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May 7, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, UK Prime Minister Harold Wilson, Foreign Secretary James Callaghan
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May 7, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, UK Prime Minister Harold Wilson, Foreign Secretary James Callaghan
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Israel
Syria
Great Britain
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Soviet Union
European Economic Community. (1958 - 1967)
Middle East conflicts
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1975-05-07
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1975
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1975
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Harold Wilson, Prime Minister
of the United Kingdom
James Callaghan, Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Sir John Hunt, Secretary of the Cabinet
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME:
Wednesday, May 7, 1975
4:06 - 5:16 p.m.
PLACE:
The Oval Office
The White House
SUBJECTS:
CSCE; Middle East; Energy;
Concorde; Commodities; EC Poll
CSCE
STATE GUIDELINES Stateliviaw3/9104
The President: I gather the Commonwealth Conference was a success.
Wilson: Yes, it was a good meeting.
NARA, DATE 5/14/04
President: We are looking forward to the meeting in Brussels and we
appreciate your taking the lead.
Wilson: I think it is a good time. We will be able to decide whether or
DECLARSIFIED
S.O. SEC.
not we should go to Helsinki.
FORD
&
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
GERALD
LIBRARY
TOP SEGRET - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
2
Callaghan: It could be a very constructive week -- with important
meetings of the IEA, the OECD and NATO.
President: Also to firm up the situation on the security conference.
Wilson: That's right.
President: What is your view on CSCE?
Wilson: We have got some way to go. We need to get from Jim the details
on what the sticking points are. Brezhnev is obviously in a hurry. He
wants three things: the CSCE Summit, a world Communist conference,
and his visit here. I think they told him he could stay until next February.
Callaghan: That gives us leverage. To come here before the CSCE or
vice versa.
Kissinger: We can't meet [for his visit here] before September because
we won't be ready until then. I think the later the better on CSCE --
son long as we don't seem to be stalling. But we told him July.
Callaghan: I am more pessimistic about a meeting in July. I don't mind
him coming here in September and having the CSCE in October.
Kissinger: That's all right with us.
President: Is there a chance he would be more flexible if we said July?
Kissinger: We said that if there was progress, we'd have the summit.
Wilson: It means more to him than to us. He needs it.
Callaghan: His success is the recognition of the legitimacy of East Europe.
He will have that if there is a CSCE Summit conference.
Kissinger: I suspect they will make all reasonable concessions to have it
in July.
FORD
?
Middle East
GERALO
LIBRARY
President: You might be interested -- and I am grateful for your
observations -- we are very disappointed in the setbacks in the Middle
East. We are undertaking a broad reassessment of our Middle East policy.
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
3
I will see Sadat and Rabin in June. Sometime shortly after that, we will
announce where we think most progress can be made. We are very
concerned about stagnation and we think it would be very risky to permit
it. The step-by-step is in suspension the other alternatives would be a
comprehensive approach, using Resolutions 242 and 338. Some argue
this is the proper approach. I would appreciate your observations.
Wilson: You aren't planning to complete the review before you see Sadat
and Rabin?
President: Yes. They are part of the process.
Wilson: I know Allon very well and got a good account of what they
think when he came to London. I laid out to him that a stalemate is not
on their side. There were different accounts -- Israeli and Egyptian
of what transpired. They feel they made an offer -- I thought it was like
a free kick after the game was over. I gather they haven't offered anything
since.
Kissinger: No, we have asked four times if they had anything more to say.
At no time have they deviated from their previous position.
Wilson: Allon's main point to me was, how does he know Sadat will survive
or that the UN force won't be vetoed?
Kissinger: That negotiation is so hopelessly confused, I don't see how it
can be resurrected. But Sadat had pledged non-use of force, an agreement
that it would be valid until it was superseded by another agreement, that
annual renewal of the UN would be automatic, and there would be a mixed
Israeli-Egyptian commission to supervise the disengagement. They asked
abouta Soviet veto of the UN force, but we could have gotten around that.
The real difficulty was between non-use of force and non-belligerency.
Sadat felt that if he gave non-belligerency for the passes, he would have no
leverage for further movement.
Callaghan: Peace.
Kissinger: What is the difference?
Callaghan: We go around like squirrels in a cage on this. A comprehensive
approach is certainly worth considering. But can't we resurrect it with
some magic ingredient? What could Egypt put in the pot? Financial support,
more on the Canal? Israel could give the passes.
FUME
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
4
Wilson: If the UN were pushed out, could there be an automatic return of
Israeli troops to the passes?
Kissinger: They never gave us a line, but it went through the middle of
the passes. The other issue was unbroken Egyptian access to oil fields.
The difference between the middle and the end of the passes is Israeli
domestic politics, because it would be a zone of limited arms anyway.
Egypt didn't care if they moved out of the passes, how far. But I think
the Israeli government was in no condition to make an agreement in March.
Wilson: That is the point. They don't have a united Cabinet at all.
Kissinger: The Presidential letter was to arrive after the Cabinet decision,
not to influence it. I said never again would they have a chance like that
for only eight kilometers in the passes. Rabin said give us 24 hours, but
that I think was because they couldn't get their propaganda organized on
the Sabbath. So he said, "While we are waiting, why not ask Sadat if there
was more he can offer. " Of course, Sadat said no. So there was no new
Israeli offer.
Wilson: That is my point. There is no real Cabinet.
President: It seems to me an evident hardening. Rabin is being praised
for being firm. They are generating the American Jews, and it doesn't
appear to me there is any flexibility in the step-by-step.
Wilson: I have heard stories about horrible infighting in the Cabinet. I
spoke to our Jews -- very frankly -- and I said there was a crisis of con-
fidence between the U.S. and Israel. I think they are worried -- not only
can Sadat survive, but is there an Israeli Cabinet?
Callaghan: Then is there an alternatave Cabinet which can be built? Is
there a good movement? If it is, and the Israelis can't move, can't you
get Egypt to move? Turn the heat on the Egyptians. They need economic
help; they could let Israeli ships through the Canal.
Kissinger: Our Ambassador -- who is very sharp -- felt that Sadat had
already gone too far for his domestic situation. Now we have a Syrian
problem. I think one reason Israel turned us down is because they are
not willing to move on the Golan.
FORD
&
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
5
Callaghan: Our Ambassador thinks Sadat may fall because of the economic
situation.
Wilson: Is one of the options an ultimate guarantee by the superpowers and
others, so there would be no UN veto? Is that ruled out?
President: I wouldn't rule anything out but I don't know that that is the
most attractive.
Wilson: I know we want to keep the Soviets out and that is a problem.
Kissinger: We might have a real problem getting an American guarantee
through Congress. It would be difficult if we had to explain in detail when
we would or would not intervene.
President: There is a very different and difficult situation in Congress.
It is not the way it was, even with respect to aid.
Callaghan: Maybe you have to put it all on the table, instead of being
kicked around as the middleman.
Wilson: Would Geneva ever happen?
Kissinger: It would be a nightmare. Having the Egyptians and the Syrians
together, it reduces the flexibility of both; then you have the problem of the
PLO, etc.
Callaghan: Couldn't you make it a condition only to meet for four days
and then go to subcommittees?
Kissinger: The Soviets are so rigid and legalistic that they would produce
a stalemate even if they wanted to be helpful.
Callaghan: I think you must go back to the step-by-step.
Kissinger: Let's see what the President sees in the meetings.
Callaghan: We would welcome knowing before your public announcement.
Kissinger: We had told the Israelisthe minimum terms on which Sadat
could settle. They didn't ever accept, but they led us on. Rabin told us
that fai lure would be a Greek tragedy; unintentionally, people bring about
the consequences they most fear, because of their natures. But he ha S
gone from 38% to 80% popularity for views he doesn't support.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
6
Wilson: Yes. He as acclamation and Knesset support but it has put him
more and more into a corne
Callaghan: Is there anything we can do?
Kissinger: Give them a sense that the President is serious, which I don't
think they appreciate.
President: We honestly don't think the step-by-step is feasible except under
the umbrella of a comprehensive proposal.
Kissinger: Unless one side or the other changes its position.
Callaghan: It is worth considering, because then we would see where we
were heading.
Energy, etc.
Wilson: Let's talk about energy. I think we got some acceptance of our
trying to bridge the consumers and producers. There wasn't total support
for tearing down the IMF, etc. We have some committees set up on
commodities.
I would like to talk about Concorde.
The Queen's visit is all set for 7-11 July.
I think we are moving on energy.
Callaghan: I think we won't break even the reasonable countries from the
77, but beneath that I think we can move on specific schemes -- on food
energy and commodities. I think we can move them.
Kissinger: I think your commodity position is very constructive. We are
trying to work up a commodity position now. I hope to have it by the time
of the OECD. I hope we can be responsive.
President: I notice the polls indicate you will prevail on the EC poll.
Wilson: I think SO. We are keeping a low profile. But the polls are
unanimous that it's more than 2-1. The vote is by countries and the poll
was by countries -- 2-1 in every country.
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
7
President: How about the press?
Wilson: It is too good. It embarrasses us.
[The meeting ended]
W ilsm n
P1 Written HK
7 may 75
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DECLARRIFIED
ILO. 12956, SEC. 3.5
NBC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Review 3/9/14
BY
NARA DATE 5/14/04
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