Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
1553117
label
June 11, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
1553117
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
June 11, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu
citationUrl
collections
Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
subjects
Romania
Spain
Israel
Korea (North)
Syria
Egypt
Arms control
Jews
Middle East conflicts
Presidential trips
Trade agreements
Helsinki Agreement, 1975
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
1553117
coverageEndDate
day
11
logicalDate
1975-06-11
month
6
year
1975
coverageStartDate
day
11
logicalDate
1975-06-11
month
6
year
1975
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
ca937b61bba78578
ocrText
File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
E.O. 12058, SEC. 3.5
BY lab
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES stateviews 12/2/03
, NARA, DATE 12/2/03
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
President Nicolae Ceausecu of Romania
George Macovescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Vasile Pungan, Counsellor to the President
Corneliu Bogdan, Romanian Ambassador to the U.S.
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Amb. Harry Barnes, U.S. Ambassador to Romania
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME:
Wednesday, June 11, 1975
3:00 p.m. - 4:15 p.m.
PLACE:
The White House
The Oval Office
SUBJECTS:
Bilateral economic relations; CSCE;
Middle East; Korea; Spain; Disarmament.
[The press took photographs]
Ceausescu: You had quite a trip.
President: You have just completed a trip to Brazil and Mexico.
[The press was dismissed]
President: Let me say, Mr. President, it is very nice to see you. It is
particularly nice of you to stop so we could have this opportunity to discuss
matters of mutual interest on your way back to Romania after your trip to
Latin America.
FORD
CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
?
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (1,3)
GERALD
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
-2-
Ceausescu: I, too, am pleased, Mr. President, to have this meeting on my
way through and I hope there will be positive results from it.
President: I do want to thank you for sending an emissary right after I
became President. It happened rather suddenly and I appreciated your
gesture.
Ceausescu: Since this is our first meeting after you became President
I want to extend to you my most sincere congratulations. I hope you occupy
this post for a long period of time. I have heard that you will be a candidate
next year, and I hope that we will be able to continue our collaboration in
the period that follows.
Bilateral Economic Relations
President: Thank you. I will be a candidate. I think we will win so I look
forward to working with you in the future. I am most anxious that we, during
my Presidency, expand the relations established by the U.S. -Romanian
Declaration of 1973.
We are of course most anxious, Mr. President, to impleme nt
the Trade Agreement between Romania and the United States. I have submitted
the necessary documents to the Congress to get Congress to take the action
which would bring about the benefits of the Trade Agreement which are
important to the United States and to Romania and to our relations.
Ceausescu: Of course we await with grea interest the entry into force of
this Agreement. I can guarantee to you there will be no opposition to it in
Romania, and I hope that it will be approved in the United States as well.
We would want the results of our good economic collaboration over the
past four years to continue, and if this agreement will come into force
would expect our two-way trade to reach a billion dollars.
Kissinger: The President is meeting with some Corgressional people this
afternoon and also with some Jewish leaders.
President: If I might make a suggestion, but first let me comme nt. We ar e
most anxious that Congress approve this Agreement which we submitted on
April 24. They have until July to take the necessary action. We do want
MFN for Romania. We want Export-Import Bank credits and trade benefits
for Romania. I think I have to be very frank and say that the Congressmen will
probably raise difficult questions with you, as they have with our own people.
FORD
?
SECRET/NODIS/XGIE
GERALD
LIBRARY
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
-3-
They are very interested in Jewish emigration to Israel and the United
States. We of course disapprove of that requirement in the law. We think
it is unnecessary, but it is the law and we must go through these procedures.
The way to get favorable action by Congress is to get some evidence that
there is some increase in emigration to Israel and to the United States.
Ceausescu: I will be very frank. As far as the United States is concerned,
there is no problem. There are still some humanitarian cases. We will
solve these as we have been solving others.
As far as Israel is concerned, there ar e not very many Romanian
citizens left who are of Jewish nationality. The great majority of these are
married to Romanians. Therefore the problem is that it is not likely that
a substantial emigration will continue.
In the last four yea rs 18, 000 people applied. And there were a
couple thousand more who applied in the years just before that. 18, 300
have left. Right now there are still about 2, 000 who have been approved,
some of them as much as two years ago. But with the tension in the area
and the war, although they have approval to depart in their pocket,
they have given up the idea or put off their departure. Therefore, in
this instance too there is no longer a major problem. We will try to solve
those cases that remain favorably.
As a matter of face we have now a fairly large number of cases
of those who want to return to Israel and we haven't been able to find a
solution to this situation yet.
I have discussed these questions already with Deputy Prime Minister
Allon and at his time of departure he made a favorable declaration. He even
met with the Chief Rabbi.
President: This is very encouraging, Mr. President. I just believe it is
very important that you are able to provide this information, thi S factual
data, to the Congressional people and to the Jewish leaders because they
could hamstring and make it difficult for us to get the necessary action by
Congress.
Ceausescu: I hope that with your efforts, Mr. President, and with the
explanations which I will be giving we will convince the Congress to give
its approval more rapidly.
FORD
?
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
GERALD
LIBHARY
SECRET/NODIS/XGIE
-4-
Kissinger: When the President finishes, he will have convinced the
Congressmen to adopt an amendment to permit free immigration into
Romania.
Ceausescu: No thanks. I am not interested.
President: I know you are concerned about the European Security Conference
and about the problems that held up the agreement. We of course have had
so me reservations about Baskets I and III. I would appreciate hearing your
own appreciation about the prospects and what you anticipate.
Kissinger: Macovescu and Gromyko are the only ones who have read all the
documents.
Ceausescu: First of all, I would like to come back to some bilateral questions
in connection with your forthcoming visit to Romania.
Aside from the problem of this Agreement which I hope will be adopted
by the Congress, perhaps it would be well on the occasion of your visit to
Romania to resolve other problems also. I previously raised the question
of concluding a long-term economic cooperation agreement and had also
raised the matter of granting Romania the special conditions of trade given
to developing countries. I do not want to get into a discussion now, and do not
insist on an answer now, but in connection with your visit I wo uld hope to be
able to solve these problems, to give your visit to Romania concrete content.
I had previously extended an invitation for you to visit Romania, to be sure, but
I wanted to use this occasion to make the invitation personal.
President: Mr. President, I appreciate your personally delivering the
invitation to come to Romania. There is a distinct possibility and I would
like to do it. If there is a European Security Conference Meeting in July
or August it might be possible to stop for a visit in Romania after the
conference in Helsinki.
Ceausescu: Following the European Security Conference?
President: Yes.
Kissinger: Mr. President, on the que stion of long-term cooperation, we
have discussed this previously and agreed on it in principle and we can
announce it at any point you consider desirable. Our plans have been to
get MFN through Congress first without any extraneous debate, so this
would fit in with the schedule you are discussing.
FORD
&
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
GERALD
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
-5-
President: If the European Security Conference is in late July and Congress
would act on the Trade Agreement for Romania by August 1.
Amb. Barnes: It could come out of committee by July 15, but they may
not take action until early September because they have 60 legislative
days and the August recess may intervene.
Kissinger: You do not have to link these two things that closely for your
visit.
President: But it would be helpful to get the Trade Agreement done and not
have it complicated by any announcement. This reinforces the need to get
favorable consideration and action before the Congressional recess.
Otherwise there will be five weeks delay. So it is important to get
Congress to act, preferably prior to the visit, and then we could announce
we wouldbe having a long-term agreement.
CSCE
Geausescu: As far as European Security is concerned, we are concerned not
so much by the fact of delay as by the content and expected results of the
Conference. For us, it is not a problem of the dates, but of the results
of this Conference. Of course, if it can take place in July, that is fine,
or if it is in August or even September, that is fine. The principal thing
is to get results which will contribute to the strengthening of confidence
and will enhance detente. Therefore, it is not Basket III which is essential,
the question of now many journalists or artists travel. That is for the experts.
This isn't what is so essential. As far as we ar e concerned, let as many
as want travel around. The essential problems are in the first Basket. On
this hangs the movement toward detente and for that matter the conditions of
things like cultural exchanges.
In connection with this we see some problems which must be solved
if the Conference is going to wind up with good results. First of all there
should be firm engagements of states on the renunciation of force and non-
interference in the internal affairs of other states. Secondly, there is the
problem of certain military aspects. Granted it is not a question of resolving
basic problems, but we hav e sought nonetheless to make sure that there will
not be interference in the internal affairs of other states. It is a question
for example, of these engagements regarding military maneuvers. And
even here it is not so much whether it will be 250 or 180 kilometers or 10 to
20 thousand men, but the very fact that the content of these me asures should
be obligatory and not something voluntary. Therefore if all these problems
SECREF/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
-6-
are going to be reduced to something voluntary, it no longer makes any sense
to waste time and energy over 100 kilometers of distance here an d there.
But what we are doing is introducing into international law certain rules
which have existed up to now. When a group of states arrives at certain
understandings, these would be mandatory and not voluntary. That is
important.
Macovescu: One of the other principal problems is that connected with
continuity of the Conference, the follow-up.
Ceausescu: I don't know what your opinion is but we believe the most
dangerous situation is still in Europe where there are the two military
blocs with modern armaments, huge concentrations of troops, atomic weapons
as well. Therefore we would want to have the summit meeting represent not
the conclusion but rather the beginning of European security. For this reason
we are in favor of an organism, a process for assuring the continuity of
this conference.
President: How often do you see it meeting? Every year, every two years?
Ceausescu: Once a year, once in two years, any time when it is necessary.
If there should appear some tense situation, if something should happen,
then it could discuss what might be done to pr event thing S getting worse.
Kissinger: What do you think of the idea of a review conference in 18 months
or two years?
Ceausescu: In our opinion that is a good idea. We think as a matter of
fact that this sort of permanent organism could have the role of pr eparing
such a conference. I don't have in mind something that would be set up
with a lot of bureaucracy, but rather something that would meet periodically
once a year or every six months. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of one
of the countri es would have the role of coordinator, and this could be on
a rotational basis.
tono
Kissinger: For example, rotating?
R
07/329
10
Ceausescu: United States, Soviet Union, Romania.
LIBRAR:
President: [Smiling] Romania.
Kissinger: We have explained to Romania and we have been in close touch
with the Romanian delegation to the Conference, tha t the very reason Romania
wants this is why we are not agreeable. We are not eager to grant to
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
-7-
countries the right of permanent interference in the West. Quite frankly,
this is the problem with a permanent mechanism. I understand why you
want something to which you could appeal, but we do not want established
structures in the West to be exploited. We are sympathetic, though, to
your concerns.
Ceausescu: We don't think of this organism as having any sort of right to
do this, and in order to avoid this problem we could regulate the basis
on which it would act to exclude such possible intervention. We see it as
preparing for new conferences and for solving such problems as will
appear. We don't want any Eastern intervention in the West or Western
intervention in the East or Western intervention in the West or Eastern
intervention in the East. I would ask you to reflect some more on this
problem and to review your position.
[Both Presidents and the Secretary nod agreement.
Middle East
Ceausescu: With regard to the Middle East, you are now having discussions
with the Israeli Prime Minister.
President: We tried very hard to keep progress going last March, but
unfortunately the negotiations had to be suspended. We are now doing
our reassessment. We want to avoid any stagnation or stalemate. I have
just finished talking with President Sadat. Today and tomorrow we will
be discussing with Prime Minister Rabin his observations on the situation.
Ceausescu: Of course the problems, as you know even better than I, are
very complicated. We will certainly welcome it if any new steps towards
disengagement can be realized. There are conditions now in which agree-
ment could be achieved. Egypt and Syria are in favor of reaching a solution.
We know very well the situation can change very rapidly, that the present
favorable conditions might no longer appear. I think that Israel too has
understood this very well. We have told them our views.
FOLLO
President: You met with Foreign Minister Allon recently.
Ceausescu: Yes, I talked with him for four hours.
Aside from the question affecting Egypt and Syria there is the
Palestinian problem and the need to achieve the formation of an independent
Palestinian state. There can be no solution unless this problem is resolved.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
-8-
The PLO has in mind setting up a state consisting of the West Bank and
Gaza with the necessary guarantees of the UN and others. This in fact
would mean the recognition of the state of Israel. The US would have a
great deal to gain if it would enter into direct discussions with the PLO.
For that matter the Israelis too would have something to gain.
Kissinger: What did Allon say?
Ceausescu: He took a step forward. He recognized that there exists a
Palestinian people which has the right to an independent existence.
President: Did Foreign Minister Allon agree that the Palestinians should
have part of the West Bank, and if so did he ask for guarantees for Israel's
protection?
Ceausescu: He sees the solution of the problem through involving Jordan.
The Israelis' main problem is the fact that the PLO proposes the elimination
of the State of Israel, while the PLO complains that Israel will not
recognize them. We think that the PLO and Israel have to begin to under-
stand that they must discuss these things with each other. I believe that
discussions with Arafat and other PLO leaders would lead to better
understanding and would provide some advantages. I have talked a lot
with Arafat and he has told me that he truly wants to assure independence
for his people so they can live in peace and that this problem of a democratic
state is something for the future, not now. In any case there is no truth in
the idea that they are playing somebody else's game. What they want is
independence for their people.
President: We find some increase in flexibility but I would hesitate to be
optimistic about the step-by-step approach. The other possibility we are
examining is a broad comprehensive one covering peace, borders, the
Palestinians and so on. This of course would undoubtedly bring us to
Geneva. What reaction so you have to the Geneva Conference reopening?
Ceausescu: The Geneva Conference can't be anything bad in itself but it
won't be able to solve the problems. The problems have to be brought there
already solved in order to receive necessary juridical sanction. Otherwise they
would just start accusing each other. In any case, there will have to be
ways for discussions outside the Conference.
Kissinger: I agree.
FORD
&
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
-9-
Ceausescu: We think the Conference ought to be somewhat larger and
that there ought to be a larger role for the UN. The Conference has to
be well prepared and has to have solutions almost ready set for it.
President: I recognize all the complexities that would take place in Geneva
unless in effect all was agreed upon before we got there. But I am not
optimistic, Mr. President, that we can get Israel agreeing with Egypt,
Israel with Jordan, Israel with Syria, Israel with the PLO. We would
hope that some progress would be met in one area, but to expect on a
bilateral basis progress in four areas, this is just being too optimistic.
Ceausescu: I agree. Of course it is not easy to reach such understandings.
I think though it would be useful, besides the efforts of the United States
and the Soviet Union, if other states could do something. I am thinking
about countries which are not directly involved like some non-aligned
countries. Also the UN. All in close connection with the Geneva Conference.
Of course, I believe that it would be useful if the United States efforts,
those of Dr. Kissinger, would enable the reaching of some understandings.
Still there is room for other paths wherever possible. I don't believe
Dr. Kissinger will be annoyed if I mention my belief that this Spring he
might have been able to make better use of the assistance of other countries.
Kissinger: I have said that on the basis of my activities I am well qualified
for the job of Director of an insane asylum and will be glad to have others
join me. [Laughter] I am not talking about being an inmate. I am talking
about the job of Director.
No, we favor broader efforts.
President: We will continue to work on it. If we can get the step-by-step
process affirmative again, we will do all we can to achieve something. But
if we see no progress we will have to propose an overall settlement, with
all the complications. But we would prefer the other approach. We are
insisting there be no stagnation. Otherwise there will be another war,
and that no one wants. We will try our best.
Korea; Spain; Disarmament
Ceausescu: I know the time is limited and I only wanted to mention other
problems in passing on which we might reach some understandings or
solutions in connection with your visit.
FORD
8
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
BALO
LIBRARY
SECET/NODIS/XGDS
-10-
I would mention Korea, the visit of the President of the People's Democratic
Republic of Korea in Romania. I had some discussions with him. I know
you have some contacts with them yourselves. He told me that he doesn't want
any sort of tension in the area, that he realizes that unification can come only
through peaceful paths, and that he understands that he needs a durable
peace and that will take some time.
The second problem has to do with Spain. [There was an exchange between
Ceausescu and Macovescu over the question of the person with whom some
discussions had been taking place in Mexico. Apparently the American
Ambassador there had talked with a Spanish group to which Ceausescu was
about to refer. ]
During my stop in Mexico I talked with a delegation of the Democratic Junta
of Spain. I know they have had some meetings with a large number of
Congressmen and other political figures here. The head of this group, who
is a good friend of mine, wants to get into discussions with the United States
on the question of the future. They want the changes that will be taking
place in Spain to proceed peacefully and in such a way as not to affect relations
with the United States. I just wanted to mention these things.
Finally there is the problem which I don't want to discuss now, that of
disarmament. We -- and there are also tens of states situated on all
continents, who think that there is no disarmament going on in the frame-
work of the Disarmament Conference but only setting limitations on
armament.
President: Do you mean SALT and MBFR?
Kissinger: I think he means the disarmament discussions in Geneva -- the
18-member conference.
Ceausescu: Vienna and Geneva, it's all the same thing. As far as the
talks between the United States and the Soviet Union are concerned, at
least as far as we have an idea of the situation, it is not disarmament but
talk of disarmament. I hope that we will be able to discuss some of these
questions when we next meet.
Ford: I hope to discuss them with you when I come to Romania.
[The meeting ende d.]
FORD
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
113en Scrwerf.t
2/ Peter Rodman
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
and
Bucharest, Romania
August 18, 1975
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
Lt General Brent Scowcroft, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington
Dear Brent:
Enclosed is the final version of the June White House conver-
sation as promised in my August 8 letter. I've also sent
copies to Hal and Art.
Best regards,
Hay
Harry G. Barnes, Jr.
Encl a/s
P.S. on neckevary my notes, I've
straightened out The one pant?,
Confusion clair Wheek I was concerned
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12988, SEC.3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDEMINES, state Review 12/2/03
BY Labe
WARA DATE 12/2/03
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
GDS
an
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
June 11, 1975
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
President Gerald R. Ford
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Lt Gen Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs
Harry G. Barnes, Jr., Ambassador - Interpreter
Nicolae Ceausescu, President of Romania
George Macovescu, Foreign Minister
Vasile Pungan - Counselor to the President -
Interpreter
DATE AND PLACE: June 11, 1975, 3:00 - 4:15 p.m., The White House
President Ford:
Let me say, Mr. President, it is very nice
to see you. It is particularly nice of you
to stop so we could have this opportunity
to discuss matters of mutual interest on
your way back to Romania after your trip
to Latin America.
President Ceausescu:
I, too, am pleased, Mr. President, to have
this meeting on my way through and I hope
there will be positive results from it.
President Ford:
I do want to thank you for sending an
emissary right after I became President.
It happened rather suddenly and I was grate-
ful that he came.
President Ceausescu:
Since this is our first meeting after you
became President I want to extend to you
my most sincere congratulations. I hope
you occupy this post for a long period of
time. I have heard that you will be a
candidate next year and I hope that we will
be able to continue our collaboration in the
period that follows.
President Ford:
Thank you. I will be a candidate. I think
we will win so I look forward to working
with you in the future. I am most anxious
DECLASSIFIED
E.O.
3.5
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
state Deview
12/2/03
GDS
BY lab
DATE 12/2/03
ASSILIED BY: HENRY KISSINGER
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
2
that we, during my Presidency, expand the
relations established by the US-Romanian
Declaration of 1973.
We are of course most anxious, Mr. Presi-
dent, to implement the Trade Agreement
between Romania and the United States. I
have submitted the necessary documents to
the Congress to get Congress to take the
action which would bring about the benefits
of the Trade Agreement which are important
to the United States and to Romania and to
our relations.
President Ceausescu:
We await with great interest the entry into
force of this Agreement. I can guarantee
to you there will be no opposition to it in
Romania and I hope that it will be approved
in the United States as well. We would want
the results of our good economic collabora-
tion over the last four years to continue
and if this agreement will come into force
would expect our two-way trade to reach a
billion dollars.
Secretary Kissinger:
The President 1s meeting with some Con-
gressional people this afternoon and also
with some Jewish leaders.
President Ford:
If I might make a suggestion, but first let
me comment. We are most anxious that Con-
gress approve this Agreement which we sub-
mitted on April 24. They have until July
to take the necessary action. We do want
MFN for Romania. We want Export-Import
Bank credits and trade benefits for Romania.
I think I have to be very frank and say
that the Congressmen will probably raise
difficult questions with you as they have
with our own people. They are very inter-
ested in Jewish emigration to Israel and
the United States. We of course disapprove
of that requirement in the law. We think
it is unnecessary, but it is the law and we
must go through these procedures. The way
to get favorable action by Congress 1s to
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
3
get some evidence that there 1s some increase
in emigration to Israel and to the United
States.
President Ceausescu:
I will be very frank. As far as the United
States is concerned, there 1s no problem.
There are still some humanitarian cases. We
will solve these as we have been solving
others.
As far as Israel is concerned, there are not
very many Romanian citizens left who are of
Jewish nationality. The great majority of
these are married to Romanians. Therefore
the problem is that it is not likely that a
substantial emigration will continue.
In the last four years 18,000 people applied.
And there were a couple thousand more who
applied in the years just before that. 18,300
have left. Right now there are still about
2,000 who have been approved, some of them as
much as two years ago. But with the tension
in the area and the war, although they have
obtained approval to depart, they have given
up the idea or put off their departure. There-
fore, in this instance too there is no longer
a major problem. We will try to solve those
cases that remain favorably.
As a matter of fact we have now a fairly large
number of cases of those who want to return
from Israel and we haven't been able to find
a solution to this situation yet.
I have discussed these questions already with
Deputy Prime Minister Allon and at the time
of his departure he made a favorable declara-
tion. He even met with the Chief Rabbi.
President Ford:
This is very encouraging, Mr. President. I
just believe it is very important that you
are able to provide this information, this
factual data to the Congressional people and
to the Jewish leaders because they could
hamstring and make it difficult for us to get
the necessary action by Congress.
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
4
President Ceausescu:
I hope that with your efforts, Mr. President,
and with the explanations which I will be
giving we will convince the Congress to give
its approval more rapidly.
Secretary Kissinger:
When the President finishes, he will have con-
vinced the Congress to adopt an amendment to
permit free immigration into Romania.
President Ceausescu:
No thanks. I am not interested.
President Ford:
I know you are concerned about the European
Security Conference and about the problems
that are holding up the agreement. We of
course have had some reservations regarding
Baskets I and III. I would appreciate hear-
ing your own appreciation about the prospects
and what you anticipate.
President Ceausescu:
First of all, I would like to come back to
some bilateral questions in connection with
your forthcoming visit to Romania. Aside
from the problem of this Agreement which I
hope will be adopted by the Congress perhaps
it would be well on the occasion of your
visit to Romania to resolve other problems
also. I previously raised the question of
concluding a long-term economic cooperation
agreement and had also raised the matter of
granting Romania the special conditions given
to developing countries. I do not want to get
into a discussion now but in connection with
your visit would hope to be able to solve
these problems.
I had previously extended an invitation for
you to visit Romania, to be sure, but I
wanted to use this occasion to make the
invitation personal.
President Ford:
Mr. President, I appreciate your personally
delivering the invitation to come to Romania.
There is a distinct possibility and I would
like to do it. If there is a European Security
Conference meeting in July or August it might
be possible to stop for a visit in Romania
after the conference in Helsinki.
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
5
Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, on the question of long term
economic cooperation we have discussed this
previously and agreed on it in principle and
can announce it at any point you consider de-
sirable. Our plans have been to get MFN
first, so this would fit in with the schedule
you are discussing.
President Ford:
If the European Security Conference 1s in
late July and Congress would act on the Trade
Agreement for Romania by August 1
Ambassador Barnes:
They may not take action until early Septem-
ber because they have 60 legislative days
and the August recess may intervene.
Secretary Kissinger:
You do not have to link these two things for
your visit.
President Ford:
But it would be helpful to get the Trade Agree-
ment done and not have it complicated by any
announcement. This reinforces the need to get
favorable consideration and action before the
Congressional recess. Otherwise there will
be five weeks delay, so it is important to
get Congress to act preferably prior to the
visit and then we could announce we would be
having a long-term agreement.
President Ceausescu:
With regard to European Security, we are con-
cerned not so much by the fact of delay as by
the content and expected results of the Con-
ference. For us, it is not a problem of the
dates but of the results of this Conference.
Of course if it can take place in July or
August or even September, that is fine. The
principal thing is to get results which will
contribute to the strengthening of confidence
and will enhance detente. Therefore it is
not Basket III which is essential, that is
the question of how many journalists or
artists travel. This isn't what is so
essential. As far as we are concerned let
as many as want travel around. The essential
problems are in the first Basket. On this
hangs the movement toward detente and for that
matter things like cultural exchanges.
FORD
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
6
Here we see some problems which must be
solved if the Conference is going to wind up
with good results. First of all there should
be firm engagements on the renunciation of
force and non-interference in internal affairs.
Secondly, there is the matter which has certain
military aspects. Granted these proposals
will not resolve the basic problems, but we
have sought nonetheless to make sure that
there will not be interference in internal
affairs of other states. It is a question
of these engagements regarding military
maneuvers. And even here 1t is not so much
whether it will be 250 or 180 kilometers or
10 to 20 thousand men, but the very fact that
the content of these measures should be
obligatory and not something voluntary.
Therefore, if all these problems are going
to be reduced to something voluntary, it no
longer makes any sense to waste time and
energy over 100 kilometers of distance here
and there. What we are doing is introducing
into international law certain rules which
have not existed up to now. When a group of
states arrives at certain understandings,
these should be mandatory and not voluntary.
One of the other principal problems is that
connected with continuity of the Conference.
Foreign Minister
Macovescu:
Follow-up.
President Ceausescu:
I don't know what your opinion 1s but we
believe the most dangerous situation is still
in Europe where there are the two military
blocs with modern armaments, huge concen-
trations of troops, atomic weapons as well.
Therefore we would want to have the summit
meeting represent not the conclusion but
rather the beginning of European security.
For this reason we are in favor of an
organism, a process for assuring the con-
tinuity of this conference.
President Ford:
How often do you see it meeting, every year,
every two years?
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
7
President Ceausescu:
Once a year, once in two years, any time when
it is necessary. If there should appear some
tense situation, if something should happen,
then it could discuss what might be done to
prevent things getting worse.
Secretary Kissinger:
What do you think of the idea of a review
conference in 18 months or two years?
President Ceausescu:
In our opinion that 1s a good idea. We think
as a matter of fact that this sort of permanent
organism could have the role of preparing such
a conference. I don't have in mind something
that would be set up with a lot of bureau-
cracy, but rather something that would meet
periodically once a year or every six months.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of one of the
countries would have the role of coordinator,
and this could be on a rotational basis.
Secretary Kissinger:
For example, rotating - -
President Ceausescu:
United States, Soviet Union, Romania -
President Ford:
(Smiling) Romania.
Secretary Kissinger:
We have explained to Romania and we have been
in close touch with the Romanian delegation
to the Conference that the very reason Ro-
mania wants this is why we would not. We
are not eager to grant to other countries the
right of permanent interference in the West.
Quite frankly, this 1s the problem with a
permanent mechanism. I understand why you
want something to which you could appeal but
we do not want to supersede existing struc-
tures in the West with ones which could be
exploited. We are sympathetic though to
your concerns.
President Ceausescu:
We don't think of this organism as having
any sort of right to do this, and in order
to avoid this problem we could regulate the
basis on which it would act to exclude such
possible intervention. We see it as pre-
paring for new conferences and for solving
such problems as will appear. We don't want
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
8
any Eastern intervention in the West or Western
intervention in the East or Western inter-
vention in the West or Eastern intervention
in the East. I would ask you to reflect some
more on this problem and to review your
position. (Both the President and the Secre-
tary nod agreement.)
With regard to the Middle East you are now
having discussions with the Israeli Prime
Minister.
President Ford:
We tried very hard to keep progress going last
March but unfortunately the negotiations had
to be suspended. We are now doing our re-
assessment. We want to avoid any stagnation
or stalemate. I have just finished talking
with President Sadat. Today and tomorrow
we will be discussing with Prime Minister
Rabin his observations on the situation.
President Ceausescu:
of course the problems as you know even better
than I are very complicated. We will cer-
tainly welcome it if new steps towards dis-
engagement can be realized. There are con-
ditions now in which agreement could be
achieved. Egypt and Syria are in favor of
reaching a solution. We know very well the
situation can change very rapidly, that the
present favorable conditions might no longer
appear. I think that Israel too has under-
stood this very well. We have told them our
views.
President Ford:
You met with Foreign Minister Allon recently.
President Ceausescu:
Yes, I talked with him for four hours.
Aside from the question affecting Egypt and
Syria, there is the Palestine problem and the
need to achieve the formation of an inde-
pendent Palestine state. There can be no
solution unless this problem is resolved.
The PLO has in mind setting up a state con-
sisting of the West Bank and Gaza with the
necessary guarantees of the UN and others.
This in fact would mean the recognition of
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
FORM
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
9
the state of Israel. The United States would
have a great deal to gain if it would enter
into direct discussions with the PLO. For
that matter the Israelis too would have some-
thing to gain.
Secretary Kissinger: What did Allon say?
President Ceausescu:
He took a step forward. He recognized that
there exists a Palestine people which has the
right to an independent existence.
President Ford:
Did Foreign Minister Allon agree that Pales-
tine should have part of the West Bank and
if BO did he ask for guarantees for Israel's
protection?
President Ceausescu:
He sees the solution of the problem through
the involving of Jordan. The Israelis are
worried because they say the PLO proposes
the elimination of the State of Israel, while
the PLO complains that Israel will not recog-
nize them. We think that the PLO and Israel
have to begin to understand that they must
discuss these things with each other. I
believe that discussions with Arafat and other
PLO leaders would lead to better understanding
and would provide some advantages. I have
talked a lot with Arafat and he has told me
that he truly wants to assure independence
for his people so they can live in peace and
that this problem of a democratic state is
something for the future. In any case there
is no truth in the 1dea that they are playing
somebody else's game. What they want is
independence for their people.
President Ford:
We find some increase in flexibility but
would hesitate to be optimistic about the
step-by-step approach. The other possibility
we are examining is a broad comprehensive one
covering peace, borders, Palestine and so on.
This of course would undoubtedly bring us to
Geneva. What reaction do you have to the
Geneva Conference reopening?
President Ceausescu: The Geneva Conference can't be anything bad
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
10
in itself but it won't be able to solve the
problems. The problems have to be brought
there already solved in order to receive
necessary juridical sanction. Otherwise they
would just start accusing each other. In
any case there will have to be ways to have
discussions outside the Conference.
Secretary Kissinger:
I agree.
President Ceausescu:
We think the Conference ought to be somewhat
larger and that there ought to be a larger
role for the UN. The Conference has to be
well prepared and has to have solutions
almost ready set for it.
President Ford:
I recognize all the complexities that would
take place in Geneva unless in effect all was
agreed upon before we got there, but I am
not optimistic, Mr. President, that we can
get Israel agreeing with Egypt, Israel with
Jordan, Israel with Syria, Israel with the
PLO. We would hope that some progress would
bemade in one area but to expect on a bilateral
basis progress in four areas, this is just
being too optimistic.
President Ceausescu:
I agree. I think though it would be useful,
besides the efforts of the United States and
the Soviet Union, if other states could do
something. I am thinking about countries
which are not directly involved like some
non-aligned countries. Also the UN. All in
close connection with the Geneva Conference.
of course I believe that it would be useful
if the United States' efforts, those of Dr.
Kissinger, would enable the reaching of some
understandings. Still there is room for other
paths wherever possible. I don't believe Dr.
Kissinger will be annoyed if I mention my
belief that this spring he might have been
able to make better use of the assistance of
other countries.
Secretary Kissinger:
I have said that on the basis of my activi-
ties I am well qualified for the Job of
Director of an insane asylum and will be
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
11
glad to have others join me. (President
Ceausescu laughs.)
No I am not talking about being an inmate.
I am talking about the Job of Director.
President Ford:
We will continue to work. If we can get the
step-by-step process affirmative again, we
will do all we can to achieve something.
But if we see no progress, we will have to
propose an overall settlement with all the
complications, but we would prefer the other
approach. We are insisting there be no
stagnation, otherwise there will be another
war. We will try our best.
President Ceausescu:
I know time is limited. I wanted to mention
two problems in passing on which we might
reach some understandings or solutions in
connection with your visit. I would mention
Korea, the visit of the President of the
People's Democratic Republic of Korea in
Romania. I had some discussions with him.
I know you have some contacts with them your-
selves. He told me that he doesn't want any
sort of tension in the area, that he realizes
that unification can come only through peace-
ful paths and that he understands that he
needs a durable peace.
The second problem has to do with Spain.
(Exchange between Ceausescu and Macovescu
over the question of the person with whom
some discussions had been taking place in
Mexico. Apparently the American Ambassador
there had talked with a Spanish group to
which Ceausescu was about to refer.)
During my stop in Mexico I talked with a
delegation of the Democratic Junta of Spain.
I know they have had some meetings with a
large number of Congressmen and other
political figures here. The head of this
group, who is a good friend of mine, wants
to get into discussions with the United
States on the question of the future. They
want the changes that will be taking place
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
12
in Spain to proceed peacefully and in such a
way as not to affect relations with the United
States. I just wanted to mention these things.
Finally there is the problem which I don't
want to discuss now, that of disarmament.
We, and there are also tens of states situated
on all continents, who think that there is no
disarmament going on in the framework of the
Disarmament Conference but only setting limi-
tations on armament.
President Ford:
Do you mean SALT and MBFR?
Secretary Kissinger:
I think he means the disarmament discussions
in Geneva.
President Ceausescu:
Vienna and Geneva, it's all the same thing.
As far as the talks between the United States
and the Soviet Union are concerned, at least
as far as we have an idea of the situation,
it is not disarmament but talk of disarmament.
I hope that we will be able to discuss some
of these questions when we next meet.
President Ford:
I hope to discuss them with you when I come
to Romania.
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS
3
P/ Clausism / insurance K/Barnes Pring and
11 June 75
Press in
C you had grite a top
400 has just complated a trip to Boyst Envir
there out
P
Very nice to have opportunity to mut or/ prior
your may lnk from your tip & Brazil
(
arts very 7lnd you accepted this inty on my
to Runni rd type we will have
protine results.
P
& Was every pleased be enstoy you sent
ujat of in The came Pro. It was everyoned
dirput x Impressiated your gester.
J
In on patienty after you Many persibing
limod I the to bruncy any days shape
you will hap post a by time deadstions
be emindote 1 They peoplemank
eaps
P
Thank you puril incombidate I hape think
will he successful I hage bash forward &
wating w/ your exponding on watring
ohly - his of a againment of (975,
C
30 e an must anfirs to mybrut have
a personal but is - I have submitted
c hureng Congeds ant art
in a hrts by about - benefits of incomed
tra h betan 2 united
C
Opcease we went or/ grent intent for that
drint $ he aighted Three is no one in
Runner ant agreem ++2 hope
DECLARSIFIED
E.O. 12058, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/04/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state Deview 12/2/03
BY Lab
NARA, DATE 12/2/03
from in US. It mr losise that alliyant of
on lon ulations begon arropmot 4 yes he
Unstruct + reach his in from
K
Printy w/ Corry group & Junish haders this
often
P
of Iright mohr sing. First but here sny
un wrt defines that any approves Ins they
have til July we becoment MEN & kno exists
for harming I wast he park, that
Cry will in all you a thing how
w/ on people about Junish engation 5 us ts
We drouppour fthis busin - lover, hat
it is - lurt me most above by it. Way To
get approved is to show from emprovement
in unique to vs t I.
(
has In correction w to as the
is we put To dornel, them are any a few
Roman of In this it the
not a ling pub of mars emigrathin of finish
pop. In last 4 yes and have used application
for FRO. These Obseady 18, 307 left Runni
There be unr 2,200 application approarl+
form are years old But w/int on one
Terry w/ proval in theriport are waiting
for setter get with. Then is before soling -
put you raind, but there are alrenty then
whichent to come look X Kanam I discrobed
the us/ allon r crhen he left Known he
annch a they good statement on it.
P
That by food Shope summir provent
this fectural info & Eng gramps house
they very dif to get formath
dition byc c eny.
C
& will moh this lian. Car I smid it is
and puh.
P
D him you internation in CSCB. a you
hmr me have had proting or Boshet TILLI
divered he intendit your caffermant
K
& Grougho are only one whoul
all drements.
C
small his & unit / have gustine as
which connected w/ you not to known
In addition to this equivant it smight be goal
exergion & zoha outser frist, Then is gresting
of a agreement a brung time erom cng Dars
on chyong country un would his to remine
conditions of trads you granth to dhjug contrip.
Pont invist conanide none but hype your
and engetheit Agins your must & Knim
c munets United Want X interator my minth
to visit AS AP
P
apprivate you driving it in ferson. If
this a CSCE servicent, it night he
possible 5 int pan eventy ofter crety
in H
C
Follow CSCE
K On this again JJ for brung time lem
carp, unl com con A in pringle
find
as any point We wanted the get MENTHS
Cm, w/o any Xtramsmirs hists. &t world
fort in well w /thrt schedule.
P
& CSCE hald later July, Cozy would hopeforth wit
on trade againment by any
Bonns &t ened whent of crutt Ry is July, but wont
gt then Cmg before Syt takes 60 lap
K
we don't have to him - 2 that electry.
P
But we wouldn't went anything to nitufan W/MEN,
keit Matment X get Cry to out or growthly no
morth. Tump in -an't mnoce in
the lmg tan emagillment.
C
In cornection us/ CSCE, we one encerent, not
Jozenh about delay as about the critint
went Form cdntr is not comportant Thing
hot contract, Junese July would you but
Argust also good, and Sept. Unit inportant
is result to myse of as the Fre
be it wt to may Contents of zud heapet
one That for - effects Grean in
farn of treveling ar-norchas justith The 15
is C important and become outhort Myents
extents t conditions of anthoral X change, In
Connection of this, the are show pubs which
aboutity knif wesched & so to c Unif. we
werd (A) constete centrate fotules not to
interpre in internal ofform of arthors, 2nd
is mil, aspects, which of muss is wr
forting usin furb, but it C chenn give
that strts will not intipen
in This internal opping, Unity
movements, for exercycle Her too St not
frosting of 100 or wo her or 10 as -200,00
but fn of that they will be
& wit whintry If w/pow will
of states kt not he & fight ever LOV no
EN him. It would instructions into not
but sure-verles and existo; Til mrs, when
grouph stnts agreem this it cm Excrem
oth satur not incometry That injustment
amother is C entimast f long. are think
Em Hill - anot danisions sit in used.
Type huge immunitation trops - incl, metern
amount Brinse f that, am wont c
1 sity X w C begining we and
C Em crop. Sr me in fored creating
organing which mild untink < which of night
P
Amorton?>
el
Oral a your 2 yrs, or whendon pwo
of penso tn stongels, am just appress, C
groy and / mntx chall w /NT
K dar about a remin and optn 18 bros 2 3rs
U
I his it but that don't supplant pumment
argustro which can't speak prepare me for as which
a mty. The states FM, smith mut Organin
of JF ^^ crud would mut and or bey 6ms
w/cothing has
K The why Unsen Bummine suks it intm
and are ayre, we dont wont that mind
finaliference w/mar fc ftm trub inc Welf.
But me my symp. w/jan concern
C
I beline such an asjustment mt home
required to interpose are can exterblish c sights
9 Hushan you X it from dong from
fmha ching. We will a Lively to program
for mutings to tobac c pubs which unger offerser.
Immed the you to book ag in at for h programs
& unine your position anoin.
Insurance him to insure - question f NIF lucknal you
have I PNL have.
P
are the my hml Inst much a any negot giveng
an, but information thing wor we
ham wasting hand at heat sty. Dhut w/ Salat
+ inty x torn be unty of Smilr Ratin.
C
you how well pubban why enopheated
We without such sursty of change agent But
C sust thing is to the h conditions A same
to peau. E & symia in form of a zobution But
you been int can change very grintly my he
familish Intis won't first
I that
P
yourson allm?
C
Thered 4 In add nt a w/chmen
pur 50 Christ f Pates. w/o of to a
Pahs sents, C sit can't be what The idea
of P also is an E & w Bonk street w/ UN
geven mtt. behin us would home much of gain
by taking brittly to PLD - abs if I come.
K
Howdr'd allon unit
@
Hennth step Ammad, Rung Cheno work
pungh + should have X
P
Did allow invention up dimnelps did he
hml any purposals for if There
hogpened
e
He chinks Josh is the Gray. Bend he Christon C
PGO burth to be I. & I in then
But the but io PR 2 to cometry the a chains
Discussin of aroport unmil help protuce Change
kil, I hoursed at lenyth w / Angent. He
downed he wants & live in forms Purty thro.
Anty it for future but how, Thee who
him the Pho is arting /n anyone ling PLO
P
2 mml have the to make predition, but
then one signs of flux, We ensilling an ownll
approach, av/ detarls. tah in to Genera
Chr.
C
Chever cankln't in army but Is can't forher a pobs.
Jm hme a 70 Cherk w/c purb solved, ineept for
ligal apposit. In put crif they world just
stat to deare la h then & you would home &
find a my antsich C enof to di Insiress I femar
longer enf. w/ fees gunth wh for UN, IT
has is he invil progoved.
P
C dif at Combra under all yeld Wee
hml. But I not f damget I a eyee
w/am and be. we morld pry in
Jane me, but I thish 5 expert program
allawas & Ohm as f. amere as has optiming
C
of cherse it not easy to much such
in addition to sports of US+SU antime Hints not
united in implact plm a unh, esp
am ahguil emities, Numbership the yours
of K to honer points of vaiw should enstime 2think
kwarl WT be impartant Angoil
K
Ew, WR far park brook afforts.
p
we will nature to wh on it few comget
shis affinative and will do bray this Jossibh 0
it. Df mt, are mill home to (1) chase cotton
celtermations. We visiol he That would
enda another was & that noons arents )
C
I know time is that + only event & & months
other proto - W can having when you
& Runnin One is Known prob. N Knen pres
error in Revenue -I becaused or/ him. He
climmal he wonts his tension + insprimite only
by pennered endors 5 that and take time
Led put is white to Spin In Wisco I
that Whyatin of drive faith of fine how
they home mtgs unito, Then PMS of this Jump
sand he ments to chains w/ asc C presting of
forther volving They write changes in Spini which
will hoppen to EMI plan pencefully & wrt against
opportin f US.
Lost 51 pub of ann, which 2 only wont
Within West may atters behind what
is happening has is not essain but in
because for hunding ans
P
Sort or MBFR
C
revent amount ers. hat MISER- case abo.
Don't went & chairs new but
to disins it in future
P
when demine 2 & Reasons
Car v Pa kuid - formed
ed Phil Bulletin is
w/ Rimine of you
want neet him