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June 9, 1976 - Ford, Botswana President Sir Seretse Khama
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June 9, 1976 - Ford, Botswana President Sir Seretse Khama
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
a
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
President Ford
Sir Seretse Khama, President of Botswana
Archibald M. Mogwe, Minister of External Affairs
Amos M. Dambe, Ambassador to the U.S.
Charles M. Tibone, Permanent Secretary,
Ministry of External Affairs
Charles Robinson, Acting Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME:
Wednesday, June 9, 1976
11:00 a. m.
PLACE:
The Oval Office
[The press enters and takes photographs. There is small talk about
President Khama's receipt of an honorary degree at Princeton. The
NSC MEMO, STATE GUIDELINES State Review3/12/04
press departs. ]
Khama: Congratulations on yesterday.
The President: We did better than we expected [in the Ohio and
NARA, DATE 7/27/04
New Jersey primaries] and they didn't do as well as they had hoped
[in the California primary], so it was a good day. [There was
a brief discussion of delegation hunting.
]
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12956, SEC. 3.5
It is very nice to see you. What Secretary Kissinger said on his
trip to Africa has my full backing. We are dedicated to working out
solutions to the very difficult problems in Southern Africa. My impression
is the programs outlined by Secretary Kissinger have been well received.
We intend to do what we can to implement our programs. I would be
interested in your impression.
BY
Khama: I very much appreciate your seeing me. I know you are
very busy.
CLASSIFIED BY Brent Scowcroft
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF ENECUTIVE ORDER 11652
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
EXEMPTION CATEGORY
5(b)(3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
2
We appreciate the United States expression of policy that you
weren't supporting Ian Smith in Rhodesia. We had wondered for some
time what the U.S. position was, so we were happy to hear it.
I got a letter from Secretary Kissinger saying he planned to meet
with Vorster. Vorster is the key man. Without him Smith couldn't
survive.
We have been talking to the leaders of the liberation groups
President Kaunda and I. Many people have said that talking to them
was a waste of time, but we felt that violence doesn't achieve very much
and it is better to talk a solution if possible. So we tried to talk for
so long as talking didn't become difficult. We didn't get very far.
We asked Vorster to put more pressure on. He said he could only go
so far.
The President: Because of his domestic situation?
Khama: Yes. He has to be careful of his own nationalists. Smith has
a lot of sympathy from the right wing group in South Africa and some
within Vorster's own party. Many there think that majority rule won't
solve the problem. There was a growing awareness of the growing
bitterness of the blacks, the demand for majority rule and a question
as to what the blacks would do if they got power in their hands. But the
blacks saw other territories getting their independence and they were
still being repressed. They felt that talking was a waste of time and
that only violence would work.
I argued that we got independence peacefully, and that blacks and
whites have lived in Botswana peacefully for ten years. We see no
reason why it can't be so in Rhodesia.
The President: What are the proportions in Botswana?
Khama: About 5, 000 whites and about 7,000 blacks. Vorster does seem
to realize that the situation is becoming desperate. He has said a race
war would be terrible to contemplate. And we hoped he would do more to
put pressure on Ian Smith.
The President: Has guerrilla warfare increased?
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
3
Khama: Yes, it has. I hope you can be of help as Secretary Kissinger
has recently declared.
The President: We want to be as helpful as we can to you in your situation.
I understand we are discussing FMS in modest amounts and we do want
to do what we can.
Khama: We don't want military equipment to join in the fighting. For
a long time - since our independence - the basis of our defense was
that we were unarmed. Now it is a great weakness, because all know
there is no force to stop them.
There is one other point. Secretary Kissinger said the United States
would be prepared to help any country which closed its borders with
Rhodesia, and to help in conjunction with others. We would like to close
the border if we thought it would hasten the end of the regime and bring
majority rule. But it is difficult for us because our exports depend
entirely on the Rhodesian-owned rail line. To close it would be disastrous
for us.
We know Zambia has closed its border and is using alternative
routes which is difficult. But for us there are no alternatives. South
Africa would not be sympathetic to us if we deliberately closed the border.
For these reasons we have been cautious. It is not just the money we
would lose, but our economy would come to a halt. We have long hoped
to take over the line so it would be ours, but what is difficult is the cost
of the takeover. We had thought to do it over a number of years. So we
know how Secretary Kissinger's remarks were meant but I wanted you
to know how difficult it is for us.
The President: We are working for repeal of the Byrd Amendment to
bring us into conformity with the UN, but there are some problems on
the Hill.
One question I always get is how certain can we be that minority
rights would be assured in Rhodesia? What can I answer?
Khama: I don't know how you can assure it. In Botswana, everyone's
rights are equally guaranteed and are equally protected. There is no
problem with us. To give special rights or protections isn't right either.
We must treat all people equally. If you believe in justice and freedom,
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
4
you will abide by them. Just putting them into words doesn't mean
they will be carried out. We have seen cases where things aren't going
to the liking of leaders in some countries; the constitution is torn up.
The President: I assume you will continue to work toward a peaceful
solution with Britain and others.
Khama: We really appreciate this. But we feel we are sitting on a
volcano. If the rail line were closed through no act of ours -- for
example, if Rhodesia needed all their manpower elsewhere and the trains
stopped -- we would be in the same situation as if we closed it ourselves.
Our effectiveness as an influence would end because so would our
existence as a state. But we are powerless to do anything about it.
That is why Secretary Kissinger's remarks about helping together with
others of like mind was taken very seriously. I hope something could
be done.
The President: We are looking into what can be done. What are your
major exports?
Khama: We ship copper (?) to a U.S. company in Louisiana, beef to
the European community, and most other exports are for South Africa.
The President: We will look with as much sympathy as we can both on
economic and foreign military sales to be as helpful as possible. We
appreciate your cooperation. You have been a very constructive influence
for moderation in the area.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
1b
3310
THE WHITE HOUSE
WaSHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
MEETING WITH SIR SERETSE KHAMA
PRESIDENT OF BOTSWANA
Wednesday, June 9, 1976
11:00 a. m. (30 minutes)
The Oval Office
From: Brent Scowcrof
Bo
I. PURPOSE
To emphasize the intention of the United States to play an active
and constructive role in promoting peaceful change in southern
Africa.
II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A. Background: President Khama is on a private visit to the
United States to receive an honorary LL. D. June 8 from
Princeton University. He is most anxious to meet with you
to emphasize his moderate approach to majority rule in
Southern Africa. He opposes Soviet and Cuban intervention,
but recognizes that liberation groups could ask for their
assistance in the absence of concrete steps toward majority
rule. He may also share with you his concerns over the
impact on the economy and internal security situation of
his country of possible steps against Rhodesia.
Botswana, which has a multi-party democracy and a free
enterprise economy, has made good economic progress in
recent years based largely on exports of livestock and
I
minerals. These exports, however, are dependent on the
continued operation of a Rhodesian-owned and administered
railroad, which is also the major rail link between Rhodesia
and South Africa. President Khama believes that closure of
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
the 7/27/04
GERALD
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
- 2 -
the Botswana-Rhodesian border, cutting off this vital
Rhodesia supply line, would help bring down Smith and
possibly minimize bloodshed. He doe's not presently planto
take this step because of the damage it would do to Botswana's
economy, but he is concerned about the extent of U.S. support
should the railroad be closed by an act of war. The State
Department has told Khama that we have no wish to bring
pressure to bear on him to close the border, but that we are
willing to participate in a major international effort to assist
Botswana if it does lose the use of the railway.
President Khama may also raise Botswana's internal security
situation, which has been aggravated in recent months by
insurgent activity aimed at Rhodesia and by Rhodesian reaction.
Botswana's effective security force numbers only 60 men, and
President Khama is concerned that in spite of his policy of not
harboring liberation movements, Botswana is powerless to
stop them from using its territory as a base for operations
against Rhodesia. In view of this, Khama may indicate his
need for limited amounts of military assistance. We are
considering recommending to you that Botswana be declared
eligible for FMS credits as an indication of US support for
Khama's moderate course.
Your purpose in this meeting will be to listen sympathetically
to President Khama's account of his fears for Botswana's
economic and security situation, to encourage him in his
attempts to find moderate solutions to the problems of
southern Africa, and to assure him of our desire to be
helpful should Botswana suffer because of actions taken
against Rhodesia.
B. Participants: President Khama, Minister of External Affairs
Archibald M. Mogwe, Botswanan Ambassador to the U.S.
Amos M. Dambe, Mr. Charles M. Tibone, Permanent
Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs [Biographic data on
the foregoing are at Tab B], Acting Secretary of State
Robinson and Brent Scowcroft.
C. Press Plan: Press photo session. Meeting to be announced.
FORD
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
- 3 -
III. TALKING POINTS
1. Congratulations, Mr. President, on your receipt of an
honorary LL. D. from Princeton. I think it is altogether
fitting that your accomplishments should have been recognized
by one of our great universities.
2. The United States values the increasingly close relations
between our two nations. We look forward, in the spirit
of Secretary Kissinger's Lusaka speech, to close coopera-
tion with you on matters of common interest.
3. I would like very much to hear your assessment of develop-
ments in southern Africa, and particularly your assessment
of prospects for an acceptable settlement in Rhodesia.
4. I understand why Botswana must keep open its borders with
Rhodesia. We would certainly be willing to participate in an
international effort to assist if you should lose use of the
railway. We wish to remain in close touch and to consider
how we might be of assistance.
5. Secretary Kissinger's Lusaka speech opens a new era in
our relations with Africa. We hope to provide our African
friends with an alternative to violence and to strengthen our
relations with Africa by moving forward with you on critical
problems of self-determination and economic development.
6. As you are aware, Secretary Kissinger will meet with Prime
Minister Vorster in Europe later this month. I know that
the Secretary has been coordinating closely with you and
other African leaders in preparation for that meeting. I
want to make clear that we are intensifying our contacts
with South Africa to encourage South African support for
the Lusaka program. We welcome your ideas on how this
can best be accomplished.
FORD
&
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
2
Severa Khama / President
6/9/76
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY Calar
NARA, DATE 7/27/04
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