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China, Republic of (4)
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1553653
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China, Republic of (4)
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Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific (Ford Administration)
East Asia and Pacific Country Files
subjects
Taiwan
China
Arms transfers
Foreign aid
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1553653
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1975-06-30
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1975
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1975-04-01
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1975
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The original documents are located in Box 4, folder "China, Republic of (4)" of the
Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential
Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 4 of Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
TOP SECRET EYES ONLY
CHIANG KAI-SHEK FUNERAL TRIP
ART
KEY POINTS
A. In conversations with the following, I used the
talking points provided by the Secretary of State.
1. KOREAN PRIME MINISTER KIM. Wednesday, April 16.
-- Explained why strong measures necessary
to correct Communist activities at home.
Drew parallel with these activities and
Mao's method used in takeover of China.
-- Communists use every possible means to
divide our two nations.
-- Now trying to infiltrate religious circles.
-- Want to weed out Communists very early.
-- Because of Vietnam some raise questions
about US commitments. Korean Government
feels it has full commitment and is taking
measures to reassure people no reason for
doubt of US.
-- Korea can take care of herself. Trying to
maintain stability and develop. Trying not
to become burden to US.
FORD LIBRARY a 07VH30
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY GG
, NARA, DATE 4/20/01
TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY
TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY
2. SOUTH VIETNAM SENATE PRESIDENT LAM AND AMBASSADOR
TO REPUBLIC OF CHINA (President Thieu's brother).
Wednesday, April 16.
-- If Congress and President would tell North
Vietnamese to stop they would.
-- Morale is key factor. President Ford's
speech had very positive effect. Congres-
sional approval of aid would be a sustaining
factor. If Congress only talks about taking
out 6,000 Americans it has very negative
influence.
-- President Thieu might consider stepping down
if he were sure it would ensure real assistance
and support from Congress.
3. PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO. Thursday, April 17.
-- Four basic principles.
-- No matter how much world situation
changes, ROC belongs to camp of
democratic nations headed by US.
-- Policy is and will remain totally
Anti-Communist.
-- Cooperation and solidarity among
people living on Taiwan.
FORD & BRAB) 07VH39
2
TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY
TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY
-- Continue economic construction so
all can enjoy better standard of
living.
-- One of last things President Chiang said
was that Government and people of US are
the best friends of our people. This is
guiding principle.
-- Chiang has told US visitors ROC does not
expect substantial US support. Do not want
American boys involved. Counseled US
against involvement in Vietnam. War in Asia
must be fought by Asians themselves.
-- All ROC expects from US is moral and spiritual
support.
-- Both PRC and Russia are enemies. Won't play
one against another.
-- Invited President Ford and Vice President to
visit Taiwan.
4. FOREIGN MINISTER MIYAZAWA OF JAPAN. Thursday,
April 17.
-- In US reassessment of policies in Asia,
should not take any actions very rapidly.
FORD
&
GERALD
3
TOP SEGRET - EYES ONLY
TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY
B. In addition to the above, I met with a number of other
foreigners in Taiwan.
-- Former Prime Ministers Kishi and Sato of
Japan.
-- Saudi Arabians, Cambodians.
C. Schedule and reporting telegrams attached.
FORD LIBRARY & GERALD
4
TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY
TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY
ADMIRAL GAYLER - CINCPAC - HAWAII. Sunday, April 13.
Vietnam
-- South Vietnam has only 2 weeks to a month.
-- Situation not reversible by aid.
-- We should evacuate now. We should at least
start getting women and children out.
-- Perhaps could take people out on planes
bringing in food, aid, and ammunition.
-- We should not be deceived by ease of Cambodian
operation. Extraction from Vietnam will be a
major military operation. We should start
reducing numbers now.
FORD LIBRARY & GERALD
TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY
2
ACTION COPY
OF STATE
COPY / OF 15 COPIES
#
Department of State
UNITED STATES or
TELEGRAM
SECKET
NOD655
PAGE 01 1787522
CONTROL: 41370
RECD: 17 APR 75
14-10
4:09AM
ACTION NOUS-00
INFO OCT-01 1001 W
050859
0 170748Z APR 75
FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO SECSTATE
INFO AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
SECRE T NODIS Wh50708
FROM JON HOWE
TAGS: GVIP (HOCKEFELLER, NELSON A.)
E.O.: 11652: GDS
1. FOLLOWING ARE SUBSTANTIVE HIGHLIGHTS OF APRIL 17
MEETING BETWEEN VICE PRESIDENT ROCKEFELLER AND
PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUU. DETAILED MEMORANDUM OF
CONVERSATION WILL BE PREPARED LATER,
2. THE PREMIER WAS OBVIOUSLY GRATIFIED WITH THE
PRESIDENT'S SELECTION OF THE VICE PRESIDENT TO HEAD
THE U.S. DELEGATION TO HIS FATHER'S FUNERAL. HE
EXPRESSED WARM THANKS FUR THE PRESIDENT'S CON-
DOLENCE STATEMENT AND HIS MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE TO
HIM ON THE OCCASION OF HIS FATHER'S DEATH. HE
PAGE 2 RUEAOWN 2210 SECRET
CHARACTERIZED THE VICE PRESIDENT'S ATTENDANCE AS
INDICATIVE OF CONTINUED PRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO
COUNTRIES. HE NOTED THAT IT WAS VERY TOUCHING TO
HAVE FRIENDS SUCH AS THE UNITED STATES.
THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT THE FRIENDSHIP
BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES WAS DEEP AND LASTING AND
THAT IT WOULD CONTINUE. THIS FRIENDSHIP WOULD
REMAIN UNAFFECTED BY PRESIDENT CHIANG'S DEATH. THE
U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO VALUE ITS FRIENDLY AND ECONOMIC
TIES TO THE ROC.
FORD
=, THE PREMIER RELATED FOUR BASIC PRINCIPLES WHICH
&
WOULD GOIDE HOC POLICIES. HE SAIU THESE PRINCIPLES
SECRET
GERALD
LIBRARY
GG 4/20/01
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF State
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 1707532
HAD BEEN REPEATEDLY STRESSED TO HIM BY HIS FATHER
DURING THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS. THE ROC WOULD
STEADFASTLY ADHERE TO THEM. THESE PRINCIPLES ARE:
(1) NO MATTER HOW MUCH THE WORLD SITUATION
CHANGES, THE ROC WOULD CONTINUE TO BELONG
TU THE CAMP OF DEMOCRATIC NATIONS MEADED
BY THE U.S.
(2) THE ROC WOULD MAINTAIN A CONSISTENTLY ANTI-
PAGE 3 RUEADWN 2210 5 ECRET
COMMUNIST POLICY UNTIL FINAL VICTORY WAS
ACHIEVED.
(3) THE RUC WOULD STRIVE TO ACHIEVE COOPERATION
AND SOLIDARITY BETWEEN THE PEOPLES LIVING ON
TAIWAN.
(4) THE ROC WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS ON WITH
ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION IN ORDER TO IMPROVE
THE LIVING STANDARD OF THE PEOPLE
5. THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT TAIWAN WAS
FORTUNATE THAT A STRONG LEAUERSHIP WAS INHERITING
PRESIDENT'S MANTLE. ME TOLD HOW IMPRESSED WE
ALL WERE WITH THE ECUNOMIC MIRACLE THAT HAD
OCCURRED ON TAIWAN.
5. THE PREMIER RETURNED TO THE QUESTION OF ROC
RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. HE REFERRED TO HIS
FATHER'S REPEATED ADMONITIONS TO HIM OVER THE YEARS
THAT REGARDLESS OF THE PROBLEMS AND UNCERTAINTIES
OF THE WORLD SITUATION, THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE
OF THE U.S. WERE THE BEST OF FRIENDS OF THE ROC
AND ITS PEOPLE. ACCORDING TO THE PREMIER, SHORTLY
PAGE 4 RUEADW 2210 SECRET R E
BEFORE HE DIED THE PRESIDENT AGAIN REAFFIRMED THIS
SENTIMENT. THE PREMIER NOTED THAT HE REGARDS
FORD
HIS FATHER'S ADMONITION AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE
&
7. THE PREMIER RECOUNTED THAT IN MEETING OFFICIAL
AMERICAN VISITORS OVER THE YEARS. PRESIDENT CHIANG
SECRET
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF & STATE
Department of State
UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SECRET
PAGE 03 170753Z
HAD CONSISTENTLY ADVISED AGAINST THE USE OF AMERICAN
TROOPS IN VIETNAM. THE PRESIDENT MADE CLEAR TO
THESE VISITORS THAT THE ROC DUES NOT EXPECT SUB-
STANTIAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE U.S. ALL IT DESIRED WAS
AMERICAN SPIRITUAL AND MORAL SUPPORT. THE PREMIER
REITERATED THAT THE ROC CONTINUES ONLY TO SEEK
AMERICAN MORAL AND SPIRITUAL SUPPORT.
E. AGAIN PUTTING IT IN TERMS OF A PRINCIPLE
ESTABLISHED BY THE LATE PRESIDENT AND ONE THAT
WOULD BE UNFAILINGLY AUHERED TO BY HIM, THE
PREMIER STATED THAT THE ROC VIEWS BOTH MOSCOW AND
PEKING AS ENEMIES AND WOULD NOT HAVE ANY DEALINGS
WITH ONE IN ORDER TO PLAY IT OFF AGAINST THE
OTHER # THE PREMIER AGAIN STRESSED THIS WOULD
REMAIN 4 GUIDING PRINCIPLE FOR THE ROC.
PAGE 5 RUEADWW 2210 SECHET
9, THE PREMIER EXTENDED AN INVITATION TO BOTH
PRESIDENT FORD AND VICE PRESIDENT ROCKEFELLER TO
VISIT TAIWAN AT THEIR CONVENIENCE. ThE VICE
PRESIDENT SAID HE WUULD TRANSMIT THIS KIND
INVITATION TO PRESIDENT FORD. ON THE SUBJECT OF
VISITS, THE VICE PRESIDENT TOLD THE PREMIER THAT
THERE WERE NO AGREEMENTS OR COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN
WITH RESPECT TO THE PRESIDENT'S FORTHCOMING VISIT
TO THE PRC.
UNGER
EOT
FORD
&
SECRET
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
3a
7508518
2814
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
SECRET
April 29, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Sales of Military Equipment
to the Republic of China
The Republic of China (ROC) is seeking US
approval for the extension of two of its military
co-production projects: F5E aircraft and T-53 air-
craft engines. We also have a long outstanding ROC
request to purchase the Harpoon anti-ship missile.
Decisions are required on responses to these requests.
For commercial reasons, the F5E is the most urgent of
the ROC requests, because the ROC must inform Northrop
of its intentions by May 1 or forfeit most of
a million dollar deposit.
The ROC already has approval for the co-production
with the Northrop Company of 100 F5E's. This program
will be completed in November 1977. It now seeks
approval to produce an additional 20 aircraft. These
would be the first installment of a planned-for produc-
tion of an additional 100 F5's: 75 F5E's and 25 F5F's,
a two-seat version capable of both training and combat
missions. Although we are supporting the construction of
the first 100 aircraft with FMS credit, the ROC has not
asked for further assistance, and we do not recommend it.
An additional 20 F5E's would increase ROC Air Force
strength by mid-1978 to an estimated 272 combat aircraft,
including 120 F5E's, 71 of the older F5A's and F5B's
and 81 F-104's and F-100's which are rapidly approaching
the end of their projected service life.
FORD
?
SECRET
GDS
GG4/20/01
GERALD
SEGRET
2.
The T-53 engines are being co-produced by the
ROC and the Avco Lycoming Company for use in the ROC's
UH-1H helicopter. A total of 80 engines will be com-
pleted by June, 1976. Avco Lycoming has now asked for
an export license to produce an additional 43 engines,
which would be used in an ROC-designed basic trainer
aircraft.
These are new requests. We are still holding a
ROC request of May, 1974 to purchase the Harpoon anti-ship
missile which is stimulated by concern over the increas-
ing threat to its Navy posed by the PRC's growing strength
in high speed patrol boats armed with Styx missiles.
The ROC wants to mount Harpoon on patrol boats which it
intends to purchase. Harpoon is not yet in the US Navy
inventory and earliest delivery to the ROC would be
mid-1977 at best. The ROC has not been specific about
the number it wants, but has requested approval of a sale
in principle.
Our Embassy in Taipei supports all three of these
requests. It particularly sees strong military and
political justifications for the additional F5E's and
Harpoon. USLO has specifically expressed serious
reservations about the additional F5E's, arguing that
the PRC will view approval as another US "transfusion"
to the ROC and as slippage in the implementation of the
Shanghai Communique.
We regard the question of additional F5E's as the
most important. In view of the overwhelming size of the
PRC air force and the critical importance of maintaining
control of the air in defending Taiwan, there is a valid
military requirement for this modest augmentation of ROC
air strength. Largely through our educational efforts,
the ROC, which continues to view its security in
predominantly military terms, assigns highest priority to
maintaining a credible air defense. Our refusal to meet
a request in this vital area would be interpreted by the
ROC as evidence of a new and far more restrictive policy
on weapons supply, with dangerous implication for its
security. ROC worries about its diplomatic relationship
with the US would be accompanied by fear that it would
also be cut off from access to US arms. If the cumulative
SECRET
FORD
of
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET
3.
effect of negative US decisions on arms supply were to
generate such alarm in Taipei, the ROC could be prompted
into actions which would complicate our course with the
PRC. On the other hand, approval of this request would
demonstrate to the ROC our continued interest in Taiwan's
security, regardless of the question of our formal ties
with it. The ROC would hope that a favorable decision
on 20 additional F5E's would portend US approval of
further F5E's, but we could caution against such an
inference.
There is little question that US agreement to more
F5E's for the ROC would upset Peking, and we would have
to be prepared to hold firm and defend our action as
consistent with normalization. The PRC has not made a
major issue over the original F5E project, and it is
familiar with the limited capabilities of this aircraft.
We believe that Peking would not react immediately and
vigorously to an additional 20 aircraft. To improve
chances of this, we would stipulate that the ROC not
publicize the decision. Over the longer run, in reaction
to this type of activity the PRC might press us to adopt
more restrictive practices on the supply of military
equipment to the ROC.
We believe that to balance an affirmative decision
on more F5E's, we should not approve the ROC requests for
the Harpoon missile or for additional production of
T-53 engines. While the ROC has a valid military require-
ment for an anti-ship missile, it is not limited to a US
source of supply. Taipei has already obtained a small
number of the Israeli "Gabriel" missile for testing pur-
poses, and the Italian "Ottomat" is also available. Both
of these are more comparable to the Styx than the Harpoon,
which is considerably more sophisticated, versatile and
has a much greater range. As for the T-53 engines for
use in the ROC trainer, this is not a vital defense
need, and a turn-down here would have the added benefit
of avoiding the appearance of helping the ROC develop
an independent aircraft production capability.
We therefore recommend that the request for 20 more
F5E aircraft be approved and that those for Harpoon
missiles and additional T-53 engines be disapproved. In
the case of Harpoon, we believe that we should continue
to remain silent, since the ROC probably already appreci-
ates that our silence to date is a face-saving turn-down.
SECRET
FORD
&
GERAVE
LIBRARY
SECRET
4.
The Department of Defense strongly supports
approval of the 20 additional F5E aircraft. It does
not concur in the disapproval of the additional
T-53 engines or Harpoon. In view of this difference
of opinion, we believe it best to defer an decision
on the latter two matters.
Jenos Executive S.Spling,Van S. Springsteen Secretary
SECRET
BERALD & LISHARY CORD
35
DOC
RECD
G NBR
INITIAL ACTION o
ISC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
MO
DA
MO 7502814
DA
HR
Fraibe
REFERENCE:
CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE
TO: PRES
FROM: kissinger, H
S/S 7508578
UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
KISSINGER
COLBY, W
OTHER
LOU
NO FORN
NODIS
SCOWCROFT
SCHLESINGER, J
C
EYES ONLY EXDIS
DAVIS
ST
EX
SEC
S
CODEWORD
SUBJECT: Stinson tt Roc TS SENSITIVE t
of Projects
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
REC
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
INFO
CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT
FOR
MEMO FOR HAK
(
)
STAFF SECRETARY
MEMO FOR PRES
(
)
FAR EAST
FICENCE
X
REPLY FOR
(
)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
APPROPRIATE ACTION
(
)
DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / so. ASIA
MEMO
TO
(
)
EUROPE / CANADA
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
JOINT MEMO
(
)
UNITED NATIONS
REFER TO
FOR:
(
)
ECONOMIC
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
(
)
SCIENTIFIC
CONCURRENCE.
(
)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
NSC PLANNING
COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL 5/8 INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL
OCEANS POLICY
INTELLIGENCE
SOLOMON
SMYSER
DATE
FROM
TO
S
SUBSEQUENT
ACTION
REQUIRED
(OR
TAKEN):
CY
TO
10/30
I
Action Completed per Pala
SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
2 Cr realls Action
complete But Could
ant remember details
FORD
DISPATCH
&
CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:
MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:
NSC/S DISP INSTR
NOTIFY
& DATE
BY
M/F'D NOV
1975
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
OPEN CRT ID: 6AB
SA
SF
CROSS REF W/
HP
NS
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:
FOLDER:
CLOSE
WH
EP
PA
DY
(NBC-74-21)
4c
DOC
RECD
LOG NBR
INITIAL ACTION o
ISC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
Imper COLBY, W
MO
DA
MO
DA
HR
19
20
12
750345
REFERENCE:
CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE
TO: PRES
FROM: KISSINGER,
S/S
UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
KISSINGER
OTHER
LOU
NO FORN
NODIS
SCOWCROFT
+
SCHLESINGER,
J
C
EYES ONLY EXDIS
Unger a of
SUBJECT: DAVIS The Jay ST EX/SEC Fourt Into w/gat Chenic TS S SENSITIVE CODEWORD
INTERNAL ROUTING AND 20 DISTRIBUTION ACTION INFO REC CY 1975 ACTION REQUIRED
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT
FOR
MEMO
FOR
HAK
-
)
STAFF SECRETARY
MEMO FOR PRES
(
)
REPLY FOR
FAR EAST
(
)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
APPROPRIATE ACTION
-
)
DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / so. ASIA
MEMO
TO
(
)
EUROPE / CANADA
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
JOINT MEMO
-
)
UNITED NATIONS
REFER TO
FOR:
(
)
ECONOMIC
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
(
)
SCIENTIFIC
CONCURRENCE.
-
-
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
NSC PLANNING
COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL
OCEANS POLICY
INTELLIGENCE
15
DATE
FROM
Sup
TO
S Jacher SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (5-20) (OR TAKEN):
CY TO
X
5/20
Nacls
Noted by b. croft
SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
FORD
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
DISPATCH
CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:
MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:
NSC/S DISP INSTR
NOTIFY
& DATE
BY
M/F'D
BY
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
CRT ID:
MAY20 1975. SA
SF
C
REF W/
OPEN
HP
NS
ISE CY ATTACHED: X
FOLDER:
CLOSE
WH
EP
PA
DY
(NBC-74-21)
4a
MEMORANDUM
3456
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
GDS
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
May 19, 1975 Think
FROM:
W. R. SMYSER 8
SUBJECT:
Your Meeting with Our Ambassador to
the Republic of China, Leonard Unger,
on May 20, 1975 at 3:00 p.m.
You have agreed to meet with Ambassador Unger on May 20, 1975
at 3:00 p.m. to review our policy toward the ROC and our normalization
process with Peking.
Background
Dick Solomon, Jack Froebe, and I met with Ambassador Unger on
May 16. Unger made the following points about the evolution of our
relations with Taiwan:
-- Premier Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK) on May 3 gave Unger a
memorandum (attached at Tab A), which CCK asked Unger to transmit
to the President.
This memorandum is essentially an ROC effort to use the
fall of Indochina and the resulting U.S. policy assessment to regain
some of the ground the ROC has lost in recent years.
The memorandum, in which CCK repeats the views he expressed
to the Vice President and to Unger earlier, asserts that Taiwan is
indispensible to the security of Japan and to the U.S. position in Asia
generally, arguing that Taiwan is an essential link in the off-island
defense chain. The memorandum thus would have the U.S. reverse the
basic policy goal stated in the Shanghai Communique. It also exudes
ROC satisfaction with the President's recent public attention to Taiwan.
-- Ambassador Unger believes he should be authorized to deliver
an oral reply to CCK, and will give us his suggestions on the substance
of a reply.
FORD
&
SECRET GDS
GERALD
LIBRARY
GG 4/20/01
SECRET
2
We must continue the gradual approach to the attenuation of
our relations with Taipei, in order to avoid an ROC resort to alternatives
of desperation -- such as the Soviet option or a formal declaration of
Taiwan's independence from the mainland. The ROC is resigned to
U.S. normalization of relations with Peking, but can digest just so many
particulars in this process at any one time.
The situation in Taipei is not so brittle as to give the Secretary
and the President no leeway in their Peking talks. Taipei could adjust
to a reversal in the relationship -- a switch of the Embassy and the
Liaison Office -- so long as Taipei had some credible assurance on the
island's security. (The State ROC Country Director, Burt Levin,
interjected, however, that the PRC would never tolerate any official
ROC presence in Washington after such a switch.) The ROC, before
Indochina's fall, expected the worst from the President's Peking trip
a reversal in our representation -- but now is hopeful that this may not
be in the cards for this trip at least.
He (Ambassador Unger) should be authorized to begin as soon
as possible consultations with CCK on what is likely to result from the
President's PRC visit, in order to get the difficult adjustment process
underway. Unger recognizes, however, that such consultations will
not be possible until rather late in the game.
On the U.S. military presence on Taiwan, the 327th Air Division
can be disestablished in the first quarter of FY 76.
Unger said that he would find it useful to continue MAAG and
TDC up to the point of diplomatic derecognition -- rather than to
have MAAG and TDC amalgamated If MAAG were to continue this way,
Unger would expect a reduction in the rank of the heads of these two
organizations. Another alternative which Unger suggested would be
the merger of MAAG into the DAO.
I believe that you should use this meeting with Ambassador Unger
to reaffirm existing guidance on China policy, particularly since he
will not see the Secretary and since we should have some differences
with the EA Bureau, where some people would have us attenuate our
relationship with Taipei faster than we believe the ROC can adjust. I
will plan to sit in on the meeting.
Suggested Talking Points
I am interested in your appraisal of the ROC's reaction to the
FORD
fall of Indochina.
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET
SECRET
3
-- Understandably, the ROC is probing our policy to see if we
might slow the process of normalization with Peking and what influence
they (the ROC) might have on us in this respect. I note that Premier
Chiang Ching-kuo has sent us a memorandum on the question of our
general China policy. How do you suggest that we reply?
I want to affirm that the normalization of our relations with
Peking will stay on course, although we are not yet sure whether there
might be some adjustments in the pace as a result of the setback in
Indochina.
We are now only beginning to chart what we might try to accomplish
during the President's trip to Peking later this year. I understand well
your desire to begin to prepare the ROC for any major new steps that
might result. By the very nature of the process, however, this will be
difficult. Nevertheless, we are sensitive to the need, and will authorize
consultations as early as possible, even though this may be considerably
later than might be desirable in terms of the ROC's adjustment.
What is your assessment of the ROC's estimate as to what is
likely to transpire during the President's Peking visit, and what the limits
of the ROC's toleration are?
The Taiwan NSSM covering both our future military presence in
Taiwan and our future military assistance to Taiwan is now in its final
stages, and we hope to get out comprehensive guidance in the near future.
What is your assessment of the political impact of President
Chiang's death? In particular, has it brought on a certain psychological
letdown, particularly among mainlanders, which although anticipated
all along nevertheless could not really be experienced and dealt with
until the event actually occurred?
FORD
?
GERALO
SECRET
Department of Stare
4b
of / SELINA AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 2166
PAGE 01 TAIPEI 02415 050026Z
62
ACTION SS-25
JAF Libiscuss 8
INFO
OCT-01
ISO-00
/026
w
DB/P
CLIFT
02026
R 0304392 MAY 75
ELLIOTT
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
FROEDE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5053
8
HORAN
KENNEDY
LODAL
S RCRE TAIPEI 2415
LOW
OBER
EXDIS
RATLIFF
S
OAKLEY
SMYSER
E.O. 11552: XGDS-1
SOLUMON
TAGS: PFOR, TW, TH, RP, CH
STEARMAN
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEN
FARRAR
REF: TAIPEI 2255
anderson
1. I CALLED ON FONMIN SHEN CHANG-HUAN AT HIS REQUEST,
MAY 3. REFERRING TO MY RECENT CONVERSATION WITH PREMIER
CHIANG AT TZU HU (REFTEL), SHEN SAID PREMIER HAD ASKED
THAT ESSENCE OF VIEWS PREMIER HAD EXPRESSED ON THAT OCCASION
AS WELL AS IN TALK WITH VICE PRESIDENT ROCKEFELLER ON
APRIL 16, BE PRESENTED IN BRIEF PAPER AND REQUESTED THAT
IT BE TRANSMITTED BY ME TO PRESIDENT FORD WHEN I RETURNED TO
WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATIONS.
2, PAPER WHICH SHEN READ AND HANDED ME COPY IS QUOTED BELOW:
REGIN QUOTE THE TRAUMATIC EVENTS THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN
INDO-CHINA RECENTLY CANNOT BUT HAVE TREMENDOUS IMPACT
ON VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD, PARTICUL RLY IN THE
ASTAN AND PACIFIC REGION. THE LEADERS OF THE REPUBLIC
OF CHINA AGREE WITH PRESIDENT FORD THAT TO INDULGE IN
RECRIMINATION AND IN APPORTIONING BLAMES IS NOT PRODUCTIVE.
ON THE OTHER HAND, MANY LESSONS MUST BE DRAWN FROM THIS
TRAGEDY TO PREVENT HISTORY FROM REPEATING ITSELF.
MILITARILY, THE INDO-CHINA CHAPTER MAY HAVE NOW COME
FORD
&
TO A CLOSE. HOWEVER, A "NEW AGENDA" AS APTLY CALLED BY
PRESIDENT FORD SHOULD BE METICULOUSLY DISCUSSED, PLANNED
DECLASSIFIED
GERALD
LIBRARY
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5.
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES,
state
8/7/00
SECRET BY. GG
I NARA, DATE 4/20/01
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
A
GRAINA
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES or
separ
SECRET
PAGE 02 TAIPEI 02415 050026Z
AND PREPARED TO DEAL WITH OTHER PROBABLE AND POSSIBLE
INTERNATIONAL CRIES THAT ARE SURELY FORTHCOMING.
IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT MANY COUNTRIES IN THIS
AREA, ESPECIALLY THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES, HAVE BECOME
INCREASINGLY NERVOUS, WHICH MIGHT EVEN LEAD TO PANIC, IN
THE VIEW OF THE REPUBLIC UF CHINA, THAILAND AND THE
PHILIPPINES SHOULD BE GIVEN TOP PRIORITY OF THE U.S. "NEW
AGENDA". THAT "AN, COUNTRIES 1N Tnio
Trif PHILIPPINES, HAVE SECUME
WHILE ATTENDING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA, EQUAL IMPORTANCE L. IN
OF NORTHEAST ASIA CANNOT BE GAINSAID. THE REPUBLIC OF
CHINA IS COGNIZANT THAT THE U.S. ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE
TO JAPAN FOR ITS INDUSTRIAL AND ECONOMIC PROWESS. BUT THE
PROTECTION OF JAPAN HINGES UN THE SECURITY AND STABILITY
OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA WHICH
ARE VITAL AND INDISPENSABLE FLANKS TO JAPAN. SHOULD
FITHER OF THE FLANKS FALL INTU THE HANDS OF AN ADVERSARY
OF THE U.S., IT WOULD RENDER JAPAN MILITARILY
int
VULNERABLE ANU CREATE UNFATHOMABLE CONFUSION AND
DIVISION IN ITS DOMESTIC POLITICS. JAPAN'S INDUSTRIAL -1Cm
CAPABILITY WOULD THEN BECOME ASSETS TO AMERICA'S
ENEMIES. CONFIDENTIALLY, A NUMBER OF JAPAN'S LEADING
ELDERLY STATESMEN HAVE EXPRESSED THE FEARS OF SUCH A
NIGHTMARE.
CORPOSION AND
JAPATES
INJUSTRIAL
TT IS BELIEVED THAT A STRONG CHAIN STRETCHING FROM
NOREA, JAPAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE PHILIPPINES,
INDONESIA DOWN TO AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND WOULD FORM A
RELIABLE AND CREDIBLE FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE FOR THE U.S.
DIPLOMATICALLY AND MILITARILY.
AST-FICHING F-OM
AS PREMIER CHIANG CHING RTC 1020 ICi PRESIDENT IMPINES,
NELSON ROCKEFELLER, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS UNEQUIVOCALLY
FORD
DEDICATED TO THE FOLLOWING POLICY DECISIONS:
int
&
!. UNRELENTING STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNISM AND
GERALD
LIBRARY
COMMUNIST REGIMES NO MATTER WHERE THEY ARE AND DETERMINED
TO DEFEND THE SECURITY OF TAIWAN, PESCADORES, QUEMOY AND MATSU:
2. FIRM ALIGNMENT WITH THE FREE WORLD, PARTICULARLY
STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNISM AND
WHERE THE ARE AND WETERMINED
COMMISST THE SECURITY SECRET QUENOY ANL MAISU:
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
;
STATE
Department of State
C UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES of
SECRET
PAGE 03 TAIPEI 02415 050026Z
TO U.S.;
3. FURTHER PROMOTION OF INTERNAL POLITICAL SOLIDARITY;
AND
4. REDOUBLED EFFORTS FOR THE CONTINUING DEVELOPMENT
OF THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF THE PEOPLE.
BY so DOING, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA WILL BE ABLE TO PLAY
A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE NEW ERA.
IT IS THE FERVENT HOPE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
THAT PRESIDENT FORD WILL EXERCISE HIS FARSIGHTED AND
STEADFAST STATESMANSHIP WHIC WILL HELP OVERCOME ANY
DIFFICULTIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA. IN THE LIGHT
OF PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO'S BASIC POLICY DIRECTION,
\
PRESIDENT FORD AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CAN ALWAYS COUNT
UPON THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AS A LOYAL ALLY AND PARTNER.
PRESIDENT FORU HAS REPEATEDLY OFFERED HIS ASSURANCES
THAT WHAT TRANSPIRED IN INDU-CHINA SHOULD NOT IMPAIR THE
CREDIBILITY OF THE U.S. IN ITS FULFILLMENT OF COMMITMENTS
TO THE OTHER ALLIES AND FRIENDS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC.
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS GRATIFISQBQTH THE WARM SENTIMENTS
EXPRESSED BY PRESIDENT FORD TOWARDS THIS COUNTRY IN HIS
RECENT APPEARANCE AT THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPER EDITORS
ASSOCIATION IN NEW YORK, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA WOULD
APPRECIATE IT IF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD REPEAT SUCH
REASSURANCES WHENEVER THE SAME ARE PUBLICLY GIVEN TO
OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE REGION.
FREQUENT AND FRANK CONSULTATIUNS BETWEEN THE TWO
GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE MOST BENEFICIAL FOR BOTH COUNTRIES.
FOR THE TASK OF STABILIZING THAILAND. THE PHILIPPINES
AND OTHER SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES THE STRENGTHENING OF
THE TIES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND NATIONS IN NORTHEAST ASIA
FORD
IN GENERAL ANU THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN PARTICULAR
A
LIBRARY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Lipartment of Stat
STATE AMERICA
TELEGRAM
or
SECRET
S
PAGE 04 TAIPEI 02415 0500262
COULD ALSO SERVE AS A CREDIBLE TOKEN OF THE U.S. INTENTION
AND DETERMINATION, so THAT THE WAVERING AND NERVOUS
COUNTRIES IN THIS AREA WOULD NOT BE DRAWN INTO THE ORBIT
OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS. END QUOTE
3. I TOLD SHEN THAT EXPRESSION OF ROC VIEWS AS PRESENTED
IN PAPER WOULD BE HELPFUL IN CURRENT WASHINGTON REASSESSMENT
OF OUR POLICIES AND THAT I WOULD MAKE A PARTICULAR POINT OF
BRINGING TO ATTENTION OF OUR POLICY MAKERS. I EXPECTED
THIS REASSESSMENT WOULD RESULT IN POLICY FOUNDED ON BASIC,
LONG-TERM INTERESTS, AND THAT, IN THIS CONNECTION, I FELT SURE
THAT OUR PEOPLE WOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE VERY MUCH IN MIND THE
S
MEANS OF WHICH A MODUS VIVENDI COULD BE WORKED OUT WITH
MAINLAND CHINA IN ORDER TO BETTER ASSURE PEACE AND STABILITY
IN EAST ASIA AND ALSO TO SEEK SOLUTIONS TO SOME WORLD
PROBLEMS IN WHICH MAINLAND CHINA MUST PLAY A ROLE. I TOLD
SHEN THAT WE WECD VERY WELL AWARE OF ROC VIEWS ON THIS
SUBJECT AND ITS ESSENTIAL INTEREST IN OUR DEVELOPING RELATIONS
WITH THE PRC. SHEN INDICATED HIS UNDERSTANDING, BUT WONDERED
IF THE HIGH PRICE WE WOULD HAVE TO PAY FOR FURTHERING DETENTE
WITH THE COMMUNISTS WOULD SE WORTH THE CLEAR DISADVANTAGES.
HE POINTED UP THE "NONTRUSTWORTHINESS" OF THE CHINESE
COMMUNISTS, E.G., INDOCHINA, CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR
INSURGENCIES, ETC., AS CONTRASTED WITH THE CLEAR, UNAMBIGUOUS
ICIES OF THE ROC WHICH WERE STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE U.S.
S
4. OUR CONVERSATION CONTINUED OVER A RATHER BROAD
RANGE OF SUBJECTS WHICH WILL BE REPORTED SEPTELS.
5. REGARDING PREMIER'S REQUEST THAT PAPER QUUTED
PARA 2, ABOVE BE TRANSMITTED TO PRESIDENT FORD, I
WILL WISH TO DISCUSS THIS DURING MY CONSULTATION
WASHINGTON.
UNGER
FORD
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF-THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
INTERNAL NSC ROUTING
6/30/75
CLIFT
DAVIS
ELLIOTT
HORMATS
LODAL
OAKLEY
SMYSER
SOLOMON
5a 1 ml 1
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FROEBE
HORAN
GRANGER *
LOW
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GERALD A. LIBRARY FORD
STEARMAN
JANKA
DARGIS
no further action
SKANCKE
FARRAR
OTHER
ADMIN
(TURN THIS TAB UP TO MOVE
BACK TO THE SECRETARIAT)
BOW
ol
5b
General:
I've told Bud
that MAK said
OK to so ahead.
David
) the Saldn?
Whis
A. FORD LIBRARY
I
5c
The
ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE
Hung
Here is the while
package on the F-5
10- production for Taiwan
The F-5 portion is at
the paper chip.
But
3 We l med a response
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R FORD LIBRARY
and
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AAM5d
3641
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
URGENT ACTION
May 27, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
W. R. SMYSER
RICHARD H. SOLOMON
RKS
CLINTON E. GRANGER
SUBJECT:
Co-Production of 50 F-5E's by the
Republic of China
We have separately sent the Secretary the Taiwan NSSM, which deals
with further arms deliveries to the Republic of China and, inter alia,
with the question of co-production of another 20 F-5E's.
It now turns out that a decision on the 20 F-5E's must be made in the
next two days, because the ROC must inform Northrop of its intent
by June 1 or forfeit most of a $1 million deposit. We would appreciate
your raising this with the Secretary within the next day or two and
letting us have a cable reply by Friday, May 30, so that we can advise
the ROC in time.
As our memorandum on the NSSM indicated, the ROC would not require
any U.S. aid to produce the additional 20 aircraft, and we would not
recommend giving it. It would, however, regard this as the first
installment of its plan to produce an additional 100 F-5's to replace
obsolescing aircraft. Our embassy in Taipei strongly recommends
approving the additional F-5E's; USLO expresses serious reservations.
State and DOD favor approval. We believe it would be consistent with
Option 3 in the lower range, which is our general recommendation on
providing military equipment to the ROC.
All of us recommend urgent approval, which would be consistent with
the bureaucracy recommendations in the NSSM and also consistent
with what we believe should be our general position on assistance to
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NBC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
NARA, DATE 4/20/01
the ROC.
DECLASSIFIED
RECOMMENDATION:
That you urgently discuss the co-production of an additional 20 F-5E's
with the Secretary to obtain his approval in time to notify the ROC
(and Northrop) by the end of this week.
FORD
&
BY
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
GERALD
LIBRARY
Se
CUNFIDENTIAL
EYES ONLY
WHA077
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FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOHAK 060/1
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TOHAK 060
MAY 30, 1975
TO:
GOMPERT/RODMAN
FROM:
BUD MCFARLANE
TODAY IS THE LAST DAY FOR DECISION ON CO-PRODUCTION OF
ADDITIONAL F-5'S IN TAIWAN IF ROC IS TO AVOID DEFAULTING WITH
ITS MILLION DOLLAR DEPOSIT. (SMYSER PACKAGE ON THIS SUBJECT,
3641, DATED MAY 27 IS WITH THE GENERAL.) PLEASE ADVISE.
WARM REGARDS.
0097
2937
(Attached)
NNNN
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY 66
NARA, DATE 4/20/01
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SECRET
3450
IMMEDIATE
TO HAK 91
5/29/75
TO:
GOMPERT/RODMAN SCOTCROFT
FOR:
SCOWCROFT
FROM: MC FARLANE PC7
Attached is a Smyser/Solomon paper containing instructions for
DECLASSIFIED
NSC MEMO, 11/24/96, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
NARA, DATE 4/20/01
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
Ambassador Unger for use in his call on CCK which is to take
place on Tuesday or Wednesday of this week. I have attached
BY 66
the original State draft at Tab D.
Warm regards,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY
6/2
General Scowcroft -
Additionally, the Secretary
said when he handed me this that
he did not want to be driven
by the Desks like this!
BERRIO R FORD LIBRARY
should hold to up will later
jane
mant divius -lis
SECRET
MEMORANDUM
3450
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
XGDS (3)
ACTION
May 29, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
W. R. SMYSE
RICHARD H. SOLOMON
RMS
SUBJECT:
Proposed Presidential Reply to the
Republic of China Premier Chiang Ching-kuo
At Tab A is a draft State cable to Ambassador Unger in Taipei which
contains a proposed message from the President to Premier Chiang
Ching-kuo. The message, which Ambassador Unger would deliver
the following
orally to Chiang Ching-kuo, responds to two recent messages from the
Premier to the President:
-- A memorandum (Tab B) which Chiang Ching-kuo transmitted
to Ambassador Unger on May 3. That memorandum summarizes the
views he had expressed to the Vice President on April 16 and to the
Ambassador earlier. Essentially, Chiang Ching-kuo seizes on the
fall of Indochina to suggest that the U.S. once again incorporate Taiwan
into its island defense chain in the Western Pacific, arguing that
Taiwan and South Korea are indispensible to the security of Japan,
which in turn is the cornerstone of U.S. strategy in Asia. Chiang Ching-kuo
also reaffirms the Republic of China's commitment to a cooperative
relationship with the U.S., and thanks the President for his statement
on the Republic of China made before the American Society of Newspaper
Editors last month.
(Tab C)
A follow-on letter of May 7,1 in which Chiang Ching-kuo thanks
the President for his reaffirmation of U.S. commitments to the
Republic of China and repeats the substance of the May 3 memorandum.
The draft oral message expresses appreciation to Chiang Ching-kuo
for his two messages, and for the Premier's expression of intent to
continue close cooperation with the U.S. It pledges the U.S. to
reciprocate this spirit of close cooperation, and at the same time
reaffirms the U.S. intent to continue its normalization of relations with
Peking. Finally, it endorses Chiang Ching-kuo's suggestion that we
continue the frank consultations between our two governments.
&
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
GERALD
LIBRARY
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
XGDS (3)
BY
# NARA, DATE 4/20/01
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
2
The draft at Tab A incorporates several changes that we have made
in the State draft. We especially call your attention to the first of
these changes, the addition of paragraph 5, which we regard as
particularly important and which you may or may not wish to confirm.
Paragraph 5 has been added by Smyser and Froebe. They
believe that the cumulative effect of the Vice President's visit to
Taipei, the President's reaffirmation of our commitment to the ROC
in the wake of Indochina, and the Vice President's meeting of May 29
with Ambassador Shen may mislead the ROC leadership to believe
that we are pulling back from our normalization process with Peking.
This could relax the pressure on the ROC to continue its gradual
political and psychological adjustment toward a new relationship with
us. Paragraph 5's reference to the search for new modalities,
followed by paragraph 6's reaffirmation that U.S. normalization with
Peking will go forward, is designed to maintain a steady pressure
on the ROC for gradual adjustment toward a new relationship with the
U.S. at the same that we preserve the ROC's necessary minimum
confidence in us by implicitly reaffirming our basic commitment.
Solomon, Lord, and Gleysteen, however, believe that paragraph 5
would not be helpful. They hold that at a time when future developments
in our relations with Peking are uncertain it would be unwise to
stimulate the ROC with a signal that might provoke them to take
defensive action via their friends in Congress or through other means.
In paragraph 2, after the phrase "It is particularly useful
at this time" we removed the phrase in the State cable "when the
situation in East Asia is being carefully assessed, together with
consideration of future courses of action, We believe this suggestion
of an "agonizing reappraisal" of U.S. -Asian policy could have a
needlessly unsettling effect and is pointless since we are not making
such a reappraisal.
In paragraph 6, we dropped a second sentence from the State
cable which read "He also notes the smooth transition that has been
made to the new leadership in the ROC following upon the sad passing
of President Chiang and he wishes the Premier and his government
the best of success in their important undertakings. 11 We believe
this carries a slightly patronizing air. Instead, we have substituted
a reiteration of our standard compliments for the ROC's economic
progress and a reaffirmation of our belief that it will continue in the
period following President Chiang's death.
FORD
&
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve the draft State cable at Tab A as revised:
-- To include paragraph 5.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
-- To exclude paragraph 5.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
FORD LIBRARY & GERALD
SECRET/SENSITIVE
6c
SECRET
GDS
IMMEDIATE
TO:
TAIPEI
FROM: SECSTATE
SUBJECT: Premier Chiang's Message to President Ford
REF: TAIPEI 2415
1.
Upon his return to Taipei, Ambassador Unger is authorized
to make a presentation along the following lines to Premier Chiang
as a response to his message to President Ford which was subject
of reftel and also to his follow-on letter to the President of May 7.
2. President Ford thanks Premier Chiang for his message conveyed
through Ambassador Unger, and also for his subsequent letter of
May 7. It is particularly useful at this time to have the pertinent
views of the Republic of China. In this connection, the President
has also noted the views which the Premier conveyed earlier to
Vice President Rockefeller and which are recalled in the Premier's
current message.
3. The President has noted with appreciation the declarations of
the Republic of China of its commitment to play a positive and
constructive role in the new era ahead. The United States also
pledges itself to such a role, and to continue in this spirit the close
cooperation between the U.S. and the ROC.
GERALD ? FORD
SECRET GDS
GG 4/20/01
SECRET
2
4. As Premier Chiang is aware from President Ford's earlier
statements, the President firmly believes that the U.S. must remain
strong and must be in a position to carry out its commitments if
peace is to be maintained in Asia and the Pacific.
5. Developments in East Asia over the past several years, many
of which have affected our two countries, have made it clear to all
that the political and military relationships and confrontations of the
1950s and 1960s have changed and are continuing to evolve. This
fluidity in the international environment has created a situation
where we all must re-examine arrangements and policies; but this
in no way affects our concern for and commitment to the security
and well-being of our old allies and friends.
6. The Premier is aware of the efforts of the U.S. to reduce the
tensions in East Asia. In particular, the U.S. desires to develop
and enlarge communication with the PRC in order to seek peaceful
and equitable solutions to outstanding problems where this is
possible, and to reduce the dangers of confrontation and conflict.
These policies do not ignore the differences, some of them profound,
which lie between the United States and the PRC, but they are based
on the belief that peaceful resolution of those differences is in all
of our interests.
7. With the foregoing in mind, President Ford endorses the desirability
of frank discussions and has made this reply to the Premier's
FORD
&
message in that spirit. He again wishes to express his profound
GERALD
SECRET
SECRET
3
admiration for the progress that the Republic of China has made,
and to express his hope and conviction that this progress will
continue under the leadership of the Premier and of the government
of the Republic of China.
.
&
SECRET
;
and
6d
Department of State
SELING AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
STATES or
SECRET 2166
PAGE 01 TAIPEI 02415 050026Z
62
JAF Libiscuss.
ACTION SS-25
INFO
OCT-01
ISO-00
/026
w
DB/P
CLIFT
02020
R 0304392 MAY 75
ELLIOTT
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
FROEDE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5053
8
HORAN
KENNEDY
LODAL
SECRE T TAIPEI 2415
LOW
OBER
EXDIS
RATLIFF
OAKLEY
SMYSER
E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
SOLOMON
TAGS: PFOR, TH, TH, RP, CH
STEARMAN
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEN
FARRAR
REF: TAIPEI 2255
anderson
1. I CALLED ON FONMIN SHEN CHANG-HUAN HUAN AT HIS REQUEST,
MAY 3. REFERRING TO MY RECENT CONVERSATION WITH PREMIER
CHIANG AT TZU HU (REFTEL), SHEN SAID PREMIER HAD ASKED
saves
THAT ESSENCE OF VIEWS PREMIER HAD EXPRESSED ON THAT OCCASION
AS WELL AS IN TALK WITH VICE PRESIDENT ROCKEFELLER ON
APRIL 16, BE PRESENTED IN BRIEF PAPER AND REQUESTED THAT
IT BE TRANSMITTED BY ME TO PRESIDENT FORD WHEN I RETURNED TO
WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATIONS.
2, PAPER WHICH SHEN READ AND HANDED ME COPY IS QUOTED BELOW:
REGIN QUOTE THE TRAUMATIC EVENTS THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN
INDO-CHINA RECENTLY CANNOT BUT HAVE TREMENDOUS IMPACT
ON VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD, PARTICUL RLY IN THE
ASTAN AND PACIFIC REGION. THE LEADERS OF THE REPUBLIC
OF CHINA AGREE WITH PRESIDENT FORD THAT TO INDULGE IN
RECRIMINATION AND IN APPORTIONING BLAMES IS NOT PRODUCTIVE.
ON THE OTHER HAND, MANY LESSONS MUST BE DRAWN FROM THIS
TRAGEDY TO PREVENT HISTORY FROM REPEATING ITSELF.
MILITARILY, THE INDO-CHINA CHAPTER MAY HAVE NOW COME
TO A CLOSE. HOWEVER, A "NEW AGENDA" AS APTLY CALLED BY
FORD
PRESIDENT FORD SHOULD BE METICULOUSLY DISCUSSED, PLANNED
?
S
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
HERALD
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8/2/00
111
SECRET
NARA DATE 4/20/01
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
B.
UNITED
the
the
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES of
SECRET
PAGE 02 TAIPEI 02415 050026Z
AND PREPARED TO DEAL WITH OTHER PROBABLE AND POSSIBLE
INTERNATIONAL CRIES THAT ARE SURELY FORTHCOMING.
TT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT MANY COUNTRIES IN THIS
AREA, ESPECIALLY THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES, HAVE BECOME
INCREASINGLY NERVOUS, WHICH MIGHT EVEN LEAD TO PANIC, IN
THE VIEW OF THE REPUBLIC UF CHINA, THAILAND AND THE
PHILIPPINES SHOULD BE GIVEN TOP PRIORITY OF THE U.S. "NEW
AGENDA". THAT MANY COUNTRIES 1N Tnio
THE
PAILIPPINES. HAVE SECUME
WHILE ATTENDING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA, EQUAL IMPORTANCE L. IN
OF NORTHEAST ASIA CANNOT BE GAINSAID. THE REPUBLIC OF
CHINA IS COGNIZANT THAT THE U.S. ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE
TO JAPAN FOR ITS INDUSTRIAL AND ECONOMIC PROWESS. BUT THE
PROTECTION OF JAPAN HINGES UN THE SECURITY AND STABILITY
OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA WHICH
ARE VITAL AND INDISPENSABLE FLANKS TO JAPAN. SHOULD
FITHER OF THE FLANKS FALL INTU THE HANDS OF AN ADVERSARY
OF THE U.S., IT WOULD RENDER JAPAN MILITARILY
int
VUI. NERABLE AND CREATE UNFATHOMABLE CONFUSION AND STABILITY
DIVISION IN ITS DOMESTIC POLITICS. JAPAN'S INDUSTRIAL
CAPABILITY WOULD THEN BECOME ASSETS TO AMERICA'S
ENEMIES. CONFIDENTIALLY, A NUMBER OF JAPAN'S LEADING
SARY
ELDERLY STATESMEN HAVE EXPRESSED THE FEARS OF SUCH A
NIGHTMARE.
CONFUSION
AND
JAPARIS
INJUSTRIAL
IT IS BELIEVED THAT A STRONG CHAIN STRETCHING FROM
NOREA, JAPAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE PHILIPPINES,
INDONESIA DOWN TO AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND WOULD FORM A
RELIABLE AND CREDIBLE FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE FOR THE U.S.
DIPLOMATICALLY AND MILITARILY.
EST-FICHING FROM
AS PREMIER CHIANG CHING 1020 IC PRESIDENT THRINES,
FORD
&
NELSON ROCKEFELLER, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS UNEQUIVOCALLY
DEDICATED TO THE FOLLOWING POLICY DECISIONS: For
int
GERALD
LIBRARY
1. UNRELENTING STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNISM AND
COMMUNIST REGIMES NO MATTER WHERE THEY ARE AND DETERMINED
TO DEFEND THE SECURITY OF TAIWAN, PESCADORES, QUEMOY AND MATSU:
DERISIONS:
2. FIRM ALIGNMENT WITH THE FREE WORLD, PARTICULARLY
STRUGGLE COMMUNISM AND
WHERE THE ARE AND JETERMINED
COMMINST To THE SECURITY SECRET PHSLACORES. QUENOY ANU MAISU;
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
A OF STATE
Department of State
of STATE UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 TAIPEI 02415 0500262
TO U.S.;
3. FURTHER PROMOTION OF INTERNAL POLITICAL SOLIDARITY;
AND
4. REDOUBLED EFFORTS FOR THE CONTINUING DEVELOPMENT
OF THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF THE PEOPLE.
BY so DOING, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA WILL BE ABLE TO PLAY
A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE NEW ERA.
IT IS THE FERVENT HOPE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
THAT PRESIDENT FORD WILL EXERCISE HIS FARSIGHTED AND
STEADFAST STATESMANSHIP WHIC WILL HELP OVERCOME ANY
DIFFICULTIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA. IN THE LIGHT
OF PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO'S BASIC POLICY DIRECTION,
\
PRESIDENT FORD AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CAN ALWAYS COUNT
UPON THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AS A LOYAL ALLY AND PARTNER.
PRESIDENT FORU HAS REPEATEDLY OFFERED HIS ASSURANCES
THAT WHAT TRANSPIRED IN INDU-CHINA SHOULD NOT IMPAIR THE
CREDIBILITY OF THE U.S. IN ITS FULFILLMENT OF COMMITMENTS
TO THE OTHER ALLIES AND FRIENDS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC.
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS GRATIFISQBQTH THE WARM SENTIMENTS
EXPRESSED BY PRESIDENT FORD TOWARDS THIS COUNTRY IN HIS
RECENT APPEARANCE AT THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPER EDITORS'
ASSOCIATION IN NEW YORK. THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA WOULD
APPRECIATE IT IF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD REPEAT SUCH
REASSURANCES WHENEVER THE SAME ARE PUBLICLY GIVEN TO
OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE REGION
FREQUENT AND FRANK CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO
GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE MOST BENEFICIAL FOR BOTH COUNTRIES.
FOR THE TASK OF STABILIZING THAILAND, THE PHILIPPINES
AND OTHER SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES THE STRENGTHENING OF
FORD
THE TIES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND NATIONS IN NORTHEAST ASIA
s
\
TN GENERAL ANU THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN PARTICULAR
GERALD
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SEGRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GRING
MAKE
Department of State
TELEGRAM
/
or
SECRET
S
PAGE 04 TAIPEI 02415 050026Z
COULD ALSO SERVE AS A CREDIBLE TOKEN OF THE U.S. INTENTION
AND DETERMINATION, SO THAT THE WAVERING AND NERVOUS
COUNTRIES IN THIS AREA WOULD NOT BE DRAWN INTO THE ORBIT
OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS. END QUOTE
3. I TOLD SHEN THAT EXPRESSION OF ROC VIEWS AS PRESENTED
IN PAPER WOULD BE HELPFUL IN CURRENT WASHINGTON REASSESSMENT
OF OUR POLICIES AND THAT I WOULD MAKE A PARTICULAR POINT OF
BRINGING TO ATTENTION OF OUR POLICY MAKERS. I EXPECTED
THIS REASSESSMENT WOULD RESULT IN POLICY FOUNDED ON BASIC,
LONG-TERM TERM INTERESTS, AND THAT, IN THIS CONNECTION, I FELT SURE
THAT OUR PEOPLE WOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE VERY MUCH IN MIND THE
S
MEANS OF WHICH A MODUS VIVENDI COULD BE WORKED OUT WITH
MAINLAND CHINA IN ORDER TO BETTER ASSURE PEACE AND STABILITY
IN EAST ASIA AND ALSO TO SEEK SOLUTIONS TO SOME WORLD
PROBLEMS IN WHICH MAINLAND CHINA MUST PLAY A ROLE. I TOLD
SHEN THAT WE WECD VERY WELL AWARE OF ROC VIEWS ON THIS
SUBJECT AND ITS ESSENTIAL INTEREST IN OUR DEVELOPING RELATIONS
WITH THE PRC. SHEN INDICATED HIS UNDERSTANDING, BUT WONDERED
IF THE HIGH PRICE WE WOULD HAVE TO PAY FOR FURTHERING DETENTE
WITH THE COMMUNISTS WOULD BE WORTH THE CLEAR DISADVANTAGES.
HE POINTED UP THE "NONTRUSTWORTHINESS" OF THE CHINESE
COMMUNISTS, E.G., INDOCHINA, CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR
INSURGENCIES, ETC., AS CONTRASTED WITH THE CLEAR, UNAMBIGUOUS
POLICIES OF THE ROC WHICH WERE STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE U.S.
S
4. OUR CONVERSATION CONTINUED OVER A RATHER BROAD
RANGE OF SUBJECTS WHICH WILL BE REPORTED SEPTELS.
5. REGARDING PREMIER'S REQUEST THAT PAPER QUUTED
PARA 2, ABOVE BE TRANSMITTED TO PRESIDENT FORD, I
WILL WISH TO DISCUSS THIS DURING MY CONSULTATION
WASHINGTON.
UNGER
FORD
&
OF
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NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
be
OFFICE OF THE PREMIER
REPUBLIC OF CHINA -
May 7, 1975
Dear Mr. President:
In consequence of the traumatic events in Indo-China,
many countries in this area, especially Thailand and the
Philippines, have become increasingly wavering. It is most
gratifying and assuring that you made a timely statement at
the press conference on May 6, that it is your aim to tie
more closely together South Korea with the U.S., to reaf-
firm your commitments to the Republic of China, to work
more closely with Indonesia, with the Philippines and with
other Pacific nations.
In order to deal with the probable and possible inter-
national crises that are surely forthcoming, a 'new agenda'
as you aptly called should be meticulously planned and
prepared.
In my view, Thailand and the Philippines should be
given top priority in the agenda. However, while attending
to Southeast Asia, equal importance of Northeast Asia cannot
be gainsaid. We are cognizant that the U.S. attaches great
importance to Japan. But the protection of Japan hinges on
the security and stability of the Republic of Korea and the
Republic of China which are vital and indispensable flanks to
Japan. Should either of the flanks fall into the hands of an
adversary of the U.S., it would render Japan militarily vul-
nerable and create unfathomable confusion and division in its
domestic politics. Japan's industrial capability would then
become assets to America's enemies. A number of Japan's
leading elder statesmen have expressed to me their fears of
such a nightmare.
I believe that the strengthening of the ties between the
U.S. and nations in Northcast Asia in general and the Republic
of China in particular could well serve as a credible token of
the U.S. intention and determination. A strong chain stretching
FORD
R
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES,
state
NARA, DATE 4/20/01
GERALO
LIBRARY
BY
,
from Korea, Japan, the Republic of China, the Philippines,
Indonesia down to Australia and New Zealand would form a
reliable and credible first line of defense for the U.S.
diplomatically and militarily.
As I have mentioned to Vice President Rockefeller during
his recent trip to Taipei that the Republic of China is dedicated
to the following policy:
(1) Unrelenting struggle against communism and communist
regimes and determined to defend the security of Taiwan,
Pescadores, Quemoy and Matsu;
(2) Firm alignment with the free world, particularly the U.S.;
(3) Further promotion of internal political solidarity; and
(4) Redoubled efforts for the continuing development of the
economic well-being of the people.
By so doing, we shall continue to play a positive and con-
structive role in the new era.
In view of the above, Mr. President, the U.S. Government
can always count on the Republic of China as a loyal ally and
partner.
1 shall be grateful for your consideration of my views
which are presented with all sincerity and frankness that
I command.
With best wishes for your continued success and personal
well-being,
Sincerely yours,
Chiang Ching. know
Chiang Ching-kuo
His Excellency
President Gerald R. Ford
The White House
Washington, D.C.
FORD LIBRARY &
6f
SECRET
EA/ROC:AMB - L UNGER
5/19/75 EXT 22012
EA:WHGLEYSTEEN
S/S
S/P - MR. LORD
NSC - MR. SOLOMON
NSC - MR. SMYSER
ROUTINE
TAIPEI
GLEYSTE
'E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
UNCE
TAGS: PFOR CH
LORD
S/S
SUBJECT:
PREMIER CHIANG'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT FORD
SOLON
REF: TAIPEI 2415
SAYBER
1. UPON HIS RETURN TO TAIPEI, AMBASSADOR UNGER IS
98
AUTHORIZED TO SPEAK ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES TO
PREMIER CHIANG AS A RESPONSE TO HIS MESSAGE FOR
PRESIDENT FORD WHICH WAS SUBJECT OF REFTEL:
2. PRES. FORD THANKS PREMIER CHIANG FOR HIS MESSAGE
CONVEYED THROUGH AMB. UNGER. IT IS PARTICULARLY
USEFUL AT THIS TIME WHEN THE SITUATION IN EAST ASIA
IS BEING CAREFULLY ASSESSED, TOGETHER WI... CONSIDERA-
TION OF FUTURE COURSES OF ACTION, TO HAVE THE PEI [NENT
VIEWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA. IN THIS CONNECTION,
THE PRESIDENT HAS ALSO NOTED THE VIEWS WHICH THE
PREMIER EARLIER CONVEYED TO VP ROCKEFELLER AND WHICH
ARE RECALLED IN THE PREMIER'S CURRENT MESSAGE.
3. IN PARTICULAR THE PRESIDENT HAS NOTED THE
DECLARATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA OF ITS COMMIT-
MENT TO PLAY A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE
NEW ERA AHEAD. THE UNITED STATES ALSO PLEDGES ITSELF
GERÄLD
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
GG
NARA, DATE 4/20/01
,
FORM DS 322A{0CR}
SECRET
2
TO CONTINUING IN THIS SPIRIT THE CLOSE COOPERATION
BETWEEN THE US AND THE ROC.
4- AS PREMIER CHIANG IS AWARE FROM PRESIDENT FORD'S
EARLIER STATEMENTS, THE PRESIDENT FIRMLY BELIEVES
THAT THE US MUST REMAIN STRONG AND MUST BE IN A POSI-
TION TO CARRY OUT ITS COMMITMENTS IF PEACE IS TO BE
MAINTAINED IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC-
5. AT THE SAME TIME THE PREMIER IS AWARE OF THE EFFORTS
OF THE US TO REDUCE THE TENSIONS IN EAST ASIA. IN
PARTICULAR THE US DESIRES TO DEVELOP AND ENLARGE
COMMUNICATION WITH THE PRC IN ORDER TO SEEK PEACEFUL
AND EQUITABLE SOLUTIONS TO OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS WHERE
THIS IS POSSIBLE AND REDUCE THE DANGERS OF CONFRONTA-
TION AND CONFLICT- THE US DOES NOT HIDE THE DIFFER-
ENCES, SOME OF THEM PROFOUND, WHICH LIE BETWEEN us AND
THE PRC BUT IT IS PERSUADED THAT THE PEACE OF THE WORLD
AND OF EAST ASIA DEMANDS THAT CONTINUING EFFORTS BE
MADE BY THE US TO FIND PEACEFUL RESOLUTIONS FOR SUCH
DIFFERENCES.
6. WITH ALL OF THE FOREGOING IN MIND, PRES. FORD
ENDORSES THE DESIRABILITY OF FRANK DISCUSSIONS AND
HAS MADE THIS REPLY TO THE PREMIER'S MESSAGE IN THAT
SPIRIT. HE ALSO NOTES THE SMOOTH TRANSITION THAT
HAS BEEN MADE TO THE NEW LEADERSHIP IN THE ROC FOLLOW-
ING UPON THE SAD PASSING OF PRESIDENT CHIANG AND HE
WISHES THE PREMIER AND HIS GOVERNMENT THE BEST OF
SUCCESS IN THEIR IMPORTANT UNDERTAKINGS.
YY
FORD
GERALD
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