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Korea (2)
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24465880
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Korea (2)
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National Security Council East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff Files (Ford Administration)
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The original documents are located in Box 5, folder "Korea (2)" of the NSC East Asian
and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 5 of NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
1A
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 032776
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMemorandum
CREATOR'S NAME
Phil Odeen
RECEIVER'S NAME
Dr. Kissinger
TITLE
SRG Discussion of Korean Modernization
Plan
CREATION DATE
06/11/1973
VOLUME
4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700243
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (2)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/02/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
IB
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 032777
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇTalking Paper
TITLE
Talking Points: Korean MOD Plan Study
SRG - June 13, 1973
CREATION DATE
06/13/1973
VOLUME
3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700243
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (2)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/02/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET
WASHINGTON
July 18, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT:
U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula
The President has approved the following as interim guidance on our
basic policy toward the Korean Peninsula:
-- We shall continue to reassure the ROK of U.S. support for its
timely and constructive foreign policy initiative announced in President
Park's speech of June 23.
-- The U.S. will make no further adjustments in its present force
levels in the ROK except in the context of the overall security situation
on the Peninsula. We will consult with the ROK well in advance of any
further force reductions.
-- The U.S. will continue military assistance to the ROK, and in
particular will complete the Five Year Modernization Plan, although
Congressional funding limitations will require that U.S. assistance on
this plan be stretched out through FY 1977. We also believe that the
emphasis in the plan should be shifted from ground forces to air defense.
The other recommendations of the Under Secretaries Committee on the
plan are presently under consideration; pending decision we should avoid
further detailed discussion of U.S. military assistance.
--
We are keenly aware of President Park's desire that we discuss the
Korean question with the PRC and the Soviet Union, and can assure the
ROK that we have that desire very much in mind. We will do nothing that
will harm South Korean vital interests, and will consult with the ROK to
the maximum extent possible.
-- We should avoid attempting to force the pace of the South-North
talks -- either by suggesting a reduction of our support for the ROK, or
by pressing on the ROK a series of initiatives that it might take up with
DECLASSIFIED
E.O.
SEC 3.3
NSC Memo
SECRET
Dept. Guidelines
By
1Ma
NARA
Date
12/3/10
SECRET
2
Pyongyang. Beyond lending every encouragement to the ROK to persist
in the talks, and assuring the ROK of continued support, U.S. direct
intervention with Seoul should be limited to averting any threatened
break-down in the talks.
-- We accept the proposition that the termination of UNCURK would
be a very useful step in helping avoid a confrontation at next fall's UNGA.
Any termination of UNCURK, however, should be without prejudice to its
past activities. We should seek to persuade the members of UNCURK
to recommend termination in their annual report. A decision on whether
to seek a UNGA resolution formally accepting the report, however, will
not be made until we have more certain indication of the intentions of the
other side.
-- We are reviewing the status of the UNC and will consider the possibil-
ity of terminating this body, provided that the related aspects of existing
security arrangements can be adjusted in a way that will not diminish the
security of the ROK. Since this is a delicate and complex undertaking,
we should proceed with caution and are confident that we can defend the
UNC against a possible hostile resolution in the next UNGA.
-- As to U. N. membership for the two Koreas, we support the position
taken by President Park in his June 23 speech. We will continue to consult
closely with the ROK and other friendly nations on the tactics we will adopt
on the Korean question in next fall's UNGA.
The President has asked that you use the above interim guidance in your
contacts with ROK officials and others, and that you not go beyond this
position pending further guidance from him.
Henry A. Kissinger
:
FORD
STRALD
LIBRARY
SECRET
4751
Bushnell
MEMORANDUM
4444
3a
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
Froete
August 27, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
R
FROM:
PHIL ODEEN
SUBJECT:
DOD Reclama on NSDM 227 (Korean
Modernization Plan)
Schlesinger's August 7 memo (Tab B) and Rush's August 24 memo supporting
the DOD position (Tab C) argue that we need to switch more rapidly from
grant to credit funding of Korean force modernization. This reaction to
NSDM 227 reflects the pre-disposition within the Departments to get away
from grant MAP and to respond to Congressional cuts in MAP funds by cutting
future requests. In fact the NSDM provides for a major cut in MAP requests
for Korea -- from $261 million for FY-74 to $180 million for FY-75. Defense
and State would gut Korean MAP funding, cutting the FY-75 request to about
$125 million.
The memos are right that we probably could not get the $655 million required
to complete the modernization program from grant MAP by FY-77. However,
the NSDM approved a funding program with $200 million of this total to be
from FMS credit. Moreover, nothing in the NSDM (Tab D) nor in the under-
lying reports (Tab E) indicates that we would face any disaster if the full
funding of the modernization program were not completed in FY-77 because
of Congressional cuts.
Cuts in Korean MAP funding will be particularly serious in FY-74 because,
of the $261 million request, $41 million is to cover the costs of Enhance,
i.e., principally the costs of the Koreans renting our F-4s which replace
the F-5s the Koreans have loaned free to South Vietnam. Thus if Congress
cuts MAP sharply and Cambodia continues to require large amounts of available
funding, there may be little funding for the Korean Modernization Program
in FY-74. This could become an important issue, but it is not the issue DOD
raises in its memo which focuses on FY-75 and future years' requests to Congress.
Our likely poor performance on Korean Modernization in FY-74 is, however,
all the morereason for seeking a relatively high funding level for FY-75.
SECRET
FORD
E.O.
SEC 3.3
Dept. Guidalines
By
NSC wa Memo,
Date 12/3/10
BERALD
SECRET
2
The State memo argues that the Koreans can afford to purchase more
equipment on a 10-year credit basis instead of receiving it from grant MAP.
The Korean economy has done extremely well. This economic strength
is one of its major strengths in comparison with North Korea. However,
we are rapidly shifting operations and maintenance costs to the Koreans and
cutting back on economic aid (lack of commodities will force a major reduction
in PL-480 this year). It is not clear that it is a desirable trade-off to reduce
Korea's future growth rate by forcing it to pay even sooner for needed military
equipment. Moreover, the State and Defense memos are written as though
we have no problems obtaining FMS (credit) funding from the Congress.
In fact we have major commitments for FMS, leaving little room for a large
Korean program, and there are other candidates for potential switches from
grant to FMS.
The memo at Tab A calls the weakness of DOD staffing to the Secretary's
attention and urges State and Defense to get on with the job at hand.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memo at Tab A to the Secretary of Defense with a copy
to the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee.
Richard Kennedy and Jack Froebe concur.
SECRET
FORD
3f
THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT:
Korean Modernization Plan (NSDM 227)
The essential foreign policy aspects of our military assistance to Korea
are that we stick by our commitment to modernize the ROK forces and
that we do nothing to signal a precipitous reduction in our support for
the ROKs.
Your memo of August 7 implies some interpretations of NSDM 227.
--
The NSDM leaves the completion date for the Modernization Plan
somewhat flexible. It states that no termination date should be established
for grant MAP while endorsing a recommendation of the Steering Group
that funding of the Modernization Plan be stretched out through FY-77.
As progress is made over the next couple of years, another review of
requirements will probably be needed and the completion date will be
considered in that review.
-- Nothing in the NSDM implies that the full $261 million in the FY-74
MAP request for Korea must be funded regardless of Congressional cuts.
There is a major distinction between cuts we make in our requests to
Congress, which would signal reduced U.S. support, and cuts made in
the program as a result of Congressional cuts and priorities in other countries
such as Cambodia.
-- Your memo states that about $165 million per year through FY-77
would be needed to complete the modernization program and you do not believe
Congress will provide this amount of grant MAP. The NSDM requires only
that assistance not be switched rapidly from grant to FMS. The option
approved by the President provides for a reduction of about $40 million per
year in grant MAP and an increase of about $20 million per year in FMS.
These figures refer to our request to Congress. The FY-74 MAP request
of $261 million includes $41 million for costs of Enhance. Thus the approved
SECRET
Guidelines
NSC Msmo,
By hh
NARA, Date 12/3/10
SECRET
2
program is a FY-75 request of only $180 million of MAP for the Moderniza-
tion Plan a substantial reduction which should improve the chances of
Congressional approval next year. Under the approved funding plan, about
$200 million of Modernization Plan costs would be funded from FMS through
FY-77 assuming the Congress provides the full FMS requests. This FMS
funding allows for completion of the Modernization Plan with substantial
Congressional reductions in our MAP requests in FY-74 and even in
subsequent years when the MAP requests will be lower.
I believe careful staffing of the full funding implications of NSDM 227 and
the underlying reports will indicate that the program approved by the
President can be defended in the Congress.
We need to emphasize with the Congress the importance of our MAP
assistance to Korea as a prime example of how MAP makes possible a
shift of defense responsibilities to our allies.
Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET
SECHET
4444 3C
TAB B
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20301
7 AUG 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: The Korea Modernization Plan (NSDM 227) (c)
(s) NSDM 227, dated July 27, 1973, provides the basic policy toward
Korea, to include, inter alia, the completion of the Modernization
Plan by the end of FY 1977 and a shift in emphasis from ground forces
to air defense. As a result of our conversation on August 2, 1973, I
have examined the financial impact of NSDM 227 on the MAP grant aid
program.
(c) For the past few years, our requests for grant military assist-
ance funds have been reduced drastically by the Congress. Our FY 1974
request of $652.0 million in New Obligational Authority (NOA) has been
reduced by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to $420 million (with
a $119.0 million ceiling on Korea) and by the House Foreign Affairs
Committee to $550 million. We are hopeful, but not too optimistic,
that a Senate/House compromise will result in a final appropriation of
$485.0 million. $261.0 million of the FY 1974 budget is earmarked for
Korea -- about 40% of the total FY 1974 request. If we fund the MOD
plan at this level, it would allocate over 53% of the possible final
appropriation.
(U) In addition to Korea, other country programs have been hard-hit
by Congressional reductions:
FY 1972
FY 1973
Proposed
Final
Proposed
Final
Cambodia
200.0
180.0
209.5
133.3
Indonesia
25.0
18.0
28.7
17.0
Korea
239.4
152.5
215.7
132.8
Philippines
17.0
14.0
20.8
17.7
Thailand
MASF
MASF
60.0
35.9
Jordan
45.0
38.0
42.7
32.8
Turkey
99.8
60.7
88.6
58.5
(s) The high grant assistance funding level needed to satisfy the
Korea plan during FY 1974 will have an adverse impact on other impor-
tant programs, and will greatly reduce our capability to deal with
emergency situations. To complete the funding of the plan by the end
3293
SEC DEF CONTR No. X-
Classified SUBJECT TO CHNERAL declassiniCation SCHEDUME DOMICRATO OF
by SecDef
SECRET
EXECUTIVE AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 31 Dec 81
ORDER 11652. AUTOHOPICALLY
2
of FY 1977 ($655.0 million) will require an average of about $165.0
million each year - FY 74 through FY 1977. Based on our recent
experience, I do not believe the Congress will authorize and appro-
priate sufficient funds to support the total plan under MAP grant aid.
(6) In light of the foregoing, I recommend that the MOD Plan be re-
viewed again to permit a new look at the mix of grant aid and Foreign
Military Sales Credit financing which would take into account the
realities of Congressional reductions in MAP funding. This review
should be completed prior to the US-Korea Security Consultative Meet-
ing in Seoul scheduled for mid-September.
J.R.schlay
(SEGRET
4751
3d C
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
SECRET
August 24, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: National Security Decision Memorandum 227
NSDM 227 of July 27, 1973 outlines our basic policy
on the Korean Force Modernization Plan. I am in general
agreement with all points in NSDM 227 except for those
dealing with funding sources for completion of the
Modernization Plan. I know that Secretary Schlesinger
has already expressed his concern to you on this same
issue.
On funding, NSDM 227 approves Option II of the
Steering Group's Report, which Ambassador Porter forwarded
to the President on June 15, 1973 as Acting Chairman of
the Under Secretaries Committee. That decision was con-
trary to the recommendation of the Under Secretaries
Committee that Option III be adopted. The difference
between the two options lies in the mix of grant military
assistance and Foreign Military Sales credits that could
be used to complete funding of the Modernization Plan.
In my view, it is clear that Congress will not
appropriate sufficient amounts of grant military assist-
ance to make possible the implementation of Option II.
This will mean that to fully fund the Modernization Plan
will require a stretch-out well beyond fiscal year 1978.
The alternative is to increase the use of FMS credits for
procurement of equipment included in the Modernization
Plan. The use of credits for this purpose was clearly
foreseen in NSDM 129, which initiated the Modernization
Plan.
The Korean economy has improved markedly in recent
years, at a rate which was not foreseen by even the most
optimistic predictions at the time the Modernization
Plan was conceived. All analyses of the Korean economic
situation reach the conclusion that the Korean economy is
easily capable of absorbing FMS credits at the levels
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
E.O.
SEC 3.3
GDS
By
NSC Mr.
Guidelines
NARA, Date
12/3/10
SECRET
-2-
stated in Option III of the Steering Group's Report.
Such levels of credit would make it possible for us
to plan on levels of grant military assistance that we
can realistically expect to obtain from Congress.
It has been argued that to reduce the Administra-
tion's request for grant military assistance to the
level stated in Option III might be interpreted by the
Korean Government as a signal of a weakening U.S.
commitment to Korea. This is, of course, a possibility
but one that can be overcome if the reasons for the
course of action recommended in Option III are carefully
and properly presented to the Korean Government. The
Koreans are well aware of Congressional attitudes toward
military assistance and of Congressional actions in recent
years. They are also aware of our support of their recent
foreign policy initiatives. Moreover, Secretary Rogers
recently restated our intention to complete the Moderniza-
tion Plan and not to withdraw any U.S. forces from Korea
during the current fiscal year and, thereafter, not to
withdraw any without advance consultations with the Korean
Government. I feel certain, therefore, that if the program
in Option III were presented to the Koreans in this context
- with appropriate reference to Korea's remarkable economic
growth in recent years, its improving balance of payments
and external debt service ratio - that they will accept
the Option III program. We can probably anticipate some
grumbling but I am convinced that the Option III program
will not have any important adverse effect on our continued
close relationships with the Korean Government.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I hope that the
funding decision announced in NSDM 227 will be reconsidered
prior to the U.S. Korea Security Consultative Meeting
(Defense Ministers) scheduled for September 12 in Seoul,
and I strongly recommend that Option III as proposed by
the Under Secretaries Committee be approved.
Kenneth Rush
Chairman
ECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
Bushnel
3l TAB D
SECRET
July 27, 1973
National Security Decision Memorandum
227
TO:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT:
Korean Force Modernization Plan
The President has reviewed the Under Secretaries' memorandum on
Re-examination of the Korean Force Modernization Plan and has
decided:
-- Air defense should be emphasized in modernizing ROK
forces in order to assist the ROK in moving toward combat self-
sufficiency for defense against the North Korean threat.
-- Modernization of ROK divisions beyond the 16 active and
three ready reserve divisions recommended in the military study should
receive low priority but the ROK should not be told the U. S. will not
support modernization of additional divisions
-- NSDM 129 continues in effect but no termination date should
be established for grant MAP assistance.
-- Planning for grant MAP and requests to Congress should
not be precipitously reduced nor should assistance be switched rapidly
to FMS (Option Two of the Steering Group's Report is approved).
-- Before high performance aircraft beyond replacement
aircraft in the original modernization plan are funded, a complete
review of the threat and air defense requirement should be undertaken
and recommendations submitted to the President.
SECRET
GDS
Classified by Henry A. Kissinger
DECLARATION
AUTHORIZED
nse memo 1/30/04
12/3/10
BY
SECRET
2
Subject to the foregoing the recommendations of the Under Secretaries'
Committee are approved and the Korean Force Requirements Study
should be the general basis for military assistance planning.
to A.
Henry A. Kissinger
cc: The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Acting Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
SECRET
3F
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 032778
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇReport
TITLE
Report of Korea Force Modernization
Interagency Steering Group
CREATION DATE
05/31/1974
VOLUME
22 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700243
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (2)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/02/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH