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1553338
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January 14, 1976 - Ford, Kissinger, Rumsfeld
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1553338
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January 14, 1976 - Ford, Kissinger, Rumsfeld
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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1976-01-14
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1976-01-14
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MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIED SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 MR # 10-119 oso etr 6/20/10; state lts 9/3/10 MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION By dal NARA, Date 10/12/10 PARTICIPANTS: President Ford Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, January 14, 1976 9:35 - 10:45 a. m. PLACE: The Oval Office Kissinger: I think we have an urgent decision to make. I don't see how I can go, in the light of the DOD and ACDA memos, which will have to go to Jackson. The objection will be that we rushed to an agreement in the face of agency objections. I just don't understand Option I. Either an agreement collapses if there is not a subsequent Backfire deal, or you must face the possibility of a treaty which leaves them running free permanently. But my fundamental problem is that I can't go under these conditions. Rumsfelb I didn't know until the me eting what the proposal was and that it would be discussed. You said you had this proposal and it was okay with Henry. It was clear I was out of the loop. I went back and had a good session with the troops. Brown is staying wired in with the Chiefs. Now for my memo. The first page just repeats the proposal. The first proposal is for a fixed number instead of limiting them to whatever is produced by a certain date. We think there is no problem with SLCM's as MIRV'd, but we haven't staffed it out. SECRET/NODIS/XGDS LISART GERALD CRO File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS -2- On the nuclear-armed thing, the Chiefs back away some. There is no problem with the modified IV. This is just a different way to allow some Backfire, by not counting 115 Bison/Bear. Kissinger: This issue has really never been discussed at the Brezhnev level. He won't even know it's a problem. The President: This is the first time I have heard of it. Rumsfeld: The paper recommends the Modified or the Variant IV. Then as a fallback, I personally would recommend combining the Modified and the Variant, thus giving them about 200-250 Backfire. Then I would think Option I is the most defensible, with an agreement on cruise missile and Backfire by a certain date. Kissinger: But what if you don't get a Backfire agreement by that date? Either it cancels the whole SALT agreement or the Vladivostok part remains and the Backfire remains free. The President: The surface ship section of Option III is better than Option IV Modified. Rumsfeld: The problem is not that; it's breaking the 2400. [More discussion]. The President: If Henry doesn't go, I think we have no chance for getting a SALT agreement. I would never forgive myself for not trying. Rumsfeld: I agree. The President: I believe after Modified Option IV he should try III and then go to I. FORD Kissinger: I have no problem with that. GERALD LERARY [Discussion about using the IV Variant. ] Rumsfeld: What if Henry went and tried IV Modified, and added Variant IV as a sweetner, and if neither of those work, he could cable back; you would call an NSC meeting and we would get to Option III that way and get everyone on board. SECRET/NODIS/XGDS SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS -3- Kissinger: That could be done. Scowcroft: You won't be here, Don. Kissinger: What if we had an NSC meeting on Monday, when you could tell me to use IV Modified, and then to add Variant IV if necessary. You could say if that is non-negotiable, you are leaning to III, but you wanted me to come back for instructions at that point. Then you could call an NSC meeting with the substitute people because the principals would have been forewarned. The President: Let's do it that way. Rumsfeld: I have a couple of points. The C-130 is ready to be billed to the French. I wanted everyone to know, in view of our press statements. The President, Kissinger, Scowcroft: Go ahead. Rumsfeld: Also about nuclear modernization in NATO. Kissinger: I have no problem if it is just studies, and if you go through the NSC before you implement. I think we need to consider it at an NSC meeting. Scowcroft: I have reservations about Nike Hercules. LIBRARY ; SECRET/NODIS/XGDS P/K/R 9:35.10:45am 2 14 Jone 76 K I think d me have on urgent drivision to mole, 8 don't see hm 2 com go, in hight of the DOD and ACD. A minns, which will have to go to Jackson. The objetim init he that are mished A an against in c face of agency attry time. I just din't industand ptin I. Either on agreement face Mayor if the is wit subsequent Backfiredral 02 current for C possibility of a But my the ~s that for personmently under these conditions P Sagree. It would but end like my c - agencies RA I chinit hum until the misting what c proposal ares and that it would he drawnst you 20ml your had twis properal & it who K w/ K. It was cliar I was antife loep. d went bach & had a geread session w/ C trops. Brown is staying wined in ev/c Chip. Kow for my inmor Frest, age just upiate C progoral. The II propisalves is for. a find # crice whatever is promised by a date. DECLASSIFIED 050 6/21/10; state lts 9/3/10 wa think there is no you w/ SLCNL MIRV E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 MR # 10-119; #27 By dal NARA, Date 10/12/10 ent and haven't stoped and One me armel ching, C Chrif ked any stome. There is no for w/ hard. iv. This is just a did wray t & allow some Bahpine, wit monthing 115 Bison /Rias. (Desission about comming < Brins/Beard This issue has rally hork have e Buz level, He int here home thapas. P 11 This 10 c 12t this & have heard fit. LIBRATTY GERALD FORD * KJANLITP statement L 13 far WSJ (cerbith you - The paper Worl 02 Uniont IV, Term failbook, & providelly world Marl countring wod t V areant, they giving then about 200-250 B orkline. Then & would think Option I is most defensible, againment by a date Urtain. K But what if you dnit get Backjiou againment by that enth E-eth it crunk C whole salt epekent or C Vlad post - Backfix Numarine he P The surpace ship section B 0 phone ICT is herter then opt II med, R The prot is not that; it is beaking < 2400 ( sure chrommin) P of K disn't go, I think us have ins have for acting Salt- I would when forgine myself for not whing R & Jagree P I hime after hod Option II he shoul e ty III + the 70 to I K and prov N/ that. (Deacussion about using HES IV) varient R₁ what if + tried IV mod, added Variout IV as a unever + if within of These work, he coronld enhli bale, your world cncl NSC mty + and would get & of ther E that K, Cmuld be dre cray of get everyout on bound. S you won't be have, Dorr. K1 what if are had an MSC with our Worday, when som could tell the to use Zn IV word, these CERALD STREET add Varient IV if energing. you could sorry if that non -vey of you learning to 11] but your cranted neto come back for instructions at that print. Then you cauld callan NSC or/ C selstitute print because a pronogob crowd have him foreurned. P hits the it that way. R Ihan a c angle of parnts. 130 is unly to be brited toc French. I wanted every and to Brow, in will of our press statements P,K,S S Go ahrel R also me. moderning atter in NATO, K Ihme no pub if it is first stuchis, if youngs Chun c NSC before you songaliment. 2 think and mult insider at NSC only s I have exercition about Nite Here, LIBRARY