Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Source Description
This file unit contains material related to the North Korean Tree Incident.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
24468962
label
Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, August 18, 1976 (Korean Incident)
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
24468962
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, August 18, 1976 (Korean Incident)
description
This file unit contains material related to the North Korean Tree Incident.
citationUrl
collections
National Security Council East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff Files (Ford Administration)
Meetings Files
subjects
Korea
Korea (North)
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
24468962
coverageEndDate
logicalDate
1976-08-31
month
8
year
1976
coverageStartDate
logicalDate
1976-08-01
month
8
year
1976
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
b92fa3a6f07213c9
ocrText
The original documents are located in Box 27, folder "WSAG, August 18, 1976, Korean
Incident" of the NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R.
Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 27 of NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
4699
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1.6
SECRET GDS
ACTION
August 18, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM G. HYLAND
FROM:
WILLIAM GLEYSTEEN
SUBJECT:
WSAG Meeting on Korean Incident
Two American Army officers serving in the U.N. Command were killed
in an unprovoked assault by North Korean guards today within the joint
security area at Pamunjom. Four other U.S. soldiers and four ROK
Army personnel were injured. The killings were the first deaths ever
in the joint security area, site of the joint Armistice Command meetings.
North Korean Intentions
The North Korean personnel involved presumably had received authorization
for an attack on a UNC target of opportunity within the joint security area.
The assault follows the issuance on August 5 of a long North Korean Govern-
ment memorandum and statement charging that the U.S. had "completed
preparations for a new war" and "is going into the stage of directly provoking
war. " Only hours before release of the statement, there was a shooting
incident in the DMZ between North and South Korean forces.
Pyongyang probably timed its attack on the American personnel to under-
score its charge of increased tension on the Korean Peninsula. Conceivably
the North Koreans hoped that U.S. forces would over-react with firearms
creating a situation which would have a favorable impact in the current
Non-Aligned Conference and in the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly
deliberations. It is also likely that Pyongyang calculates that an aura of
heightened tension will surface the Korean issue in the American election
campaign.
Over the last several months, we have been concerned that Pyongyang
could be contemplating a strategy of provocations and harrassment. This
concern was based upon:
that
Naval and air deployments the past year/have significantly strengthened
the North's capability for rapid action in and along the demilitarized zone.
Pyongyang is also in a better position to support probes in the vicinity of
the Northwest Islands or to respond belligerently to incidents at sea as well
as in the DMZ.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12906 (es assended) SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, Sick Dept. Guidelines
SECRET GDS
By
NARA, Date 1/21/11
SECRET
2
North Korea's likely assessment of the lessons of Indochina and
the Middle East.
The U.S. election campaign and our feeling that Pyongyang would
be tempted to produce a shock which would bring the issue of U.S. involve-
ment in Korea to a head within the U.S.
-- South Korea's continuing rapid economic development and military
modernization which has probably persuaded the North that time is not
on its side.
Pyongyang's likely estimate that it was approaching the peak of its
political and diplomatic gains vis a vis the South.
Future North Korean Moves
It could be that Pyongyang intends to take only this one-shot swipe at the
U.S. and will not follow up with other provocative actions.
If a primary North Korean intention, however, is to underscore for the
American public the risk and dangers of a continued U.S. military presence
in Korea, Pyongyang might seek to sustain an atmosphere of crisis. We
must, therefore, consider the possibility that the current incident will be
followed by others or even that it is the opening shot in a strategy of
harrassment and limited military action.
Danger Areas
If North Korea does intend to pursue a policy of harrassment and limited
military probes, the areas or targets of possible North Korean action are:
The entire DMZ area, including the joint security zone, and the
U.S. company deployed within the DMZ.
The Northwest Islands.
- - Naval and fishing activities.
- - Reconnaissance and intelligence operations.
Precautions
- Issue warnings to U.S. and UNC commanders in the field to be on
the alert for further provocations and possibly limited military actions by
the North. U.S. commanders should review operations and deployments
SEGRET
SECRET
3
for vulnerabilities and take necessary action to avoid arelessness in
operations.
- - Instruct commanders to take necessary actions to guard against
incidents and dangerous exposure of U.S. military elements during
military exercises such as the forthcoming air defense exercise, COPE
JADE DELTA.
-- Strengthen coordination and control measures with the ROK.
Public and Diplomatic Actions
Issue strong public protest. Both the State Department and the
White House have issued statements condemning the North Korean action
and warning that North Korea will bear the responsibility for the conse-
quences.
Encourage Congressional statements of condemnation and consider
seeking Congressional resolution reasserting U.S. determination to
maintain peace in the Korean Peninsula.
Inform the Chinese of our strong reaction and the dangerous
situation which North Korea appears to be creating. Consider passing
similar message to the Soviet Union.
-- Consult with the Japanese as soon as possible on the incident and
on any U.S. counter-measures.
- - Inform U.N. Security Council.
-- Seek condemnation of North Korea from friendly governments.
-- Exploit the incident to underscore the need to continue the Armistice
arrangements.
U.S. Counter - Measures
Direct limited military action (an air strike against a SAM site,
barracks or other military target, seizure of a North Korean military
vessel, etc.). This would involve a high risk of provoking further North
Korean moves leading to an increase in basic tensions and danger of war
in Korea. The moves might well be considered an over-reaction in many
U.S. and foreign circles, allowing North Korea to escape the onus for its
action.
FORD
SECRET
SECRET
4
-- Urge South Korea military retaliation in the form of some limited
ground operation. Although the ROK would probably be willing, their
action would involve even greater dangers than U.S. moves and would
establish a precedent which we might regret within a very short time.
-- Military deployments.
Redeploy U.S. forces within Korea to strengthen our forces
along the DMZ, especially the security unit stationed immediately in the
vicinity of Panmunjom.
Send in to Korea additional ground forces, presumably from
Okinawa, (probably provoking an adverse Japanese reaction), move a
carrier toward Korea, deploy F-111s temporarily to Korea, stage B-52
flights over Korea.
Instructions to U.S. Representative on MAC
-- If the North Koreans agree, there will be a meeting of the MAC
tonight. At a minimum, a U.S. representative should demand a North
Korean apology, an investigation, and punishment of those found guilty
of the murder and attack.
Political Exploitation
- Assuming we stop short of military retaliation or massive deployments
to Korea, it may be possible to exploit the North Korean aggressiveness to
our advantage in dealing with non-aligned governments at the U.N.
FUND
SECRET
DOC
RECD
LOG NUMBER
MO
DA
MO
DA
HR
INITIAL ACTION o
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
8
25
8
2712
7604705x
2a
TO PRES
FROM: SECSTATE
$/5
UNCLAS LOG OUT
SCOWCROFT X
SECDEF
LOU
NO FORN
NODIS
DCI
X REF
c
EYES ONLY
EXDIS
HYLAND
DAVIS
STATE EXSEC
$
CODEWORD
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
OTHER DAVIS
TS
SENSITIVE
SUBJECT Menutes of 8-18 WASAG re Korea
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
REC
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
CONCUR-
COOR-
INFO
CY
RENCE
DINATE
FOR
ADV CYS 5 CROFT/ WGH
MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
STAFF SECRETARY
MEMO FOR PRES
CONGRESSIONAL
REPLY FOR
ECONOMIC
DISTRIBUTION INITIAL ACTION ASGMT
APPROPRIATE ACTION
CANADA/ OCEANS
MEMO
TO
FAR EAST/PRC
RECOMMENDATIONS
INTELLIGENCE
JOINT MEMO
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO
FOR:
MID EAST/NO. AFRICA
ANY ACTION NECESSARY
NSC PLANNING
CONCURRENCE
,
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
SCIENTIFIC
COMMENTS: INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
SUB SAH/ AFRICA/ UN
DATE
FROM
TO
STATUS
SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):
DUE
CY TO
8/25
Scrift
CIX
not L Info by Hyland
8/2
9/21
SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
FORD
DISPATCH
NSC/S DISP INSTR
NOTIFY
MICROFILM a FILE ROMTS
M/FD
BY
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
IF
CRT ID:
NS DY
SPECIAL INDEXING:
OPEN
WH SA FP
CLOSE
PA
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED
NSC 76-21
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976
599-022
2
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
4705 X
SECRET
August 25, 1976
wat
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
K
FROM:
Jeanne W. Davis
ma
SUBJECT:
fr
Minutes of WSAG Meeting
held August 18, 1976
Attached are the minutes of the Washington Special Actions
Group meeting held August 18, 1976 to discuss Korea.
Attachments
cc: William G. Hyland
William Gleysteen
SECRET/XGDS (3)
XGDS of E.O. 11652 by authority
of Brent Scowcroft; Exemption
Category (Section 5 (B) (3))
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12956 (as amended) SEC 3.3
is
FORD
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
By Wh
NARA, Date 1/21/11
670875
LIBBARY
2L
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 033321
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMemorandum of Conversation
TITLE
Washington Special Actions Group
Meeting
DESCRIPTION
Re The North Korean Tree Incident
CREATION DATE
08/18/1976
VOLUME
11 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700439
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
27
FOLDER TITLE
Washington Special Actions Group
Meeting, August 18, 1976 (Korean
Incident)
DATE WITHDRAWN
04/20/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
2.d
SECRET
18 August 1976
DDCI BRIEFING FOR
18 AUGUST WSAG MEETING
NORTH KOREA
I. We are virtually certain that the violent incident
in the Joint Security Area this morning was a de-
liberate provocation. We believe it was primarily
intended to agitate American public opinion over the
issue of our troops in Korea in the context of the
US election campaign.
II. Since early this spring, North Korean propaganda
has charged almost daily that the US is introducing
new weapons into the South, conducting provocative
military exercises, and keeping South Korean armed
forces on a war footing.
--- Pyongyang has warned that these developments
have created a "grave situation" in which war
may break out at any time.
-- On August 5 -- only a few hours after an ex-
change of fire between ROK and North Korean
troops on the DMZ -- North Korea, in an un-
usually high level statement, alleged that
DECLARRIFIED
GERALD F FORD CIRRARY
RAC
NLF-NSC_EA-PA-27-10-3-4-9123103
HR
1/12/09
SECRET
SECRET
the US and South Korea have now "completed"
war preparations. The statement was the
first issued at this level since 1969 that
was directed specifically at US actions in
the South.
III. North Korea's efforts have most recently been
focused on the Non-Aligned Conference in Colombo,
now drawing to a close.
--- Their efforts in Colombo, in turn, were in-
tended to affect favorably their prospects
in the UN General Assembly debate. A reso-
lution has now been introduced that once
again calls for American withdrawal from
Korea.
IV. While the North Koreans have made gains in the in-
ternational forum, their propaganda efforts have
won them little or no return in the American po-
litical forum. They may now be raising the ante
in hopes of stimulating American opposition to
a continued US troop presence. This morning's
incident seemed deliberately intended to produce
American casualties.
FORD & LIBRARY OF
- 2 -
SECRET
SECRET
--- The Joint Security Area is one of the very
few places where North Koreans have direct,
continuing contact with US military personnel.
-- In June, there were several similar inci-
dents in which US forces in the Joint Security
Area were harassed by North Korean personnel.
No casualties resulted, however.
--- According to the account of today's incident
issued in Seoul, a North Korean officer at
the scene was heard to tell his troops to
kill the UNC (i.e., US) personnel.
-- A North Korean radiobroadcast shortly after
the incident occurred described it as a US
provocation that forced North Korean security
personnel to take defensive measures. The
broadcast warned that future incidents of
US aggression would be met in this fashion,
but otherwise signaled no major change in
Pyongyang's policy.
V. North Korea's next moves will undoubtedly be
conditioned by the American reaction.
--- Should the response to this probe lead them
to believe that they can play effectively
FORD
&
on American sensitivities by further con-
LIBRANY
- 3 -
SECRET
SECRET
trolled acts of violence, we would expect them
to pursue this course.
VI. But we believe that their principal immediate ob-
jective is to improve upon their 1975 success in
the General Assembly. Accordingly, we believe that
they are extremely unlikely to embark upon a course
that would run the risk of major US reprisals
or portraying North Korea as significantly raising
the threat of instability on the peninsula.
FORM
&
- 4 -
SECRET
3a is
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
4705 X
like
SECRET
August 25, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
Jeanne W. Davis
mA
SUBJECT:
Minutes of WSAG Meeting
held August 18, 1976
Attached are the minutes of the Washington Special Actions
Group meeting held August 18, 1976 to discuss Korea.
Attachments
CC: William G. Hyland
William Gleysteen
SECRET/XGDS (3)
XGDS of E.O. 11652 by authority
of Brent Scowcroft; Exemption
Category (Section 5 (B) (3))
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12956 (as amended) SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
By
NARA, Date 1/21/11
FORD I: LIBRARY
3B
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 033322
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMemorandum of Conversation
TITLE
Washington Special Actions Group
DESCRIPTION
Re The North Korean Tree Incident,
Duplicate
CREATION DATE
08/18/1976
VOLUME
11 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700439
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
27
FOLDER TITLE
Washington Special Actions Group
Meeting, August 18, 1976 (Korean
Incident)
DATE WITHDRAWN
04/20/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
3C
-SECRET
18 August 1976
DDCI BRIEFING FOR
18 AUGUST WSAG MEETING
NORTH KOREA
I. We are virtually certain that the violent incident
in the Joint Security Area this morning was a de-
liberate provocation. We believe it was primarily
intended to agitate American public opinion over the
issue of our troops in Korea in the context of the
US election campaign.
II. Since early this spring, North Korean propaganda
has charged almost daily that the US is introducing
new weapons into the South, conducting provocative
military exercises, and keeping South Korean armed
forces on a war footing.
-- Pyongyang has warned that these developments
have created a "grave situation" in which war
may break out at any time.
-- On August 5 -- only a few hours after an ex-
change of fire between ROK and North Korean
troops on the DMZ -- North Korea, in an un-
usually high level statement, alleged that
B.
FORD
DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY same 750 PA - 27-10-3-11 9/23/03
LISBARD
BY
NARA DATE 1/22/11
SECRET
SECRET
the US and South Korea have now "completed"
war preparations. The statement was the
first issued at this level since 1969 that
was directed specifically at US actions in
the South.
III. North Korea's efforts have most recently been
focused on the Non-Aligned Conference in Colombo,
now drawing to a close.
-- Their efforts in Colombo, in turn, were in-
tended to affect favorably their prospects
in the UN General Assembly debate. A reso-
lution has now been introduced that once
again calls for American withdrawal from
Korea.
IV. While the North Koreans have made gains in the in-
ternational forum, their propaganda efforts have
won them little or no return in the American po-
litical forum. They may now be raising the ante
in hopes of stimulating American opposition to
a continued US troop presence. This morning's
incident seemed deliberately intended to produce
American casualties.
FORD
- 2 -
SECRET
SECRET
-- The Joint Security Area is one of the very
few places where North Koreans have direct,
continuing contact with US military personnel.
-- In June, there were several similar inci-
dents in which US forces in the Joint Security
Area were harassed by North Korean personnel.
No casualties resulted, however.
-- According to the account of today's incident
issued in Seoul, a North Korean officer at
the scene was heard to tell his troops to
kill the UNC (i.e., US) personnel.
-- A North Korean radiobroadcast shortly after
the incident occurred described it as a US
provocation that forced North Korean security
personnel to take defensive measures. The
broadcast warned that future incidents of
US aggression would be met in this fashion,
but otherwise signaled no major change in
Pyongyang's policy.
V. North Korea's next moves will undoubtedly be
conditioned by the American reaction.
--- Should the response to this probe lead them
to believe that they can play effectively
&
FORD
on American sensitivities by further con-
- 3 -
SECRET
SECRET
trolled acts of violence, we would expect them
to pursue this course.
VI. But we believe that their principal immediate ob-
jective is to improve upon their 1975 success in
the General Assembly. Accordingly, we believe that
they are extremely unlikely to embark upon a course
that would run the risk of major US reprisals
or portraying North Korea as significantly raising
the threat of instability on the peninsula.
is
FORD
OTHER
- 4 -
SECRET