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CLORET SPOKE
a.
Two NVA corps headquarters have been formed as major
tactical components of the NVA. The 1st Corps Head-
quarters, located in central North Vietnam, controls
three strategic reserve divisions and major artillery,
armor, and engineer elements. The 2nd Corps Headquarters,
identified in early June 1974, controls Communist
main force units in South Vietnam's two northern
provinces. These tactical headquarters could facilitate
the deployment of NVA divisions to reinforce current
Communist military operations in MR 1 as well as to
control a large force structure in any future major
offensive.
b. Twenty-two MIGs are currently deployed at two bases in
the North Vietnamese panhandle, and additional deplov-
ments are possible.
25X1
the southernmost airfield at Dong Hoi, only 30 miles
north of the DMZ, may soon be used by MIGs. MIGs have
carried out almost daily flights over southern North
Vietnam, and
MIGs will
25X1
become more active in this area. Several radar com-
plexes in the panhandle provide ground control intercept
coverage of about 100 miles into South Vietnam.
C.
The Communists have moved supplies into South Vietnam at
an unprecedented rate. This push has continued and may
actually have increased during the past several months.
For example, during May, June, and early July, heavy
ordnance shipments were noted moving to Viet Cong (VC)
MR 5 on South Vietnam central coast. In addition, in
early July,
a transportation
25X1
campaign was undertaken to move large quantities of
supplies in 30 days to all areas of South Vietnam.
3. After thorough examination, we believe that these indi-
cators are insufficient to conclude that the Communists have made
a decision to launch a major offensive on the scale of their April
1972 effort. Several other indicators that would, in our judgment,
be involved -- and which we believe would likely be detected --
are lacking. These would be:
- 2 -
SECRET SPOKE
FORD
Approved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-CODEWORD-30-14-2-1
only e
Document source description
This item is a National Security Council memorandum from William L. Stearman to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.
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"ocrText": "Digitized\nCLORET SPOKE\na.\nTwo NVA corps headquarters have been formed as major\ntactical components of the NVA. The 1st Corps Head-\nquarters, located in central North Vietnam, controls\nthree strategic reserve divisions and major artillery,\narmor, and engineer elements. The 2nd Corps Headquarters,\nidentified in early June 1974, controls Communist\nmain force units in South Vietnam's two northern\nprovinces. These tactical headquarters could facilitate\nthe deployment of NVA divisions to reinforce current\nCommunist military operations in MR 1 as well as to\ncontrol a large force structure in any future major\noffensive.\nb. Twenty-two MIGs are currently deployed at two bases in\nthe North Vietnamese panhandle, and additional deplov-\nments are possible.\n25X1\nthe southernmost airfield at Dong Hoi, only 30 miles\nnorth of the DMZ, may soon be used by MIGs. MIGs have\ncarried out almost daily flights over southern North\nVietnam, and\nMIGs will\n25X1\nbecome more active in this area. Several radar com-\nplexes in the panhandle provide ground control intercept\ncoverage of about 100 miles into South Vietnam.\nC.\nThe Communists have moved supplies into South Vietnam at\nan unprecedented rate. This push has continued and may\nactually have increased during the past several months.\nFor example, during May, June, and early July, heavy\nordnance shipments were noted moving to Viet Cong (VC)\nMR 5 on South Vietnam central coast. In addition, in\nearly July,\na transportation\n25X1\ncampaign was undertaken to move large quantities of\nsupplies in 30 days to all areas of South Vietnam.\n3. After thorough examination, we believe that these indi-\ncators are insufficient to conclude that the Communists have made\na decision to launch a major offensive on the scale of their April\n1972 effort. Several other indicators that would, in our judgment,\nbe involved -- and which we believe would likely be detected --\nare lacking. These would be:\n- 2 -\nSECRET SPOKE\nFORD\nApproved For Release 2005/09/21 : NLF-CODEWORD-30-14-2-1\nonly e"
}