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Gerald R3Ebrd Presidential Library
SECRET SPOKE
6. A recent COSVN assessment of the Communist dry season
offensive from April to July 1974 states that: (1) the GVN
has suffered severe setbacks; (2) the military balance is shifting
in the Communists' favor; (3) military operations are necessary
through the summer and fall; and (4) such activity could lead
to striking "a decisive blow in the 1975 dry season. " The same
assessment admitted Communist weaknesses in both city and district-
level political structures and held that little could be gained
at the bargaining table. It is not clear how much of this
assessment is propaganda or exhortation.
Conclusion
7. The Communists have been rebuilding their military forces
in both North and South Vietnam since the Vietnam settlement
agreement of January 1973. They clearly are preparing to return
to large-scale warfare at some point in the future as we stated in
out last National Intelligence Estimate on Vietnam. (See NIE
53/14.3-74: The Likelihood of a Major North Vietnamese Offensive
Against South Vietnam Before June 30, 1975, published May 23,
1974. They now have the capability of launching a major or all-
out offensive on relatively short notice -- i.e., several weeks
or so. We do not believe, however, that the current evidence
portends an overall strategy change, and we do not expect the
North Vietnamese to attempt an all-out countrywide offensive
through the end of the year.
8. Whatever Hanoi's present plans, it must be recognized that
developments throughout South Vietnam over the past few months
have placed South Vietnam in a more vulnerable position. If the
North Vietnamese perceived that the battlefield situation had
turned in their favor and/or that the US was no longer willing to
come to Saigon's defense because of domestic political constraints,
they might be tempted to undertake heavier military actions and
take greater risks to make major gains in South Vietnam.
- 4 -
SECRET SPOKE
FORD
Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-CODEWORD-30-14-2-1
a
a
Document source description
This item is a National Security Council memorandum from William L. Stearman to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.
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"ocrText": "Digitized from Box\nGerald R3Ebrd Presidential Library\nSECRET SPOKE\n6. A recent COSVN assessment of the Communist dry season\noffensive from April to July 1974 states that: (1) the GVN\nhas suffered severe setbacks; (2) the military balance is shifting\nin the Communists' favor; (3) military operations are necessary\nthrough the summer and fall; and (4) such activity could lead\nto striking \"a decisive blow in the 1975 dry season. \" The same\nassessment admitted Communist weaknesses in both city and district-\nlevel political structures and held that little could be gained\nat the bargaining table. It is not clear how much of this\nassessment is propaganda or exhortation.\nConclusion\n7. The Communists have been rebuilding their military forces\nin both North and South Vietnam since the Vietnam settlement\nagreement of January 1973. They clearly are preparing to return\nto large-scale warfare at some point in the future as we stated in\nout last National Intelligence Estimate on Vietnam. (See NIE\n53/14.3-74: The Likelihood of a Major North Vietnamese Offensive\nAgainst South Vietnam Before June 30, 1975, published May 23,\n1974. They now have the capability of launching a major or all-\nout offensive on relatively short notice -- i.e., several weeks\nor so. We do not believe, however, that the current evidence\nportends an overall strategy change, and we do not expect the\nNorth Vietnamese to attempt an all-out countrywide offensive\nthrough the end of the year.\n8. Whatever Hanoi's present plans, it must be recognized that\ndevelopments throughout South Vietnam over the past few months\nhave placed South Vietnam in a more vulnerable position. If the\nNorth Vietnamese perceived that the battlefield situation had\nturned in their favor and/or that the US was no longer willing to\ncome to Saigon's defense because of domestic political constraints,\nthey might be tempted to undertake heavier military actions and\ntake greater risks to make major gains in South Vietnam.\n- 4 -\nSECRET SPOKE\nFORD\nApproved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-CODEWORD-30-14-2-1\na\na"
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