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This file contains general George Brown
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July 2, 1976 - Ford, Kissinger, Max Fisher
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1553494
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July 2, 1976 - Ford, Kissinger, Max Fisher
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This file contains general George Brown
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Israel
Lebanon
Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyah.
Arms transfers
Foreign aid
Terrorism
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1976-07-02
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7
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1976
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2
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1976-07-02
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7
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1976
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
President Ford
Max Fisher
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
DATE & TIME:
Friday - July 2, 1976
2:00 p.m.
PLACE:
The Oval Office
President: That was a good meeting the other day.
Fisher: Look at this. One of the guys was so touched he stayed over-
night to write this. [Hands a paper to the President.]
President: This is a helleva fine paper.
NSC 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES stateleview3/13/04
Fisher: I am leaving this afternoon. I allowed myself two extra
days to get armed and meet with more groups. There is a feeling of
the Jewish groups around the world that they want more input into the
NARA. DATE 7/27/04
Israeli policy. This could be very helpful. They want me to set it up.
There will be a couple launched from the U.S. and 100 or so from
elsewhere.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
[There is some talk about the political organization and the campaign.]
What can I do to help in Jerusalem?
President: The most overriding thing is in Lebanon. The Israelis have
done exactly the right thing by standing aside. As a result the Syrians
are wearing down the PLO.
CLASSIFIED BY Brent Scowcroft
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY
5 (B) (3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp to det
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
- 2 -
Kissinger: And without any pressure from us. We came to parallel
conclusions -- there was absolutely no hint of pressure from us. The
Syrians are wearing down the PLO and the Syrians are stuck in Lebanon.
They can't pull out without turning it over to the PLO and indicating a
botched military operation.
The one thing I see that is dangerous is the possibility of Israeli attacks
on Fatah camps as a result of this hijacking.
President: That could coalesce all the Arabs against Israel.
Kissinger: I tell you it is my personal belief that the French are making
a mistake conceding to negotiations with the terrorists. But that is their
business.
President: Retaliation would just spark the Arabs to unite.
Kissinger: The problem is these are Yemeni Jews -- Sephardic Jews.
They are not so tough and they are over 50 percent of the Israeli
population. That is the reason for the change.
Fisher: What about the role of the PLO in the Lebanon situation?
[The President and Secretary Kissinger described the thinking process
and that there was no change in our policy.]
The TQ thing worked out fine. I want to thank you.
President: Javits was very pleased.
Scowcroft: Humphrey told me he thought it worked out fine.
Fisher: So I just wanted to know what was happening.
Kissinger: Not a Goddamn thing is happening. We have given the Arabs
proposals and they haven't responded. We have no reason to press.
Fisher: It looks like the message for me to convey is to stay away from
retaliation.
This settlement thing is another problem.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
- 3 -
Scowcroft: They just authorized three more.
President: Really? Max, that is a very serious matter.
Kissinger: Israel shouldn't make the same mistake of hitting the refugee
camps. The PLO is getting chewed up right now without any help.
Fisher: This George Brown thing is bad. I think something will have
to be said. Lissy has drafted something innocuous.
President: I don't see how we can make a statement. What is the
occasion?
Fisher: You will get a lot of mail. Maybe in response to this, you can
get it out by answering the letters.
President: We will look at it.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
1b
THE WHITE HOUSE
3830
SECRET (GDS)
WASHINGTON
MEETING WITH MAX FISHER
Friday, July 2, 1976
2:00 p.m. (20 minutes)
The Oval Office
From: Brent Scowcroft BO
I. PURPOSE
To review matters of common concern with Max Fisher prior
to his visit to Israel and convey, through him, to the Israeli
leadership your continued strong support for Israel.
II.
BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A. Background: You saw Max Fisher last week with a group of
Jewish leaders. He will be going to Israel again quite soon
and wanted to see you privately. The principal developments
since your last meeting are as follows:
--Approval of the Security Assistance Appropriations
Bill for FY 76, the Transitional Quarter and FY 77, with
a total of over $4. 2 billion for Israel.
The Israeli concern that we may be moving toward a
shift in our position of not recognizing the PLO.
-- The terrorist hijacking to Uganda of the Air France
plane and the Israeli decision to negotiate for the exchange
of hostages held by the terrorists for prisoners (Palestinians)
held by Israel.
-- The continuing war in Lebanon with the escalation of
Christian-Palestinian fighting and a more active Arab
League role.
Subject to GDS of E. O. 11652
Automatically Downgraded at Two
Year Intervals and Declassified on
SECRET (GDS)
December 31, 1984.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state Deview 3/13/04
RY Wn
MARA DATE 7/27/04
SECRET (GDS)
- 2 -
On economic and military assistance for Israel, Max Fisher
understands just how the positions of the Administration and
Congress have evolved and he fully appreciates how hard you
have tried to balance the competing demands of an austerity
budget, a balanced package for the Middle East and meeting
Israel's real needs. (You will recall Max thought that a sum
between $250 and $275 million for the TQ would be adequate. )
He can tell the Israeli leadership of your pleasure at having
been able to find a formula whereby Israel will receive $4. 2
billion in assistance for FY 76, the TQ and FY 77, compared
to a total of just over $6 billion for the entire preceding 27-
year period. Our support for Israel's security and survival
will not weaken. We will continue to provide support within
Israel's realistic needs and our practical limitations.
Regarding the PLO issue, Foreign Minister Allon has told
the Knesset of the "amazement and reservations" expressed
officially by the Israeli Government to the United States
Government over the latter's "having found fit to express
its thanks to the murderers" of Ambassador Meloy and Mr.
Waring, i. e., the PLO. Allon also criticized the permission
given by the State Department to PLO Representative al-Hut
to visit Washington, where he lunched with several Senators
and Members of Congress (e. g., Senators Ribicoff, Nelson,
Morgan, Haskell Abourezk). At the same time Allon noted
that Administration officials have reassured Israel that there
is no change in United States policy or attitude vis-a-vis the
PLO. The Israeli Government and press have blown the expres-
sion of appreciation to the PLO over the Beirut evacuation and
the al-Hut visit to Washington out of all proportion, reflecting
both the genuine sensitivity of top Israeli officials to every
move we make on this subject and the volatility of the issue
in domestic Israeli politics.
Max Fisher could help to reassure the Israelis that there is no
change contemplated in our basic policy. He could also suggest
that by making major issues out of minor incidents, the Israelis
tend to hurt their own image in this country where there is
considerable public and even Congressional sentiment for
trying to find a means of dealing with the Palestinians
without in any way compromising Israel's security. This has
SECRET (GDS)
SECRET (GDS)
- 3 -
led members of Congress and others to talk directly to PLO
representatives despite the unwillingness of the USG to do so.
The USG cannot ignore the practical fact that only the PLO
can provide any protection whatsoever to our diplomats and
other citizens in West Beirut.
Regarding the terrorist hijacking, you could have Max Fisher
convey to the Israelis from you personally what they have been
told officially, namely, that we have been making every effort
to help obtain the release of the hostages (e.g., we have
approached the UN Secretary General, the Egyptians and others
to intercede with Idi Amin and with the Palestinians) and that
we share Israel's anguish over this situation. Max could
also assure the Israelis of our determination to redouble
efforts to find a more effective international means of
dealing with terrorism.
Regarding Lebanon, the Israelis are not unduly concerned over
the present situation since the combination of Syrian and Lebanese
Christian fighting with the PLO has seriously damaged the
latter's military capabilities and could also. lead to a long-term
political weakening of the PLO. As yet the Arab League decision
to intervene has had no appreciable effect, easing Israeli fears
that it could produce a long-term radical Arab orientation.
However, should the Christians and Syrians continue their
attacks on the PLO and Lebanese left despite strong Arab League
opposition, it could produce great bitterness and violence inside
Lebanon and open the US and Israel to Arab criticism as being
behind it. Israeli restraint has been appreciated and we hope
that it will continue. We also hope the Israelis will join us in
encouraging the Lebanese Christians to seek a compromise
solution, not involving partition, rather than persisting in
the kind of military action which would inevitably lead to
retribution, continued violence and a collapse of prospects
for any political agreement.
B.
Participants: Max Fisher, Brent Scowcroft.
C.
Press Arrangements: White House photo only.
SECRET (GDS)
SECRET (GDS)
- 4 -
III. TALKING POINTS
Security Assistance
1. Please tell our Israeli friends how pleased I am to have
been able to work out with Congress a formula for security
assistance for FY 76, the TQ and FY 77, which will provide
more than $4. 2 billion for Israel, yet be within the budget
ceiling imposed by the austerity situation in this country,
and also maintain the balance which I consider essential
for the Middle East as a whole. This amount is over 60%
of the total provided Israel by the USG between 1949 and
1975 and indicates in a concrete manner my dedication to
Israel's security and well-being.
PLO
2. I am aware of the Israeli concern about the PLO. You can
reassure them that there is no change in our position of no
recognition and no negotiations with the PLO as long as
they do not recognize Israel's right to exist and accept
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
3. While I recognize the sensitivity and importance of this
issue for Israel, they may wish to consider whether such
strong reactions to minor events do not harm their image
in this country. Despite the position of the USG, there is
public and even Congressional sentiment for a dialogue
with the PLO, resulting in occasional meetings between
Members of Congress and PLO officials. The Administration
does not encourage this but we cannot prevent it. We cannot
ignore the practical fact that only the PLO can provide any
protection for our diplomats and other citizens in West Beirut.
Terrorist Hijacking
4. We share Israel's anguish over the terrorist hijacking to
Uganda and the situation of the Israeli and other hostages.
We have done our best to try to save the lives of the hostages
without suggesting that the terms of the terrorists be met.
5. The Israelis can be certain that we intend to redouble our
efforts to put an end to such terrorist actions. We will be
interested in whatever ideas they may have.
SECRET (GDS)
SECRET (GDS)
- 5 -
6. We are watching the situation in Lebanon very closely, as
Israel knows. We have appreciated Israel's restraint thus
far and we hope it will continue. We also hope that Israel
will join us in using whatever influence it has with the
Lebanese Christians to urge them to work for a political
compromise while it is still possible and not to push their
military successes so far as to invite another cycle of
retribution and even greater violence which could kill all
hopes for an eventual agreement.
SECRET (GDS)
il may Fisher /
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state Review 3/13/04
BY We
NARA DATE 7/27/04
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