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President Ford's Trip to Seoul, November 1974 (2)
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President Ford's Trip to Seoul, November 1974 (2)
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The original documents are located in Box 18, folder "President Ford's Trip to Seoul,
November 1974 (2)" of the NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the
Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 18 of NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
/
1a
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT TO KOREA
November 22-23, 1974
INDEX
I. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
II. ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS
A. UNC Alternatives
B. Armed Forces Modernization
C. Air Capability
D. North Korea
E. Political Issues
F. PL-480 for Korea
G. US Forces in Korea
H. Korea/Japan Relations
I. Trade Deficit Problem
III. BACKGROUND PAPERS
A. Domestic Political Situation
B. The South Korean Economy
C. Security Situation
D. Prospects for Stability
E. US/Korea Economic Relations
F. Foreign Policy of the ROK
G. Korean Question in the United
Nations
IV. DRAFT COMMUNIQUE
V. TENTATIVE SCHEDULE
VI. BIOGRAPHIC SKETCHES
?
FOCD
DECLARCIFIED
TOP SECRET/NODIS
LIBRAR
E.O. 12959 les amended) SEC 3.3
GDS
By
We
State Dept Guidelines 13/11/2019 therevew 12/8/03
NARA, Date
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
LIBHARY
runo
077559
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
Your Visit to the Republic of Korea
I. PURPOSE
Your visit provides an opportunity to affirm
our commitment to Korea, and a timely discussion
at the highest level of issues that will impact on
peace and stability in Asia. It comes at a critical
time when President Park Chung Hee is under increas-
ing pressure trom his domestic opponents and growing
external criticism of his authoritarian rule. The
ROKG will seek to use the visit to demonstrate that
Park's policies have not affected our backing. If
you had not gone on to Korea it would have been taken
as an indication we were disassociating ourselves
from Korea, a signal that would have sharpened the
attack by Park's internal critics, and also could
have led to North Korean miscalculation.
Your purpose in this visit will be to:
-- reaffirm our commitment to Korea under our
Mutual Defense Treaty at a time of rapidly changing
circumstances.
-- keep Pyongyang and its allies on notice that
U.S. support to the ROK will continue.
-- reiterate that we have no present plans for
substantial reduction of our forces in Korea.
-- clarify the assistance we will be able to
contribute in the future to modernization of the ROK
Armed Forces in light of our declining resources.
SECRET
FORD
DECLASSIFIED
GDS
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
State Dept Guidelines Steneview 12/8/03
By
Ha
NARA, Date 1/3/11
SECRET
-2-
--- assure that we are preparing to work with the
ROKG towards a new security relationship following
the expected termination of the United Nations Command.
-- urge efforts toward substantive progress in
the now stalled negotiations with North Korea.
-- demonstrate we are not partial in Korean-
Japanese disputes and that the security interests of
the two countries are interdependent.
-- reassure that we will not bypass the ROK in
any discussions with other powers that might affect
the security of the peninsula.
-- impress again that we will not develop con-
tacts with the North until her allies do so with the
South.
-- assure that ROK needs will be taken into ac-
count in any adjustments necessitated by energy and
food crises.
II. BACKGROUND AND STRATEGY
A. Background. President Park is a man under
siege. Disaffection with his arbitrary rule is more
vocal and widespread than even before. Relations with
Japan are still strained. U.S. Congressional criticism
of Park's authoritarian rule has resulted in decreased
military assistance, and Korea's remarkable economic
growth has slowed as a result of the energy crisis
and spiraling inflation.
Security Issues
Park's policy of firmness in the face of North
Korean bellicosity, while simultaneously seeking
broader and flexible international contacts, includ-
ing communist powers, has wide support. Although the
South opened talks with the North in 1972, there has
been no progress and the sessions have degenerated to
sterile propaganda exchanges. In military terms the
balance between both sides remains much as it has for
SECRET
SECRET
-3-
several years. The ROKG, however, portrays a greatly
increased threat from the North, in large part to
justify Park's domestic policies. Tension remains,
but in a recent series of maritime incidents both sides
talked loudly but kept the situation from escalating.
While concerned over our further disengagement
from the peninsula, the Koreans are moving confident-
ly to adjust to the eventuality. Our air force units
in Korea continue to compensate for ROK deficiency
in the air, but our ground forces are there primarily
for political reasons. The ROKG wants to keep them
to assure U.S. involvement in the event of invasion
and because their removal would be interpreted as
disassociation from Park. We believe their presence
provides a restraining influence on both the North
and South and contributes to stability in the area.
Termination of the United Nations Command would not
affect the presence of our forces who are there under
a bilateral Mutual Defense Treaty.
Declining appropriations have caused a delay in
the five year program to modernize the ROK Armed Forces.
In the meantime, the emphasis on modernization has
been concentrated on improved air capability. The
ROKG would like to acquire additional F-4 Phantoms
rather than the less expensive F-5s. There are
indications the ROKG is also seeking a missile
capability and in general is moving to greater
independence in defense procurement.
Korean Political/Economic Scene
The Korean political scene is dominated by the
struggle of Park's critics to reverse his recent ef-
fort to maximize his authority and squelch dissent.
Caught up in harsh sentences under courts martial
were an ex-President, a Catholic bishop, respected
intellectuals, and a number of Christian and student
activists. Partly in response to expression of
international concern, Park has rescinded the most
onerous measures, but his opposition is now reorgan-
izing, calculating that now is the best time to
wring concessions from him.
1040
SECRET
SECRET
-4-
International reaction to Park's rule has been
severe. In the U.S., Congress held hearings on
human rights in Korea, and Committees of both houses
have recommended the reduction or termination of
military assistance. The U.S. press has been ex-
tremely critical, and repression in Korea remains
an important theme in public mail to the Department.
Although none of this has changed our basic evalua-
tion that a strong, viable South Korea is essential
to stability in the area, it has seriously eroded
public support for one of our closest allies.
Our relationship is further aggravated by
impending changes which probably would have come
about regardless of Park's domestic policies.
Congressional authorizations for military assistance
are declining before we have been able to provide
certain of the more important items (especially air-
craft) for the modernization of the Korean Armed
Forces. At the same time Korea is developing a
taste for increasingly sophisticated expensive items
with an offensive as well as defensive capability.
Heavily dependent upon petroleum imports for
energy required to expand exports, Korea has been
uneasy over the oil crisis. Critical Japanese
investment and trade have declined. Inflation and
unemployment could add an economic dimension to
political controversy. The ROKG is concerned over
cessation of substantial PL-480 shipments which were
depended upon heavily. We can only assure President
Park that ROK needs will be given consideration and
we will do our best to meet them.
The ROK was recently involved in a confrontation
with Japan which seriously threatened their relations
and President Park will probably be anxious to ex-
plain the Korean position. We believe that any dis-
putes between the two countries should be handled in
normal government channels, without resort to con-
frontation diplomacy.
B. Visit Approach. Our objectives for your
visit are straightforward, as is our strategy to
FORD
achieve them.
SECRET
SECRET
-5-
-- Your arrival statement, as well as your visit
with American ground forces, highlight the American
defense commitment to Korea. Pyongyang has already
begun commenting adversely on the visit, thus in-
dicating she reads this message clearly.
-- Your overnight stay in Korea after Japan
demonstrates the even-handed attention we give both
in our concept of security for Northeast Asia.
-- Your schedule provides ample time with Park
(at least two, and possible three, occasions) to
clarify our views on other security issues, including
military assistance.
Park will probably seek to justify his
tough domestic policy and you may therefore wish to
point out the effect his policies are having on
support for Korea within important U.S. circles.
We also recommend you make a point of
speaking to opposition leaders who, we understand,
will be included in the reception and dinner.
-- Your departure statement refers to congres-
sional restraints on military assistance which also
serves to remind both Korean and American audiences
of U.S. concerns for human rights.
III. PRINCIPAL TALKING POINTS
A. General. The American people join me in ex-
pressing sorrow at the tragic death of Madam Park.
B. U.S. Korean Relations.
1. We will do our best to complete the
program for modernization of the ROK Armed Forces.
Korea's willingness to move toward credit sales is
helpful.
2. We have no plans for substantial
reduction of our forces in Korea and will work out
new command relationships if the UNC is terminated.
FOND
SECRET
SECRET
-6-
3. With regard to PL-480, ROK needs will
be given consideration and we will do our best to
meet them.
4. If Korea's internal political develop-
ments are raised, explain that ROKG actions have
been the subject of considerable adverse comment in
the U.S. and have had an unfavorable effect on public
support of our commitment to the ROK.
5. If the procurement of advanced aircraft
is raised, indicate we are studying this question and
will be back to the ROKG in the near future.
C. International Security Issues.
1. We are fairly optimistic about our
joint position in the UNGA on dissolution of the UNC.
(The UN debate may coincide with the visit.)
2. We will support ROKG efforts to open
relations with Communist countries. The ROK should
continue to seek dialogue with North Korea despite
the obstacles.
3. On Korea-Japan relations we believe that
both countries benefit from their association and we
favor the amicable settlement of any disputes that
may arise between them.
4. We will not take any actions affecting
Korean security in any discussions with other powers
without prior consultation with the ROKG.
SECRET
ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS
FORD : erouse LIBRARY
Rus
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER
ISSUES/TALKING POINTS
UNC Alternatives
Background
The United Nations Command (UNC), created by
the UN Security Council to coordinate the efforts
of the countries who contributed to the defense of
the ROK in the Korean War, is a wasting asset.
Virtually all foreign forces have been withdrawn
from Korea, other than American forces which
technically are not in the UNC. With the PRC in
the UN, and the North Koreans present as observers,
we face growing difficulty in blocking UNGA draft
resolutions calling for termination of the Command.
The UN Command is integrally involved with admin-
istration of the Armistice Agreement which in the
absence of a peace treaty provides the mechanism
for maintaining peace on the peninsula. The ROKG
is cooperating in our efforts to terminate the
UNC in a manner that will not be destabilizing,
and we have had preliminary discussions with them
on successor command relationships.
Although U.S. Forces in Korea are not under
the operational control of the CINCUNC, he also
serves concurrently as Commander of U.S. Forces in
Korea (USFK). CINCUNC does have operational con-
trol over virtually all ROK Forces and the token
remnants of the contributions from other countries.
CINCUNC signed the 1953 Armistice Agreement for our
side. The USG and ROKG are not signatories. For
the other side, the signatories are the Commanders
of the Korean Peoples Army (KPA) and the Chinese
Peoples Volunteers (CPV).
In mid-June we made a package proposal to the
PRC for dissolving the UN Command, which includes:
-- substitution of the US and ROK military com-
manders as successors in command to CINCUNC, with
the North Korean and PRC commanders continuing as
TOP SECRET NODIS
GDS
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
cw
12/8/03
State Dept Guidelines
By
hh
NARA, Date 1/3/11
TOP SECRET/NODIS
-2-
adherents for the other side;
-- notification to and endorsement of the
altered armistice arrangement by the UN Security
Council;
-- a nonaggression pact between the two Koreas;
-- a public U.S. commitment to the reduction
and ultimate withdrawal of our troops in Korea, in
return for which the PRC and North Korea would pri-
vately accept an interim U.S. military presence in
the South until the situation on the peninsula is
stabilized.
The Chinese response at the end of July in ef-
fect rejected the third and fourth elements of our
plan. Inasmuch as these are not essential, we went
back to them with a truncated version based on the
first two items in our June proposal. Our discus-
sion with the PRC at the beginning of October led us
to conclude that the North Koreans had not yet
accepted our proposal, and were in fact preparing
for a confrontation at the UN. It is possible that
the PRC is somewhat more disposed to a compromise,
as it was last year, but there has been no concrete
expression of such intention. Accordingly, we have
introduced our own resolution in the UN and have in-
dicated publicly that we are prepared to be flex-
ible regarding the UNC provided the Armistice Agree-
ment remains.
Korean Position
The ROKG is ready to dissolve the UNC provided
the armistice mechanism remains. In place of UNC
they are prepared to establish some form of combined
command, with perhaps a U.S. officer designated the
senior member. But this would hold only if the U.S.
officer were seen to be under the guidance of an as
yet undefined joint defense body similar to the
NATO model. U.S. operational control would be con-
tingent upon maintenance of U.S. forces at approx-
imately the same level. The ROKG would thus continue
TOP SECRET/NODIS
TOP SECRET/NODIS
- 3 -
to directly involve the U.S. in the defense of
Korea, while maintaining a major voice in overall
defense planning.
U.S. Position
We are in agreement with ROKG views concern-
ing the importance of maintaining the Armistice
Agreement. We have deferred a determination on
the sucessor command structure to the UNC until
we know the other side is prepared to cooperate
with us in alternative arrangements. Operational
control poses conflicting problems for us which we
will want to consider carefully. We have had OpCon
of Korean forces for almost twenty-five years --
a very long time. OpCon continues to perpetuate
our direct involvement. On the other hand, it
allows us to continue to exert a restraining influ-
ence on the peninsula and better enables us to avoid
being drawn into situations against our own interests
as long as significant U.S. ground forces remain in
Korea. In any event, we will have to look very
closely at the specifics of any combined command
arrangement put forth by the ROKG to guard against
any unacceptable restrictions on our flexibility.
Further, we do not intend to become involved in
any combined command arrangements which require
us to maintain specific levels of forces in Korea.
Talking Points:
You may wish to:
-- express satisfaction over the way that
consultations between the ROKG and the U.S. on the
termination of the UNC have gone forward.
-- say that we are prepared to work with the
ROKG in developing alternative command arrange-
ments once the other side agrees to our proposal
on the UN Command.
---- say that we will continue to discuss the
essence of our proposals on the dissolution of
the UN Command and preservation of the Armistice
TOP SECRET/NODIS
TOP SECRET/NODIS
-4-
Agreement with the PRC. In our discussions with
the Chinese, we will stress the desirability of
avoiding confrontation in the UNGA on the Korean
question. We will continue to make clear to the
Chinese that we are obligated to discuss any PRC
counter-proposals with the ROK.
Department of State
November 1974
TOP SECRET/NODIS
FORD 6306
B
1g
on
1h
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER
ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS
Armed Forces Modernization
Background
Coincident with the withdrawal from Korea of
one US combat division, the US announced a five-year
plan (FY 1971-1975) to modernize the ROK military
forces. The types and quantities of equipment were
encompassed in an illustrative list to which repre-
sentatives of both countries agreed. Although
there was no specification of the cost of equipment
embraced by the plan, the administration placed a
ceiling of $1.25 billion on New Obligational Author-
ity to be used for modernization and $250 million on
the value of excess defense articles transferred to
the ROK.
Congressional appropriations since FY 1972 for
security assistance have not been sufficient to allo-
cate the programmed or requested funds to complete
the Modernization Plan by the terminal year of FY
1975. Therefore, the plan has been extended. We
hope to meet the ROK request to complete the plan
by the end of FY 1977 but this will depend upon
funds authorized and appropriated by the Congress
in this and subsequent fiscal years and internal
executive branch decisions.
As of the end of FY 1974, about $500 million
more NOA was required to complete the plan. We pro-
pose to meet Congressional constraints by decreasing
requests to the Congress for the grant component of
security assistance and increasing the FMS credit
portion in the next two fiscal years. The ROKG has
indicated that it is prepared to undertake greatly
increased FMS credit utilization and toward that
end we hope that the Congress will concur in our
requests for substantially higher FMS levels.
Korean Position
The ROKG has requested $345 million in grant
security assistance and indicated a requirement for
SECRET
GDS
FORD
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
By
in
State Dept Guidelines streeview 12/8/03
NARA Date 1/3/11
SECRET
-2-
$500 million in FMS credit in fiscal years 1975
through 1977. While hoping for the grant component
to complete the major portion of the Modernization
Plan, the ROKG recognizes the difficulties which we
face in obtaining requested funds from Congress and
is ready to accept substantially greater FMS levels.
US Position
In the light of Congressional funding limita-
tions and attitudes toward the Korean domestic
situation, it is unlikely that we will obtain
appropriations for the large amounts of grant MAP
originally expected. We hope that the Congress will
authorize and appropriate increasing amounts of FMS
credit for utilization by the ROK.
Talking Points
You may wish to say:
-- we attach a high priority to completion of
the Modernization Plan and regret our inability to
obtain sufficient funds to have accomplished that
objective in the original timeframe.
-- it is not possible to predict Congressional
reaction to our requests for security assistance
funds but we will do the best we can with whatever
appropriations become available.
-- for our part, . we are greatly encouraged by
the ROKG's readiness to accept the need for greater
reliance on its own resources and on FMS credit.
-- we must also recognize that Congressional
constraints and attitudes pose increasing difficul-
ties in obtaining support for all foreign assistance
programs, including grant FMS credit and grant MAP.
Department of State
November 1974
SECRET
FORD
LIB LIBRABITY LIBRAS R
ly
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER
ISSUES/TALKING POINTS
Republic of Korea Air Capability
Background
The Republic of Korea (ROK) is interested in the
procurement of high performance aircraft beyond those
contained in the Five Year (FY 71-75) Korean Modern-
ization Program (MOD Plan). At one point, the ROKG
wished to purchase 57 F-4E aircraft. However, in
September, the ROKG indicated its readiness to embark
on a program involving the following mix.
a. One F-4 wing (the already provided MAP-funded
F-4D squadron; the bailed F-4D squadron now
on loan to them, and one F-4E squadron to be
purchased.
b. In addition to 72 MAP-furnished F-5E aircraft,
a minimum of 3 squadrons (54 UE) of F-5E to
be purchased or co-produced.
C. An expressed ROKG preference for an eventual
follow-on light weight fighter. The ROKG
decision on eventual long range modernization
would be made after results of the USAF com-
petitive test (YF-16 VS. YF-17) become avail-
able. Should the USAF fail to adopt either,
the ROKG decision would then be made on other
suitable US first line aircraft for incorpor-
ation into ROKAF structure in the late 70's
or early 1980's.
The MOD Plan originally called for provision of 10
modern tactical fighter squadrons consisting of a mix of
five F-5A squadrons, two F-4D squadrons, and three squad-
rons of the then to be developed International Fighter,
F-5E. Improvements to the ROK Air Force (ROKAF) current-
ly scheduled are the May 1975 return of 36 F-5A's on
loan to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) as part of a pro-
ject ENHANCE PLUS (the build up of RVN air assets just
prior to the end of the Vietnam conflict) and the
SECRET
E.O. 12958 DECLASSIFIED (as amended) SEC 3.3; ASL guildings GDS
FORD
th
State Dept Guidelines- 5therwiew r/c/03;
By
NARA, Date 1/3/11
Dd Directive
520030
SECRET
-2-
completion of delivery of 72 F-5E's in September 1976.
The attached table shows the changes that are to take
place in the ROKAF inventory between now and September
1976.
National Security Decision Memorandum 227, Korean
Force Modernization Plan, directed that before high
performance aircraft beyond replacement aircraft in the
original modernization plan are funded, a complete re-
view of the threat and air defense requirement should
be undertaken and recommendations submitted to the
President. Washington agencies are now in the process
of assessing future Korean aircraft requirements and
are in the final stages of considering a package sales
proposal on the F-4D squadron now on loan to the ROKAF.
Korean Position
The ROKG believes that additional modern aircraft
beyond the MOD Plan are needed to meet their ultimate
aircraft requirements. The ROKG wishes to buy one F-4E
squadron and the F-4D squadron it now has under bail-
ment. It is also interested in procurement and co-
production of F-5E or possibly F-4E aircraft.
US Position
Although there is general agreement that a require-
ment exists for additional high performance aircraft for
the ROKAF, we are studying this question and it is pre-
mature to formulate types and numbers of high performance
aircraft for the future ROKAF inventory at this time.
We are prepared to sell the bailed F-4D squadron under
certain conditions, which we expect to communicate to
the Koreans in the very near future.
Your Talking Point: (If raised by President Park)
-- We understand the ROKG's desire for additional
high performance aircraft, and have the specific re-
quests under serious study.
Attachment:
Table
Department of State
FORD
November 1974
SECRET
LIBRARY
SECRET
ROK TACTICAL AIRCRAFT*
Type
November 1974
September 1976
F-86
99
0 - 99 1/
F-5A
58
94
F-4D
34
34
F-5E
4
72
Total Aircraft
195
198 - 299
Total Supersonic Aircraft
96
200
1/ The number of F-86's in the 1976 ROKAF is uncertain. The
ROK is under no obligation to retire these aircraft and
may decide to keep a portion of them in the inventory.
Alternatively the ROK may retire them all because of age
and logistical problems.
2/ It should be noted that the NKAF are forecast to have
approximately 300 supersonic tactical fighter aircraft
by this same period.
The table shows that, although there may be no significant
change in the total number of aircraft (if the ROK retires
its F-86's) the number of modern, supersonic aircraft will
double between now and September 1976. These additional
aircraft will qualitatively improve the capability of the
ROKAF.
*The Interdepartmental Group Review requested by National
Security Study Memorandum (NSSM 211), addresses the ROK
aircraft mix and also concludes that it is premature to
formulate types and numbers of high performance aircraft
for the ROKAF at this time.
SECRET
FORD
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
11
BRIEFING PAPER
ISSUES/TALKING POINTS
North Korea
Background
Despite the opening of contacts between the two
Koreas three years ago, the North-South talks have
produced little concrete progress; they are presently
only a forum for mutual recrimination rather than the
exchange of constructive proposals. North Korea's
bellicosity toward the South is limited only in that
its Soviet and Chinese backers, who have their own
bilateral problems, wish to avoid renewed hostilities
on the peninsula. North Korean-initiated military
incidents still occur, and the danger of miscalcula-
tion resulting in a serious military confrontation
continues.
Two years ago, North Korea embarked on a major
diplomatic effort to improve its international rela-
tions, and has sharply increased contact and trade
with non-Communist countries. Pyongyang has altered
its contemptuous attitude toward the United Nations
by sending an observer mission to New York and joining
several UN specialized agencies. It has persuaded
a growing number of countries to extend diplomatic
recognition, while preventing any communist state
from recognizing the ROK. North Korea has attempted
without success to establish official contact with
the U.S.
ROK Position
South Korea continues to see herself under the
heavy shadow of North Korea's desire to reunify the
peninsula by force and on its own terms. The ROKG
points to North Korean efforts to improve its offen-
sive capabilities and several North Korean-initiated
incidents this year --- including the August 15
assassination attempt against President Park in which
Madam Park was killed -- as indications that the North
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
GDS
FORD
E.O. 12358 (as amended) SEC 3.3,
State Dept Guidelines statesview 12/8/03
By
he
NARA, Date 1/3/11
SECRET
- 2 -
Korean threat has increased. While the ROKG has
injected more propaganda into the North-South talks
since the August 15 incident, it is unlikely that
Seoul will break off the talks. Seoul has sought
without success to develop contacts with Pyongyang's
allies while seeing her own advantage in international
support slowly erode as more non-Communist countries
recognize North Korea. The ROKG counts heavily on
the U.S. for diplomatic support and is very sensitive
to any signs of changes in our policy toward North
Korea. The South Koreans are also concerned about
any discussions we may have with the USSR and the
PRC which affect their interests and may ask you to
support their efforts to develop contacts with Com-
munist countries.
U.S. Position
We would like to see increasing dialogue and
contact between the two Koreas in order to reduce
tension on the peninsula. Continued communication
between the two sides is also useful to the case
we are called upon to make annually in the UN.
While maintaining our security support to the ROK
to enable her to deter and resist any renewed North
Korean aggression, we do not agree with the ROKG
that the military threat to the South has increased.
We support Seoul's efforts to establish relations
with Communist countries and give full support to
her diplomatic efforts against the North Korean-
backed resolution in the UN. We have no contacts
with North Korea save for those that are required as
the host country for the UN. We have discouraged
several recent North Korean approaches to establish
direct contacts with us.
Talking Points
-- We fully appreciate the need for strength in
the face of North Korean bellicosity.
-- We recognize that the talks with the North
have been unproductive, but they are important to
detente in Asia, and to our case in the UN.
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-- Accordingly, we believe it is in our mutual
interest that the dialogue with the North continue.
-- The U.S. will not recognize North Korea
until such time as the major communist powers
recognize the ROK. We will keep the ROKG informed
of any approaches by the North.
-- We will continue to impress upon other coun-
tries the importance of even-handedness in their
responses to diplomatic initiatives by North Korea.
--- We will support ROK initiatives to improve
relations with Communist countries where our support
might be effective. If the opportunity presents
itself in Vladivostok, we will tell the Soviets we
will not respond to Northern initiatives until the
Communist countries move towards contacts with the
South.
Department of State
November 1974
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BRIEFING PAPER
ISSUES/TALKING POINTS
Political Issues
Background
President Park Chung Hee has ruled continuously
since he came to power by military coup in 1961.
After his reelection in 1971 he began a steady march
toward authoritarian rule, which reached his goal at
the end of 1972 when he pushed through a referendum
(under martial law) approving extensive revision of
the constitution, labelled Yushin (Revitalizing)
reforms. The revision seriously diminishes basic
rights guaranteed in the previous constitution, ends
direct election of the President, greatly enhances
his authority, and removes any limitation on his
tenure. Park argued that these measures were neces-
sary to cope with the effects of the opening of a
dialogue with North Korea which began in July 1972.
Opposition to these revisions did not gain real
momentum until late 1973 when the ROKG was on the
defensive over its role in the abduction from Japan
of Park's leading political opponent (Kim Tae Chung)
and it had become clear there would be no immediate
progress in the North-South talks. Rapidly spreading
demands for Constitutional revision caused Park to
promulgate sweeping Emergency Measures in January.
These established courts martial which are authorized
to impose sentences of up to fifteen years for even
indirect criticism of the Yushin Constitutional
framework.
In early April the continuance of campus unrest
caused Park to promulgate an even harsher Emergency
Measure which proscribed all campus political activity
and provided sentences up to death for activities
remotely connected with a student organization suppos-
edly seeking to overthrow the government through
violence under the guidance of North Korea. Before
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the most extreme of these measures were rescinded
some two hundred people were sentenced by courts
martial. These included former President Yun Po Sun,
Catholic Bishop Chi Hak Sun, and numerous leading
intellectuals, educators, students, and Christian
leaders.
The measures did not eliminate discontent which
is now being aggravated by economic grievances result-
ing in part from a general slowdown. Growing student
demonstrations calling for amnesty and Constitutional
revision have resulted in the closure of most of the
major colleges. Opposition political leaders, Christ-
ian organizations, and segments of the press have
joined in the demand for the restoration of human
rights.
The attention given the ROKG's authoritarian
measures by the media and missionary-connected church
organizations in the U.S. has resulted in Congressional
Hearings on the deprivation of Human Rights in Korea,
and subsequent moves to reduce or terminate military
assistance.
ROKG Position
The Yushin Constitution, the Emergency Measures,
and the overall tight control of Korean society are
necessitated by the continuing threat from North Korea.
The threat is evidenced by North Korea's obstruction
of the North-South talks, a series of maritime inci-
dents, continuing efforts at subversion and, most
recently by the August 15 attempt to assassinate
President Park. The ROKG is not anti-Christian. All
religions are tolerated in Korea, and there is freedom
of worship. Those Christian leaders who have been
brought to trial were guilty of crimes against the
state. Some limitations on personal freedoms must
be imposed because North Korea would take reckless
advantage of the turmoil open dissent would engender.
U.S. Position
We do not share Seoul's assessment of the North
Korean threat, not so much because of her intentions
but mainly because she does not have the capacity alone
is
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to wage a successful war against the South. The ROKG
knows our views on the threat, and also that we do not
believe it justifies the deprivation of human rights.
On this issue, we have said publicly that our security
interests require support of the ROKG even though we do
not approve of her policies on human rights. On July
24, in testimony before a Senate subcommittee, Secretary
Kissinger stated that "
the position of South Korea
is quite crucial to the future evolution of Japan and
therefore our historic relationship with South Korea,
which in turn was dictated by the strategic and political
necessities of the area, [and which] has led us to con-
tinue economic and military assistance when we would not
have recommended many of the actions that were taken by
the Government of South Korea. "
We have made clear our concerns to the ROKG but
have not sought to lecture them. We have also made
them aware of the effects of Congressional reaction to
political developments in Korea. Our ability to provide
assistance and the credibility of our commitment to Korea
are jeopardized by Congressional action and the public
disapproval it reflects.
Talking Points
You may wish to:
-- refer to the historically close ties between the
American and Korean peoples.
-- indicate our understanding that Korea faces a
security threat.
-- explain that ROKG actions have been the subject
of considerable adverse comment in the U.S. and have had
an unfavorable effect on public support of our commitment
to the ROK and threaten our programs of assistance to
Korea.
-- while we will say nothing publicly to embarrass
the ROKG, Congressional and press interest are such that
we will be unable to avoid questions on whether the subject
was discussed. It would be damaging to our mutual
interests if we did not acknowledge that it was discussed
in at least a general fashion, without specific elabora-
tion.
Department of State
November 1974
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER
ISSUES/TALKING POINTS
PL 480 for Korea
Background
In connection with 1971 textile negotiations and
modernization of the Korean military, the U.S. agreed
to provide Korea approximately $300 million of PL 480
beginning in FY 1971 and culminating in FY 1976. This
sale was to have been in addition to the regular recurring
annual level of PL 480. Korea agreed to restrict its
textile exports to the U.S. and to pay for certain
defense costs which the U.S. had earlier agreed to
fund. Due to reduced availability of commodities for
PL 480 and higher priority security (Indochina) and
humanitarian (Bangladesh, the Sahel) requirements, we
have not been able to maintain the agreed level of
PL 480 with Korea. In 1973 we shipped only $26.6
million out of a $126.8 million agreement and there has
been no program in 1974. We are $254 million in arrears
through FY 1974. The ROK is in essential compliance
with its part of the agreement and has formally raised
the question of U.S. performance. We acknowledge our
inability to comply with our agreement but have explained
that all PL 480 programs are subject to availabilities.
The ROK requested deliveries valued at $193.2
million for FY 1975 under PL 480. We initially hoped
to provide $150 million but reduced U.S. agricultural
production and budget constraints required us to lower
the target to a smaller $121 million in the State/AID
high option presented to you in September. Of this
amount $20.2 million (60,000 MT of rice) has been
approved and we expect to begin negotiations in Decem-
ber. In addition to the $20.2 million, $3.1 million
has been approved for programming rice under the Private
Trade Entity (PTE) program (10,000 MT).
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Korean Position
The ROK will cite a critical need for PL 480
financing to alleviate budget and balance of payments
problems. The local currency generated from the sale
of PL 480 commodities is an important item in the
Korean budget. Korea's balance of payments position
has been weakened by its preponderant dependence on
imported oil as a source of energy. While the ROK has
been understanding to date regarding U.S. shortfalls,
it views the 1971 understanding as a firm commitment.
It hopes for at least $150 million in FY 1975 and wants
to know as soon as possible how much it will definitely
receive in FY 1975.
U.S. Position
The 1971 PL 480 commitment to Korea was made at a
time when we still had large reserve stocks and commodity
prices were stable. The PL 480 situation has changed
radically in the past two years. There are now severe
commodity availability and budget constraints on the
program. We have had to reduce many country programs
below earlier levels and at the same time meet urgent
humanitarian needs as they arise.
We continue to recognize the PL 480 cumulative
shortfall to Korea but we will not be able to meet it
within the original time-frame. During FY 1975 we hope
to be able to program a substantial quantity of PL 480
to Korea, making it one of the largest recipients.
Your Talking Points
-- We have had to reduce PL 480 shipments to Korea
below projected levels because of the severe limits on
global programming imposed by reduced commodity supplies
and high prices.
-- We recognize our past inability to supply the
agreed amounts of PL 480 and subject to availabilities
will do our best in the future.
-- Korea is one of a limited number of countries
to be allocated PL 480 during the first half of this
fiscal year (70,000 metric tons of rice valued at $23.3
million).
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-- We do not yet know the total size of our
PL 480 program with Korea during FY 1975 but we are
aware of and sympathetic to Korea's needs and the
high priority it attaches to PL 480.
Department of State
November 1974
CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER
ISSUES/TALKING POINTS
US Forces in Korea
Background
The US has maintained sizeable ground and air
forces in Korea since the Korean War. They are
stationed there under the Mutual Defense Treaty of
1954 and the status of Forces Agreement of 1966. In
1971, we withdrew one of two Army divisions. At
present our actual force level is approximately
40,000, consisting of one combat infantry division,
a wing of F-4 tactical fighters, a missile command,
an air defense brigade and various support organiza-
tions. With the exception of a company responsible
for the security of a 500 meter strip astride the
DMZ evacuation route to Panmunjon, where the Military
Armistice Commission meets regularly, our forces are
no longer positioned directly on the DMZ. The with-
drawal of this company from the DMZ will be raised
with the ROKG in the near future.
The senior U.S. military officer in Korea
simultaneously holds three commands: Commander-in-
Chief of the United Nations Command (in this position
he exercises operational control over ROKG armed
forces), Commander U.S. Forces Korea, and Commanding
General Eighth United States Army.
As seen by Koreans, the presence of American
forces is the most important element of the U.S. com-
mitment to the defense of South Korea. They are a
deterrent to renewed North Korean hostilities, and
also serve as a visible pledge of U.S. assistance if
hostilities break out. In this sense they are a
stabilizing influence in Northeast Asia. In their
absence, North Korea might be tempted to attack the
ROK, Japan would be concerned about the potential
for instability on the neighboring peninsula and the
USSR and the PRC might be concerned that the other
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could gain in influence at its expense.
Neither the PRC nor the USSR appear to regard
our forces as a threat, and despite public comments
to the contrary, probably prefer to see some con-
tinuing U.S. military presence in Korea. North Korea,
however, is adamantly opposed to our forces. She
believes that without them the Park government would
fall and North Korea would be able to unify the South
under the leadership of Kim Il Sung.
Korean Position
The ROKG attaches great importance to the con-
tinued presence of U.S. forces at their present level,
composition and location. They justify their presence
on the basis of the North Korean threat, which in their
view has been increasing. They understand that our
forces cannot remain permanently, but they worry about
precipitous reductions.
Presently, they are concerned about Congressional
and public proposals to reduce force levels overseas.
They are uncertain about the implications of proposals
to designate the Second Infantry Division as a Pacific
theater mobile reserve force and Congressional pres-
sures to relocate the division south of Seoul so as
to free it from the possibility of immediate commitment
in the event of hostilities.
U.S. Position
Our force levels in Korea are related to the
security situation on the peninsula, ROK military capa-
bilities, and our own requirements. Our air units
compensate for South Korean deficiencies. Our Army
division remains primarily for political purposes, since
we believe the ROK Army can handle the ground combat
role in the event of a North Korean invasion. We do
not believe a full-scale attack by North Korea
against the South is likely in the near future,
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although tension remains and lesser armed clashes are possible.
Your Talking Points
-- The United States will honor its obligations under the
1954 U.S. /ROK Mutual Defense Treaty.
-- The U.S. does not now plan any significant reductions
in force levels in the ROK.
-- The U.S. will consult with the ROK well in advance of
any future reductions in U.S. force levels in Korea.
- - In the event the UNC is dissolved, we will work out
with the ROK plans to establish successor command arrangements.
- - If raised by the ROK, say that we have no plans to
relocate the Second Infantry Division or give it a regional mission.
Department of State
November 1974
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER
ISSUES/TALKING POINTS
Korea/Japan Relations
Background
Since the normalization of relations in 1965,
Korea's relations with Japan had been improving and
expanding until August 1973. Beginning then, with
the abduction by the Korean CIA of President Park's
leading political opponent from Tokyo in August 1973,
and subsequently the murder of President Park's wife
by a Korean resident of Japan during an assassination
attempt in August 1974, relations have deteriorated.
Notwithstanding, the GOJ remains a staunch supporter
of Korea's international position and has worked
effectively with us on the ROK's behalf in the UN
General Assembly.
Economic ties with Japan are very strong. With
bilateral trade of $3.0 billion in 1973, Japan was
Korea's largest trading partner and Korea was Japan's
fifth largest. Japan continues to be the largest
source of private investment in Korea, though the
climate for new investment has been adversely affected
by the political problems of the past year. Japan is
also a major source of economic assistance, providing
$157 million in official development assistance in 1973.
Japan has no official relations with North Korea,
despite continuing domestic pressure for recognition
of Pyongyang. The GOJ does, however, approve the
gradual improvement of relations with North Korea
beginning with further expansion of exchanges and
private trade with North Korea which last year amounted
to $170 million.
Despite the primacy over the North which they enjoy,
South Koreans are generally suspicious of Japanese efforts
to improve relations with the North. They are constantly
on the lookout for signs of favored treatment of the
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Chosen Soren, the pro-Pyongyang organization which
includes about half of the 600,000 Koreans still re-
maining in Japan from the colonial period. It is
this suspicion which has fueled the impatience over
what the ROKG leadership considers cavalier disregard
of serious anti-ROK subversive activity in Japan.
This impatience in turn led to President Park's de-
mands on the GOJ following the assassination attempt
which created the recent crisis in their relations.
Although the leaders of both countries recognize
their interdependency, the deep animosity between the
two can easily be stirred to provide temporary poli-
tical advantage, particularly on the Korean side.
ROK Position
The permissiveness of the GOJ toward pro-North
Korean organizations of Korean residents in Japan
enables North Korea to carry out subversive activities
freely. Japan must be compelled to recognize the
danger and act on it. Japan should make no further
moves to develop relations with North Korea.
U.S. Position
Japanese laws and public opinion would not per-
mit the GOJ to undertake the internal measures the
ROKG would like to see. Unreasonable ROKG demands
and stimulation of anti-Japanese sentiment could
push the GOJ to move more rapidly to expand relations
with North Korea. Mutual security and economic con-
siderations demand that the ROK and Japan maintain
their extensive ties on a correct, if not cordial
basis.
Your Talking Points
You may wish to:
-- express satisfaction that a solution has been
found to the recent dispute.
-- comment that we have no indication that Japan
intends to move precipitously in its relations with
North Korea.
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-- remind that we are a friend of both countries
and will neither take sides nor mediate between them.
-- affirm the importance we attach to good rela-
tions between the two. ROK security is dependent
upon a friendly Japan and vice versa.
Department of State
November 1974
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BRIEFING PAPER
ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS
Trade Deficit Problem
Background
The ROK is faced with an estimated trade
deficit in 1974 of between $1.2 billion and $1.4
billion, an increase of 2.5 times the deficit of
$566 million in 1973. The 1975 trade deficit is
expected to be about $200 million more than in
1974. The current trade deficit is the result
primarily of an $800 million increase in the cost
of imported crude oil and secondarily the rela-
tive scarcity and high costs of raw materials and
food imports. We understand President Park may
privately ask for the President's support in ob-
taining more American investment and assistance to
tide Korea over its present economic difficulties.
U.S. Position
Many considerations militate against the pro-
vision of increased assistance provided to the ROK.
These considerations include severely decreased
levels of surplus agricultural commodities, com-
peting requirements of food deficient countries for
the limited commodities available and significantly
higher domestic costs in the US occasioned by infla-
tionary trends. In addition American business at-
titudes on investments are made on a commercial
basis, not by government direction.
ROK Position
The ROKG understands and appreciates the re-
straints on official US funds. However, the capital
inflow from Korea's principal sources of private
foreign capital, namely the US and Japan, will not
meet the ROK's needs in 1974. The ROK understands
that this is a reflection of broader economic trends.
However, the ROKG believes its friendship with the
US, its economic growth records and prospects, and
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its high financial credibility make Korea a good
risk for investment. The ROKG would appreciate US
support with the private American financial community
for the ROK effort to increase investment.
Talking Points
-- We are aware of the serious economic adjustment
problems facing Korea and other countries. The Presi-
dent and the Secretary are devoting considerable at-
tention to solution of problems such as Korea faces.
-- The US has taken the lead on new initiatives
in the fields of food, energy, population and the
recycling of oil revenues and the emerging internation-
al structure to deal with these problems should bene-
fit the Korean economy.
-- With regard to PL 480, ROK needs will be given
consideration and we will do our best to meet them.
-- We support and encourage American business
investment in Korea, although we have limited in-
fluence over private investment decisions. Korea en-
joys a high level of business confidence in the inter-
national business community. We hope that Korea will
do everything to maintain and enhance that confidence.
-- Many of Korea's economic problems are a part
of a global problem and require multilateral solu-
tions. The U.S. has supported and will continue to
support the ROK's endeavor to have access to the IMF
oil facility.
Department of State
November 1974
CONFIDENTIAL