Memorandum from Clinton E. Granger to Brent Scowcroft Regarding a Report on Vietnam

TOP SECRET - GDS - 2 - In gross terms, the GVN had 13 divisions before the NVA offensive. They now have only 6 divisions, plus fragments that have been withdrawn South from the northern provinces. The six are disposed with three in Military Region (MR) III, on the main approaches to Saigon, and three in MR IV, defending the Delta. Against this the North Vietnamese have 11+ divisions in the northern provinces and as strategic reserve, and an additional eight in the south, for a total of 19. Again in gross terms, the ratio of combat forces is about 3:1 against the South Vietnamese. The NVA have in excess of 600 Soviet or Chinese-provided tanks; the ARVN have only a little over a hundred left in their entire inventory. The NVA maneuver battalions (armor and infantry) are supported by adequate artillery, and have demonstrated ability to use their forces in conventional warfare in a highly professional manner. They have more than adequate ammunition stocks to support continued offensive action to a final conclusion. The NVA remain highly disciplined in their operations, in spite of the relatively short training period for some of their replacements. Their command and control is excellent, permitting them to use their forces effectively in offensive operations. The ARVN divisions in MR III and IV are intact, discipline is reasonably sound, but morale has suffered seriously from the unprecedented disasters FORD 8 in the north. They have been, and remain defensive minded, and with each NVA success their stamina for sustained operations will continue to shrink. Morale has been deteriorating at a rapid rate in the last week. The NVA are operating as military units, with their families in North Vietnam. In contrast, the ARVN are concerned about the future of their families, and when fighting in areas where the families are located may be expected to place greater emphasis on family responsibility over responsibilities to a Government which may not be able to protect those familites. I believe this one factor, more than any other, explains the rout in MR I and II. The NVA have a winner outlook, while the ARVN have a defeatist philosophy With this as a general background, I do not think that the ARVN will be able to sustain a defense of the remaining half of South Vietnam - unless the North Vietnamese do not press their advantage, and permit the GVN time to rebuild their army. The probability of this is very low, since intelligence indicates that the NVA are moving to exploit success. Given time to rebuild their forces, as outlined in General Weyand's report, and with equipment and supplies provided by a supplemental bill for $722 million in FY 1975, the GVN would probably be able to defend the reduced land areas, especially considering the reduced lines of communica- tion and the advantages of interior lines in a conventional war. This would TOP SECRET - GDS