Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
1553811
label
People's Republic of China (18)
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
1553811
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
People's Republic of China (18)
citationUrl
collections
Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific (Ford Administration)
East Asia and Pacific Country Files
subjects
Soviet Union
China
Taiwan
Nuclear testing
International relations
Surveillance
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
1553811
coverageEndDate
logicalDate
1977-01-31
month
1
year
1977
coverageStartDate
logicalDate
1976-11-01
month
11
year
1976
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
577848190ad00dee
ocrText
The original documents are located in Box 14, folder "People's Republic of China (18)" of
the Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford
Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 14 of Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 012796
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
....
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Memorandum
CREATOR'S NAME
Richard T. Boverie
RECEIVER'S NAME
Brent Scowcroft
CREATION DATE
11/17/1976
VOLUME
1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400149
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
14
FOLDER TITLE
People's Republic of China (18)
DATE WITHDRAWN
05/07/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
HJR
REDACTED
6/11/10
SECRET
6183
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
was
INFORMATION
November 17
1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
RICHARD T. BOVERIE
Quilkly
SUBJECT:
Chinese Nuclear Test
As predicted, the Chinese conducted a high-yield atmospheric nuclear
weapons test
iat their Lop Nor Test Site.
Due to the relatively high altitude of the blast, its fall-out would be
minimized (little surface contact) and most of the radioactive debris
would be carried high into the stratosphere. This was also true of
the last test, however,
but deposited
more fall-out over the US than expected due to abnormal weather
patterns.
Judging
DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted
from the reaction to the last test, we can probably expect considerable
E.O. 12058 (as amended) SEC 3.3
MR # 10 -045, #21
state rev 9/26/02; AFTACULL 6/11/10
NARA, Date 7/12/10
pressure from the press to divulge details of the NSC (EPA) study
the President requested at that time, and of the consultations
Secretary Kissinger promised with the Chinese.
With regard to the latter point, an EA deputy office director in the
State Department called in a counselor from the Chinese liaison office
and reaffirmed our continued opposition to atmospheric testing. The
Chinese response was that there was "no reason under heaven" why
they should not be able to test in the atmosphere since the US and
Soviets had done so for an extended period.
We are checking into the status of the EPA report and will send over
some proposed press guidance as soon as we have some more
information about this report and the anticipated severity of the
fall-out.
CC: Cathie DeSibour
SECRET
if
DOC
RECD
LOG NUMBER
MO
DA
MO
DA
HR
INITIAL ACTION o
NSC COMESPON
E PROFILE
11
17
11
17
19
7606183
TO: P
FROM: SECSTATE
S/S
UNCLAS LOG IN/ OUT
SCOWCROFT
SECDEF
LOU
NO FORN
NODIS
HYLAND
DCI
X REF
C
EYES ONLY EXDIS
DAVIS
STATE EXSEC
$
CODEWORD
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
OTHER BOVERIE
TS
SENSITIVE
THINESE NUSLEAR TEST ON Nov 17
SUBJECT
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
REC
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
CONCUR-
COOR-
INFO
CY
RENCE
DINATE
FOR
ADV CYS S'CROFT / WGH
MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
STAFF SECRETARY
MEMO FOR PRES
CONGRESSIONAL
X
X
REPLY FOR
ECONOMIC
DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT
APPROPRIATE ACTION
EUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS
MEMO
TO
FAR EAST/ PRC
+
RECOMMENDATIONS
INTELLIGENCE
JOINT MEMO
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO
FOR:
MID EAST/ NO. AFRICA
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
NSC PLANNING
CONCURRENCE
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
SCIENTIFIC
COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
SUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN
DATE
FROM
TO
STATUS
SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKENI:
DUE
CY TO
11/17
BOVERIE
S'SROFT
"ix"
iNFo (By-pass)
DESIBOUR
11/18
NSC/S
J
Noted by Scioft
SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
0201 LIBEARY & 07VH38
DISPATCH
NOTIFY
MICROFILM & FILE ROMTS
NSC/S DISP INSTR
M/ D
FBY
NOV2
1976
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
OPEN CRT ID mai
NS
DY
SPECIAL INDEXING:
WH SA FP
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED
X
CLOSE KES
PA
NSC 76-21
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976
599-022
)
2a
MEMORANDUM
6333-X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE-XGDS
INFORMATION
November 30, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
WILLIAM HYLAND
Individual
B
FROM:
WILLIAM GLEYSTEEN
IS
SUBJECT:
Reconnaissance Flights Near China
In concurring with this month's reconnaissance schedule for the East
Asian area, I penned a note saying that I wished to explain something.
In view of the statements we made in Peking in 1972-73 about terminating
our U-2 operations in Taiwan, I have tried to ensure that U-2 aircraft
are not re-introduced into direct China operations.
In 1974 when the drone program over the Yellow Sea was dropped in
favor of extending Burning Candy flights northward around the Shantung
Peninsula, we, in the State Department, agreed on the understanding
that U-2's would not be ultimately involved. Last year when the U-2's
were moved from Southeast Asia to Korea, we again specified that it was
with the understanding that they would be used for Korean and not primarily
Chinese purposes. Since then, and despite statements each time that it
is the final phase of a track adjustment, the U-2 tracks have been inching
westward over the Yellow Sea. The current track moves the planes well
off the Korean coast and about 110 miles from Shantung. This is safe
enough in terms of our political commitments SO long as the salami slicing
stops.
My particular concern about U-2 aircraft does not apply to other kinds of
aircraft, and obviously I would abandon my scruples if U-2 aircraft were
uniquely able to obtain vitally important information. Nothing I have seen
so far suggests this is the case.
DECLASSIFIED
13528
$
10-041,222 AFlts 12/15/11
state etc 3/15/10 cialth 3/17/10: osDets 10/4/10
By dal NARA, D. 2/6/12
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE-XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY DERALD
} P
1
P3 -2
1- Bill Glustrin
EYES ONLY FOR
2B
DOC
RECD
LOG N° BER
1 2c
MO
DA
MO
DA
HR
INITIAL ACTION o
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
11
30
12
1
11
7606333X
TO: PRES
FROM: SECSTATE
S/S
UNCLAS LOG IN/ OUT
SCOWCROFT
*
SECDEF
LOU
NO FORN
NODIS
HYLAND
DCI
X REF
C
EYES ONLY
EXDIS
DAVIS
STATE EXSEC
S
CODEWORD
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
OTHER Heyoters
TS
ENSITIVE
SUBJECT tlights near China LA
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
REC
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
CONCUR-
COOR-
INFO
CY
RENCE
DINATE
FOR
ADV CYS S'CROFT/ WGH
MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT.
STAFF SECRETARY
MEMO FOR PRES
CONGRESSIONAL
REPLY FOR
ECONOMIC
DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT
APPROPRIATE ACTION
EUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS
MEMO
TO
FAR EAST/ PRC
RECOMMENDATIONS
INTELLIGENCE
JOINT MEMO
(
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO
FOR:
/
MID EAST NO. AFRICA
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
NSC PLANNING
CONCURRENCE
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
SCIENTIFIC
COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
SUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN
DATE
FROM
TO
STATUS
SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKENI:
DUE
CY TO
11/30
stowcreft
IX
12/6
Noted Info by Scroft
Gleysten
SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
FORD & LIBRARY 07V339
DISPATCH
NOTIFY
MICROFILM a FILE RQMTS
NSC/S DISP INSTR
M/ F'D
BY
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
IF
CRT ID:
NS
DY
SPECIAL INDEXING:
OPEN
WH SA FP
CLOSE
PA
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED
NSC 76-21
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976-220-930
599-022
3a
MEMORANDUM
6515-X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
INFORMATION
December 15, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
Jagar
FROM:
WILLIAM H. GLEYSTEEN
HS
SUBJECT:
Ambassador Gates and China Transition
Papers
I have been meaning to talk to you about the attached letter from Ambas-
sador Gates to you and Secretary Kissinger, but I think a brief memo
will suffice.
As you will recall, Gates originally asked to be involved telegraphically
with the preparation of transition papers. You suggested instead that
he send in his ideas by letter, and he has done so. State is drafting an
acknowledgement thanking Gates for his effort and promising to keep his
proposals in mind if the new Administration requests policy views. In
addition, State proposes to send Gates a copy of their transition paper
on China, but they are not sure whether the Secretary will agree to do so.
I do not think you need to bother with the Gates letter which crosses no
new frontiers. Briefly, it states that: China is going to be a very
important factor in the world scene; leadership transition and other
problems may make it difficult for China to proceed with normalization
and that we will have problems on our own side as well; but the new Adminis-
tration should nevertheless make an effort to resolve the Taiwan problem,
perhaps by trying to get around a direct approach to the security question
through a step-by-step expansion of assurances about continued economic
access to the island. Meanwhile, Gates would continue with troop draw-
downs, lower our representation in Taipei to the Charge' level, and would
let the PRC know that we are continuing to implement the Shanghai
Communique in these ways.
I have a number of problems with Gates' proposals. The main one is
that Peking could easily satisfy us on the question of economic access
to Taiwan without giving us any comfort on military security. In fact,
they have already done SO. I also suspect that if we were to lower our
diplomatic representation in Taiwan in current circumstances, we might
SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
DECLASSIFIED State Dept Review
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 sw 9/26/02
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
HR 2/4/03
SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
2
find that the domestic cost was not worth the marginal gain with the
PRC -- in fact, Gates seems to underestimate the conservative
American mood on Taiwan. Finally, even though I, too, would proceed
with military drawdowns in Taiwan, I would not favor getting down on
our knees to tell the Chinese what we are doing. I would prefer to
let the Chinese find out for themselves.
My miscellaneous comments are not meant to belittle Ambassador
Gates' thoughtful letter, only to emphasize the complexities.
SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
SECRET
THE
United States Liaison Office
Peking, People's Republic of China
December 1, 1976
Hon. Henry Kissinger,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
and
General Scowcroft,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
Dear Secretary Kissinger and General Scowcroft:
I refer to my exchange with the White House concerning
USLO's participation in framing China policy proposals for
the new Administration, and I am responding to the suggestion
that I send my present comments by letter. I still consider
a dialogue during the transition period will be useful.
In making the following recommendations I assume that
the PRC has the potential to become a major world power by
the year 2000. However, I also assume that its progress
toward this goal will be painfully slow. Chinese economic
policies and practices are antiquated. Its leaders are un-
skilled in modern management or systems techniques. The
organization of industry is sadly deficient. They are weak
militarily. The purge of the "Gang of Four" has stimulated
new expectations, but higher standards of living and a signi-
ficant military modernization program are at present
financially impossible.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.5
State Dept Review
STATE DEPT.
GUIDELINES
SW 9/26/02
BY.
HR
2/4/03
SECRET
-2-
Hua Kuo-feng, in my view, is heading a transitional
government which is likely to be faced with a continuous
struggle for power. The movement toward modernization of
the army, increased and more efficient production, and a
higher standard of living will continue, but the sorting
out process of both people and priorities is a huge task,
and more heads could roll along the route.
Given these circumstances, I believe that the Chinese
leaders will be preoccupied with domestic economic and politi-
cal problems for some time. Meanwhile it is unlikely they will
be willing or able to effect much change in their foreign policy
including the priority in the Sino-U.S. relationship on our
common concerns vis-a-vis the Soviets. This is to say that
the Chinese will continue to care more about the U.S. perfor-
mance globally, as a counter to the USSR, than about resolution
of the Taiwan issue.
While there is no particular heat from Peking on the
Taiwan issue now, that can change. The issue has not been
put in the closet; there is the "debt"; and we have acknow-
ledged that the next move is up to us. The Chinese are
likely to remain intransigent on their three conditions and
their refusal to renounce the use of force in recovering
Taiwan. In making their conditions increasingly precise and
hence less negotiable -- while also declaring that they do
not expect a peaceful transition -- the Chinese may even
secretly want (a) to make it politically impossible for the
SECRET
-3-
USG to free itself of the Taiwan problem now, when the PRC is
in no position to do anything about Taiwan anyway, and (b) to
make it politically difficult for the USG not to meet Peking's
terms later on, when much of the American public will have
come to see the alternative as U.S. involvement in another
Asian war.
Notwithstanding different views on Peking's Taiwan game,
all of us here agree, on both geopolitical and bilateral
grounds, that the U.S. must actively seek opportunities to
end the present stagnation in our relations with Peking and
that certain initiatives are called for as soon as possible.
These are primarily cosmetic but they will signal to Hua's
new government, and others, that the new Administration
recognizes China's importance and also intends to pursue
normalization. The new Administration should, over its first
few months:
-Include Huang Chen among the first of the envoys to be
received by the new Secretary and the President.
-Reaffirm to Huang, and in a private Presidential message
to Hua, and in the Administration's first public foreign policy
statement, that the Shanghai Communique remains the basis for
the development of U.S. China relations.
--Promptly name USLO Chief. The importance of the back-
ground and characteristics of this individual is in Chinese
eyes a vital part of the relationship -- more so than in
other places.
SECRET
-4-
- --Proceed to carry out present undertakings on the U.S.
force level on Taiwan.
--Leave our representation in Taipei at the Charge level.
All of the above steps would convey continuity. They
would not give anything away, and would not require prior
decisions on the pace of normalization or on our basic terms
for normalization.
As part of the negotiating process in moving toward
normalization, I recommend a series of meetings either at the
Assistant Secretary or Ambassadorial level with the Chinese,
here and/or in Washington, to find out if the Chinese remain
intransigent on their three conditions and their refusal to
endorse a peaceful transition for Taiwan. Second, the meetings
should also explore the Chinese concept of the "Japanese
formula". For example, will the Japanese formula allow us to
assure our businessmen that their present and future invest-
ments on Taiwan will be safe for, say, the next 10-20 years?
Third, we should inform the Chinese that we are withdrawing
the remainder of our forces in Taiwan and do not intend to
name a new Ambassador to Taipei. Fourth, we should see if
there is any give on the Chinese side in settling the claims/
assets question. Fifth, contingent on the fourth, could be a
discussion of follow-on economic measures, such as most
favored nation status. A textile restraints agreement is
another possibility, and there are other items that can be
included, along the lines of U.S. proposals during the
Secretary's visit in October 1975.
SECRET
-5-
If we make no progress with the Chinese, we still have
the same options we have had all along:
(1) Retain the status quo while continuing to try to
get the Chinese to change their terms and not to contradict
publicly our desire for a peaceful transition. Success under
present conditions is unlikely, and we would have to assess
the costs of a long period of stagnation in our relations.
(2) Seek another way to break the impasse with a concen-
trated plan to fully inform Congress and the public about the
strategic issues involved, One possibility is to substitute
a PRC private assurance (growing out of the Japanese formula)
that Taiwan will remain open for foreign investment. We might
leak such a statement if the PRC would agree not to deny it.
Another possibility is to decide on a three-year program
leading toward recognition of the PRC and using this time
to keep negotiations open and to obtain public support for
the abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty.
You are in a better position to gauge American public
opinion concerning our relations with Taiwan and the Mutual
Security Treaty. Codel Curtis and others are strong in their
support of the MST -- and of course there are the U.S. news-
paper editorials and statements over the past few months which
stressed the need for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue.
On the other hand, these views may be in fact noisy,
minority ones. Wide-spread interest in China on the part of
our fellow citizens is testified to by continuous coverage of
SECRET
-6-
events in China by even small-town newspapers all over the
country. Senator Mansfield also was for movement now. We
may be over-emphasizing our political difficulties.
In any case, it is my firm view that continued stagnation
could freeze political positions in both countries to the
point of making a reopening very difficult. I think it is
imperative for the new Administration to do everything possible
to move toward diplomatic relations with the PRC. The prospect
of a powerful, hostile China twenty-five years from now is not
something that can be brushed aside.
Sincerely yours,
Thomas S. Gates
Chief, U.S. Liaison Office
3c
DOC
RECD
LOG
9ER
MO
DA
MO
DA
HR
INITIAL ACTION o
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
12
15
12
16
09
7606515x
TO: PRES
FROM: SECSTATE
S/S
UNCLAS LOG OUT
SCOWCROFT
*
SECDEF
LOU
NO FORN
MODIS
HYLAND
DCI
X REF
C
EYES ONLY
EXDIS
DAVIS
STATE EXSEC
$
CODEWORD
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
OTHER Gluptern
TS
SENSITIVE
SUBJECT
amb Mates Views of china - LA
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
REC
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
CONCUR-
COOR-
INFO
CY
RENCE
DINATE
FOR
ADV CYS S'CROFT/ WGH
MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
STAFF SECRETARY
MEMO FOR PRES
CONGRESSIONAL
REPLY FOR
ECONOMIC
DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT
APPROPRIATE ACTION
EUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS
MEMO
TO
FAR EAST PRC
RECOMMENDATIONS
INTELLIGENCE
JOINT MEMO
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO
FOR:
MID EAST/ NO. AFRICA
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
NSC PLANNING
CONCURRENCE
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
SCIENTIFIC
COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
SUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN
DATE
FROM
TO
STATUS
SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKENI:
DUE
CY TO
12/15
Acowergs
IX
01/03
Dam
Notedby Info Scrott
Heyster
SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
GERALD ? FORD
DISPATCH
NOTIFY
MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS
NSC/S DISP INSTR
M/F'D
BY
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
IF
CRT ID:
NS
DY
SPECIAL INDEXING:
OPEN
WH SA FP
CLOSE
PA
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED
NSC 76-21
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976-220-930
599-022
4a
MEMORANDUM
6558
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL - GDS
ACTION
January 10, 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT B
SUBJECT:
Response to Senator Curtis' Letter Regarding
His China Trip
Before meeting with you on December 17, Senator Curtis sent a letter
thanking you for having been given the opportunity to travel to the
People's Republic of China (Tab B).
Senator Curtis also offered his view that the Chinese consider Taiwan
an important but lesser issue in comparison with "Soviet aggression"
and the need for US-PRC cooperation to deal with it. He urged that we
not abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan arguing that it is
not necessary for the sake of US-PRC relations and that it would be
wrong to desert a free society for a closed Marxist one.
A suggested response is at Tab A.
Max Friedersdorf and Jack Marsh concur. Douglas Smith, of Robert.
Hartmann's office, has cleared the text.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the letter to Senator Curtis at Tab A.
CONFIDENTIAL - GDS
FORD & LIBRARY GENALD
HR 5/11/01
6558 4b
(redo)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Carl:
I want to thank you for your thoughtful letter of December 10
and for your courtesy in personally reporting to me on your
trip to the People's Republic of China.
You are to be congratulated on the excellent job you did as
leader of the delegation. You and your colleagues repre-
sented the American tradition of friendship towards others
combined with a free and frank exchange of views.
I firmly believe that such visits will do much to further the
understanding between our peoples and governments, and
thus make a significant contribution to sound policy. I am
hopeful that they will not only continue but will be expanded,
so that more Members of Congress and more of the American
people will have an opportunity to learn about and share ideas
with the Chinese people.
Warm personal regards,
The Honorable Carl Curtis
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
R.
FORD
GERALD
ADDRESS
4C
m
Retyped - - 1/8/77
Scowcroft/feb
Dear Carl:
I want to thank you for your thoughtful letter of December 10
and for your courtesy in personally reporting to me on your
trip to the People's Republic of China.
You are to be congratulated on the excellent job you did as
leader of the delegation. You and your colleagues repre-
sented the American tradition of friendship towards others
combined with a free and frank exchange of views.
I firmly believe that such visits will do much to further the
understanding between our peoples and governments, and
thus make a significant contribution to sound policy. I am
hopeful that they will be continued so that more Members of
Congress and more of the American people will have an
opportunity to learn about and share ideas with the Chinese
people.
Warm personal regards,
The Honorable Carl Curtis
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
GERALD R. FORD LIBRACY
4d
ACTION
ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP
1 TO (Name, office symbol or location)
INITIALS
CIRCULATE
Thelma
DATE
COORDINATION
2
INITIALS
FILE
DATE
INFORMATION
3
INITIALS
NOTE AND
RETURN
DATE
PER CON
VERSATION
4
INITIALS
SEE ME
DATE
SIGNATURE
REMARKS
# S 6558
The draft for the
to Curtes was
reclone. attached
put Thanks, in folder
LIBRATE GERALD ? FORD
Do NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences,
disapprovals, clearances, and similar actions.
DATE
FROM (Name, office N&C/S symbol or location)
PHONE
1/6
OPTIONAL FORM 41
* GPO : 1970 0 - 406-308 5041-101
AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41CFR) 100-11.206
Int & Comera ofc MH
MEMORANDUM
1/10/77 1430 Hold 4e your
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
6558
CONFIDENTIAL
GDS
ACTION
December 23, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
WILLIAM GLEYSTEEN
SUBJECT:
Confidential Letter of Acknowledgement to Senator
Curtis
Senator Curtis has written the President thanking him for the
opportunity to travel to the PRC and offering some thoughts on U.S.
policy towards China (Tab B).
A suggested response is attached at Tab A.
Cathie de Sibour, C Maxnfriedersdorf, and Jack Marsh concur.
Douglas Smith, of Robert Hartmann's office, has cleared the text.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
CONFIDENTIAL
GDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
HR 5/11/01
4f
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
6558
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL GDS
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
Response to
SUBJECT:
cknowledg of Senator Curtis' Letter to You
Regarding His China Trip
Before
In addition to meeting with you December 17, Senator Garl Curtis
sent you a letter of for having been given the opportunity
to travel to the People's Republic of China (Tab B).
Senator Curtis also offered his view that the Chinese consider Taiwan am
important
ant lesser issue the major one with being the Soviet threat and the need for
U.S. - PRC cooperation to deal with it. He strongly urged that we not
abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan arguing that it is not
necessary for the sale of U.S. -PRC relations and that it would be
morally wrong to desert Loake a free society for a closed Marxist one.
A suggested response is at Tab A.
Max Friedersdorf concurs. Douglas Smith, of Robert Hartmann's
office, has cleared the text.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the letter to Senator Curtis at Tab A.
&
FORD
GERALD
LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL GDS
HR 5/11/01
4g
Please file the attached cleared draft
with the rest of the package.
nac
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
1
4h
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
December 23, 1976
TO:
DOUG SMITH
FROM:
ALAN ROMBERG 373
The attached proposed Presidential reply to
Senator Carl Curtis is forwarded for your
clearance.
Please call 4966 when cleared.
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
-
4i
December 23, 1976
Dear Senator Curtis:
I want to thank you for your thoughtful letter of December 10
and for your courtesy in calling on me in personally person December 17 to report ing
to me on your trip to the People's Republic of China.
You are to be congratulated on the excellent job you did as leader
of the delegation. You and your colleagues represented the American
people in the fine st tradition of friendship towards others combined
with free and frank exchange of views.
I firmly believe that such visits will do much to further the under-
standing between our peoples and governments and they Will make a significant
contribution to sound policy. I am hopeful that they will not only continue
but but will
over time be expanded, so that more Members of Congress
and more of the American people will have an opportunity to learn about
and share flest ideas with the Chinese people, both here and in China.
With Marm personal regards,
GRF
The Honorable Carl Curtis
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
for No
FORD is LIBRARY 07V839
Staff 4j
6558
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 17, 1976
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
JIM CONNOR JEE
SUBJECT:
Report from Senator Carl Curtis
re visit to People's Republic
of China
The attached report from Senator Carl Curtis covering his trip to the
People's Republic of China was directed to you in the President's
outbox.
Please follow-up with appropriate action.
cc: Dick Cheney
Max Friedersdorf
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
Staff 4j
6558
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 17, 1976
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
JIM CONNOR JE6
SUBJECT:
Report from Senator Carl Curtis
re visit to People's Republic
of China
The attached report from Senator Carl Curtis covering his trip to the
People's Republic of China was directed to you in the President's
outbox.
Please follow-up with appropriate action.
cc: Dick Cheney
Max Friedersdorf
R.FORD LISBARY
CARL T. CURTIS
COMMITTEES:
4b
NEBRASKA
AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY
FINANCE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE
TAXATION
United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS AND
CONDUCT
CHAIRMAN OF REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
December 10, 1976
Dear Mr. President,
I am taking this opportunity to express my appreciation to
you for appointing me to the delegation to visit the People's
Republic of China. Mildred and I wish to thank you most sincerely
for this great opportunity and for this most interesting experience.
May I also take this occasion to convey to you my thoughts con-
cerning the People's Republic of China as it related to the official
policies of the United States?
I found the Chinese people to be friendly individuals. I was
impressed by the fact that they were all working and that they all
looked well and happy.
I am convinced that the concern they express in reference to
the Soviet threat is genuine and real. They frequently mention
this. Because of their belief concerning the danger of Soviet
aggression, they welcome the friendship and cooperation of the
United States.
The People's Republic of China through its officials will
urge a full normalization of relations between our two countries
and will repeat the party line in reference to Taiwan. These
people believe in one China and that the People's Republic of
China should be that one China; also, that the People's Republic
should possess and govern Taiwan. However, as the conversations
proceeded, the officials admitted that the world problem of
Soviet aggression is of supreme importance and that Taiwan is a
lesser issue. I think this is significant.
I believe it would be a mistake for us to abrogate our
treaty with Taiwan and desert our friends in Taiwan. It would
reflect very badly upon the United States for us to break a
treaty. Other nations would not know when they could rely on
the United States.
As a further reason for not deserting Taiwan, I want to
point out that the People's Republic of China is a closed Marxist
vonor
The President
Page 2
December 10, 1976
society. Our group gave a gift to our guides and interpreters
of two World Atlases and some copies of Bartlett's quotations.
Later they talked with me as Chairman of the delegation and to
Senator Birch Bayh as Vice Chairman. We were told that they could
not accept the gifts since they contain errors. The Chinese
mentioned that the Atlases were wrong about Taiwan and they stated
that many of the quotations were in error because they were
contrary to the Marxist teachings. This is quite significant. The
People's Republic is a closed society to Christianity and all other
religions and to private enterprise. All of these things not only
are present in Taiwan but flourish there. It would be wrong for
the United States to do anything that would destroy the liberty
and freedom of any of these people.
I do not think that it is necessary for us to abrogate a
treaty or forsake Taiwan to continue to have the friendship and
the cooperation of the People's Republic of China. If the United
States stands firm and everyone is patient, a solution might
come about that would be acceptable to all the parties involved,
including Taiwan.
Respectfully yours
CARL T. CURTIS, USS
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
20500
P. S. Attached hereto are transcripts of our conversations
with Vice Premier Li and Vice Foreign Minister Wang.
4l
CONFIDENTIAL
There follows a nearly verbatim transcript, cleared by
Senator Curtis, of the conversation between Codel
Curtis and PRC Vice Foreign Minister Wang Hai-jung on
November 13, 4:00 - 5:40 p.m., at the former American
Legation. Americans present were:
CODEL:
Senator Carl Curtis
Senator Birch Bayh
Senator Milton Young
Senator Ernest Hollings
Senator Ted Stevens
Senator Bennett Johnston
Mr. Robert Wolthuis
Mr. Terry Howe
Mr. Richard Hart
USLO:
Ambassador Gates
Mr. Richard Bock
Principal Chinese present, in addition to Vice Foreign
Minister Wang were:
Tang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director, American and Oceanian
Department, MFA
Ko Po-nien, Vice President, Chinese People's Institute
of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA)
Kang Tai-sha, Deputy Secretary-General, CPIFA
Wang: I would like to extend a welcome to our American
friends on behalf of my colleagues and to thank them for
coming so far to visit our country.
Curtis: I would like to express my appreciation for the
opportunity to visit your country. We have seen some of
your countryside and industry and the manner in which you
are developing your economy. J. also wish to express my
appreciation for your hospitality.
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 5 State Review
XGDS-1
STATE DEPT, QUIDELINES SW 9/26/02
BY
HR NARA, DATE 2/4/03
CONFIDENTIAL
2
Wang: You are our friends and when you come over to look
at our country it helps promote mutual understanding
between us.
Curtis: We value that friendship. Our people have a
warm feeling for the Chinese people. We are happy to
bring you the greetings from the President of the United
States.
Wang: Thank you. It is our common desire to develop
friendship between the Chinese and American peoples.
Curtis: I think that is a mutual desire. We were
delighted with your invitation to come visit you. We have
six Senators and their wives, three from each Party. The
three Democratic Senators are very influential within that
Party and close to President-elect Carter. We are here
not only to show our friendship but to learn about your
country, to know more about your economy and to meet with
you and other leaders of your country.
Wang: Well, how shall we proceed this afternoon?
Curtis: We are your guests. Whatever you wish. We will
be glad to hear what you have to say.
Wang: In that case, we welcome our friends who have
travelled so far to take the floor first and to express
your views on the international situation.
Curtis: We feel very strongly obligated on our part for
the U.S. to remain a very strong power. This is not only
in our interests but also that of our friends. There are
those who have great ambitions and we hope to make our
contribution to world peace by remaining the number one
military power. We feel that one of the big factors in
world politics at present is the supply of oil. It has
shifted some of the power. We are pleased to know that
your oil production is increasing and would appreciate
knowing something about this. Under our system of govern-
ment, we, as members of the U.S. Senate, are not empowered
to carry out or administer foreign affairs. That is the
responsibility of the President and his Secretary of State.
Consequently, while certain policies must be approved by
Congress, we are without power to negotiate with foreign
countries, make proposals, or react to them. But, in the
end, what our President proposes or what the Secretary of
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
3
State carries out, we are of course interested in. We
would like to carry back with us some of your ideas and
expectations with regard to matters of common interest.
We would be most pleased to hear from you your views con-
cerning the conduct and future plans of the Soviets.
Wang: Well, it is difficult for us to say anything about
the conduct and future plans of the Soviets. Maybe this
question can best be answered by the concrete activities
and conduct of the Soviets in days to come. What the
Soviet Union says is actually unbelievable and is meant
to deceive people. They talk of sham things. This
conclusion is drawn from the conduct and activities of
the Soviet Union.
Curtis: I can share your opinion. I have great doubts
of many things they say. I regard them as adventurers
and a potential threat. Perhaps it would be better put
to ask what should be our course of action with regard
to the Soviet Union.
Wang: What course the U.S. will take is a matter for
the U.S. Government. The Chinese Government's attitude
is to expose their schemes, criticizing and repudiating
their schemes, and exposing their deceptions and fallacies
and adopting a tit-for-tat struggle against them. In
dealing with Soviet social-imperialism, China and the U.S.
have a very great point in common. Our difference of
principle with the Soviet Union must continue to be
carried out. But the debate on principles need not hinder
and obstruct state relations. But we hold that the Soviet
social-imperialists have fundamentally betrayed the
principles of Marx and Lenin and their imperialistic
nature will never change.
Curtis: Do you feel the Soviets are a threat to your
border?
Wang: People say they have deployed one million troops
along the border. One million troops along a borderline
of more than 7,000 kilometers. What use is it to station
so many troops on such a long borderline? If they dare to
mount an invasion against us, I'm sure they will be
annihilated in the Great Sea of a people's war. Our policy
is: "We will not attack unless we are attacked. If
attacked we will certainly counter-attack." We have no
fear of them. The Soviet threat is mainly directed against
the U.S.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
4
Curtis: Why do they threaten the U.S.?
Wang: Because they want to strive for world hegemony.
You have interests in the world to defend and the Soviet
Union seeks to expand. In our view, such a situation will
never change.
Curtis: I agree that they are a serious adversary and I
am interested in your views regarding them.
Wang: superficially, Soviet social-imperialism appears
wildly ambitious. But actually they are very weak. The
imperialistic nature of their policies causes them to
carry out aggression, expansion, and to bully other
countries all over the world, but essentially they are
weak although wildly ambitious. If they continue to seek
world hegemony, they lack the physical strength and they
are most unpopular among the people of the world.
Curtis: What is the basis of their weakness?
Wang: They are carrying out fascist rule in their own
country. Internationally they want to enslave the peoples
of other countries. The irregular development of industry
in their country, the bad harvests are all part of this.
We look upon them as paper tigers and paper tigers are
always weak; their weakness is decided by the nature of
social-imperialism. What do you think?
Curtis: My individual opinion is that they are imperialists,
permit no freedom to their own people, and have ambitions
to dominate in the world. Do you believe the Soviets are
anxious to take more territory?
Wang: They are seeking hegemony.
Curtis: Should we be concerned about the Soviets'
activities towards Western Europe.
Wang: Yes, we should. (Wang apparently misunderstood
question as being directed at Chinese attitudes. She
was corrected by Nancy Tang.)
Curtis: Do you favor the U.S. policy of strengthening
NATO and full support of NATO?
Wang: This is an affair of the U.S. Government. On our
part, we endorse the idea that the U.S. and Western
Europe should establish a relationship of partnership
and equality. We also endorse and hope that Europe
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
5
becomes united and strong. Today there are many countries
in Europe and they seem to be divided and too soft. We
endorse your efforts to improve relations with Europe.
Curtis: Our delegation which is here at your gracious
invitation is a bipartisan one and the Vice Chairman is
the distinguished Senator from Indiana, Birch Bayh. I
would like to yield to him.
Wang: Welcome.
Bayh: Madame Vice Foreign Minister, I also appreciate
your hospitality and don't wish to impose to a great
extent. For most of us, this is our first visit to China.
Senator Stevens of Alaska served here during our common
effort against the Japanese and my father was in Kunming.
We have heard warm reports of the Chinese people but this
is our first exposure. I make these remarks SO that you
will understand that my comments are based on a lack of
familiarity and not designed to be offensive. Both of our
countries have gone through dramatic times in the last few
weeks. We share your grief at the loss of your great
Chairman Mao Tse-tung. I would like to convey our sympathy
at his passing.
In the same period, you have a new Chairman, Mr. Hua. You
have also had a natural disaster and have displayed a
marvelous ability to bounce back. At the same time our
country has tried to strengthen ourselves economically and
we have had the quadrennial exercise of political elections.
These things are now behind us for both the U.S. and China.
Now to the future. I apologize for speaking so long. We
here of course wish to sustain the initiative taken by
Chairman Mao, former President Nixon, Premier Chou, and
Secretary Kissinger to try to move toward normal relations.
Now we have new leaders. What do you see in our relation-
ship under Chairman Hua as opposed to that under Chairman
Mao? We read of the Gang of Four having been opposed to
this relationship started by Mao and Chou. I think we
can all speak with some authority that our new President
is determined to move toward normalization under the
principles of the Shanghai Communique. We cannot be
certain of our attitude. Could you enlighten us, please?
Wang: It is true that this year Chou En-lai, Chairman
Chu Teh of the National People's Congress and Chairman Mao
all passed away unfortunately. The Chinese people were deeply
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
6
grieved in particular with the passing away of our great
leader, Chairman Mao. But I'm sure you will be able to
witness from our newspapers that the Chinese people are
heeding the call by the Central Committee headed by
Chairman Hua to turn grief into strength. They are also
determined to carry on the behest of Chairman Mao and
resolutely implement the policies and line formulated
by Chairman Mao, and to carry through to the end the
revolutionary cause pioneered by him. Chairman Hua was
personally selected by Chairman Mao before he died to be
his successor to the revolutionary cause. Chairman Hua
has been loyal to Marx-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung thought.
Maybe you have also heard of the words of Chairman Mao
when he was alive and spoken to Chairman Hua that "With
you in charge, I'm at ease. " You can see Chairman Hua
is resolutely carrying out and implementing the policies
formulated by Chairman Mao. With Chairman Mao at ease,
the 800,000,000 Chinese people are even more at ease
because the successor of the revolutionary cause was
selected and arranged by Chairman Mao while he was alive.
As to the Gang of Four, you've heard of them--Wang Hung-
wen, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Chiang Ch'ing, Yao Wen-yuan--
they constituted an anti-party clique. They frenziedly
opposed Chairman Mao, opposed his thought, and frantically
opposed the policies and line formulated for us personally
by Chairman Mao. They engaged in scheming activities and
plotted to usurp party and state power. When Chairman
Mao was still alive, he criticized them for a number of
years and tried to educate them when he saw them engaging
in revisionism, splittism, and scheming. Because Chair-
man Mao discovered this scheme in timely fashion and
acted and exposed them, they were unable to succeed while
Chairman Mao was alive. When Chairman Mao passed away,
they again engaged in frenzied opposition to Chairman Hua,
who had been selected as successor to the revolutionary
cause by Chairman Mao when he was alive. They plotted to
usurp the supreme party and state power. Why were they so
frenziedly opposed to Chairman Hua? Just because Chairman
Hua resolutely inherited the behest of Chairman Mao,
resolutely carried out the policies and line of Chairman
Mao, and remains infinitely loyal to his thought. Chairman
Hua had been waging a resolute struggle against their
scheming activities. Originally, Chairman Mao wanted to
settle the question of the Gang of Four while he was alive
but unfortunately before he could do so, he passed away.
Chairman Hua brought about the solution of this issue which
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
7
Chairman Mao wished to but was unable to because of his
death. Chairman Hua with one stroke smashed the plot of
the Gang of Four to usurp party and state power. In this
way, under the leadership of the Central Committee headed
by Chairman Hua, we are even more determined to carry out
the line and policies of Chairman Mao.
Bayh: Does this mean that you will continue to follow
the principles of the Shanghai Communique to move towards
normalization?
Wang: Of course. The lines and policies formulated by
Chairman Mao also include foreign policy and under the
leadership of the Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua,
we will resolutely implement such lines and policies. On
the question of normalization between our two countries,
as I have often stated to American friends and as Mr.
Gates of the Liaison Office understands well, if both
parties adhere to the principles of the Shanghai Communique,
relations between the U.S. and China can be improved. This
was stated by Premier Chou in his report to the Fourth NPC.
On the question of normalization between our two countries,
we have three principles which we have time and again
stated. I am sure you are familiar with them, but I would
like to clearly state them for you. The three principles
are: sever diplomatic relations between the U.S. and
Taiwan; withdrawal of American troops from Taiwan; and
abrogation of the so-called Defense Treaty with Taiwan.
These are inseparable and indispensable. There can be no
other alternative. On the question of Taiwan, we do not
believe in the so-called peaceful transition. Chairman
Mao taught us "Where the broom doesn't reach, dust will
not run away by itself.' In Taiwan, there is still a
bunch of counter-revolutionaries. Our stand on Taiwan is
that we base ourselves on a footing to fight. As to when
we will liberate Taiwan and the methods we will adopt to
liberate Taiwan, this is purely an internal matter for
China and no other nation has the right to interfere
whatsoever. Since you raised this issue, I have stated
our consistent stand very candidly.
Bayh: I appreciate your candor. Our nation remains
committed to the Shanghai Communique although we realize
there might be some difficulties. But we are dedicated
to this purpose and our distinguished representative
Ambassador Gates has stressed to us the three principles
which the Vice Foreign Minister has mentioned. One last
thing--after talking with outstanding leaders like your-
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
8
self, and meeting with our hosts who are outstanding
ambassadors of goodwill, I am convinced that our two
nations have so much to offer to each other and to the
world, I am certain that if our two nations are interested
in solving these questions, we can find a method to
resolve our differences.
Wang: Between friends we can have a candid exchange of
views. Between China and the U.S. there are many common
points on many issues. The big issue is the international
one. Taiwan is a minor issue. Among the many common
points we share, the most important is to deal in common
with our northern so-called ally.
Bayh: We have a saying that with friends like that we
don't need enemies.
Curtis: We do have something very much in common-the
protection of things we hold dear against the Soviets,
just as you have. The fact that you extended an
invitation to us and that we were able to accept it has
led to better understanding. I commend you on inviting
us to visit here. We also commend you on your statement
that the large picture is world affairs, and the welfare
of your great country and our country with respect to the
Soviet Union. We also feel that way. We are pleased to
hear you say that the problem of Taiwan is secondary to
these world problems. Taiwan is a problem for us as well
and we hope that eventually there will be a peaceful
solution.
Wang (smiling broadly): I already stated that we don't
believe in peaceful transition and that has always been
our consistent stand.
Curtis: You must realize that when a nation such as ours
follows a course of conduct for decades, it is difficult
to change. Just as you have problems, we have problems.
Bayh: Time is all too short and especially I've already
had some time to speak. This first visit to China has
been an eye-opener. As much as I had respected your
country and your people, I now respect them even more. I
am convinced that it is possible for more Chinese to come
to the U.S. I would like to make a slight suggestion. I
am convinced it can resolve some problems. Relations could
be more supportive through broader exchange programs, more
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
9
trade, and other ways of getting to know one another
better. We've had this opportunity but there are only
six of us. If there were 600 you would have 600 missionaries
going back.
Wang: Since the doors between China and the U.S. were.
opened by your former President Nixon, and by Chairman
Mao, and after the issuance of the Shanghai Communique,
there have been quite a few exchanges between China and the
U.S.
Curtis: You have been a most gracious hostess. Before we
end, I wonder if my colleagues have something to say.
Young: We deeply appreciate the opportunity to come to
know you better. We will know you more in the future.
The U.S. is spread thinly over the world but we are bound
not to become second to the Soviet Union. Still, there
are problems--the Philippines want us to remove our bases.
We have problems all over the world and that's why we need
friends like you.
Hollings: I too am very grateful for your hospitality,
and as Senator Bayh has pointed out, this visit has been
an eye-opener. China has a big part of the world's
population and the U.S. and China should be working
together for peace in the future. I thank you for your
time and appreciate the opportunity to meet you this
afternoon.
Stevens: I thank you too. This has been a very enjoyable
time and it is most memorable for me to come back again.
I would like at some time to explore why we cannot have
some of the steps that lead towards normalization prior
to the realization of the principles you have mentioned,
such as air routes and expansion of exchanges. I think,
and it may be important, sometimes I'm not sure you are
fully cognizant of the difficulties we face, and increased
exchanges would help you become aware of these problems.
Johnston: Madame Vice Foreign Minister, I would like to
add my gratitude to that of my colleagues. One question
of substance is related to Korea. In the coming session
of Congress in January, some colleagues will be calling
for the withdrawal of troops there. May we report to our
colleagues that the retention of troops and the treaty
with Korea will not be a major stumbling block in imple-
menting the Shanghai Communique or a block to the
improvement of our relations?
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
10
Wang: On Korea, our stand is consistent; we support the
stand of the DPRK on independent and peaceful reunifi-
cation of Korea and that all U.S. troops should be with-
drawn and the UNC disbanded. The issue of Korea should
be left to the Korean people themselves to settle. This
has been our principled stand.
Curtis: Ambassador Gates, do you have something to
say?
Gates: We're old friends.
Wang: I welcome your coming here and the exchange of
views. They will help promote mutual understanding
between us.
Curtis: We believe much has been gained. You are a
charming hostess.
Wang: Our exchange of views and discussion will help
understanding but when you leave Peking and visit other
parts of our country you will understand more what
happens in our country. You can witness for yourself
how the people bring their initiative into full play and
rely on their own efforts to bring about socialist
revolution and construction of our country.
Curtis: We have already witnessed some of that. Before
we depart, I would like to say that former President
Nixon asked me to extend his warmest greetings.
Wang: I will convey that to our leaders. Thank you
for coming to visit us.
(After the session had ended, Wang came up to Senator
Curtis to say that the conversation had been frank and
was not for publication.)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Transcript of Li Hsien-nien/Codel Curtis Conversation
There follows nearly verbatim transcript, cleared
by Senator Curtis, of conversation between Codel Curtis
and PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien on November 14,
4:45 - 6:15 p.m., at the Great Hall of the People.
Americans present were:
CODEL:
Senator and Mrs. Carl Curtis
Senator and Mrs. Birch Bayh
Senator and Mrs. Milton Young
Senator and Mrs. Ernest Hollings
Senator and Mrs. Ted Stevens
Senator and Mrs. Bennett Johnson
Mr. and Mrs. Robert Wolthius
Mr. Terry Howe
Mr. Richard Hart
USLO:
Ambassador Gates
Mr. Richard Bock
Principal Chinese present, in addition to
Vice Premier Li, were:
Vice Foreign Minister Wang Hai-jung
T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director, American and
Oceanian Department, MFA
K'o Po-nien, Vice President, Chinese People's Institute
of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA)
K'ang Tai-sha, Deputy Secretary-General, CPIFA
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 state Review
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES SW 9/26/02
CONFIDENTIAL
BY
HR NARA, DATE 2/4/03
XGDS 1
CONF IDENTIAL
2.
Li: Welcome to our friends.
Curtis: We are delighted to be here.
Li: Today you visited the Great Wall?
Curtis: We have read of it through the years.
For many of us this is our first visit to China and
we were delighted to visit the Great Wall.
Li: It's a place of historical interest. I
wonder whether any of you have been to China before.
Curtis: Senator Stevens, tell us of your first
trip to China.
Stevens: I was in the 14th Air Force, stationed
in Kunming and was here in Peking in 1945 right after
the war ended.
Li: That is under Chennault?
Stevens: Yes, I served with General Chennault.
Li: You were in China during World War II. At
that time you had a transport team.
Stevens: I was a pilot. I flew transport planes
into Sian, Hankow, Kweilin, all over the country.
Li: How long since you arrived in China?
Curtis: We arrived last Monday, had a delightful
stay in Shanghai, took the train to Nanking, enjoyed
our stay there of two nights and then had a very
pleasant train ride here. We have been treated
wonderfully.
Li: So you arrived the 8th of November. In
Shanghai did you read the big character posters?
Curtis: We couldn't read them ourselves, but our
guides told us about some of them.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3.
Li: You have arrived in China at a time when the
Central Committee has made the decision to appoint
Hua Kuo-feng as Chairman of the Central Committee and
of the Military Commission of the Central Committee.
It is also at the time that we have explained the
schemes of the gang of four--Wang Hung-wen, Chang
Chun-ch'iao, Chiang Ch'ing, and Yao Wen-yuan. The
decision was made in October. Thus, you must have seen
many big character posters in Shanghai.
Curtis: Yes, we did.
Li: That was a major event in China. This year
First Premier Chou En-lai passed away, then Chu Teh,
the Chairman of the National People's Congress, and
then our great leader and teacher Chairman Mao Tse-tung.
Curtis: We follow all the news we get from China
because we value the friendship of your great country.
We wish to express our condolences on the loss of your
leaders, particularly Chairman Mao. Also, we bring
greetings to you from President Ford.
Li: Thank you. When President Ford visited
China last year, I met him. Please convey my greetings
to him.
Curtis: Thank you, I will do SO. A few days
before I left the U.S. I had a call from former
President Nixon and he asked that I convey his greet-
ings to China and the Chinese people.
Li: Please convey my thanks to Mr. Nixon.
Curtis: You'll be pleased to know that when the
announcement of our visit was made, all of us ex-
perienced a tremendous response from our people who
expressed a great interest in China. My Nebraska
constitutents were delighted that we were making this
trip.
Li: Your state has a highly developed agriculture.
Curtis: Yes, we are a great agricultural state.
A number of the senators here represent agricultural
states and we have been tremendously impressed by the
industriousness of your agricultural workers.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
4.
Li: Senator Young, you are also from an
agricultural state, I believe.
Young: I'm a farmer myself and my three sons
farm. One of the amazing things to me is that your
land has been producing for 2,000 years or more and
produces just as well as ours which has been pro-
ducing for only a little over one hundred years.
Li: In the past 2,000 years or more we were
under feudal rule and production was restrained.
Afterwards, there was aggression by foreign imperialist
states so our agriculture did not develop. Before
liberation (in 1949), production was backward in China
and not only draft animals but also human beings had
to pull plows. There was the ruthless plunder by
landlords and bureaucratic-capitalists, as well as by
imperialists. So peasants at that time were in a dire
plight. It was not surprising that several million
peasants starved to death. That was the situation
during the feudal dynasties and under Chiang Kai-shek's
rule. You might very well study why Chiang Kai-shek
fell. There must be some reasons behind it. It was
because he offended the majority of the people. Above
all he offended the peasants and workers. Now in
China, with such a vast territory and 800 million
people, we have solved the food problem in the main, -
so people won't starve to death or die of cold. This
was the great achievement made under the leadership of
Chairman Mao and by relying on the efforts of the
broad masses of people. But we are not satisfied.
Just now I said we had solved the food problem in the
main. It is not yet completely solved and we must
continue our efforts. We just have sufficient food
grain to feed our people. We have some to export but
we also import some. The amount is limited compared
to yours. We export one or two million tons and import
about the same. We must rely on our own efforts and
run everything with our own strength.
Curtis: I wish to commend you on your great
progress, and on your determination to be self-
sufficient in food. You have done a great job. I
understand your exports include some rice. Is that
right?
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
5.
Li: We export some rice and soy beans.
Curtis: What do you import?
Li: A certain amount of wheat, also some food
grains from your country.
Curtis: While we commend your determination to
be self-sufficient in food grain, if you have to buy
any, please come to us. Senator Young is a wheat
farmer and so is Senator Bayh.
Li: But we don't have enough money.
Curtis: Then we must buy something from you.
Do you have some oil to sell us?
Li: We are just self-sufficient in oil. Our
surplus is not much. Of course we have big oil
deposits.
Curtis: We understand the potential is very
great.
Li: Yes, you're right. Further efforts should
be made for exploration. Our oil industry is still
very young and in the past we had very little. In
1960 we began to have our own oil industry. But we.
had to import oil from others, especially from our
neighbor to the North who tried to strangle us.
Perhaps you know what I mean by our neighbors to the
North. We've had bad relations.
Curtis: We don't think they're very neighborly.
Li: They seek hegemony.
Curtis: The major reason the U.S. spends so
much to stay strong militarily is that we feel that
will retard any chance that the Soviet Union will try
aggression.
Li: The Soviets have big ambitions and would
like to have the whole globe, but they are unable to
achieve that because their strength is not that
great. Politically, they seek hegemony. No matter
what tricks or fine words they use, they will event-
ually be exposed by the people of the world. Their
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
6.
seeking hegemony makes them the enemy of the world's
people. At home there is lopsided development in
the Soviet economy. There is not enough food to eat,
not enough food grains. Some people satirize the
Soviet Union by saying the Soviets SOW seeds in the
Ukraine and harvest crops in the US. Their top
priority is the development of national defense and
in domestic policies the Soviet Union oppresses the
minority nationalities and practices fascist rule.
Actually they are very feeble.
Curtis: You have had a long and distinguished
career and you are a student of economics. Why in
your opinion is the Soviet economy weak?
Li: I'm no student of economics. I'm not a
scholar of economics. But I did fight in the war.
In my view, the Soviet Union has offended the workers
and peasants and broad masses of the people; therefore
there is no enthusiasm on their part. In planning,
they give prominence to development of national
defense. Other branches of industry- machine building,
chemicals, etc. are lagging behind. In relations
between industry and agriculture, they neglect the
development of agriculture. You can study whether or
not I'm right. In the Soviet Union line, principles
and policies are all wrong. They practice revision-
ism and fascism, and there is no way to mobilize the
enthusiasm of the workers, peasants and other people.
Curtis: We in the US are very aware of the
Soviet military threat and the great sums they are
spending on armaments. That is why we intend to stay
strong and why we make sacrifices in many parts of
the world to resist Soviet aggression.
Li: We are also aware of Soviet military
strength, but they talk of disarmament every day.
Curtis: Do you think the Soviets have plans for
Western Europe if they are not resisted?
Li: What do you mean by plans? The Soviets
think first of all about Europe.
Curtis: I mean aggressive plans.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
7.
Li: Some people in the world tend to think about
the focus of Soviet strategy lies in the East. Chairman
Mao thought that the Soviet strategic focus was in
Europe, including the Middle East. This does not mean
we will slacken our vigilance. We are heightening our
vigilence. That is why we dig tunnels deep and store
grain everywhere. By digging tunnels deep we mean if
the Soviets invade us we will fight back. Mao taught
us to prepare against war, prepare against natural
disasters, and do everything for the people. By pre-
paring for war we mean if the Soviets attack China,
we certainly will fight back. But the focus of Soviet
strategy remains in Europe including the Middle East,
SO we support a united Europe. But at present the
European countries are too divided.
Curtis: Do you support the efforts of the United
States to make NATO strong?
Li: You can't afford to leave Europe; neither
can Europe.
Curtis: The US has assumed responsibility in so
many places in the world and we expect to continue
those responsibilities, so we welcome the support of
the great people of China in opposition to Soviet
aggression.
Li: We hope you will establish an equal
partnership with Europe and all other peoples of the
world.
Curtis: Do the Soviets have many troops on
your borders?
Li: They claim to have stationed about one
million troops on the border. The border extends
over many thousands of kilometers. It is a long
front line. Do you think the one million troops are
directed against China only? I think they are pri-
marily directed against the US, then against Japan,
and of course are also directed against China. One
million troops is not enough to fight against China.
Even if they added another one million it would not
be enough. Nor even two million more. If the
Soviets come, we'll yield some places to them, then
close our door and beat the dog inside the room.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
8.
When the door is closed, it is easier to deal with
the dog and to beat the dog. That was the way we
fought the Japanese. We closed the door and thor-
oughly annihilated the Japanese. At that time,
China was ruled by Chiang Kai-shek and large tracts
of territory in North and Central China were left to
us because Chiang Kai-shek ran away. Chiang Kai-shek
first ran from the Northeast and the Japanese occupied
it. Then from North, Central, South and East China.
Chiang Kai-shek's troops were running in front of the
Japanese and our troops were running after the Japan-
ese. They turned their backs to the Japanese but we
faced the Japanese. During the war of resistance
against the Japanese, North, Central, even East and
South China was led by the Communist Party. So one
million Soviet troops on the border will be no match
for us. In the final analysis, the focus of the
Soviet strategy is Europe. My friends may not believe
my words but facts will bear me out. As for the dis-
armament they are always talking about, we don't
believe it.
Curtis: What would be the best strategy in
Europe to oppose Soviet aggression?
Li: I don't know. The Soviet Union wants to
swallow up that place.
Curtis: Are you making progress in your
armament program?
Li: Since we must make preparations against war,
we must manufacture some things.
Curtis: You have been very gracious in receiving
us. I would like to yield at this point to the Vice
Chairman of our delegation, Senator Birch Bayh of the
state of Indiana. He might wish to make some comments
or ask some questions.
Bayh: Mr. Vice Premier. This is my first time
in your country. Earlier I saw it through the eyes
of my father who was here at the time when Senator
Stevens was here, but it's not like seeing it myself.
My wife and I are delighted and extremely impressed
by what we have seen. It would be remiss of us not to
indicate our gratitude to your Vice Foreign Minister
who met us yesterday, to our host at the banquet and
to all those, including Madame K'ang, who have shown
us the kindest hospitality.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
9.
Li: What years was your father in China?
Bayh: 1943-45. I'm a farmer basically as well
as a Senator. I have been impressed by the way that
the greatest amount of production is obtained from
each square centimeter of ground, by the industriousness
of your people and by the diversification of your
agriculture. We have seen all this as well as your
cancer institute, your hospital, your industries. It
is to see the legend of Chairman Mao come alive. We
can thus realize better the depth of the grief your
country must have at the death of the Chairman, and
we wish to convey our sympathy.
Li: Thank you.
Bayh: I would like to ask your thoughts on a
different area. You have understandably talked about
defense against the war-making potential of the Soviet
Union, which is of course extremely important. We are
all concerned that another war with the modern in-
struments of war now available would be a holocaust.
I would like to talk about peace. I do not wish to
contradict anything you have said but we have heard
of the important work you have given in economic
guidance in helping Chairman Mao. I believe you are
an economic genius. I appreciate your modesty, but
believe we can see your expertise everywhere.
Li: You flatter me.
Bayh: This has been a long prologue. I would
like to get your thoughts on what I think our whole
country would like to know. As I understand it,
sometime this year you will promulgate your fifth
Five Year Plan of your country. Are there elements
in this plan which you could disclose to us in which a
closer relation and friendship between China and the
United States could be beneficial?
Are there ways in which we could be of assistance
--although I can appreciate your strong feeling of
self-reliance--range of areas which could be part of
the continuing relationship between our two countries?
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
10.
Li: Speaking about our plan is complex and
involves lots of aspects. It is difficult to discuss
in a systematic way. During his lifetime, Chairman
Mao not only laid down the basic line for policy but
also the basic line and principles for construction
of the country. These principles were stated in the
report by the late Premier Chou En-lai at the Fourth
NPC. He discussed the modernization of industry,
agriculture, national defense and science and technology.
In making economic plans, we must first think of the
800 million people and bear in mind the food, clothing
and housing problems of 800 million people, so we plan
the economy in the order of agriculture, light industry
and heavy industry. This is consistent with the teach-
ings of Chairman Mao that we must first develop agri-
culture. If we don't have enought food for our people,
even if we import 10 or 20 million tons of grain, this
would not solve our problem. If agriculture is de-
veloped, it is easier to develop light industry, and
heavy industry will have a solid foundation. So we
make our plans according to this principle. We have
a plan but it is not yet finalized. We have no in-
tention of making it public. The plan has not yet
matured and is still under discussion. In duscussing
it we may find new problems and revise the plan. As
for relations between our two countries, especially
trade, it remains to be seen. We have bought some
equipment from the US--such as chemical fertilizer
plants.
Bayh: The Kellogg urea plants.
Li: It depends on whether. we need this and are
able to do it. The question of necessity is easy.
But if we ask our Minister, he will ask for many
things. As for our ability, that is very difficult.
We don't have the money to buy. On principle we rely
on our own efforts. Mainly we rely on our own efforts.
We do not plan to be in debt. We were once in debt to
the Soviet Union. Our debts to the Soviet Union were
incurred in 1950-51 during the war of resistance
against the US and to assist Korea. We fought a war
in that country, our two countries. It is not pleasant
to be a debtor.
Bayh: It is not pleasant to be a creditor of
the Soviets either.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
11.
Li: Perhaps the Soviet Union finds it pleasant.
Then we made our minds up to repay all debts to the
Soviet Union. After that we never incurred any foreign
or domestic debts. Once we issued public bonds but
we later repaid them. So as to trade between our two
countries, we 11 have to see. I have just said that
it depends on necessity and ability. Another thing
is your high tariff which is troublesome. I think
it is not easy to solve this problem for the time
being. Roughly this is where we are at the present
stage. I think we import more from the US than you
do from us.
Bayh: You have been very kind and I appreciate
your response. What I asked was in respect to our
future relations. I think that to the extent that we
can increase trade opportunities, permit more people
of the US to visit China and more Chinese to visit
the US--there has been some of this but it should be
increased- to the extent that trade and other open
door policies can be pursued they will help to find
a solution. The group here is going back, as ambas-
sadors of goodwill for China.
Li: At present there are lots of exchanges
already.
Curtis: We feel privileged and appreciate the
opportunity to carry on this conversation with you.
I would like to extend to my colleagues the opportunity
to say something or to ask questions.
Young: First I would like to say that I deeply
appreciate the real friendship which we have received
while here. You have opened your doors to us and
shown us real friendship. I would like to say also
that no other nation in the world could feed, clothe,
educate and provide such good care of 800 million
people. To do this and to stay out of debt is some-
thing. We could learn a few things from you about
staying out of debt. Thank you.
Hollings: Mr. Vice Premier, I appreciate very
much the opportunity and I am particularly honored
to have this conversation with you, since you are
well known in the US as one of the last of the
veterans of the Long March and as a partner with
Chairman Mao and Premier Chou in the modernization
of China.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
12.
Li: We will work still harder to build our
country under the leadership of the Central Committee
headed by Chairman Hua, relying on the efforts of the
people.
Hollings: As a Senator, I must point out that I
speak individually. We are told that anything a US
senator may utter is considered a position of the
USG. That is not true. Each one of us speaks for
himself. There are five other genators here and they
do not speak for me and I cannot speak for them. I
believe you have an investment in the time and effort
it took to bring me all the way to China and I wish
to speak frankly. Speaking for myself, we believe in
the principles of the Shanghai Communique and we believe
we are adhering to the principles, and as the Communique
states, as tensions ease, we can continue to make
progress under the Shanghai Communique. We believe
this trip so generously provided to us has helped to
ease tensions and certainly has enhanced my under-
standing and appreciation of China. As a senator, I
believe that there is one China and that you are that
China.
Li: You're right.
Hollings: However, we have had friends of long
standing on Taiwan and as a Senator, I don't believe
the majority of the US senators would abruptly abandon
that friendship. A journey of 1,000 miles, they say
in China, begins with one step. I think we should
make steps together to try to increase trade, open
air routes, and on our side reduce troops on Taiwan
to make steps for the realization of the Shanghai
Communique principles. We in the US have never
believed in hegemony. The fact in our long history is
that we gave freedom to the Philippines and Cuba.
After World War II in which we defeated Germany, Italy.
and Japan, we not only gave them freedom but also
financed their recovery.
Li: People in the world believe you still have
some hegemony.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
13.
Hollings: We absolutely refute that by our own
acts over 200 years of history. We wish nothing but
freedom for the peoples of the world and I think the
US and China working together could bring about
freedom and economic sustenance to the third world.
I'm sure this visit has served as a platform or
starting point for me as a senator to understand and
appreciate the greatness of China and I hope similar
visits by your distinguished leaders to the US will
follow.
Li: How can we go to the US since the Embassy
of the Taiwan clique is there?
Hollings: That's one of the problems we will
have to solve and we in the Senate will be working
on that problem.
Li: The solution must conform to the Shanghai
Communique.
Curtis: Senator Stevens of Alaska.
Li: That is the northernmost state.
Stevens: Yes we are. Alaska is somewhat
similar to Yunnan province where I was stationed
during the war. It may interest you to know that
those of us in the Air Force here had great respect
for your people in the North. My squadron supplied
your troops at times. You speak the truth when you
say you really fought the Japanese. We knew that and
respected you for it. My large colleague from the
South, he speaks candidly and we respect his candor.
But I'd like to pursue his point. Isn't there some
way we could start the flow of visits both ways? We
have difficulties in Congress in being able to follow
through on the implications of this relationship
based on a lack of understanding. Your people have
doubled since I was here. Your housing and food
problems have been solved, but that word isn't
getting back to the US. We need more of our people
coming this way but also more of your people coming
to the US to visit colleges, our counties, our cities,
to increase friendship and understanding. I have been
amazed by the friendship I have found here. I am
deeply impressed by the smiles I have seen on the
streets here because I didn't see that during the war.
Perhaps people don't smile during wars. But this is
a two way street, this approach to normalization.
Somehow I don't see much coming our way on that
two-way street.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
14.
Li: It is not a bad record having so many people
visiting before completion of normalization of rela-
tions. The future depends on events, nevertheless there
will be exchanges. As for visits by officials, our
relations are not yet normalized. In Washington there
is still the Embassy of Taiwan. If we go, both you
and we will be embarrassed. I've heard that Vice
Foreign Minister Wang told you that the major aspect
is the international situation, and the minor question
is Taiwan. I think she put the question very well.
Nevertheless Taiwan remains an issue. I think our
American friends, especially Mr. Gates, know our views
very well SO I won't discuss this any more.
Johnston: Mr. Vice Premier, I would like to add
my thanks for the warm hospitality. I am particularly
reassured and pleased to learn that Chairman Hua is
committed to Chairman Mao's policies in carrying out
the principles of the Shanghai Communique, and to
develop further relationships and cooperation between
our two countries.
Li: You are right that we will carry out the
behest of Chairman Mao.
Johnston: In our country, policy does not
trickle down from the top but comes up from the
people. Presidents have found this out in a couple.
of instances, most recently in our policies in South-
east Asia and the Middle East. What my colleagues
are trying to say is that we are trying to help you
and you must help us with our people in developing
this friendship.
Curtis: Mr. Vice Premier, this has been a most
enjoyable and helpful occasion. I am gratef ulto you
for having received us and express the gratitude of
all of us for the invitation to bring our wives along.
They are a very influential group and have enjoyed it,
especially our hospital trip yesterday to see your
advances in cancer treatment. Thank you for this and
I express the gratitude of all of us.
Li: You should have asked the ladies to sit
in front.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
15.
Curtis: You are a very wise man.
Li: We must show respect for the ladies. I
would like to thank you for coming and for having
travelled SO far. I express my welcome to you.
CONFIDENTIAL
4m
December 23, 1976
Dear Senator Curtis:
I want to thank you for your thoughtful letter of December 10
and for your courtesy in calling on me in pensonally person December 17 to to] reporting report
to me on your trip to the People's Republic of China.
You are to be congratulated on the excellent job you did as leader
of the delegation. You and your colleagues represented the American
people in the finest tradition of friendship towards others combined
a
with free and frank exchange of views.
I firmly believe that such visits will do much to further the under-
standing between our peoples and governments and Hus Will make a significant
contribution to sound policy. I am hopeful that they will not only continue
but will
but over time, be expanded, so that more Members of Congress
and more of the American people will have an opportunity to learn about
and share are ideas with the Chinese people, both here and in China.
With Warm personal regards,
GRF
The Honorable Carl Curtis
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
on r aditable
GERALD ? FORD
DOC
RECD
LOG NUMBER
40
MO
DA
MO
DA
HR
INITIAL ACTION
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
12
17
12
18
10
7606558
TO: PRES
FROM: SECSTATE
S/S
UNCLAS LOG OUT
SCOWCROFT X
SECDEF
Lou
NO FORN
NODIS
HYLAND
DCI
X REF
C
EYES ONLY
EXDIS
DAVIS
STATE EXSEC
S
CODEWORD
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
OTHER CONNOR, J
TS
SENSITIVE
SUBJECT ack ltr to Pres fm Sen Curtis funding npt of his visit
to PRC & mtgs w/ Vice Premier Ll & Vice Fomen wang
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
REC
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
CONCUR-
COOR-
INFO
CY
RENCE
DINATE
ADV CYS S'CROFT/ WGH
FOR
MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
STAFF SECRETARY
MEMO FOR PRES
X
CONGRESSIONAL
REPLY FOR
ECONOMIC
DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT
APPROPRIATE ACTION
EUR/ CANADA/ OCEANS
MEMO
TO
FAR EAST/ PRC
X
RECOMMENDATIONS
INTELLIGENCE
JOINT MEMO
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO
FOR:
MID EAST/ NO. AFRICA
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
NSC PLANNING
CONCURRENCE
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
SCIENTIFIC
12/24
COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
SUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN
DATE
FROM
TO
STATUS
SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED IOR TAKENI:
DUE
CY TO
12/03
1/10
showcrft Per P x
Pres to por etato Curtis
Sgn It, to Curtis
SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
1/21
U
Fal L Aution UNK
FORD & LIBRARY GIV879
RECEIVED
FEB 81977
CENTRAL FILES
DISPATCH
NOTIFY
MICROFILM a FILE ROMTS
NSC/S DISP INSTR
M/ F'D
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
BY IF Ngc/s
CRT ID:
NS
DY
SPECIAL INDEXING:
OPEN
WH
SA
n
CLOSE
PA
Had
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED
NSC 76-21
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976-220-930
599-022