at a rate seven times that of the North.
The North is using a thousand tons per month
and can use those thousand tons, but the
South wants to use 54 thousand tons. We can-
not support that level. We cannot support
giving the South the same amount that the
North gets from the Soviet Union and China.
So it is difficult for the South to prevail.
If we are going to get negotiations,
Mr. Secretary, you should force them to a
political struggle, because I see no hope
over three years.
Fraser:
On Cambodia it seems to me all that is left
is to negotiate an orderly transition of
power to the insurgents. We have the
impression we are trying to get more than
that. We should ask someone like the French
or Waldheim and see what terms it would take
for a surrender. If our expectations are
high, we may be unrealistic. If I were
satisfied that we were doing the right thing,
I would consider it. Otherwise we are merely
continuing the war and next year it would
start all over again.
it
FORD
CONRIDENTIAL NODIS
LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL NODIS
6
On Viet-Nam, we have no ability to affect
the political situation or the situation
in the villages, and we concentrate on the
main forces. I received reliable reports
that the VC infrastructure is coming back.
It is a smoldering fire. Six hundred thousand
people came under their control in one
month--an overall 10% shift in population
but actually a doubling of the population
under VC control. The criticism of President
Thieu is rising sharply and there are economic
difficulties. Thieu is associated with cor-
ruption, which is a major political factor.
People who were for Thieu in 1971 are now
against him.
I went over there to see what the situation
is like. Now I am for a general phase out.
I would be willing to support more aid if
Viet-Nam were moving toward traditional
values. The problem is the United States is
supporting a regime without regard to our
traditional factors. I don't like to tell
a country what to do, but if they did move
politically to open up it might be easier
to get a political accommodation.
The Ambassador we have in Viet-Nam is a first-
rate disaster. He is inflexible and is a
total spokesman of the Thieu regime. I
cannot believe he is an adequate representative
for yourself or for the United States. I
have talked to others about him and get the
same impression. I think he is a problem.
Flynt:
Along the lines of the last statement, I
believe we must become more realistic on
Viet-Nam. We received substantial reports
from Embassy personnel that they are almost
prohibited from sending reports to the
Ambassador which he does not wish to hear.
I must agree he is stifling information which
he does not wish to hear. The same is true
of the CIA. Pete McCloskey agrees.
Chappell:
I saw the same things as the others, but I
did not come to the same conclusions. I
CONFIDENTIAL NODIS
GE LIBRARY RALD R. FORD
CONFIDENTIAL NODIS
7
had a most significant visit with Mr. Buu
of the Labor Federation. He lost a son in
the war. While he opposes Thieu he told
us he went all the way with any group that
is against Communists. He is a strong
anti-Communist. He expressed concern that
Thieu was not keeping doors open to the
dissidents. He realizes that some are not
good, and lean to the other side. While he
was critical he still wants to work with
Thieu and he asked us to say this to him.
We did and Thieu said he would talk to Buu.
President:
Is organized labor a major factor in South
Viet-Nam?
Chappell:
They are an important influence. This man
was extremely well-informed and a good
contact. He said he had 1-1/2 million
members.
Flynt:
That may be an exaggeration.
Chappell:
Organized labor is still an important factor
and can be influential.
Flynt:
We have no disagreement on substance.
Chappell:
I look at the military factors. I went to
the front with General Truong who is very
competent. I found high morale and high
competence. The defenses were substantial
and in general I feel South Viet-Nam has an
undeniably strong will to defend itself
against the Communists, and I am willing
to vote to support them. This isacountry
which I feared was a welfare leech. I now
think there is a good chance they can support
themselves, having become self-sufficient in
rice and there is oil exploration going on.
President:
Do they have a refinery capacity there?
Chappell:
Not yet. With oil exploration work in the
countryside, and the increase in production,
I say they are on an upward trend as far as
their economy is concerned. We would make
a serious mistake if we did not give aid
R.
which they need. They are not asking for
open end in aid. There are no troops in
Viet-Nam as in Europe. Thieu said if we
GERADO
FLORIDA
LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS
CONFIDENTIAL /NODIS
8
help him in the transition period, he will
be able to take care of their needs, and I
think he is right. So, while the last time
I was reluctant to support aid, I now strongly
feel we should do all we can. We need to
get the facts before the country.
Cambodia is very critical. The best hope is
for a negotiated peace, but we need to get
help there quickly. It is useless to send
food and medicine without ammunition. We
found substantial willingness on the part of
the soldiers to do the job. The generals
are good and the soldiers have a determination
to stay with it. Desertion has been
decreasing instead of worsening. We should
give now to get help to them, so that they
can make it through the rainy season. If
they can hold their position around Phnom Penh
and then open the river, it just might work.
We should then look at it again later on.
I believe they will hold if we can keep the
airport open.
We had the vote in the Appropriation Com-
mittee 7-6 or 8-5. I thought we had Coughlin.
I had a feeling it was all right, but we
will be stronger if we get it with the
Authorization Committee and avoid a fight in
the Rules Committee. We need to push in
the Foreign Affairs Committee.
President: 7-6 or 8-5 in favor?
Chappell:
Yes.
Fraser:
According to a military briefing, South Viet-Nam
may lose two or three provinces and Hue
could be isolated. If that happens, it will
look as if Viet-Nam is coming apart at the
seams and that will lead people to want to
write it off.
President: If that happened, should the result be that
the United States do less or the United States
should try to do more to prevent it?
&
CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS
RALD
FROM
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9
Fraser:
My impression is that there is not much dif-
ference. I am prepared to do a slow phase-
out, but I was pointing out this could be a
problem.
McCloskey:
There are seven reserve divisions above the
DMZ. Three are alerted to move. Truong
said that if two of these move they would
take Hue and threaten Danang. If they com-
mit them, South Viet-Nam could lose three
provinces.
Bartlett:
One thing that impressed all of us was the
fact that the refugees in Cambodia were all
worrying about the savagery of the Com-
munists and this influenced our thinking.
So if there were a military victory by the
Khmer Communists, it would be bloody. We
should carve out more for medical needs in
military aid. We should meet their needs.
Kissinger:
I have to leave because I am on my way to
the Middle East. I would like to say one
word before I go. First with respect to
Cambodia, the tragedy we face is the dis-
sension in this country which has produced
the situation. Whereas if we can demon-
strate that in June and July of 1973 we had
negotiations in our grasp, we had China
ready to work as a intermediary for the first
time. You will remember this was the time
of Watergate and there was no good communica-
tion with the Congress. Congress cut off
the bombing. If they had held off for three
months, we would have been in touch with
Sihanouk. Within three days of the bombing
halt the Chinese refused to pass messages to
Sihanouk which we were handing over.
We never put enough in Cambodia to win a
military victory. We never did enough to
bring it to a conclusion. The events in
1973 were a tragedy. Right now the question
is whether the United States can have it on
its conscience not to send in arms to a
people trying to defend themselves. We have
been trying with the Chinese and others for
CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS
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10
months. I agree that it must be liquidated
by negotiations. We have been trying since
October. We had it in our grasp in July
1973.
Since October we are continuing our efforts.
We know that Sihanouk has to come back.
What is keeping Sihanouk from coming back
is the Communists. If there was anything
left to Cambodia that Sihanouk could get,
he would get it. If we can get through
the rainy season, the key will be Sihanouk.
The question is whether or not the United
States can pull the plug and have it on
our conscience.
On Viet-Nam, it was my misfortune to negotiate
that with the North Vietnamese for four
years. They are hard cases. I wish I could
agree to get a political solution instead
of a military solution. It was not possible
to negotiate a political solution with them
without a strong military situation. They
are the most devoted, single-minded abrasive
Communists I have ever seen. I once took
Le Duc Tho to a museum in Hanoi which he
had never visited himself. All of the
artifacts reminded him of prisons where he
had been. We saw something from Vinh and
he said that was a good prison but a
miserable jailer. He is a dedicated revolu-
tionary. They are hard cases and in some
ways rather admirable. Le Duc Tho and all
the others have fought all their lives.
They will not give up, unless they have to.
They must run out. Look at the political
options they put forward. For years they
said they would not accept Thieu and then
they did. Now they say they will not accept
the Government of Thieu again.
I agree with Don Fraser, in five years we
may see Viet-Nam as we see Cambodia today.
We can put in enough or not enough. The
strategy problem of South Viet-Nam is dif-
ferent. The North Vietnamese can concentrate
on one province and make one victory and it
sets up a roller coaster effect. Their
a
GE RALO
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11
casualties can go up, there can be riots
which could make the Government become more
repressive, and we would then say that
they should broaden their base and then they
would not. So if aid is given, we have to
face the possibility of a phase-out. I do
not like it, but if it has to be done it
should be high enough to be relevant to the
job. Vietnamization is over with. In
Viet-Nam there is a chance. Maybe all the
past has been wrong but in the process
millions of South Vietnamese have been
engaged. We have no legal commitment to
give aid. But having negotiated it, there
is a strong moral commitment. In 1972 and
and 1973 everyone said they would fight
among themselves. We did tell them--there
were no promises--the United States Congress
would do enough to help them.
As far as the three-year program is concerned.
I have designated Habib to work it out, but
it must be done right. We have to give
enough to succeed rather than produce a
lingering death. The domino theory is
unpopular, but when other countries look at
it and see U.S. involvement in 1945 and then
look at what has happened, other countries
see the United States providing no arms for
Cambodia and no help for South Viet-Nam, the
impact will be strong. Whether we get the
bill or not, I do not think we should shave
it too close.
President: Henry is leaving, I will want to see him off.
I will be back shortly. All of you know of
my deep personal conviction. More of you
have disagreed with me than have agreed with
me. From the beginning I felt we should
have a strong worthwhile policy of helping
those who help themselves, including Viet-Nam
and Cambodia. I have learned more. I have
learned of our negotiating efforts. When
Phil Habib went up to give the details to the
leadership, Cliff Case called and urged me
to expose the record to the public. He
urged me to ask Congress to act now on
R.
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Cambodia. I feel obligated to ask Congress
to act now. With the help of Cliff and
others, I hope we can act now. With all we
have done, it will become a blot on the
conscience of the United States. I have
talked to Senators Church and Pearson.
They took my statement on three years with
an adequate program which would end our
aid. I agreed to negotiate a figure. If we
are going to have a three-year program, we
need to do it and do it well. Not by drips.
Otherwise there would be an adverse reaction
in Southeast Asia. We will have domino
effect whether we like it or not, so I will
work on Cambodia and Viet-Nam and find an
answer we think is right.
(The President and Secretary Kissinger left the room.
After a few minutes the President returned to the meeting.)
President: Okay Bella.
Abzug:
My trip was important to me. You know of
my longstanding opposition. It gave me in-
sights. The tragedy of Cambodia was that we
visited on them a war of our doing. I see
it in different terms, as a humanitarian
obligation. I do not see it in military
terms. Our negotiating stance must be to
protect those who may be targets of retribution.
That would be understandable. Our giving
aid when faced with our own problems would
not be understandable, but giving humanitarian
aid would be acceptable. Congress is not
ready but we should change the emphasis, not
to have military slaughter which would be
the greatest hardship. The situation is
lost and I want to minimize additional slaughter.
You continue a bloodbath by war, in other
ways too. So we should address ourselves to
the humane problem and protect them during
the takeover. This makes it a realistic
proposal. A moral obligation can be made
on both levels. Protection in case of a
changeover and humanitarian aid.
President: The only question is if we could declare
humanitarian aid and shut off military
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operations. But, unfortunately we cannot
make clear breaks by compartments.
Abzug:
We can if we make a statement that we are
going to resolve the problem in a peaceful
way.
President:
I don't know whether you have seen the chron-
ological statement of efforts to negotiate.
I can assure you they have been pursued and
will continue to be pursued.
Abzug:
There is a reality in suffering and I, who
oppose, will do what I can. If we hand out
military aid it will add to the suffering.
On Viet-Nam, the difficulty I have on the
phase-out program is that it is unrealistic.
Because I think continuing aid will stiffen
the other side and their supporters. I think
there is instability underneath and a
reluctance on the part of the other side to
deal with Thieu. There is also a reluctance
to consider the Government without him, and
unless an effort is used to obtain a broader-
based Government without him, I think progress
will not be viable. You can't tell me the
other side will not accede. So our stance
must be changed. Our Government can use our
relations with Russia and China to make a
different approach.
The Ambassador has not reflected a meaningful
independent position. We have not been
properly represented. We have to convince
Congress and the people. And we need to show
them a different approach. We behave as if it
is still our war and seek a victory. We should
try to bring about a solution that includes all
elements. We will not accomplish that in a
military approach.
Murtha:
We need a victory there. From an historical
standpoint the United States should have a
victory there. Take Indonesia for example,
which is rich in resources. If North Viet-
Nam and South Viet-Nam were combined, they
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14
would have a dedicated army to dominate
that area. We have a strong economic
interest and we have given our word.
I went to visit the area where I was for a
year in the Marines. General Truong said
he was cut back to the bone because of
limited supplies. The United States was
spending 6,000 tons per day but the Viet-
namese are using only 800 tons per day in
the same area. The Vietnamese battalion
will use up three radio batteries per month
whereas we used to draw 9. They are using
two hand grenades instead of 5 per man, so
he has limited strength to defend. They
strictly conserve on artillery. They worry
about losing land and increasing casualties.
The reason the North Vietnamese action is
increasing is because the South Vietnamese
have to restrict their actions. They cannot
operate in sanctuaries because they have
less mobility. It will be a disgrace if we
do not give aid. In five years we will end
up with an historical blot. Kissinger said
to Thieu we would furnish aid. We have an
obligation to fulfill it.
President: When were you in Viet-Nam?
Murtha:
In 1966. I drove down to Hoi An and the
security was good, and it is because of U.S.
aid.
Fenwick:
For many reasons, not only my campaign promises,
but also for my convictions as well, I have
been against military aid for many years.
It was hard on this trip as I am shaken in
my resolution. Cambodia is the third act
of a tragedy. China is the key. So long as
China furnishes bullets, we are going to
have war. I know what efforts you have made.
We must redouble our efforts until we find
out what China wants.
We say that the Government is inept and
corrupt, but that we will provide aid. I am
prepared to do so under certain conditions,
as part of a plan for peace. If we can hold
CONFIDENTIAL /NODIS
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15
off until the rainy season, I would vote for
ammunition. If we could get people out in
the meantime--such as civil servants, teachers,
refugees--I would vote for ammunition. If it
is part of some program which would use the
Mekong to get out. If we could have a plan
to take care of the pitiful people, teachers,
lawyers, civil servants, refugees. I don't
know what we could do for the millions of
refugees, but that kind of responsible action
I could conceive would receive acceptance.
Viet-Nam is more complex. I spoke to many
dissidents. We did not ask every person if
they wanted Communism in Viet-Nam, but of those
we did ask, not one did. No dissidents, nor
people in prison, etc. What are we going to
do to resolve this? I have not made up my
mind. I do not say we are going to give them
any benefit by allowing Communism to take over.
I am not prepared to support Thieu. As far as
his press laws are concerned, we should request
that he repeal them. The party law is such
that it makes it difficult for the people to
register a voice. One has the feeling that he
only wants to have a one party election. I
spoke to Ambassador Martin and he said there
is some chance that the appropriate law would
be passed. We need an international election
team to be present. Ambassador Martin says
Thieu will win a free election. Why then
won't Thieu do this?
Corruption is an issue. Thieu got rid of some
people. There are other parties in Viet-Nam
that are independent. There is an opposition in
the legislature. The elements of some kind of a
viable government are not lacking. There are no
mass parties, only mass groups like the Buddhists,
Catholics and the Cao Dai. We ought to put a
person in charge of anti-corruption, maybe a
political figure.
If you asked who could replace Thieu, that is
an unsettling question because there is no one.
I find myself sharing McCloskey and Fraser's
view - that is we can't vote money without seeing
a viable solution. We need a plan. For example
P.
GERALD
OHO
CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS
GE
LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL /NODIS
16
in Cambodia, we should get in touch with the
UN.
The PRG gave me their terms. Forget it. They
asked us to get rid of Thieu and stop aid.
They said the Paris Accords are not a reality.
They will have to be renegotiated.
I cannot go along with the idea of a phased-out
aid program. I cannot see where it leads. The
reality is China, whether or not it supplies
the arms.
President:
If you have reservations about a phase-out,
would you stop period?
Fenwick:
Not SO. I will regret my vote no matter which
way I vote.
President:
Let me reiterate. I am grateful that you went,
including those who came back with unfavorable
views. I am impressed with the suggestions.
We will take them into consideration - some of
the important suggestions. If we could sort
them out as clear-cut, but I am afraid I feel
the United States must make a maximum effort,
including some of what you suggested. We
need to be forthright and strong in Cambodia,
moving toward negotiations. In Viet-Nam the
three-year aid cut-off must be adequately
financed. It has better than a 50-50 chance.
As I look at the past, present and future, our
country must be strong and forthright and at the
same time as humane and flexible as we can be.
Flynt:
Most of us want to support you as much as we can.
President:
You will be influential.
Fraser:
I have a suggestion. Would you find it useful
to bring in as consideration for policy some
people who could serve in an advisory role?
Responsible people who come to the problem with
a different approach and who can help, like
Paul Warnecke?
President:
We will use every conceivable suggestion. It
is a critical situation which is a broad
national problem. We will not rule out any help
on a national problem.
GERALD
OHIO
CONFIDENTIAL /NODIS
GE
LIBRARY
MEMORANDUM
1b
1543
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
March 7, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
WILLIAM STEARMAN
SUBJECT:
Minutes of the Meeting of the President with
the Congressional Delegation which Visited
Southeast Asia
Attached for your approval is a memorandum of conversation (Tab A)
prepared by the State Department on the President's March 5 meeting
with eight members of the Congress who recently visited South
Vietnam and Cambodia.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve the memcon at Tab A.
APPROVE 10
DISAPPROVE
LIBRARY GERALD R. OHOP
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guid. nes
By , NARA, Date 1/20/00
A
K
7504990
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1543
Washington, D.C. 20520
March 12, 1975
UNCLASSIFIED
(with CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS attachment)
MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject:
Memorandum of Conversation between
the President, the Secretary of
State and the Congressional
Delegation which Visited Viet-Nam
and Cambodia
Attached for approval is a memorandum of
conversation covering the President's meeting
with the members of the Congressional Delegation
which visited Viet-Nam and Cambodia from
February 25 to March 3, 1975.
A copy of this memorandum is being provided
to the Secretary of State. It is being handled
as NODIS within the Department.
George S.
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
Memorandum of Conversation
of March 5, 1975.
a.
FLOOF
LIBRARY
UNCLASSIFIED
(with CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS attachment)
1e
DOC
RECD
G NBR
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
MO
DA
MO
DA
HR
312
3/3
10
7501543
Hearman INITIAL ACTION O
REFERENCE:
CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE
TO: PRES
FROM: KISSINGER, H
S/S 2504990
UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
KISSINGER
COLBY, W
OTHER
LOU
NO FORN
NODIS
SCOWCROFT
X
SCHLESINGER, J
C
EYES ONL
DAVIS
ST EX SEC
X
S
CODEWORD
SUBJECT: MEMCON, Pris + Congressomal Deligation & SENSITIVE
SEA,
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
REC
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
INFO
CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT
FOR
MEMO FOR
FRAK -Sampt ( X )
STAFF SECRETARY
MEMO FOR PRES
)
FAR EAST Stearmon
X
X
REPLY FOR
(
)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
APPROPRIATE ACTION
(
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DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / so. ASIA
MEMO
TO
(
)
EUROPE / CANADA
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
JOINT MEMO
(
)
UNITED NATIONS
REFER TO
FOR:
(
)
ECONOMIC
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
)
SCIENTIFIC
NSC PLANNING
COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL 3/18 INSTRUCTIONS)
CONCURRENCE
)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
CONGRESSIONAL
X
OCEANS POLICY
INTELLIGENCE
SMMSER
DATE
FROM
TO
S
SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):
CY TO
3/17
Supt
+
Decision (3/28)
3/31
NSC/S
C
beowcroft approved memcon
SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
LIBRARY GE RALD R.
DISPATCH
CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:
MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:
NSC/S DISP INSTR
NOTIFY
& DATE
BY
M/F'D
BY
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
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SA
SF
CROSS REF W/
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WH
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(NBC-74-21)
2
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED
WASHINGTON
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.
MR91-16,#9 NSC ltr. 8/20/92
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
By KBH NARA, Date 9/25/92
PARTICIPANTS:
President Gerald Ford
Congressional Vietnam Delegation:
Senator Dewey Bartlett (R-Okla)
Representative John Flynt, Jr. (D-Ga)
Representative Paul McCloskey, Jr. (R-CA)
Representative Millicent Fenwick (R-NJ)
Representative Bella Abzug (D-NY)
Representative Donald Fraser (D-Minn)
Representative William Chappell (D-Fla)
Representative John Murtha (D-PA)
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Mr. John O. Marsh, Counsellor to the President
Mr. Max Friedersdorf, Assistant to the President
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME:
Wednesday, March 5, 1975
11:15 a. m.
PLACE:
The Oval Office
RALD GE R. FORD UBRART
The White House
President: Did you find President Thieu amenable to any of your suggestions?
Flynt: My conversation on this was all on the last day. It was agreed that
his political base had to be broadened to bring more of the operation into
the Government.
Bartlett: Chappell and I also talked to Thieu before we left. We had been
asked to by the anti-Thieu loyal Vietnamese -- General Minh, the Labor
leader. We suggested that Thieu broaden his base to add advisors who
are loyal but are not Thieu supporters. He said he got the information.
McCloskey: This was my fourth trip there. I was surprised by what I saw.
Vietnamization has succeeded from a military standpoint. It is a superb
fighting force. But these things are disturbing: The South has two times
TOP SECRET XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY. HENRY A. KISSINGER
-2-
the manpower, they are firing 7 - 1 the artillery, the killed-in-action
is double for the North. Yet the North has a tremendous will to fight and
the terrain favors them. As you know, we supported giving military aid
by 6 - 2. We were even shocked by Cambodia. If it collapses, there will
be a massacre. We don't know whether the perimeter can hold. But DOD
is asking for some ammunition that Vietnam is using. I don't know whether
we can get the votes. I would suggest you withdraw the $300 [million]
because I don't think you can get it and I think it would hurt. But in the
long term -- three years -- I think they will lose to the North. They are
firing in a 7-1 ratio. I think we could get through the Congress the same
kind of aid as the North gets, but that is not enough. So I think you should
force negotiations now and not in three years.
Don Fraser: I fear that what we are negotiating is how to transfer power
peacefully to the Communists. I am willing to support aid that is enough
to allow that to happen. If our goals are higher, we are misled.
On Vietnam, I think there is underreporting on the political changes.
I have a report that the Viet Cong infrastructure is coming back to life in
the Delta. Even the Government of Vietnam reports a 10% shift in the
population. The criticism of Thieu is rising. As the economic situation
is bad, complaints grow and Thieu's tie to the corruption is hurting. I
would support more aid to Vietnam if I thought the regime was more willing
to liberalize in Western values. I don't like to tell others how to behave,
but I am reluctant to support those who act in opposition to our political
values. I fear that Thieu is moving in the wrong direction. I think Martin
is a disaster. He is a total spokesman for Thieu.
Bartlett: I wrote that State must become more realistic on the situation
in South Vietnam. We read reports from Embassy people that the
Ambassador wouldn't receive reports he didn't agree with. Pete seconds
this.
Chappell: I am more optimistic. I saw the same things and perhaps come
to a different conclusion. I spoke to
who is opposed to Thieu
but is a strong anti-communist. His fear was that Thieu is not keeping
the doors to dissidents open enough. He wanted to work more with Thieu.
We reported that
to Thieu and he agreed he would do his best.
President: Is organized labor a big factor?
Chappell: It would be an important factor in any election.
GE LIBRARY RALD R. FORD
-3-
Bartlett: I would say a factor, but not a big one.
Chappell: I think Thieu is determined to improve. We looked in detail at
the military situation. We found competent generals and high morale.
In general, I think South Vietnam has an unusually strong will to defend
against Communism and I am willing to support their efforts to do it.
I had thought of Vietnam as a leech. I have changed completely. They
are a strong country, a strong people and in a few years they could be
self-sufficient. They are already in rice, and there are promising oil
explorations.
President: Are there any refineries?
Chappell: Not yet, but they could be put in easily. For example, they have
taken the refugees, put them through training programs, put them into the
countryside, fishing, etc., where they could be productive. I think we
would be making a serious mistake not to give them the aid they need.
Thieu is not asking for an open-ended situation. He wants to help them
in this transition situation.
I was before a reluctant supporter, but now I am a strong one. I
think we should do whatever we can to strengthen the fight against communism
in that area. Cambodia is desperate. But what we can hope for is a nego-
tiation. But we must get enough food and ammunition in there to keep them
going. We found a lot of esprit in the troops. Desertions are down. If we
W ould act now to get help in
The Communists are making an all-out
effort now. If they fail, and they hold, I believe Cambodia has a chance.
We had the votes yesterday, 8 - 5 or 7 - 6 is the worst. But it was
decided we would be better to go the regular way to get this thing authorized.
Fraser: Our briefings indicated that South Vietnam could lose 2 - 3 more
provinces this spring and Hue would be isolated. If that happened it would
look like Vietnam was falling apart.
President: So what is your suggestion?
Frazer: I only mention this because it could result in a pull-out syndrone.
McCloskey: Seven reserve divisions could at least isolate the northern
provinces.
Kissinger: Could I say a word? The tragedy we face is that the disunity FORD
in this country means that had we followed either the Administration' soor
the opposition's strategy we might be better off. But as it is, we have
done first but not enough.
LIBRARY
-4-
We never tried for a military solution in Cambodia. We did at first
enough to keep them alive. In the 1930's, 98% of the people praised
Chamberlain -- two years later he was a pariah. I don't know how the
people will treat those who led them to disasters, even if it was done in
response to popular feelings.
The obstacle to Sihanouk coming back is the Communists, not us.
If we get to the rainy season we will have to make the best deal possible.
Can the United States have on its conscience pulling the plug on
Vietnam? That is the question. It is easy to say get a political not a
military solution. But from my experience with the North Vietnamese,
you can negotiate with them only if there is a convergence of forces.
When I was visiting a museum in Hanoi with Le Duc Tho, every exhibit
of an archaeological excavation in the museum reminded him of a prison
he had been in. He had spent most of his life in French prisons. Unless
they have run out of military options, they won't negotiate.
I agree with what Don said. In five years we may see Vietnam in
the position Cambodia is in now. We go on just not giving enough. The
North can concentrate in one place and Thieu must defend a 700-mile
border. There is a lot of moralizing -- "Thieu gets more repressive."
We press him and he eases up not from conviction but to get aid -- and
that is taken in Vietnam as a sign of weakness.
I would urge that we do what is right -- give enough to give it some
chance to succeed rather than doom them to a lingering death. The domino
theory is discredited. But if we let these people down, the impact on the
United States in the world would be very serious indeed.
President: Henry has to leave now for the Middle East. I will go out and
then come back and finish. You know my conviction from my House days.
It has always been that we should help those who want to help themselves.
I have learned more, but my conviction now is deeper. It is interesting
to note that when Case (you know his feeling) saw the negotiating record
he wanted it made public and he urged aid for Cambodia. We have a
fighting chance. If we don't move, we don't have a chance. It will be a
blot on the conscience of the United States. I spoke to Church and Passman
about my statement. We agreed to negotiate a figure. That figure has to
be adequate. We must do it well or concede that our policies will have an
adverse effect in Southeast Asia and actually have a divisive effect. We
need to find a way to do what is right.
[The Secretary leaves]
RALD 1/3 R. FORD JBRANZ
-5-
Abzug: My trip was important to me although you know my opposition.
The tragedy of Cambodia was striking. We have an obligation, but I see
it as a humanitarian one. I think military aid only brings more suffering.
I, too, worry about what the takeover will bring, and I think one purpose
of the negotiation must be to prevent retribution. I think the American
people would accept a massive humanitarian effort, but not to continue
the military slaughter. There is no way out -- it is lost and we want to
minimize a bloodbath, and military aid maximizes that. We have a moral
obligation and to protect them in the event of a changeover. Anything else
will be misunderstood and make things worse.
President: If we could divide it, that would be fine. But we can't make
that clean a break.
Abzug: You can if we make a realistic appraisal.
President: I don't know if you have yet seen our negotiating efforts. They
have been pursued and will be.
Abzug: I agree with Don that the basis of negotiation may not be there.
Giving military aid is a gesture and doesn't solve the situation. On Vietnam,
the difficulty I have with the three-year idea is that it will stiffen the
resistance of the South. Unless we broaden the government and maybe
remove Thieu, there is no hope. If we increase aid, the other side will.
Why don't we look at a different diplomatic approach? We have not as of
now been prepared to offer a realistic negotiation. I see the possibility
to convince the American people only if we change our objectives. We
still behave as if it were our war and we have to bring about a victory.
Murtha: I want to reinforce what Secretary Kissinger said. I think it is
imperative we have a victory in the United States. The rest of the world
is watching us. Southeast Asia is rich in resources and people. If North
Vietnam wins they will have a strong army dedicated to communism.
The army has been cut back to the bone because of shortages. The
United States' forces there used 6, 000 rounds a day, the ARVN is using
800, to defend the same territory. They are now making efforts to conserve
ammunition, so their casualties have increased, and they are losing land
which will have to be taken back at great expense. If we don't give them
aid we will end up with a historic blot on the record of the United States.
I think the American people know that. We have an obligation to fulfill
our words. There is no doubt about the improvement in the security
situation since I was there before.
FORD & LIBRARY 70
-6-
Fenwick: I have been against our military activities for many years. This
trip has been hard because I am shaken in my conviction. In Cambodia, we
are in on the third act. The key is China. As long as China sends bullets,
there is no end. It doesn't matter who is sitting in Phnom Penh. Can't
we redouble our efforts to see what China wants for the area?
I will vote for military aid only if it is part of some program to
settle the situation. We have to have a way to get the small people out --
the non-coms, the teachers, lawyers, refugees, civil servants. If we
could organize with Thieu and South Vietnam to take these people, I would
vote for military aid. I feel the United States best serves its own prestige
by that kind of action.
In Vietnam, no dissident I talked to wanted to see the communists
win in Vietnam. It doesn't matter how opposed they were to Thieu. That being
the case, what do we do? I don't know. I am in an agony of spirit. We don't
benefit the people by allowing a takeover that no one wants. Thieu's press
law and the law restricting parties must be reproved. Finally, I think
Thieu should ask international observers in to monitor the elections.
Martin says Thieu would win. If so, why wouldn't he let it? Now the
corruption -- the elements of some kind of viable system are there, but
there is no mass support for the parties. Only the Catholics, the Buddhists
and the Cao Dai have mass support. The reality is there is no substitute
for Thieu. We can't continue to vote money where we don't see the hope for
a viable solution.
In Cambodia we must get to the UN, the refugee committee and plan
to get the people out. I don't know what to recommend in Vietnam. I don't
agree with Don to phase out because I don't know where it will lead us.
President: Let me reiterate. I am grateful that you went, including those
of you who came back with negative views. I am impressed with your
sincerity. We will take account of your suggestions. I wish we could
sort things out as easily as some people think. I think the United States
must make a maximum effort -- being forthright and strong and in
Cambodia arriving at a negotiation. In Vietnam, I am willing to go along
with a three-year cutoff. I think that gives them better than a 50-50 chance
of making it. I think our country must be strong and forthright and forth-
coming in negotiation.
Bartlett: We want to support you and help achieve support in the Congress
and the public.
FORD a RALE LIBRARY
- -7-
Fraser: If you could pull in people who have had a different approach --
like Paul Warnke - - you might get some more support on this side of
the aisle.
President: We won't rule out any suggestion.
[The meeting concluded]
PALA A FORD BRART
18
P/ congramine victum / K/ 3
5 Mar 75
wouse
(comen late)
Flopet
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&
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C Curry some bull fail as North gets, hat that
art emp. & So I think you should force
bag atiatis now - int in3 yrs.
RALD 1/2/15 R. FORD TBRART
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prover peacefully t C Curto, lan wathing to
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START
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FORD
LIBRAR
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of force.
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RALIS BALL 13 JBRART
as sign -p
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You know my emmith 25 has always her
and and should help three who want to help
& have Ganed more, ent my credition now
dryn. It interesty to write that when Case (you
know his fulin) smr c negot word he wonted it
made public + he unget and is combition
We hunca forgething chance g ml but name, ne
dnt have a thance It mill h or blot on
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am polices will have alvase effect inser
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LIBRARY
massive humanther effort, but wrt of contribe
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and are ant to dising bradback - and and
maximize that, We lane hural Antryster X to
protect in what of changeare compting eles will
he *nunk thing was
Y
your curld divid- that would he fine But he can't
mahr that elvena back.
a year can if us incre a readition of jossival
P Ident have if you have you seen me got effents.
They have seen pressured will he
a & agree w/Don the husis of regot my wont he there
Criming mil and is gestness & diesn't solvec int.
O n UN, The dif I hnve cs/c 3ye video is that
it will stiffin in resistance Re mith. Unlus
and bonder e effer gost + maybe receive Thin,
there is no higher 4pm main and, contra inh
will. Thought there why don't cur look
at a dig ching approach. We had not af me
born proposed ts offer a unhiles wegest.
I su possiblet an people only if and
change are objectives We still where and it
Murtha well ones am & we hunto to bring about a writer
munths Immith surifice what K said. Ithit importantion
was homeon in try in SEA us. The reat of c world is
watching no, has SUM is with in resorrces r
people If N SN wis they will have a storyang
deduction to use
The any has ent mikt bone because of
shertages. US used 6000 st/dmy, armising
800, to eyencle same tristing Clited consinting
Cashnkies have they losing land which
EORD
will have h he the tontat great informal.
If wl don't quin them and we will and up w/a
histine blot one US. I think us prople known
that. We have vergatin X pulpick on words.
Then is no dmubt about 6 inpersement in usensity
st sind I was hear.
FAMILY
I have been against am mil activities for may year.
This ham hard becomes lan shaken in
my convition Combradia and in on 3 Hart,
The bey is China as long as China sends
hmllts, the is no end. It doesn't matter who
Latting in P.P. Can't effects $ 212
what Chinn wents for c area-
I will wrte for mil and only if it part of some
your to smith C set. we have to to have a way to
techness, lawyer
get as small people and - hememes, elforgen,
Give could organis w/ Then SVN
to Coke these playah, sevent not for mil and, spell
cos bet this its am protings by that kind
of actrem,
VN. no dissidnt would t see cursts in UN. Doesn't
matter how reports Their That his case, arlent
d, me do, don't know. & am in am agong
of spirit. we Int besefit people by allowing -
tabson me one wants, Twice feross laws
tam restricting partris must be uproked
Finally d think Them should ash intl Hawers
in to munita Mutiner Inmitia Typ Thin
would amin, If 70, why united las let it?
and caraption- The elements of some have of
with sytem and there, but there is me mass
Jpport forc p artivis. Och Catholic, you distr Cas Dan
&
11
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have mass support The unlity is thre is
We senstitute for Then
We can't ontine to note may where and don't
2u c hype for a mith solution. Su Commention
but must get UN, upanger hate x plants yet
people and
I clirt hear what commed in VN. I don't
a you we/ Dan phase ant become & dent home where
it will believe
P Let me internate J qualified you must ind these
who came buth w/ my atris invis. 2 impressed w/- you
sincerely We will Cals account of your supplities
I with and canld sent tring ant to easily ao some
afryon think & think sd not note max
export- hing forthinght - strong n in
arming at wrgat Incn, sun Min is goiding
w/ 3 ye enroll 8 think that girs then with
Ohm 50-50 chance of anothing it 8 think
are entry must be story n forthingt
t fortuning n injust
alchull
Bontan w 1 want a support you x belp For part in
Cry and public
F raser If my mn sevel paral in people who have had dif
approvants- like Panl w awks- you might
FNA 10ml were support an this nile ofc and
P We want rule ant any my.
FORD OF 1 LIBE
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