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China, Republic of (10)
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China, Republic of (10)
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Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific (Ford Administration)
East Asia and Pacific Country Files
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China
Taiwan
Foreign aid
Olympics
Arms transfers
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The original documents are located in Box 5, folder "China, Republic of (10)" of the
Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential
Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 5 of Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 012661
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
....
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Intelligence Report
DESCRIPTION
Re Republic of China
CREATION DATE
05/1976
VOLUME
12 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400122
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
China, Republic of (10)
DATE WITHDRAWN
04/26/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
SANITIZED 6/30/03
/
Searet
Interagency
Intelligence
Memorandum
Prospects for Arms Production and Development
in the Republic of China
+
-
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
With PORTIONS EXEMP TED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (c)(d)
Secret
NIO IIM 76-020
MB 01-170, MR #6; CIAlts 3/14/03
May 1976
to
dal NARA, Date 6/30/03
Copy
No
1
FORD A. QUALO LIBRARY
FORD R. LIBRARY DERALO
I
PROSPECTS FOR ARMS PRODUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
CONCLUSIONS
The Republic of China would prefer to rely on the US for military
assistance, but has apparently concluded that it can no longer count
on doing so indefinitely. To maintain a strong defense posture, the
government is attempting to expand domestic arms production, de-
velop new weapons systems, and find other sources of modern weap-
ons and advanced technology.
- As these programs advance, the Nationalists should be able to
reduce further their dependence on the US.
- They will continue to be heavily dependent on foreign sources
for modern weaponry.
- The ROC appears to have little prospect of becoming self-suffi-
cient in arms production within the next decade.
The major problem the government faces in manufacturing conven-
tional arms, munitions, and spare parts is the lack of defense industries
similar to those in the US and other advanced countries.
- Because of its reliance on the US, the ROC has never developed
the high technologies and skills necessary for manufacturing arms
and military supplies on a commercial basis.
NOTE-This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and
the Defense Intelligence Agency and coordinated with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
of the Department of State.
1
FORD R. LIBRARY
SECRE
- The relatively small amounts of weapons and munitions now be-
ing produced on Taiwan come from military armaments plants
and research centers. The facilities are not capable of manufactur-
ing these items in large quantities.
- To increase production, the government is currently encourag-
ing commercial companies to expand their product lines to in-
clude weapons, munitions, and spare parts.
- The corporations have the skilled manpower and much of the
technology needed to produce many military items. They will,
however, require technical assistance, specialized equipment, and
technologies to manufacture large weapons such as tanks and
artillery and sophisticated electronics such as radars.
- Commercial companies will probably be reluctant to commit
large amounts of capital until they have gained experience in
producing weapons for government and foreign markets.
- Thus, while the potential exists on Taiwan for an expanding arms
industry, growth in this field is likely to be slow initially.
The ROC has found several countries outside the US that are will-
ing to sell arms and technology. The procurement of advanced weap-
ons from these sources will, however, create additional problems for
the government.
- The Nationalists probably would have difficulty maintaining for-
eign weapons systems with which they are unfamiliar.
- This problem could be severe if the ROC had to rely on foreign
suppliers for critical spare parts. For this as well as economic
reasons, the government is seeking licenses to manufacture most
items on Taiwan.
The ROC appears to be achieving some success in its nuclear, mis-
sile, and chemical warfare programs, although none of these programs
will contribute significantly to Nationalist military capabilities for at
least several years.
- The ROC is attempting to develop the capability to fabricate
nuclear devices. If the ROC violates safeguard agreements, it
probably could develop the capability and acquire the materials
to build a crude nuclear device in three to four years.
- The ROC program to develop short range surface-to-surface mis-
siles is still in its infancy. The Nationalists obtained assistance
from Israel and have begun producing limited numbers of proto-
type antiship missiles based on the Gabriel Mark II. A ballistic
GHD
2
SECRET
LISHARY
SECRET
missile with a range of 110 kilometers is being developed, but will
not be operational before 1980. The ROC also is interested in
developing a longer range ballistic missile that could hit the
mainland.
CERALD One
3
SECRET
THE DETAILS
1. The US has been the principal supplier of
rifles, machine guns, 105-mm howitzers, recoilless
arms and military equipment for the Republic of
rifles, antitank rockets, land mines, hand grenades,
China since the Nationalists were forced to with-
explosives, and munitions. In addition, the ROC
draw from the mainland some 26 years ago. But
produces military vehicles such as jeeps and trucks
that is changing. In recent years, the US has sharply
and communications equipment.
reduced its military presence in Asia and continued
to move ahead in its efforts to normalize relations
5. Most items now being manufactured in Taiwan
with the People's Republic of China; the US has
are copies of US-designed weapons and many re-
in fact been cutting back its military assistance to
quire key components made in the US. The only
Taiwan.
non-US weapon that is produced in significant
quantities is the M-64 rifle
2. These developments have raised serious doubts
The ROC plans to purchase plants
in Taipei about the long-term reliability of the US
and equipment so that it can expand its production
as a major source of weapons and supplies. The
of ground forces equipment and munitions. Taiwan
ROC clearly would prefer to rely on the US for
also plans to begin producing larger artillery pieces
military assistance, but has apparently concluded
such as 155-mm guns and howitzers.
that it can no longer count on doing so indefinitely.
6. The ROC aircraft industries also are expand-
3. In an attempt to maintain its defense posture
ing. Under a coproduction agreement with the US,
and preserve a credible military deterrence, the
Taiwan last year started assembling the F-5E
ROC is attempting to become more self-reliant by
fighter. Taiwan manufactures some parts for the
expanding its own capabilities for developing and
F-5E, but major components of the aircraft such
manufacturing weapon systems. In addition, Taipei
as avionics, jet engines, and weapons systems are
is actively seeking new sources from which it can
produced in the US. The ROC has already built
procure advanced weapons and technology.
about 30 F-5Es and plans to complete a total of
120 of the aircraft within the next two years. The
Domestic Arms Production
ROC has requested approval to build 80 additional
4. The ROC already produces a variety of
F-5s. Between 1964 and 1974, Taiwan assembled
weapons and munitions in limited quantities for
55 PL-1 trainers, but production has slowed and
its air, ground, and naval forces. For example,
may be ending. The ROC is also coproducing the
Taiwan manufactures infantry weapons such as
UH-1H helicopter under license to the US. More
4
SECRET
than 80 of the UH-1Hs have been built. A total
11. There is no evidence that Taiwan has pro-
of 118 are to be completed under the contract.
vided significant amounts of weapons or munitions
Aircraft repair and maintenance facilities on Tai-
to any country. Recent reporting does suggest that
wan are capable of servicing virtually all aircraft
there is a ready market especially in Southeast
now in the ROC inventory.
Asia for the conventional arms, munitions, and mili-
7. The ROC is also making progress in improving
tary supplies that Taiwan manufactures or is now
its navy, although it still relies heavily on the US.
developing.
Taiwan manufactures small patrol boats and service
12. Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and the
craft and is modernizing the older ships provided
Philippines have approached Taipei about pur-
by the US. The major emphasis has been on re-
chasing military equipment. Several countries re-
arming old naval ships with more modern weapons.
portedly have expressed interest in the turboprop
For example, the ROC has installed the US-made
trainer that Taiwan is currently developing, and
Sea Chaparral surface-to-air missile systems on four
Singapore has asked about buying some F-5E
destroyers. Three other destroyers are being
fighters. Any sales of coproduced weapons would
equipped with the US-designed Asroc antisub-
require US approval.
marine rocket system, but the ROC lacks trained
personnel to maintain the Asroc equipment.
13. Most of Taiwan's arms and munitions and
military hardware is produced at military research
8. With US assistance, the ROC is also moving
and armament plants and are not yet available in
ahead with plans to begin construction on larger
sufficient quantities to export. These facilities are
naval ships. Taiwan recently concluded a contract
expanding their capabilities to produce weapons
with a US firm to build two multi-mission patrol
systems, but they cannot meet the needs of the
ships, which will be armed with surface-to-surface
ROC armed forces.
missiles. The first unit is being built in the US and
should be completed next year; the second ship
14. Taipei appears to recognize this problem
will be constructed in Taiwan using materials
and is actively encouraging commercial companies
and technical assistance provided by the US com-
to enter the field and manufacture arms, munitions,
pany. The ROC plans to build 20 of the patrol
and military supplies. The government opened a
ships; most are to be assembled at shipyards in
military products exhibition in Taipei on April 14.
Taiwan.
The exhibit reportedly is directed at promoting
self-sufficiency' through cooperation between the
9. ROC shipyards have demonstrated the capa-
government and private firms. More than 1,000
bility to handle maintenance and major repair work
on naval vessels. The Nationalist Chinese are cur-
items have been displayed but only 80 or so are
locally manufactured. Most of the items represent
rently overhauling the two submarines the US pro-
vided for training. This is the first time the ROC
US parts and components that the government
has overhauled submarines on its own. There have
would like to get commercial companies to manu-
facture.
been some delays in this program, but one of the
submarines should be completed this spring.
15. The ROC has sent delegations to numerous
countries to discuss the possibility of Taiwan pro-
Overseas Markets
viding military hardware and assistance. Taipei is
10. The ROC is not a major supplier of arms and
apparently trying to drum up business so that
is not likely to become one in the near future. Tai-
it can demonstrate to the commercial companies
wan has provided several million rounds of small
that there is a market overseas for any surplus
arms ammunition to the Philippines and assisted
weapons and military supplies that they produce.
Singapore by training some pilots. A Nationalist
In addition, Taipei probably sees international po-
military team consisting of four instructor pilots
litical advantages in developing domestic weapons
and 17 technicians is now in Jordan to assist in the
production for sales overseas.
training of pilots and maintenance personnel for
16. The one field in which the ROC possesses
the F-5E aircraft.
the potential to become a major source for foreign
5
GERALD LISAARY FORD
SEGRET
markets is chemical warfare. Taiwan has a rela-
obtaining missiles and/or related technology and
tively advanced chemical agent program, and sev-
is attempting to get the following systems:
eral countries have reportedly approached it seek-
ing to purchase agents and technology. Taiwan,
however, has established a strict policy that under
no circumstances will it export chemical agents or
related technology. The ROC program is founded
on technology and assistance provided by
and this policy may well have been one of the stipu-
lations in the original agreement that Taiwan signed
with
Third Country Arms
17. The ROC has achieved limited success in
recent years finding new sources for weapons and
technology.
Prospects for Third-Country Arms
23. At the present time, Taiwan can only get
some of the weapons, technology, and equipment
that it seeks from countries other than the US. Be-
cause of their relations with the PRC, several coun-
tries have already refused to sell arms to Taiwan,
but others have continued to show a willingness to
sell weapons and military hardware to the ROC.
24. Taiwan reportedly considers itself in a time-
bind and believes that it must hurry if it is to get
the modern weapons and technology that it seeks.
The ROC appears to be concerned that additional
sources of military hardware will dry up as other
countries follow the US lead and move to improve
their ties with the PRC.
25. Of the countries from which Taiwan bas
sought arms, only Israel is likely to remain as a re-
liable source well into the future.
26. France, Italy, West Germany, and the UK
are receptive to selling weapons, equipment, and
technology to the ROC, but all of them probably
would put restrictions on the types of hardware that
they would provide. Both the UK and France have
21. The ROC has sought to obtain additional
sold aircraft and technology to the PRC, and they
weapons, equipment, and technology from these
are unlikely to risk losing this market by selling
and other countries, but no deals have been con-
advanced aircraft to the ROC.
cluded so far. Taiwan is particularly interested in
6
SECRET
FORD
LIBRARY
probably would be willing to sell them to the ROC,
Missile Program
if the US approved the sale.
31. This program is still in its infancy, but is mak-
ing slow but gradual progress. The ROC efforts
appear to be directed primarily towards developing
a short range surface-to-surface antiship missile that
27. France, West Germany, Italy, and the UK
can be used offensively as well as defensively.
manufacture defensive missiles that the ROC is in-
32. The ROC has built and is expanding facilities
terested in acquiring.
in support of its missile program. They include test
facilities at the institute, a missile test range on the
southeastern coast, a solid propellant production
US approval and encouragement of such
plant, and several missile component production
sales by third countries might induce them to pro-
plants that are in varying stages of construction.
vide these and other weapons and technology to
33. The ROC apparently obtained sufficient tech-
Taiwan.
nical data and assistance
to develop its
own version of the Gabriel Mark 11 antiship missile,
Research and Development
which it calls the Drone Bee. Between July 1975
28. In addition to the weapons that it is already
and April 1976, the ROC test flew this missile 18
times, but more than half of them were failures.
producing or obtaining from foreign sources, the
ROC is conducting research and development work
The last three test flights in late April failed. Tai-
on a variety of weapons and equipment. The mis-
wan is developing the Drone Bee as an antiship
sile program has a high priority; Taiwan is also do-
weapon to counter PRC naval craft equipped with
ing work on aircraft, tanks, artillery, munitions, and
the Styx missile as well as for defense against in-
vading forces. The Drone Bee is suitable for use on
chemical warfare.
ships or from shore installations. Taiwan hopes to
29. The Nationalist Chinese are developing three
complete testing on the Drone Bee by the end of
aircraft on their own-two trainers and a small
1977, when production is scheduled to begin. The
transport. The turboprop trainer prototype, which
ROC plans to produce some 400 of the missiles.
first flew in late 1973, has progressed slowly. Pro-
duction of this trainer hinges largely on the ROC
34. The Drone Bee is also serving the important
obtaining rights to coproduce the US-made gas tur-
function of providing the Nationalists experience
bine engine; the US has recently agreed to provide
in the development of missiles. The ROC also has
43 of the engines. The transport is scheduled to
plans to build other surface-to-surface missiles and
begin flight testing in two years, and a jet trainer
one of them will be capable of hitting targets on
prototype is planned for construction by late 1979.
the mainland from launch sites on Taiwan.
Taiwan has a large pool of experienced engineers
35. Taiwan reportedly has a 110-km range ballis-
and technicians, but they have had relatively little
tic missile, called the Green Bee, in the planning
design and research training. For this reason, the
stage. This missile is expected to carry about a
ROC will be hard pressed to produce an advanced
200-km payload. The Green Bee cannot reach the
fighter without massive technical assistance from
mainland from Taiwan, but there are reports that
the US or other countries.
it will eventually be deployed on the offshore is-
30. The Nationalists committed themselves to the
lands. The ROC considers the Green Bee as an
development of advanced weapons as early as 1965
intermediate step towards the development of a
when they established the Chung-Shan Institute of
surface-to-surface missile that will have a range
Science and Technology. The institute consists of
of about 500 kilometers. From Taiwan, that missile
four research departments-missile, nuclear, chemi-
would be capable of hitting targets more than sev-
cal, and electronics.
eral hundred kilometers deep in the PRC.
7
SECRET
FORD
LIBRARY
36. ROC scientists have also worked on a series
missile. They may also have trouble producing the
of artillery-type rockets called Working Bees which
grain for the Green Bee if they do not obtain extra
carry high explosive and chemical warheads as far
mixing equipment, and the ROC may have trouble
as 14 kilometers. In addition, the ROC has done
acquiring such equipment if the US denies it an
research on developing a wire-guided antitank mis-
export license for the larger equipment.
sile based on the Soviet AT-3 Sagger, which it ob-
tained from South Vietnam.
provided an
Nuclear Program
analysis of the AT-3 system and perhaps some
41. The ROC has been conducting the prelimi-
components. This program has temporarily been
nary studies and experimentation in nuclear re-
shelved.
search and high explosive technology that are nec-
essary for it to develop a nuclear device. The
Missile Technicians
leader of the research team conducting these studies
37. The scientists and technicians assigned to the
believes, however, that Premier Chiang Ching-kuo
various missile projects appear to be very capable
would not order the fabrication of a nuclear device
and in the majority of cases, well trained, mostly
until 1977 at the earliest, and then only if the ROC
in US institutions. These people, however, are
felt it was necessary for its survival. It is not likely
largely theoretically oriented and lack technical
that the ROC will actually be in a position to take
training and experience. The ROC has recognized
that step until later this decade. In any event, diver-
this problem and is trying to correct it by training
sion of nuclear materials to fabrication of an explo-
programs.
sive device would entail violation or abrogation of
38. The ROC scientists started out with no mis-
IAEA safeguards. Detection of such a violation
could lead to sanctions by nuclear suppliers. These
sile design or development experience, and this ex-
sanctions would probably take the form of inter-
perience will have to be acquired on the job.
Within the next two to three years, they will prob-
ruption of deliveries of nuclear materials and equip-
ment; this could seriously interfere with Taiwan's
ably be able to work out most of their problems,
while they acquire the necessary experience. It
civil nuclear program, which depends on foreign
sources for enriched uranium. Sanctions would not
seems likely that development of the more sophisti-
cated missiles, even with outside help, will require
materially affect the weapons program, because the
ROC already' has enough fuel for the research re-
longer times than allowed by present schedules.
actor for many years.
Foreign Technology
42. A first device could be delivered only by sur-
39. As ROC scientists try to develop larger
face means or by a large transport aircraft such as
a C-130. Once a crude nuclear device has been de-
rocket motors, they will have to rely more on for-
eign assistance. Specific areas include ablative mate-
veloped, it would take the ROC at least two addi-
rials, case bonding and insulation techniques, high
tional years to develop a nuclear weapon small
strength materials, and precision control mechan-
enough to be carried externally on a tactical air-
craft. Nuclear warheads suitable for use with the
isms. All of these types of technology are, however,
available from a number of other countries.
surface-to-surface missiles now in the planning
stage or under development would require many
40. So far, the ROC has been quite successful
more years to develop.
in acquiring the necessary equipment to carry on
the development of their small missiles. Taiwan
43. The Nationalist Chinese have steadily ex-
also seems to have acquired the minimum equip-
panded their facilities at the Institute of Nuclear
ment necessary to develop an inertial guidance sys-
Energy Research while attempting to obtain addi-
tem for the Green Bee missile, and possibly for the
tional ones such as a heavy water production plant
500-km missile as well. The Nationalists do not,
for a complete nuclear fuel cycle. The main facility
however, have sufficient solid-propellant produc-
at the Institute is the Taiwan research reactor which
tion capability to produce grains for the 500-km
is fueled with natural uranium and moderated with
8
ORD
1
heavy water. When operating under average con-
areas of high explosives, shockwaves, and detonat-
ditions, this reactor produces about 10 kilograms of
ing systems. Problems were encountered in the ex-
"weapon grade" plutonium per year. The reactor
periments, but these were solved and the program
was obtained from
along with fuel for more
was considered a success in September 1975. The
than two full core loadings and heavy water. The
success of this design work probably led to the pre-
ROC also purchased 162 tons of uranium metal from
mier's statement to the press last fall that the ROC
South Africa; this metal is fabricated at the In-
now had the capability to manufacture nuclear
stitute into fuel elements for the reactor.
weapons.
44. In order to use the plutonium produced by
the reactor to fabricate a nuclear device, the Na-
Nuclear Scientists
tionalist Chinese must separate the plutonium from
48. The ROC has sufficient trained manpower to
the spent fuel. In 1973 the US pressured the ROC
build and operate all of the existing research facili-
into canceling a contract for a pilot-scale fuel re-
ties for the nuclear fuel cycle, but may encounter
processing facility that it had signed with a
difficulties if they build additional or larger facili-
company. The ROC is currently negotiat-
ties to support a nuclear weapons program. The
ing with a
company for the procurement of
only problem area that has been specifically identi-
the components and technical design for a pilot
fied so far is a lack of trained reactor operators for
reprocessing plant. Acquisition of such a facility
future nuclear power plants. By the time these
would provide Taiwan with the capability to obtain
plants or any other nuclear facilities are completed,
sufficient plutonium for a significant nuclear weap-
however, the ROC should be able to train enough
ons program.
operators and technicians.
45. A very small reprocessing laboratory has re-
49. Most top nuclear scientists in the ROC re-
cently been completed at the Institute. It will give
ceived their formal education and training in US
ROC scientists useful training and practical experi-
schools. Many have since returned to the US, Can-
ence, but it is not capable of separating significant
ada, France, and Israel for specialized training in
quantities of plutonium. Meanwhile, there have
various aspects of nuclcar science engineering.
been sporadic reports and some physical evidence
that small amounts of fuel from the reactor are be-
50. Nuclear courses now being taught on Taiwan
ing reprocessed at other hot laboratories to obtain
at the Tsing-Hua University have already bene-
plutonium, but the amounts recovered would be
fited the ROC nuclear program. Between 1958 and
1970, for example, about 200 scientists received
extremely small.
advanced degrees in nuclear physics, nuclear chem-
istry, and nuclear engineering. These students
Nuclear Weapons
formed the nucleus of the ROC nuclear research
46. The ROC will not be able to develop a nu-
program. The Institute of Nuclear Energy Research
clear weapons capability until significant quantities
is the only major organization in the ROC that
of plutonium are available. The ROC may be satis-
does work in the nuclear field. It employs over
fied to acquire the capability to develop and pro-
600 people. They are relatively well qualified and
duce only a few test devices rather than weapons.
have excellent facilities to work with.
The work at the Institute appears to be directed at
the basic theoretical design and research required
for such devices.
47. During 1974 and 1975 a group of ROC nu-
clear scientists reportedly used computer facilities
at the Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Tech-
nology to conduct extensive theoretical design cal-
culations for a first generation nuclear device. Ex-
periments were carried out, presumably in the
9
FORD
SECRET
LIBRARY
E
LICHARD
SECRET
10
PAYMENT
Electronics
67. The only electronics equipment that the ROC
i
currently produces in quantity for the armed forces
are AN PRC-77 field radios, which are coproduced
under a US license. There is a modern electronics
industry on Taiwan; however, relatively little of
its technology is suitable for manufacturing the
sophisticated equipment needed by the military.
68. The ROC is encouraging commercial firms
to produce military electronics systems and com-
ponents. Before the companies can do so, however,
they will have to invest large amounts of capital
11
SECRET
FORD of LISRARY
SECRET
to build and equip modern plants. The commercial
and assistance to develop and build sophisticated
firms lack experience in manufacturing equipment
military equipment such as radars, avionics, and
for the military and probably will be slow to com-
missile guidance systems. Even with advanced
mit capital to such enterprises.
foreign technology and participation by commer-
69. ROC research and development work on elec-
cial firms on Taiwan, the ROC will probably not
tronics is just beginning. The Nationalists will de-
be able to meet the requirements of the armed
pend heavily on foreign sources for technical data
forces for at least a decade.
FORD
12
SECRET
AMERIA TOHOR C)
Secret
2a
2350
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET (XGDS) (3)
May 14, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Mr. George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Sale of "Rapier" Air Defense
System to Taiwan
The proposed sale of the Rapier" air defense system to the
Republic of China by United Technologies International, as
described in your memorandum of April 21, has been reviewed
and is approved.
Mile Hornbod
Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
for
SECRET (XGDS) (3)
FORD LIBRARY & GERALD
DECLASSIFIED
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Visit 8/1/00
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
BY GG
NARA, DATE 4/23/01
,
2b
mit
MEMORANDUM
2350
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET XGDS -3
ACTION
April 23, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
AM
FROM:
CLINTON E. GRANGER
JAY TAYLOR
SUBJECT:
Sale of "Rapier" Air Defense System to Taiwan
The State Department has recommended (Tab B) approval of the sale
of a "Rapier" air defense system to the Republic of China. The "Rapier"
is a British designed and manufactured anti-aircraft missile system
for use against low-flying targets. British Aircraft Corporation has
licensed the Norden Division, United Technologies International, to
produce and market the "Rapier" in the United States. Under the
Norden proposal (Tab C) "Rapier" equipment would be secured primarily
from the United Kingdom and assembled and tested by Norden in the
United States before shipment to Taiwan.
State points out that the "Rapier" is a purely defensive system, and
it is unlikely to appear provocative to the PRC. Moreover, although
the U.S. involvement is not inconsiderable, the United Kingdom as the
designer, manufacturer, and ultimate licensor of the system would
likely bear the brunt of any adverse PRC reaction. As State points out,
this sharing of the political risks is well suited to our policy of lowering
the profile of our military relationship with Taiwan without jeopardizing
the possibility of a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue by the
NSC MEMO, 11/24/96, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES 8/1/00
Chinese themselves.
Secretary Kissinger has personally approved this recommendation.
Defense concurs.
DATE 4/23/01
We feel that "Rapier" is the type of defensive equipment that we should
allow the ROC to acquire. It has the added advantage of involving a
third country as a source of Taiwan's defense equipment.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve the Davis to Springsteen memorandum at Tab A.
FORD
&
concurring in the proposal.
94
Concurrence: Dick Solomen
100/5
GERALD
LIBRARY
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
SECRET XGDS -3
7604547
2350 2c
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
April 21, 1976
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Sale of "Rapier" Air Defense
System to Taiwan
United Technologies International/Norden has
requested an advisory opinion on the sale of a
"Rapier" Air Defense System to the Republic of
China (ROC). The "Rapier" is a British-designed
and manufactured anti-aircraft missile system for
use against low-flying targets, consisting of a
launcher with surveillance radar, a computer command
transmitter and launching facilities for four super-
sonic missiles. British Aircraft Corporation has
licensed the Norden Division, United Technologies
International to produce and market Rapier in the
United States.
Under the Norden proposal outlined in the attached
letter, Rapier equipment would be secured primarily
from the United Kingdom, and assembled and tested by
Norden in the United States before shipment to Taiwan.
Norden would also provide technical support for the
system such as repair and replacement of components,
including their manufacture in the United States. The
first Rapier batteries shipped to Taiwan would thus be
entirely British-manufactured and subsequent ones would
contain some American parts. Deliveries would begin
within three months after signature of a contract. The
total value of this transaction is likely to be less than
fifteen million dollars.
SECRET
XGDS-3
STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION PEVIEW
Retain Class'n
FORD
Change to
DECLASSIFIED
&
visit
LIBRARY
Declassify in part and excise as shown
EO 12958, 25X ( )( )( )
E.O. 12358, SEC. 3.5
9/3/00
state
i, NARA, GUIDELINES, DATE 4/23/01
GERALD
Declassify
After
STATE
DEP
With concurrence
JL
(not)(obtained)
BY bibe
PS by
Date 8/3/00
B
SECRET
-2-
The Rapier is purely a defensive system which
would fill a gap in Taiwan's air defense capabilities.
It would contribute to United States interests by
serving to deter PRC use of force to resolve the
Taiwan issue. Its sale is unlikely to appear pro-
vocative to the PRC. Moreover, although the U.S.
involvement in this transaction is not inconsiderable,
the United Kingdom -- as the designer, manufacturer
and ultimate licensor of the system -- would likely
bear the brunt of any adverse PRC reaction. This
sharing of the political risk is well-suited to our
policy of lowering the profile of our military
relationship with Taiwan without jeopardizing the pos-
sibility of a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue
by the Chinese themselves.
We recommend prompt approval of the Rapier sale
as proposed by United Technologies Corporation.
C.
George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
As stated.
FORD
&
SECRET
GERALD
LIERAR
2f.2
NORDEN
1125 Fifteenth Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005
February 11, 1976
Office of Munitions Control
PM/MC, Rm. 800, SA-6
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520
Attention: Mr. William B. Robinson, Director
Dear Sir:
United Technologies International have become aware of interest by
the Government of the Republic of China for an Air Defense System for
use in their military forces. It is our understanding that their specific
interest is in the surface-to-air guided missile system, "Rapier,"
developed by the Guided Weapons Division of the British Aircraft Corpor-
ation in Great Britain. The "Rapier" is intended primarily for defense
against fast maneuvering low-flying targets. A brief description of
the weapon system is attached to this letter for reference.
Norden, a Division of United Technologies Corporation, have been the
licensee of BAC for the "Rapier" system in the United States. As a
result of this relationship with BAC, Norden has developed considerable
expertise involving the "Rapier" system awaiting such time that new
requirements would develop for the system. Such an opportunity has
now presented itself in the Republic of China.
Discussions have been held between senior personnel of Norden, BAC,
UTI, and the Republic of China, relative to the application of the
"Rapier" Air Defense System in Taiwan. What is proposed is essentially
as follows:
1. The License Agreement between Norden and BAC would be extended
to include the Republic of China and a time-frame consistent with
FORD
the requirements of the Republic of China.
?
2. A proposal would be made to the Republic of China by UTI/Norden
GERALD
LIBRARY
for a "Rapier" Air Defense System.
3. UTI/Norden would accept a purchase order directly from the Republic
of China.
4. UTI/Norden would deliver to the Republic of China "Rapier" systems
to a delivery schedule and quantities roughly as follows:
Division of
UNITED
Office of Munitions Control
Page 2
February 11, 1976
Several fire units three (3) months after receipt of order.
A battery of twelve (12) fire units over a twelve (12) month
period.
At least one (1) battery of fire units a year over a period
of several years.
The "Rapier" equipment proposed for delivery to the Republic of China
by Norden would be secured incrementally from BAC by Norden with various
components secured by Norden from domestic U.S. sources as they would
be available. Norden would effect final assembly and check-out of
the system in the U.S. and ship the complete system to Taiwan. Norden
would also provide such technical support to the Republic of China
as necessary to overhaul, repair, and replace component parts including
the manufacture of parts and/or system components in the U.S.
The above course of action suggests several benefits in the best in-
terests of the United States. Included among these would be the capa-
bility of Norden ultimately to manufacture the "Rapier" system in the
U.S. as a "second source" for an Air Defense System in NATO use; and
provide a source in the U.S. for systems for other foreign and/or domestic
sales as they might occur. These sales also would serve to enhance
the U.S. balance of payments posture in foreign trade. A second very
important benefit would be the significant additional jobs created
at the Norden Division of United Technologies. It is noteworthy that
the present high unemployment rate in southern Connecticut is reflected
in Norden presently operating at a fraction of its plant capacity.
As recited above, our conversations regarding the "Rapier" matter have
been verbal to date with any further substantive discussions or cor-
respondence hinging on the position of the United States Department
of State relative to the proposed course of action. We are, therefore,
respectfully requesting your consideration of the proposed action and
an advance advisory opinion of its consistency with the policy of the
United States.
In the event there are questions associated with this request, they
could be directed to myself or to Mr. George H. Kronmiller, International
Director - Washington Office, United Technologies International, 1125-
15th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20005; Telephone: 785-7463.
We would be pleased to expand on any portion of this letter as necessary
by either correspondence or calling on your Offices in Washington at
your discretion.
Yours very truly,
Peter L. Scott
President
2d
NORDEN
N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
February 11, 1976
Office of Munitions Control
PM/MC, Rm. 800, SA-6
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520
Attention: Mr. William B. Robinson, Director
Dear Sir:
United Technologies International have become aware of interest by
the Government of the Republic of China for an Air Defense System for
use in their military forces. It is our understanding that their specific
interest is in the surface-to-air guided missile system, "Rapier,"
developed by the Guided Weapons Division of the British Aircraft Corpor-
ation in Great Britain. The "Rapier" is intended primarily for defense
against fast maneuvering low-flying targets. A brief description of
the weapon system is attached to this letter for reference.
Norden, a Division of United Technologies Corporation, have been the
licensee of BAC for the "Rapier" system in the United States. As a
result of this relationship with BAC, Norden has developed considerable
expertise involving the "Rapier" system awaiting such time that new
requirements would develop for the system. Such an opportunity has
now presented itself in the Republic of China.
Discussions have been held between senior personnel of Norden, BAC,
UTI, and the Republic of China, relative to the application of the
"Rapier" Air Defense System in Taiwan. What is proposed is essentially
as follows:
1. The License Agreement between Norden and BAC would be extended
to include the Republic of China and a time-frame consistent with
the requirements of the Republic of China.
2. A proposal would be made to the Republic of China by UTI/Norden
for a "Rapier" Air Defense System.
3. UTI/Norden would accept a purchase order directly from the Republic
of China.
4. UTI/Norden would deliver to the Republic of China "Rapier" systems
to a delivery schedule and quantities roughly as follows:
FORD
&
Division of
GERALD
LIBRARY
UNITED
VE
ORIES
Office of Munitions Control
Page 2
February 11, 1976
Several fire units three (3) months after receipt of order.
A battery of twelve (12) fire units over a twelve (12) month
period.
At least one (1) battery of fire units a year over a period
of several years.
The "Rapier" equipment proposed for delivery to the Republic of China
by Norden would be secured incrementally from BAC by Norden with various
components secured by Norden from domestic U.S. sources as they would
be available. Norden would effect final assembly and check-out of
the system in the U.S. and ship the complete system to Taiwan. Norden
would also provide such technical support to the Republic of China
as necessary to overhaul, repair, and replace component parts including
the manufacture of parts and/or system components in the U.S.
The above course of action suggests several benefits in the best in-
terests of the United States. Included among these would be the capa-
bility of Norden ultimately to manufacture the "Rapier" system in the
U.S. as a "second source" for an Air Defense System in NATO use; and
provide a source in the U.S. for systems for other foreign and/or domestic
sales as they might occur. These sales also would serve to enhance
the U.S. balance of payments posture in foreign trade. A second very
important benefit would be the significant additional jobs created
at the Norden Division of United Technologies. It is noteworthy that
the present high unemployment rate in southern Connecticut is reflected
in Norden presently operating at a fraction of its plant capacity.
As recited above, our conversations regarding the "Rapier" matter have
been verbal to date with any further substantive discussions or cor-
respondence hinging on the position of the United States Department
of State relative to the proposed course of action. We are, therefore,
respectfully requesting your consideration of the proposed action and
an advance advisory opinion of its consistency with the policy of the
United States.
In the event there are questions associated with this request, they
could be directed to myself or to Mr. George H. Kronmiller, International
Director - Washington Office, United Technologies International, 1125-
15th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20005; Telephone: 785-7463.
We would be pleased to expand on any portion of this letter as necessary
by either correspondence or calling on your Offices in Washington at
your discretion.
Yours very truly,
FORD
&
Peter L. Scott
JOYALD
President
NSCh 338.18
2e
THE WHITE HOUSE
7116797
WASHINGTON
October 21, 1971
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR
THEODORE L. ELIOT, JR.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT E. PURSLE'
MILITARY ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT:
Transfer of Major Items of U. S.
Military Equipment to the Republic
of China
In the future, White House approval should be obtained
for any transfers of major items of U.S. military
equipment to the Republic of China (such as F-5Es or
M-48 tanks), whether through grant MAP, FMS credit
or cash sales, commercial sales, as Excess Defense
Articles, or through any other means. A. memorandum
giving a full doscription of the proposal should be sub-
mitted to the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs in each case.
Altxander
Brigadier General, Army
Deputy Assistant to the President
FORD
for National Security Affairs
?
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
GERALD
MSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY, GG
CONFIRENTIAL
1 NARA, DATE 4/23/01
APPLICANT
DATE
CASE No.
CATEGORY No.
United Technologies
Norden)
2/19/76
GC-1408
267
CONSIGNEE
Government of the Republic of China
DESTINATION
Baner
to
China
for
pm
COMMODITY DESCRIPTION
Requests an advisory opinion as to whether the USG would approve the
sale and export of a surface-to-air guided missile system to the Govern-
ment of the Republic of China. This system would involve the British
"Rapier" missile sytem developed by the British Aircraft Corporation in a
reversed manufacturing licensing agreement.
Sent to: STD, Army, PM/SAS, EA/RA, ACDA NSC
Sanford
AGENCIES REFERRED TO
Hand-carry 2/19
ISA
AF
NAV
ARMY
NASA
AEC
ODDR&E
NEA/RA
APPROVED
FDCO
AFJALE
DSR
FORD
DISAPPROVED
MC COMMENT:
20-WORKBAY DEADI
FOR
REPLY
LIBRARY
AP:
BERALD
FORM
7 - 66 DS-1649
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
COMMODITY CARD
2g
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET XGDS - 3
MEMORANDUM FOR
Mr. George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Sale of "Rapier" Air Defense System to Taiwan
Sale of the "Rapier" air defense system to the Republic of China by
United Technologies International, as described in your memorandum
of April 21, is hereby approved.
Jeanne W. Davis
FORD
&
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
GERALD
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES I state i sit 8/1/00
SECRET XGDS -3
BY GG
, NARA, DATE 4/23/01
2h
DOC
RECD
LOC
MBER
MO
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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
4
21
4
21
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7602350
Barnes INITIAL ACTION o
TO: PRES
FROM: SECSTATE
S/S 7604547
UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
SCOWCROFT +
SECDEF
LOU
NO FORN
NODIS
HYLAND
DCI
X REF
EYES ONLY
EXDIS
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
DAVIS
STATE EXSEC
t
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CODEWORD
SUBJECT Sale of Raping OTHER air Defense TS SENSITIVE
Sy ten to Jaivan
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
REC
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
CONCUR-
COOR-
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DINATE
ADV CYS S'CROFT/ WGH
FOR
MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT.
STAFF SECRETARY
MEMO FOR PRES
CONGRESSIONAL
REPLY FOR
ECONOMIC
DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT
APPROPRIATE ACTION
EUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS
MEMO
TO
FAR EAST/ PRC
X
X.
RECOMMENDATIONS
INTELLIGENCE
JOINT MEMO
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO
FOR:
MID EAST/ NO. AFRICA
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
NSC PLANNING
X
x
CONCURRENCE
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
x
X
DUE DATE:
4-28
SCIENTIFIC
+
COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
SUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN
Solomon
DATE
FROM
diest
TO
STATUS
DUE
X
Oeucion SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKENI:
CY TO
4/23
4/30
5-13
NSCK
I
SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
5/13
Davis
5
C
58n memo to Spingster 5/18)
5/14
Davis sgd memo to Springteen
a FORD
NSC/S DISP INSTR
DISPATCH 5/14/76
NOTIFY
MICROFILM a FILE RQMTS
M/F'D
MAY 17
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
IF
1976
CRT ID:
NS
DY
SPECIAL INDEXING:
OPEN MSF
CLOSE TB PA
WH SA FP
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED
NSC 76-21
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976
599-022
3 wnt
3177
MEMORANDUM
BM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
will
CONFIDENTIAL - GDS
INFORMATION
May 20, 1976
Kl B
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
CLINTON E. GRANGER of
SUBJECT:
FMS Case Over $25 million - - Republic of China
The Department of Defense is prepared to make pre-notification to
Congress of the intent to sell equipment and spare parts to support ROC
co-production of 80 F5E/F aircraft. Value of this sale is $114 million.
The effect of this case would be to increase the current ROC co-production
goal for F-5 aircraft from 120 to 200 units.
Anticipating no adverse Congressional reaction to this sale, I have
concurred to State in pre-notification her to Congress.
11
Tom Barnes X and Les Janka concur.
Subject to GDS of E.O. 11652
Automatically Declassified
CONFIDENTIAL- GDS
December 31, 1982.
GG 4/23/01
GERALD R LEGARAY FORD
36.
CONFIDENTIAL
Transmittal No. 76- AS
ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF POSSIBLE SECTION 36 (b) STATEMENTS
FOREIGN MILITARY SALES
a. Prospective Purchaser:
Republic of China
b. Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services
under Consideration for Purchase:
Aeronautical equipment, support equipment, quality assurance,
documentation and spares to support the co-production of eighty
(80) F-5E/F aircraft.
c. Estimated Value (3) of This Case: $114.0M
d. Description of Total Program of which This Case is a Part:
The current co-production arrangement provides for the production of
120 F-5 aircraft. This case would increase the total program to
200 F-5 aircraft.
e. Estimated Value of Total Program of which This Case is a Part:
$219.9M
f. Prior Related Cases, if any:
Peace Tiger
June 1973 - 100 F-5 aircraft
Peace Tiger
June 1975 - 20 F-5 aircraft
g. Military Department:
Air Force
h. Estimated Date Letter of Offer/Acceptance (LOA) Ready for Formal
Notification to Congress:
June 1976
1. Date Advance Notification Delivered to Committees:
FORD
&
Classified by DSAA COMPTRACTER
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE 0F
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11632. AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED
GERALD
LIBRARY
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 31Dec82
PROFILENTIAL
CONCIDENTIAL
IDENTIAL
GG 4/23/01
CONFIDENTIAL
In reply refer to:
I-4609/76
Honorable Dante B. Fascell
Chairman, Subcommittee on International
Political and Military Affairs
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Mr. Marian A. Czarnecki
Chief of Staff
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Mr. Richard M. Moose
Staff Associate
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Mr. Czarnecki:
Mr. Moose:
This provides an advance notification in accordance with our letter
dated 18 February 1976 regarding possible transmittals to Congress
of information as required by Section 36(b) of the Foreign Military
Sales Act, as amended.
This is to advise you that we have under consideration an offer to
the Republic of China tentatively estimated to cost $114.0 million.
Sincerely,
FORD
&
Classified by DSAA 9-COCLPTROLLER
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECI ESIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
EXECUTIVE CRDER 11132. AUTOMNICALLY DOWNGRADED
GERALD
LEBRARY
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 310.082
GG 4/23/01
CONFIDENTIAL
3d
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INITIAL ACTION o
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520
6
/
17
7603177
TO: PRES
FROM: SECSTATE
S/S
UNCLAS LOG IN/ OUT
x
SCOWCROFT
SECDEF
LOU
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HYLAND
DCI
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E
EYES ONLY
EXDIS
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
DAVIS
STATE EXSEC
S
CODEWORD
OTHER galler
TS
SENSITIVE
SUBJECT FMS Case over $ 25 million - Rep
of China
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
REC
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
CONCUR-
COOR-
INFO
CY
RENCE
DINATE
ADV CYS S'CROFT / WGH
FOR
MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
STAFF SECRETARY
MEMO FOR PRES
CONGRESSIONAL
X
REPLY FOR
ECONOMIC
DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT
APPROPRIATE ACTION
EUR/ CANADA OCEANS
MEMO
TO
FAR EAST
XL
RECOMMENDATIONS
INTELLIGENCE
JOINT MEMO
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO
FOR:
MID EAST/ NO. AFRICA
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
NSC PLANNING
CONCURRENCE
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
SCIENTIFIC
COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
SUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN
solomen
X
DATE
FROM
TO
STATUS
SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED IOR TAKENI:
DUE
CY TO
6/01
Scroft
CIX
6-7
NSC/S
Info Noted by Scourlit
SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
10/7
6/7
Granegr
S
any further action necessary 6-8
thanger
NSC/S
C
No further action necessary,
state notified 20 May of
NSC's concurence. B/D
(76-AS)
FORD
&
DISPATCH
NOTIFY
MICROFILM & FILE ROMTS
NSC/S DISP INSTR
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
GERALD
JUN9 CRTV A/ F'D 1976 NS IF
DY
SPECIAL INDEXING:
OPEN CLOSE D
WH SA FP
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED No
PA
NSC 76-21
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 1976
599-022
4a
nsc 3729
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20301
25 JUN 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: Transfer of Major Items of U.S. Military Equipment
to the Republic of China (c)
(c) Pursuant to your memorandum of 21 October 1971, on 12 March 1975
the Department of Defense requested NSC approval for sale of 960 TOW
missiles, 48 TOW launcher sets, 48 jeep adaptation kits, spare parts,
maintenance materiel, training items and test equipment to the Republic
of China.
(c) Introduction of the TOW weapon system into the ROC's inventory
would help to dissuade the PRC from attempting to resolve the Taiwan
issue through the threat or use of force by strengthening the ROC's
capability to defend against amphibious invasion and by partially
offsetting the PRC's qualitative and quantitative superiority in armored
vehicles. The proposed sale would not significantly increase the ROC
Military's offensive capability vis-a-vis the PRC.
(c) The NSC staff has deferred action on this request pending completion
of NSSM 212, while approving other items of similar military utility,
e.g., additional F-5E aircraft, an Improved HAWK missile battalion, and
self-propelled Vulcan guns, listed under Option III of the draft NSSM
("limited ROC access to new weapons, lower range").
(c) We would like to clear our file in regard to our March 1975 request
and be advised by you what action we should take - keep file active,
deliver material or close file.
A.P.
FORD
&
Classified
by
Dir, Security Assistance Operations, DSAA
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
GERALD
LIBRARY
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 31Dec82
CONFIDENTIAL
Sec Def Cont Nr. X
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760 3729
Baines INITIAL ACTION o
TO: PRES
FROM: SECSTATE
S/S
UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
SCOWCROFT X
SECDEF
clements, W
1835
LOU
NO FORN
NODIS
HYLAND
DCI
X REF
C
EYES ONLY
EXDIS
DAVIS
S
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
STATE EXSEC
CODEWORD
OTHER
TS
SENSITIVE
SUBJECT Request by Dod for NSC decision on
transfer of US military equipment to Rep of
auna re TOW missiled
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
REC
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
CONCUR-
COOR-
INFO
CY
RENCE
DINATE
ADV CYS S'CROFT WGH
FOR
MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT.
STAFF SECRETARY
MEMO FOR PRES
CONGRESSIONAL
REPLY FOR
ECONOMIC
DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT
APPROPRIATE ACTION
EUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS
MEMO
TO
FAR EAST/ PRC
x
RECOMMENDATIONS
INTELLIGENCE
JOINT MEMO
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO
FOR:
MID EAST/ NO. AFRICA
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
6
NSC PLANNING
X
CONCURRENCE
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
SCIENTIFIC
COMMENTS: (INCLUDING 7/6 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS!
SUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN
DATE
FROM
TO
STATUS
SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKENI:
DUE
CY TO
7/7
JT
Tosc/s
C
Sale was ground.
SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
(Close action out. No
GERALD 5 FORD
DISPATCH
NOTIFY
MICROFILM & FILE ROMTS
NSC/S DISP INSTR
M/F'D
BY
20 1976
MD
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
MF
CRW: NSSM 0212
CRT ID:
NS
DY
SPECIAL INDEXING:
OPEN MK
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED pssm 212
WH SA FP
CLOSE MI
PA
NSC 76-21
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976
599-022
(750)1584
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
July 5, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR
M. STASER HOLCOMB
REAR ADMIRAL, U.S. NAVY
MILITARY ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT:
Sale of TOW Missiles to the ROC
I refer to the memorandum of March 12, 1975 from the Secretary
of Defense regarding the sale of the TOW weapon system to the
Republic of China. Approval is hereby granted for the sale of
960 TOW missiles, 48 TOW launcher sets, 48 jeep adaptation
kits, spare parts, maintenance material, training items, and test
equipment, to the Republic of China.
Willam G. Hylard
William G. Hyland
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
cc: The Department of State
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
GG 4/23/01
FORD LIBRARY &
with
MEMORANDUM
7501584
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL GDS
ACTION
June 9, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
JAY TAYLOR
R.C.R.
SUBJECT:
Request for Approval for Sale of TOW Anti-Tank
Missiles to the ROC
At Tab B is a memorandum from Secretary Schlesinger dated March 12,
1975 recommending approval of the sale of the TOW anti-tank missile
system to the Republic of China. Action on this request was held up
pending decision on NSSM 212, U.S. Security Assistance to the Republic
of China.
We have recently received updated recommendations on NSSM 212 from
both State and Defense and are currently preparing a memorandum for
you. State's memorandum on NSSM 212 specifically recommends approval
of the sale of the TOW missile to the ROC. Since Secretary Kissinger
personally approved this memorandum and the TOW missile is clearly a
defensive weapon, we believe we can move ahead separately with this
item.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve the memorandum at Tab A from Jeanne Davis to the
Department of Defense, approving the requested sale.
APPROVE M DISAPPROVE
Clint Granger concurs
FORD LIBRARY &
CONFIDENTIAL GDS
GG 4/23/01
CONFIDENTIAL
#1584 1584
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5c
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
12 MAR 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: Transfer of Major Items of U.S. Military
Equipment to the Republic of China (C)
(U) Reference is made to your memorandum of 21 October
1971, same subject.
(C) Approval is requested for the (FMS) sale of 960 TOW
missiles, 48 TOW launcher sets, 48 jeep adaptation kits,
spare parts, maintenance materiel, training items, and
test equipment to the Republic of China.
(C) Sale of the TOW weapon system to the Republic of China
would strengthen that country's defensive military posture.
(C) The present leadtime for delivery of TOW missiles and
related equipment is thirty-six (36) months.
(U) The Department of State concurs.
Jams R.
FORD
GERALD ? LIBRARY
Classified by Dir, Security Assistance Operations, DSAA
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 3/Dec/981
GG 4/23/01
CONFIDENTIAL SEC DEF CONTR No. X- 0702 B
750/1584
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
MEMORANDUM FOR
M. STASER HOLCOMB
REAR ADMIRAL, U.S. NAVY
MILITARY ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT:
Sale of TOW Missiles to the ROC
I refer to the memorandum of March 12, 1975 from the Secretary
of Defense regarding the sale of the TOW weapon system to the
Republic of China. Approval is hereby granted for the sale of
960 TOW missiles, 48 TOW launcher sets, 48 jeep adaptation
kits, spare parts, maintenance material, training items, and test
equipment, to the Republic of Ghina.
William G. Hyland
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
CCI The Department of State
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
GG 4/20/01
Revised:WGH:AH:nm:6/14/76
a FORD LIBRARY
Se
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
GONFIDENTIAL
GDS
June 9, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR
M. Staser Holcomb
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Military Assistant to the Secretary
Department of Defense
SUBJECT:
Sale of TOW Missiles to the ROC
the
fron the
I refer to your memorandum of March 12, 1975 regarding sale of the the
TOW weapon system to the Republic of China. Approval is hereby
granted for the sale of 960 TOW missiles, 48 TOW launcher sets,
48 jeep adaptation kits, spare parts, maintenance material, training
items, and test equipment, to the Republic of China.
Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
Cc The Department of State
GERALD A LIBRARY FORD
CONFIDENTIAL GDS
lab 4/23/01
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
MEMORANDUM FOR:
M. Staser Holcomb
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Military Assistant to the Secretary
Department of Defense
SUBJECT:
Sale of TOW Missiles to the ROC
I refer to the memorandum of March 12, 1975 from the Secretary
of Defense regarding the sale of the TOW weapon system to the
Republic of China. Approval is hereby granted for the sale of
960 TOW missiles, 48 TOW launcher sets, 48 jeep adaptation
kits, spare parts, maintenance material, training items, and
test equipment, to the Republic of China.
Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
CC: The Department of State
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
GG 4/23/01
FORD LIBRARY & OERALO
(1975)
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Equipm
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UNITED NATIONS
REFER TO
FOR:
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ECONOMIC
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 012662
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
....
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Memorandum
CREATOR'S NAME
Brent Scowcroft
CREATOR'S TITLE
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
RECEIVER'S NAME
The President
TITLE
Chinese Activity in the Taiwan Strait
CREATION DATE
07/07/1976
VOLUME
4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400122
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
China, Republic of (10)
DATE WITHDRAWN
04/26/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
SANITIZED . 11/02
694H
MEMORANDUM
3934
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Roc
SECRET/SENSITIVE
ACTION
July 7, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
THOMAS J. BARNES
0
SUBJECT:
Assessment of Chinese Activity in the Taiwan Strait
Last week we sent you a memorandum on the situation in the Taiwan
Strait. You indicated that we should follow up with an analysis for the
President. Attached at Tab A is a memorandum from you to the
President providing a status report on the situation and discussing ROC
motivations as well as the role of Chinese domestic politics.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum at Tab A to the President.
Discussed unity
with 100
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
GERALD A LIBRARY FORD
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY. GG
9 MARA, DATE 4/23/01
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/SENSITIVE
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Chinese Activity in the Taiwan Strait
There is still uncertainty about the significance of unusual activity
over the last few weeks in the Taiwan Strait. But while the internal
political situation in China makes prediction hazardous, we do not
believe the PRC intends to launch any aggressive action against ROC-
held territory. In addition, there is reason to question ROC reporting
of some incidents. This memorandum briefly reviews developments
in the Strait, and the possible role of Chinese domestic politics on the
situation.
Background
ROC sources reported that on the morning of July 3 PRC artillery fired
32 rounds of live ammunition on a small uninhabited island southwest of
Little Quemoy. There is no independent U.S. confirmation of the firing,
and
ROC artillery may have fired on
the island first. Since the July 3 incident, there has been no further
action of this sort. Whether the July 3 firing was a PRC or a ROC
initiative, it was at least indirectly related to the unusual PRC military
activity of the last several weeks at the southern end of the Taiwan Strait.
Several PRC naval vessels, including landing ships, one missile frigate,
two oilers, one water carrier, and at least ten small landing craft, moved
through the Taiwan Strait in early June. Two submarines also apparently
moved into the same area at the end of June. A second missile frigate
moved up to the area from the south. Most of these ships apparently
have remained in the Swatow-Amoy region.
two
regiments of MIG-19s and some additional IL-28s have also recently
moved into the southern part of Fukien Province.
DECLASSIFIED F.O. 12058 Sec. 3.6
SECRET/SENSITIVE
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (C)
MR01-171, #7, CIA Ur 5/10/02
By dal NARA, Date 12/6/03
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
2
In response to this activity, the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan conducted
abnormally frequent air patrols along the coast. In apparent reaction to
the Taiwan reconnaissance flights, Peking fighters, for the first time
since 1967, ventured out over the Taiwan Strait to a distance of 15 miles.
At the same time,
indicated widespread rumors
in Fukien Province of special war preparations
reported
that the situation was tense, that militia were being mobilized, that
citizens had been told not to go out at night, and that cadre had been
instructed to return from leave.
attributed the
preparations to a report that ROC Premier Chiang Ching-kuo had held
a war council in Taipei to map out plans for military action against the
mainland.
said he had heard there would be an attack
on Quemoy.
Interpretations
The ROC is still reportedly concerned that the PRC operations may
presage a Chinese attempt to take control of the Pratas Islands, a
Nationalist controlled reef about 386 kilometers southwest of Taiwan.
believes that the increased PRC activity is probably part of a
coastal defense exercise.
concludes that it is very likely a "training-
contingency" exercise but that "an impending operation cannot be ruled out. "
There was a PRC naval exercise at the upper end of the Taiwan Strait
last year, but it was on a smaller scale than the current activity. An
exercise could have sparked the rumors which
are now reporting. Last year, however, there was not such a
large number of these reports.
Taiwan Motivations
One concern is that Taiwan may be attempting to play up the prospect
of a PRC military move.
the
ROC may have incorrectly reported the artillery shelling in the Quemoy
area on July 3 in order to excite fear of PRC intentions.
These developments come at a time when the U.S. political campaign
has raised some hope in Taipei that the trend in U.S. China policy could
be halted. Editorialists in Taipei, for example, have said that the
American people have a right to know the views of the Presidential
candidates on the China-Taiwan question. And the ROC has apparently
leaked various news items such as the withdrawal of U.S. advisors from
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
Quemoy and Matsu in order to stimulate debate. While the ROC would
probably welcome a crisis in the Strait, it must be careful not to over-
play its hand and expose itself to charges of provocation and interference
in U.S. politics.
PRC Dynamics
The possibility of some PRC military action in the near future against
either of the offshore islands or Pratas would seem to be remote. Such
action would threaten to undermine the course of U.S. -PRC normalization
and possibly lead to a reaffirmation of the U.S. security tie to Taiwan.
It would also cause great alarm in Japan. Nevertheless, such a contingency
is at least conceivable in light of the tense and uncertain political situation
in Peking.
The Leftists in Peking who, with Mao's support, currently have the
political initiative, will be in a vulnerable position when the Chairman
dies. Judging by the joint July 1 editorial on the CCP's anniversary,
the Leftists are still attempting to expand the purge of Teng Hsiao-p'ing
to other moderates, and presumably to build alliances with other forces
in the regime, particularly the military.
While there is no evidence that the current debate in China has involved
any substantial challenge to the basic PRC foreign policy line of strong
anti-Sovietism and improvement of relations with the West, the Left has
in the past pressed for a tougher stance on the issue of U.S. withdrawal
from Taiwan. The Left has conceivably raised the point again. Thus
Leftist influence could have contributed to the large-scale exercise in the
Strait as part of an effort to make clear that China reserves the right to
use force in dealing with Taiwan and gradually to increase the PRC's
ability to do so.
On the other hand, there has been no escalation of China's public
attention to the Taiwan problem or other evidence that it is a current
issue of debate. The July 1 editorial did not mention the subject. More-
over, Premier Hua Kuo-feng and other Chinese officials in recent conver-
sations with visiting foreign leaders have not suggested any toughening of
Peking's attitude toward Taiwan.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
GENALD LISAARY PORT
SECRET/SENSITIVE
4
Conclusion
I will continue to watch the situation, but at this point the recent
PRC operations in the Fukien area do not appear to be a prelude to a
near-term attack on Taiwan-held territory. At the minimum, however,
the PRC activity reflects China's increasing assertion over the last two
years of its transit rights and presence in the Strait. The policy of the
PRC Air Force of not flying over Taiwan Strait waters will inevitably
change just as the Chinese Navy now asserts the right to sail through the
passage. Thus the current activity is significant primarily in terms of
the long-term trend away from ROC dominance of the Strait and toward
the gradual assertion of PRC power in the area.
Finally, in the shorter term, the possibility of the early death of Chairman
Mao and a desire to warn off the ROC from any adventures might also
relate to the recent PRC activity.
GERATO FORD LIBRARY
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SUBJECT ASSESSMENT oF SHINESE AcTiviTy iN
THE TAIWAN STRAiT.
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
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ACTION REQUIRED
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nb
MEMORANDUM
3987
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
July 10, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
THOMAS BARNES
X
SUBJECT:
Chinese Representation Issue
at the Olympics
Attached at Tab A is a memo from you to the President providing
a review of the Chinese representation issue in the Olympics and
making a recommendation on our position. Denie 1000 Clift concors,
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.
FORD
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
10
TAB A
GERALD ? LIBRARY FORD
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHIRGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Chinese Representation Issue
in the Olympics
The Canadian government's decision to set conditions on the ROC's
parlicipation in the Montreal Olympics has again revived the China
representation issue, this time pitting the IOC against a host
government. The decision, although portrayed by the Canadian
government as consistent with its recognition of the PRC as the
government of China and not in violation of its obligations an host
to the Olympics, was in part prompted by several strong approaches
from the PRC over the past nine months. Both Prime Minister
Trudeau and External Aftairs Minister MacFachen have stead(ast)y
maintained Canada's position and argued that they have not caved in
to PRC pressure, but only yielded to their "own foreign policy. 11
Lord Killanin protested the decision as violating the obligations
Canada undertook as host of the Olympics to admit all members who
were in good standing. He also stated that Canada's decision set a
dangerous precedent,
The IOC claims to be the supreme authority during the period of the
games and holds that any action involving nomenclature of Olympic
committees, Dags or anthems is its perogative, the Canada, however,
maintains it agreed to admit for participation inlgaines athletes
representing all national Olympic committees recognized by the IOC
FORD
only "in accordance with normal procedures. "
&
Background
GERALD
LIBRARY
For the past twenty years at least, the ROC has been a member of
the IOC and eligible to participate in the Olympics. With the exception
of the 1952 and 1960 Rome games, its athletes have competed under the
name of the Republic of China, most recently at Munich in 1972 and
Innshruck in 1976, even though Austria has diplomatic relations with
the People's Republic of China.
2
A8 far as we can determine from conflicting sources, both the
ROC and the PRC for a number of years had national Olympic
committees and were members of the IOC, The PRC withdrew
from the 1956 Melbourne games without competing and then in
1958 left the IOC in protest over Taiwan's parlicipation. At the
Rome games in 1960, the IOC apparently ruled that the ROC
Olympic Committee would be known officially a6 the "Olympic
Committee, Republic of China" but that in competition the team
would be designated the "Chinese Republic of Formosa, 11 The ROC
acquiesced by participating under protest. The ROC flag was flown
and national anthem played when a ROC national won a silver medal.
The PRC All-China Sports Federation has recently pressed forward
its campaign to gain recognition from the IOC as the Chinese National
Olympic Committee and to have the ROC expelled. The PRC has won
membership in 8 major Olympic sports federations at the expense of
the ROC, but the ROC retains membership in 17. Both countries now
meet the technical requirements for Olympic participation -- member-
ship in at least 5 of these Olympic federations. The IOC to date has
been reluctant to admit the PRC at the expense of the ROC, It decided
in May 1975 not to rule on the PRC's April application for membership,
pending a report by an IOC study team headed by Lord Killanin, The
issue in still under consideration,
In the midst of the current controversy the PRC has intensified its
lobbying efforts by sending a letter 10 the IOC and dispatching a
delegation -- apparently of observers -- to Montreal, which has
reportedly already arrived.
Current Situation
A decision will have to be taken soon if the issue is to be resolved
before the scheduled opening of the Olympics on July 17. Killanin,
working informally with the IOC Executive Council, may be able to
reach a compromise with the Canadian Government, which would
then be ratified by the full IOC. Or the IOC as a whole may have to
decide the issue without such a compromise during its scheduled
July 13-15 meeting. A complicating factor is an Executive Council
agenda item, which liets China under applications for new membership.
This could reopen the question of PRC participation in the Olympics in
the Council's first meeting on July 10.
FORD
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
1)
It is difficult to predict whether and how the issue will be resolved.
The 10C miglit tie able to work out a compromise with Canada patterned
after the 1960 Olympics or the Executive Council and the 100 might vote
on the PRC's application for membership. Although in theory members
of the IOC are not meant to be advocates of their own governments!
policies, both the Executive Gouncil and the full 10C are waighted
heavily in favor of those recognizing the PRC should the vote fall along
national linen. In any caso, United States influence over the decision is
dimited we are not members of the Executive Council and have only
2 votes in the IOC.
U.S. Position
In the fiftion and early. sixties, we lobbied extensively to uphold the
ROC's position in the Olympics. However, in recent years as well as in
the current dispute, the United States Government has taken a low key.
positions We have stated our regret over the increasing politicization
of international sports events whenever quastions concerning participation
by politically sensitive countries (Clina, Jerae), South Africa) arise and
are sympathetic to efforts of sports bodies that wish
to minimizo such politicisation. But sports events is an issue to Be
decided by the various US private sports groups and international sports
bodies, We have not underlaken any intergovermmuntal lobbying offorts
in recent years.
Options
Our options in regard to the Montreal Games are:
Option 1 Maintain our principled but low key position
Option 2 - More active verhal support by the State Department (in
White House for the principle that the Olympics should
ha insulated from polition.
The USOC has souglit more positive USG support for its position We
could continue to be flexible on the issue of ROC participation in the
Olympics but state to the USOC, and lot it lie known publicly, that we
FORD
bulieve any liost government should live up to the forma of reference
&
it accepted from the IOC to host the games,
GERALD
LIBRARY
4
More active USG public opposition to the politicization of the
Olympics at this time would better position LIA to Lend support to our
athletes and those from other countries in the 1980 games when we expect
political problems to arise with the USSR as the bost country. Such
public support, however, has the disadvantage of creating the appearance
that we are unnecessarily tangling with the PRC, an appearance we wish to
avoid. We would also have to take issue, at least implicitly, with Canada,
Option 3. Go heyond a public statement and lobby with Canada and other
governments in support of the U. S. Olympic Committee and
10C positions.
This action would mark a significant shift from our policy of leaving these
matters in private hands. The shiff would prompt misleading and unhelpful
speculation about changes in our China policy. Moreover, Jobbying at this
late date in not likely to be effective.
Recommendation
The State Department recommends that at least initially, we should
continue to take the first option. This position holds out the greatest
promise for insulating our policy toward China from public controversy
at a sensitive time. It is also consistent with the position the United States
has taken on numerous occasions that participation in international sports
events is purely a private matter.
I believe we should adopt option 2. The current case is the first
in which a host government has attempted to interfenwith the decision
of the IOC and it will set a procedent for the 1980 Moscow games: We
should make it clear that the U.S. Government does not take a position
as to whether the ROC should or should not be in the Olympics; this
question is for the IOC to decide. We should, however, avoid Jobbying
the Canadian Government.
FORD
&
917
GERALD
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
URGENT INFORMATION
July 14, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BUD McFARLANE
FROM:
THOMAS J. BARNES
*
SUBJECT:
Taiwan Participation at the Olympics
The International Olympic Committee is scheduled to meet at 1500
July 14. The first item on the agenda is what to do about Taiwanese
participation.
A subsidiary development is that the basketball federation has just
voted to expel Taiwan and include the PRC. Of the 26 sports federa-
tions, 16 now recognize the ROC as China, and 10 say the PRC is
China. There is a rumor that the soccer federation is planning to
follow the basketball federation's example and that both switches could
provide a PRC groundswell. The majority is now clearly in Taiwan's
favor, however, and an entity can participate in the Olympics provided
that at least five federations support it.
GERALD ? LEGARAY FORD
9
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Memorandum
CREATOR'S NAME
Brent Scowcroft
CREATOR'S TITLE
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
RECEIVER'S NAME
Secretary of State, Secretary of
Defense, Director of Central
Intelligence
DESCRIPTION
Re Republic of China
CREATION DATE
08/03/1976
VOLUME
1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400122
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
China, Republic of (10)
DATE WITHDRAWN
04/26/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
EXEMPTED 6/02