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Vietnam - President Nguyen Van Thieu
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1555873
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Vietnam - President Nguyen Van Thieu
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This file contains material relating to Nguyen Van Thieu.
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Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders (Ford Administration)
Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders
subjects
Vietnam (Democratic Republic)
Vietnam (Republic)
Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Peace negotiations
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1975-03-31
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1975
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1974-08-01
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1974
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The original documents are located in Box 5, folder "Vietnam - President Nguyen Van
Thieu" of the National Security Adviser's Presidential Correspondence with Foreign
Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 5 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
017
C
N
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L*******8
COPY
ROUTINE
MJA905JIB053
DE RUMJIR #1119 2341105
R 2210467 AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8067
C N D N TIAL SAIGON 11119
EXDIS
ED 116521 GD8
TAGS: PFOR vs
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT THIEU TO PRESIDENT FORD
1. THE ASSISTANT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
AUGUST 22 PASSED us FOR OUR INFORMATION FOLLOWING LETTER
FROM PRESIDENT THIEU TO PRESIDENT FORD WHICH WILL BE DELIVERED
IN WASHINGTON BY AMBASSADOR PHUONG.
2. BEGIN TEXT: SAIGON, AUGUST 21, 1974, DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,
3. I AM PLEASED TO ACKNOWLEDGE YOUR LETTER OF AUGUST 10, 1974
AND TO RENEW MY WISHES FOR THE FULL SUCCESS OF YOUR MISSION,
R.
FORD
WHICH IS MOST IMPORTANT NOT ONLY TO AMERICA BUT ALSO TO THE
REST OF THE WORLD.
GERALD
4. AS YOUR EXCELLENCY so APTLY PUT IT, WE HAVE TRAVELED A
LIBRARY
LONG AND HARD ROAD TOGETHER DURING THE PAST TWENTY FIVE
YEARS. DURING THIS HISTORIC JOURNEY, MANY FINE YOUNG MEN
OF BOTH NATIONS HAD GIVEN THEIR LIVES AND WE SHALL SEE TO
IT THAT THEIR SUPREME SACRIFICE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN MADE IN VAIN.
THIS MEANS THAT A GENUINE PEACE MUST BE SECURED AND THAT THE
SACRED RIGHT OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO SELF
DETERMINATION MUST BE PRESERVED,
5, IN THAT NOBLE ENDEAVOUR, I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM HAS DONE ITS UTMOST TO RESPECT AND
IMPLEMENT THE PARIS AGREEMENT. THE ONLY OBSTACLE TO PEACE AND
TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION OF THE VIET-NAM PROBLEM RESIDES IN THE
STUBBORN AND BELLICOSE ATTITUDE OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WHO DO
NOT RENOUNCE TO THEIR SCHEME OF FORCIBLE CONQUEST OF SOUTH
VIET-NAM YET. TO OVERCOME THAT OBSTACLE, WE MUST SHOW THE
COMMUNIST SIDE THAT THERE IS NO HOPE FOR THEM EITHER TO BREAK
WHSR COMMENT
HAK, SCOWCROFT, LL6 STEARMAN, SMYSER
PSN#030494 PAGE 01
TOR:234/13:40Z DTG1221046Z AUG 74
Z
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COPY
KBH 3/3/00
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1
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THE WILL! OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE OR TO UNDERMINE THE
SUPPORT OF THE U.S. FOR THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM.
6, YOUR ASSURANCES ABOUT THE CONTINUITY OF AMERICAN POLICY
TOWARDS VIET-NAM AND ABOUT THE ADEQUATE AMOUNT OF MILITARY
AND ECONOMIC AID THAT WE COULD GET IN THE END ARE MOST
HELPFUL IN THAT RESPECT. I STRONGLY HOPE THAT FUTURE
ACTIONS BY THE U.S. CONGRESS WILL FURTHER CONVINCE THE
COMMUNIST SIDE OF OUR COMMON DETERMINATION AND STEADFASTNESS
OF PURPOSE, THUS BRINGING PEACE THAT MUCH NEARER, SINCERELY,
(SIGNED) THIEU. END TEXT.
LEHMANN
BT
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
PSN:030494 PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:234/13:40Z DTG:221046Z AUG 74
N
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S/S 7417073
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
4148
Washington, D.C. 20520
September 17, 1974
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Letter for President Ford from Vietnamese
President Thieu
Vietnamese Ambassador Tran Kim Phuong delivered
to the Acting Secretary September 3 the attached
letter from President Thieu to President Ford. The
letter is in response to President Ford's letter of
August 10, which reiterated U. S. assurances of con-
tinued support for the Republic of Viet-Nam in the
new Administration. It is not President Thieu's
initial congratulatory message to which a reply has
been transmitted. The Department does not believe
a reply is required.
George Executive S, Springsteen Secretary
FORD
Attachment:
Original Letter from President Thieu
CONFIDENTIAL
GDS KBH 3/3/00
Saigon, August 21 , 1974
NGUYEN VAN THIEU
President of the Republic of Viet-Nam
Dear Mr. President,
I am pleased to acknowledge your letter of August 10,
1974 and to renew my wishes for the full success of your
mission, which is most important not only to America but
also to the rest of the world.
As Your Excellency so aptly put it, we have traveled
a long and hard road together during the past twenty five years.
During this historic journey, many fine young men of both
nations had given their lives and we shall see to it that their
supreme sacrifice would not have been made in vain. This
means that a genuine peace must be secured and that the
sacred right of the South Vietnamese people to self determination
must be preserved.
In that noble endeavour, I can assure you that the
Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has done its utmost
to respect and implement the Paris Agreement. The only obstacle
to peace and to a political solution of the Viet-Nam problem
resides in the stubborn and bellicose attitude of the North Viet-
namese who do not renounce to their scheme of forcible conquest
of South Viet-Nam yet. To overcome that obstacle, we must
show the Communist side that there is no hope for them either
to break the will of the South Vietnamese people or to undermine
the support of the U.S. for the Republic of Viet-Nam.
His Excellency GERALD R. FORD
President of the United States Of America.
W ashington D.C.
- 2 -
Your assurances about the continuity of American
policy towards Viet-Nam and about the adequate amount of
military and economic aid that we could get in the end are
most helpful in that respect. I strongly hope that future
actions by the U.S. Congress will further convince the
Communist side of our common determination and stead-
fastness of purpose, thus bringing peace that much nearer.
Sincerely,
21
DOC
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INITIAL ACTION O
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3
Saigon, September 19 , 1974
NGUYEN VAN THIEU
President of the Republic of Viet-Nam
Dear Mr. President,
About a month ago, I wrote to Your Excellency about
the situation facing the Republic of Viet-Nam as the Communist
side spurned all negotiations and stepped up their armed attacks
in complete disregard of the Paris Agreement.
Since then, the situation has become even more serious.
In fact, the prospects for the resumption of the talks between
the two South Vietnamese parties are bleaker than ever, while
the Communist generalized offensive continues unabated. Now
the leaders of the Hanoi regime openly declare their active
support for movements aimed at overthrowing the legal Govern-
ment of the Republic of Viet-Nam while they intensify their
infiltrations and military action, thus baring their plans for a
forcible conquest of the whole South Viet-Nam.
ALL FORD (18519)
His Excellency Mr. Gerald E. FORD
President of the United States of America
Washington D. C.
- 2 -
I think that the main cause for the increasingly defiant
and bellicose attitude of the Communists resides in their
believing that the United States is now wavering in its dedica-
tion to our common goal, namely a South Viet-Nam capable
of defending itself and of deciding its own future. The utterly
inadequate amount of military and economic aid to the Republic
of Viet-Nam which has been voted by the U.S. Congress might
have induced the Communists to make such speculations.
This can in turn lead to very dangerous miscalculations
on the part of the Communists, as they might be tempted to
launch an all out offensive to complete their forcible conquest
of South Viet-Nam.
Therefore, it is essential that the United States unmist-
akably demonstrates once again its attachment to a serious
implementation of the Paris Agreement and its support for the
Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, if peace is to be
restored in South Viet-Nam and in South East Asia.
In this respect, I am most appreciative of your efforts
made on September 12th to persuade leaders of Congress to
restore the cuts in aid funds. I sincerely hope that Your
Excellency will succeed in bringing the amounts of military
and economic assistance up to the levels required by the new
realities of the situation and the need for South Viet-Nam to
achieve an economic takeoff.
...
- 3 -
The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam had
signed the Paris Agreement in good faith, under the double
assurance that, on the one hand, Russia and Red China will
exercise a restraining influence upon Hanoi and that, on the
other hand, all necessary military equipments and economic
assistance will be provided by the United States to the
Republic of Viet-Nam to maintain its capabilities of self
defense and to develop its national economy.
The first assumption turned out to be an empty pro-
mise, as Russia and Red China continue to give North Viet-
Nam all the ingredients to pursue an aggressive war in
South Viet-Nam.
FORD
But I am convinced that thanks to your generous efforts,
LIBRARY
the second assumption will be borne out.
Our valiant soldiers by enduring daily sacrifices in
the battlefields have proved beyond doubt our will to resist
Communist aggression. It would be unfortunate indeed if
sufficient means could not be supplied to them because of the
lack of resolve and misconception on the part of our allies.
Beside providing us with an adequate amount of military
and economic assistance, the United States can also show its
support for the just cause of the Republic of Viet-Nam by
solemnly restating our common goals. In this regard, I hope
that some time in the near future, we can meet together
- 4 -
to discuss about ways and means to achieve a genuine peace
in South Viet-Nam.
Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my
lasting friendship and highest consideration.
FORD
LIBRARY
Staffed 12/5/74 L/A
Spetec: tile)
Saigon, September 19 ,1974
Dear Mr. President,
About a month ago, I wrote to Your Excellency about
the situation facing the Republic of Viet-Nam as the Communist
side spurned all negotiations and stepped up their armed attacks
in complete disregard of the Paris Agreement.
Since then, the situation has become even more serious.
In fact, the prospects for the resumption of the talks between
the two South Vietnamese parties are bleaker than ever, while
the Communist generalized offensive continues unabated, Now
the leaders of the Hanoi regime openly declare their active
support for movements aimed at overthrowing the legal Govern-
ment of the Republic of Viet-Nam while they intensify their
infiltrations and military action, thus baring their plans for a
forcible conquest of the whole South Viet-Nam,
GERALD ? LIBRARY FORD
His Excellency Mr. Gerald E. FORD
President of the United States of America
Washington D. C.
- 2 -
I think that the main cause for the increasingly defiant
and bellicose attitude of the Communists resides in their
believing that the United States is now wavering in its dedica-
tion to our common goal, namely a South Viet-Nam capable
of defending itself and of deciding its own future. The utterly
inadequate amount of military and economic aid to the Republic
of Viet-Nam which has been voted by the U.S. Congress might
have induced the Communists to make such speculations.
This can in turn lead to very dangerous miscalculations
on the part of the Communists, as they might be tempted to
launch an all out offensive to complete their forcible conquest
of South Viet-Nam.
Therefore, it is essential that the United States unmist-
akably demonstrates once again its attachment to a serious
implementation of the Paris Agreement and its support for the
Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, if peace is to be
restored in South Viet-Nam and in South East Asia.
In this respect, I am most appreciative of your efforts
made on September 12th to persuade leaders of Congress to
restore the cuts in aid funds. I sincerely hope that Your
Excellency will succeed in bringing the amounts of military
and economic assistance up to the levels required by the new
realities of the situation and the need for South Viet-Nam to
achieve an economic takeoff.
...
- 3 -
The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam had
signed the Paris Agreement in good faith, under the double
assurance that, on the one hand, Russia and Red China will
exercise a restraining influence upon Hanoi and that, on the
other hand, all necessary military equipments and economic
assistance will be provided by the United States to the
Republic of Viet-Nam to maintain its capabilities of self
defense and to develop its national economy.
The first assumption turned out to be an empty pro-
mise, as Russia and Red China continue to give North Viet-
Nam all the ingredients to pursue an aggressive war in
South Viet-Nam.
But I am convinced that thanks to your generous efforts,
the second assumption will be borne out.
Our valiant soldiers by enduring daily sacrifices in.
the battlefields have proved beyond doubt our will to resist
Communist aggression. It would be unfortunate indeed if
sufficient means could not be supplied to them because of the
lack of resolve and misconception on the part of our allies.
Beside providing us with an adequate amount of military
and economic assistance, the United States can also show its
support for the just cause of the Republic of Viet-Nam by
solemnly restating our common goals. In this regard, I hope
that some time in the near future, we can meet together
...
- 4 -
to discuss about ways and means to achieve a genuine peace
in South Viet-Nam.
Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my
lasting friendship and highest consideration.
-
Republic of Viet-Nam
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
K on X
*
of / GREENA AMERICA Date
Department of State
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 1986
PAGE 01 STATE 236790
73
ORIGIN 55-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 1026 R
DRAFYED BY TEXT DRAFTED BY WHITE HOUSE
APPROVED BY EA/VN:RHWENZEL
S/S -JPMOFFAT
004203
R 260237Z OCT 7.4
FM SECSTATE WASHOC
TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON
e 0 N F I E N I STATE 236790
TORD
EXDIS
E.O. 116521 N/A
TAGSI MASS, vs, US
SUBJ: PRESIDENT FORD'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT THIEU
THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF PRESIDENT FORD'S LETTER TO
PRESIDENT THEIU DATED OCTOBER 24,
BEGIN TEXT
DEAR MR, PRESIDENT:
I VERY MUCH APPRECIATED MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BAC
AND RECEIVING FROM HIM YOUR LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 19,
AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM REMAINS UNCHANGED UNDER
THIS ADMINISTRATION, WE CONTINUE STRONGLY TO SUPPORT
YOUR GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO DEFEND AND TO PROMOTE THE
INDEPENDENCE AND WELL-BEING OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE.
WE ALSO REMAIN CONFIDENT IN THE COURAGE, DETERMINATION AND
SKILL OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND ARMED FORCES.
I FULLY UNDERSTAND AND SHARE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT THE CURRENT
SITUATION TN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, PARTICULARLY THE
GROWING COMMUNIST MILITARY THREAT WHICH YOU NOW RACE,
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
FORM DS.1652
KBH 3/3/00
OP
and
Department of State
% / GRAND AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 STATE 235790
7 AM ALSO WELL AWARE OF THE CRITICAL NECESSITY OF AMERICAN
MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID FOR YOUR COUNTRY, I GIVE YOU MY
FIRM ASSURANCE THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION WILL CONTINUE TO
MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO PROVIDE THE ASSISTANCE YOU NEED.
ALTHOUGH I WOULD WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH you
TO DISCUSS WAYS AND MEANS TO ACHIEVE A GENUINE AND LASTING
PEACE IN SOUTH VIETNAM, PRIOR COMMITMENTS PRECLUDE SUCH A
MEETING AT THIS TIME. BUT I HOPE THAT SUCH A MEETING
CAN BE ARRANGED IN THE FUTURE,
I AGREE WITH YOU THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT MY GOVERNMENT
CLEARLY INDICATE ITS SUPPORT FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT AND FOR
THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARIS AGREEMENTS. I
BELIEVE MY PUBLIC STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 9, MY MEETING
WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BAC AND DEPUTY DEFENSE SECRETARY
CLEMENT'S VISIT TO SAIGON ALL CLEARLY DEMONSTRATE THAT
WE ARE STANDING FIRM IN OUR COMMITMENTS TO YOU. WE
HAVE ALSO CONVEYED TO OTHER POWERS HAVING AN INTEREST IN
VIETNAM THAT WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT YOUR GOVERNMENT
AND THAT WE FAVOR A COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARTS
AGREEMENTS, I SHALL TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OTHER OCCASIONS
TO SHOW MY SUPPORT FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT AND FOR THE PEACE
THAT WE ACHIEVED TOGFTHER.
OUR COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN THROUGH MANY DIFFICULT TIMES
TOGETHER. IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT WE SHALL FACE OTHER
DIFFICULTIES IN THE FUTURE. I AM CONFIDENT, HOWEVER,
THAT THESE PROBLEMS CAN BE OVERCOME IF WE WORK TOGETHER
TO MEET THEM WITH STRENGTH AND DETERMINATION.
WITH BEST WISHES FOR YOU AND FOR THE VALIANT PEOPLE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM,
SINCERELY,
GERALD R₂ FORD END TEXT.
SIGNED ORIGINAL BEING POUCHED, INGERSOLL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
FORM DS-1652
Embassy of Viet Nam
Sicraft FY,
Hashington, D.C.
No. 3199/W/CT
November 27, 1974
His Excellency Gerald R. Ford
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
My dear Mr. President:
I have the honour to transmit to you the following
message from His Excellency Nguyen Van Thieu, President
of the Republic of Vietnam:
Quote: Dear Mr. President:
I WISH TO CONVEY TO YOU MY HEARTFELT THANKS FOR YOUR
MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS AND GOOD WISHES ON THE OCCASION
OF THE NATIONAL DAY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.
THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-
NAM HIGHLY VALUE THE SUPPORT GIVEN BY THE UNITED STATES TO
THEIR JUST CAUSE. IT IS MY CONVICTION THAT THE COMMON
DETERMINATION OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES WILL INDUCE THE COMMU-
NIST SIDE TO RESPECT THE PARIS AGREEMENT so AS TO RESTORE
PEACE IN SOUTH VIETNAM.
PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. PRESIDENT, THE ASSURANCES OF MY
HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.
Signed NGUYEN VAN THIEU
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM Unquote
Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my
highest esteem.
Truly yours,
REPUBLIC
EMBASSY
OF
REP
VIET
phy.
FORD LIBRARY & among
Tran Kim Phuong
Ambassador
L18
7A
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SEGRET
Dear Mr. President:
I appreciate
Your thoughtful letter of January 25
when Vietnam is very much on my mind, and on the
minds of other people here and throughout the world.
I share your concern about our North Vietnam's failure to
observe the most fundamental provisions of the Paris
Agreement and our the heightened level of North
Vietnamese military pressure.
Once again the South Vietnamese people and armed
forces are effectively demonstrating their determina-
tion to resist Hanoi's attacks, despite the existing.
limitations on ammunition and other supplies with
which you are faced. I was particularly impressed
by the gallant performance of your forces at the Phuoc
Long province capital and at Ba Den Mountain, where
they were overwhelmed only by greatly superior num-
bers after being cut off from resupply and reinforcement.
In shite of North Vietnans's escalating military attacks
your Government continues to press for unconditional
resumption of the negotiations which the Communists
broke off last summer Even though your several
FORD
offers to reinstitute negotiations have all been rejected
thus far, they demonstrate that it is the Communist
side -- not the Republic of Vietnam -- which is pro-
longing the war. We continue to believe that imple-
mentation of the Paris Agreement, with direct negotia-
tions between the Vietnamese parties, is the quickest,
most appropriate, and most effective way to end the
MICROFILM DATA
SECRET
DO
INIT
DECLASSIFIED
MAR MAR 25
DATE
E.Q. 12958, Sec. 3.5
OREG)
NSC
NSC Mamo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
TO
By KB4 , NARA, Date 3/3/00
SECRET
-2-
bloodshed in Vietnam; We, therefore, strongly support
your efforts to resume negotiations and he The meatine,
We have frequently stated that the United States would
provides South Vietnam with the means to defend itself,
ENSURE Them THE UNITED SMIPS
and
I intend to do everything I can to achieve this ob
jective. Specifically, as you know, I have just re-
quested the Congress to appropriate an additional $300
million in military aid this fiscal year to help provide
your forces with the ammunition and other supplies
needed to turn back North Vietnamese attacker
The path to peace is never easy. It has been extraor-
dinarily long and difficult in Vietnam. But I remain
hopeful that if we persevere we will yet reach our ob-
jective of a fair peace, a lasting peace, a peace which
is consistent with the will of the South Vietnamese
people and which justifies the sacrifices of the Vietna-
mese and American peoples.
Sincerely,
TORD CIBRAR,
His Excellency
Nguyen Van Thieu
President of the Republic of Vietnam
Saigon
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
7B
Date:2-11475
TO: Paul Theis 1975 FEB II PM 5 22
OK lent
For clearance and/or comments
and return to meAS SOON AS POSSIBLE
& 1/12/75
Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
(Ext. 3440-1)
Attachment
7C
Dear Mr. President:
I appreciate your thoughtful letter of January 25. Vietnam
is very much on my mind, and I share your concern over North
Vietnam's failure to observe the most fundamental provisions of the
Paris Agreement and over the heightened level of North Vietnamese
military pressure.
Once again the South Vietnamese people and armed forces are
effectively demonstrating their determination to resist Hanoi's attacks,
your
despite the existing limitations on ammunition and other supplies
which you are faced. I was particularly impressed by the gallant
performance of your forces at the Phuoc Long province capital and at
Ba Den Mountain, where they were overwhelmed only by greatly
superior numbers after being cut off from resupply and reinforcement.
Even though your several offers to reinstitute negotiations have
clearly
all been rejected thus far, they demonstrate that it is the Communist
side -- not the Republic of Vietnam -- which is prolonging the war.
We continue to believe that implementation of the Paris Agreement, with
direct negotiations between the Vietnamese parties, is the quickest,
most appropriate, and most effective way to end the bloodshed in
Vietnam. We strongly support your efforts to resume negotiations
and in the meantime, I intend to do everything I can to ensure that the
United States provides South Vietnam with the means to defend itself.
2
The path to peace is never easy. It has been extraordinarily
long and difficult in Vietnam. But I remain hopeful that if we persevere
and
we will yet reach our objective of a fair peace, a lasting peace a
peace which is consistent with the will of the South Vietnamese people --
and justifying justifies the sacrifices of the Vietnam and American peoples.
ese
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Nguyen Van Thieu
President of the Republic of Vietnam
Saigon
7D
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
GERALD
Dear Mr. President:
Your thoughtful letter of January 25 comes at a time
when Vietnam is very much on my mind and on the
minds of other people here and throughout the world.
I share your concern about North Vietnam's failure to
observe the most fundamental provisions of the Paris
Agreement and about the heightened level of North
Vietnamese military pressure.
Once again the South Vietnamese people and armed
forces are effectively demonstrating their determina-
tion to resist Hanoi's attacks, despite the existing
limitations on ammunition and other supplies with
which you are faced. I was particularly impressed
by the gallant performance of your forces at the Phuoc
Long province capital and at Ba Den Mountain, where
they were overwhelmed only by greatly superior num-
bers after being cut off from resupply and reinforcement.
In spite of North Vietnam's ascalating military attacks,
your Government continues to press for unconditional
resumption of the negotiations which the Communists
broke off last summer. Even though your several
offers to reinstitute negotiations have all been rejected
thus far, they demonstrate that it is the Communist
side -- not the Republic of Vietnam -- which is pro-
longing the war. We continue to believe that imple-
mentation of the Paris Agreement, with direct negotia-
tions between the Vietnamese parties, is the quickest,
most appropriate, and most effective way to end the
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
By KBH , NARA, Date 3/3/00
SECRET
-2-
bloodshed in Vietnam; we, therefore, strongly support
your efforts to resume negotiations.
We have frequently stated that the United States would
provide South Vietnam with the means to defend itself,
and I intend to do everything I can to achieve this ob-
jective. Specifically, as you know, I have just re-
quested the Congress to appropriate an additional $300
million in military aid this fiscal year to help provide
your forces with the amminition and other supplies
needed to turn back North Vietnamese attacks.
The path to peace is never easy. It has been extraor-
dinarily long and difficult in Vietnam. But I remain
hopeful that if we persevere we will yet reach our ob-
jective of a fair peace, a lasting peace, a peace which
is consistent with the will of the South Vietnamese
people and which justifies the sacrifices of the Vietna-
mese and American peoples.
Sincerely,
448
His Excellency
Nguyen Van Thieu
President of the Republic of Vietnam
Saigon
SECRET
3) KATHY FURD MEEHAN X
SP
EST
BASEMENT
WH
d Balr degatals
letter Date assate mm
UNC LASSIF
CLASSIFICATION
8B
NSC REFERRAL TO STATE SECRETARIAT
Date: Feb. 24, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GEORGE SPRINGSTEEN
NSC LOG#
0817
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: Presidential 'green' letter
TO: Pres Thieu of Vietnam
FROM: The President
DATE: Feb. 24, 1975
SUBJECT: Continued support for Vietnam
ACTION REQUESTED:
DRAFT REPLY FOR:
PRESIDENT'S SIGNATURE
WHITE HOUSE STAFF SIGNATURE
OTHER
DIRECT REPLY
FURNISH INFO COPY
XXDISPATCH
RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS
TRANSLATION
APPROPRIATE HANDLING
INFORMATION
FOR ADDITIONAL PROCESSING AS INDICATED:
DUE DATE: Match 6
URGENT XXXX
ROUTINE
COMMENTS:
B.Mechort
for JEANNE W. DAVIS
Staff Secretary
Unclassified
CLASSIFICATION
8-
817
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
ACTION
February 20, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
W.L. STEARMAN
MASI
SUBJECT:
Presidential Response to Thieu Letters
At Tab B is the signed Presidential letter replying to a President Thieu
letter which was received telegraphically and which State said was dated
January 25 (Tab C). We just received the actual letter and discovered it
was dated January 24. To complicate things further, we also just received
another letter from Thieu dated January 25 (Tab D) which was not sent
telegraphically. At Tab A for your approval is a redrafted first page
which replies to the second letter and corrects the date of Thieu's first
letter.
The new (January 25) Thieu letter asks the President to denounce Com-
munist violations and to use his influence to prevail upon the Communist
side to implement the Agreement and to return to the negotiating table.
We have added a sentence to the original letter responding to this request.
The only changes are:
-- Added reference to the January 24 letter;
-- Added last sentence in the first paragraph;
-- Deleted "in the meantime" and added "until peace comes" in the last sentence
of paragraph three.
I would appreciate your approving the revised first page without sending
it to the President. The reply is already long overdue -- partly because
we wanted Graham Martin's views before drafting a response.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve transmission of the letter to President Thieu using the
revised first page at Tab A.
Approve (3 Disapprove
Dick Smyser concur
V
DECLASSIFIED
Paul Theis has approved revised page
E.O. 12953, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY
, NARA, DATE 3/24/04
8D
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 24, 1975
Dear Mr. President:
Your thoughtful letters of January 24 and 25
come at a time when Vietnam is very much on my
mind and on the minds of other people here and through-
out the world. I share your concern about North Viet-
nam's failure to observe the most fundamental provi-
sions of the Paris Agreement and about the heightened
level of North Vietnamese military pressure. I wish
to assure you that this Government will continue to
press for the full implementation of this Agreement.
Once again the South Vietnamese people and armed
forces are effectively demonstrating their determi-
nation to resist Hanoi's attacks. Despite your ex-
isting limitations on ammunition and other supplies,
I was particularly impressed by the performance of
your forces at the Phuoc Long province capital and
at Ba Den Mountain, where they were overwhelmed
only by greatly superior numbers after being cut off
from resupply and reinforcement.
Even though your offers to reinstitute negotiations
have been rejected thus far, they clearly demonstrate
that it is the Communist side -- not the Republic of
Vietnam -- which is prolonging the war. We continue
to believe that implementation of the Paris Agreement,
with direct negotiations between the Vietnamese parties,
is the quickest, most appropriate, and most effective
way to end the bloodshed in Vietnam. We strongly sup-
port your efforts to resume negotiations and will make
every effort to provide the assistance that is so nec-
essary to your struggle until peace comes.
R.
-2-
The path to peace is never easy. It has been extraor-
dinarily long and difficult in Vietnam. But I remain
hopeful that if we persevere we will yet reach our
objective of a fair peace, a lasting peace and a peace
which is consistent with the will of the South Vietna-
mese people -- justifying the sacrifices of the Viet-
namese and American peoples.
Sincerely,
Herald R. Food
Page & 07/21
His Excellency
Nguyen Van Thieu
President of the Republic of Vietnam
Saigon
C
NGUYEN VAN THIEU
President of the Republic of Viet-Nam
Saigon, January 24th, 1975
Dear Mr. President,
As we are approaching the second anniversary of the
signing of the Paris Agreement of 27 January 1973, I wish to
draw your attention to the very grave situation our country is
facing as a result of the continuing aggression carried out by
North Vietnamese troops in South Viet-Nam.
Indeed during the last two years, and despite the
existence of the Paris Agreement, North Viet-Nam has vastly
increased its military capability in the South, stepped up land
and population grabbing operations and launched incessant attacks
against outposts, bases, district towns which were indisputably
under the jurisdiction and control of our government long before
the Paris Agreement was concluded. The recent capture of the
Phuoc-Long province last week -- certainly the most massive
and the most blatant violation of the Paris Agreement -- clearly
shows that the North Vietnamese and their political instrument
in the South, the "National Liberation Front", have completely
His Excellency Gerald Ford,
President of the United States of America
WASHINGTON, D.C.
2
disregarded the Agreement. It is quite evident by now that
North Viet-Nam instead of seeking a political solution within
the framework of the Paris Agreement, has again resorted
to military adventures to impose their will over South Viet-
Nam.
You are certainly aware, Mr. President, that this
continued aggression from North Viet-Nam constitutes a most
serious threat to the survival of South Viet-Nam as a free
and independent country and destroys the chance for the South
Vietnamese people to exercise their right of self-determination,
a principle for the defence of which more than fifty thousand
young Americans as well as hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese
had sacrificed their lives. To uphold this principle, our troops
have fought gallantly and well, and since the withdrawal of all
allied troops they have shown determination and ability to go
forward alone to preserve our independence and freedom.
Nevertheless as North Viet-Nam continues to receive
large quantities of war material from communist countries to
pursue their armed aggression against South Viet-Nam, we must
rely on the assistance of the United States of America for the
supply of equipment and ammunition necessary to our defence.
In most cases we have sustained setbacks solely because of the
communist massive application of fire power and armor ; on
our side our troops had to count every single shell they fire in
order to make the ammunition last.
I understand that some sections of the American
public opinion have been induced into believing that too much
aid to the Republic of Viet-Nam would only prolong the war
and encourage us not to seek a political solution. The record
clearly shows the opposite. Reduction of military assistance
to Viet-Nam by the U.S. Congress has only encouraged the
Communists. Thus, they have broken off all the negotiations
in Saigon as well as in Paris and systematically rejected all
3
our proposals for general elections. Taking advantage of
the scarcity of our supplies and hoping that adequate aid for
us will not be forthcoming, they are once again undertaking
to destroy our government structure by force of arms with
a view of imposing a solution of their own.
Two years ago we signed the Paris Agreement with
the hope that the elaborate structure for global peace would
effectively work. We also signed with the great conviction
that should the communists resort to the use of force again
we will be provided with adequate means to defend ourselves.
Today I wish to appeal to you to take all necessary
action to preserve the Paris Agreement. I am aware of and
thankful for the numerous personal efforts and intervention
you have made in our behalf since you took over the highest
office of your great country. I am also very heartened by
your decision last week to seek more supplemental military
assistance for the Republic of Viet-Nam.
I hope that you will be successful in convincing the
United States Congress and the American people that the
cutbacks and restrictions in aid to the Republic of Viet-Nam
could undermine its very survival and eventually make a
mockery of the commitment of the United States to the defence
of peace in Viet-Nam.
I trust that you and the Secretary of State will not
spare any effort to preserve the Paris Agreement and to
ensure that the countless sacrifices that our two nations have
made will not be made in vain.
Sincerely yours,
st
Embassy of Viet Nam
Washington, D.C.
0224/W/CT
February 13,1975
Dear Mr. President;
I have the honor to forward to you, herewith
enclosed, a letter dated January 25,1975, from the Pre-
sident of the Republic of Vietnam.
Please accept, dear Mr. President, the renewed
assurances of my highest respects.
Truly yours,
6phul
b
P
LIBRARY
Tran Kim Phuong
Ambassador
His Excellency Mr. GERALD R. FORD
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D.C.
NGUYEN VAN THIEU
President of the Republic of Viet-Nam
Saigon, January 25, 1975
Your Excellency,
On April 25 last year, I wrote to Your Excellency
about the tense situation in South Viet-Nam following the
capture of the Tong-Le-Chan base by North Vietnamese
communist troops.
Since then the situation has considerably worsened
because of the numerous and increasingly brazen violations
of the Paris Agreement of January 27, 1973 by the communist
side. It has reached a critical stage with the recent events
in the Province of Phuoc-Long.
In fact, from December 14, 1974 on, important
North Vietnamese troops at division strength, massively
supported by tanks and artillery, were attacking and forcibly
seizing the district towns in the Province of Phuoc-Long,
a territory that is undisputably under the permanent control
of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam for many
decades up to now. On January 7, 1975 communist troops
/ 2
His Excellency Mr. GERALD FORD
President of the United Statesof America
WASHINGTON D.C. (U.S.A.)
2
overran the provincial capital Phuoc-Binh, after having
subjected this city to heavy artillery barrages, in callous
disregard of the fate of over 26, OOO of its inhabitants,
including many women, children, the sick and the wounded.
The communist capture of the Province of Phuoc
Long which clearly belongs to the Republic of Viet-Nam
constitutes a blatant, grave and large scale violation of
the ceasefire-in-place ordered by the Paris Agreement.
It also represents an intolerable challenge to all peace-
loving countries and nations in the world.
The capture of Phuoc-Long by communist troops
is by no means an isolated incident. It is a part of a
communist plan aimed at deliberately and systematically
destroying the Paris Agreement, through continuous and
grave violations of the ceasefire by communist troops,
through the communist unilateral boycott of the peace
negotiations between Vietnamese parties as prescribed
by the Paris Agreement, through the overt call made by
the communist side for the overthrow of the legal
Government of South Viet-Nam and the massive buildup
of the communist military strength in South Viet-Nam.
/3
3
If the Communists were allowed to carry out
this plan with impunity, the Viet-Nam war would break
out anew and peace in South-East Asia and in the world
would be once again endangered.
The International Commission of Control and
Supervision set up by the Paris Agreement is now thoroughly
paralyzed due to the non-cooperation of the communist side.
As to the Paris International Conference on Viet-Nam, given
the present negative stance of its communist participants,
there is no likelihood that this Conference can be reconvened in
the near future.
Thus, while the Government of the Republic of
Viet-Nam maintains its correct position of strictly
respecting and seriously implementing the Paris Agreement
of January 27, 1973, it is duty-bound to defend its territory
and population against Communist attacks and encroachments.
I am convinced that this just position deserves the whole-
hearted support of all the peace and freedom loving people
in the world.
/ 4
4
Therefore I wish to ask Your Excellency to
strongly denounce and severely condemn the violations
of the Paris Agreement perpetrated by the communist
side in Viet-Nam. I also hope that Your Excellency
will use your great influence to prevail upon the
communist side to respect the ceasefire, return to
the negotiating table and implement every provision of
the Paris Agreement. Moreover, we would most
appreciate Your Excellency's eventual statement of
support for the just cause and the correct stand of
the Republic of Viet-Nam.
All this would be indeed a valuable contribution
to the restoration of peace in Viet-Nam and in
South-East Asia.
Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances
of my highest consideration.
8M
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
817
WASHINGTON
SECRET
ACTION
February 15, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
Reply to a Letter to You From
South Vietnamese President Thieu
South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu has written you (Tab B)
citing his concern over the recent step-up in North Vietnamese attacks,
expressing thanks for your personal efforts in seeking supplemental
aid for South Vietnam and asking that you take all action necessary
to preserve the Paris Agreement.
At Tab A is a draft reply from you to President Thieu. Your reply
thanks him for his letter, indicates that you share his concern over
the recent escalation of military activity, conveys your praise for
the gallant performance of South Vietnam's military forces, and
states your intention to do everything within your means to provide
South Vietnam with the supplies necessary to defend itself.
Paul Theis has seen the draft response and concurs.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the draft response at Tab A.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
By KBH , NARA, Date 3/3/00
SECRET
8 I
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
February 12
TO BUD MACFARLANE
We have revised the letter to Thieu
as suggested, and have run it back through
Paul Theis.
Jeanne Davis
8J
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
817
ACTION
SECRET
February 10, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
WILLIAM L. STEARMAN
YR
SUBJECT:
Presidential Reply to a Letter from
South Vietnamese President Thieu
South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu has written the President
(Tab B) citing his concern over the recent step-up in North Vietnamese
attacks, expressing thanks for the President's personal efforts in
seeking supplemental aid for South Vietnam and appealing to the President
to take all action necessary to preserve the Paris Agreement.
At Tab A is a draft Presidential reply to President Thieu's letter.
The President's reply thanks President Thieu for his letter, indicates
that the President shares his concern over the recent escalation of
military activity, conveys the President's praise for the gallant per-
formance of South Vietnam's military forces, and states the President's
intention to do everything within his means to provide South Vietnam
with the supplies necessary to defend itself.
A memorandum from you to the President transmitting the suggested
reply is at Tab I.
Paul Theis has seen the draft response and concurs.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
By KBH , NARA, Date 3/3/00
SECRET
8K
SECRET
SAIGON 924
LIDRARY
January 25, 1975
Dear Mr. President:
As we are approaching the second anniversary of the signing of the
Paris Agreement of 27 January 1973, I wish to draw your attention
to the very grave situation our country is facing as a result of the
continuing aggression carried out by North Vietnamese troops
in South Vietnam.
Indeed during the last two years, and despite the existence of the
Paris Agreement, North Vietnam has vastly increased its military
capability in the South, stepped up land and population grabbing
operations and launched incessant attacks against outposts, bases,
district towns which were indisputably under the jurisdiction and
control of our Government long before the Paris Agreement was
concluded. The recent capture of the Phuoc Long Province last
week -- certainly the most massive and the most blatant violations
of the Paris Agreement -- clearly shows that the North Vietnamese
and their political instrument in the South, the "National Liberation
Front, " have completely disregarded the Agreement. It is quite
evident by now that North Vietnam instead of seeking a political
solution within the framework of the Paris Agreement, has again
resorted to military adventures to impose their will over South Vietnam.
You are certainly aware, Mr. President, that this continued aggression
from North Vietnam constitutes a most serious threat to the survival of
South Vietnam as a free and independent country and destroys the chance
for the South Vietnamese people to exercise their right of self-deter-
mination, a principle for the defense of which more than fifty thousand
young Americans as well as hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese had
sacrificed their lives. To uphold this principle, our troops have fought
gallantly and well, and since the withdrawal or all allied troups they
have show determination and ability to go forward alone to preserve
our independence and freedom.
Nevertheless as North Vietnam continues to receive large quantities
of war material from Communist countries to pursue their armed aggression
against South Vietnam, we must rely on the assistance of the United States
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
By KBH , NARA, Date 3/3/00
SECRET
2
of America for the supply of equipment and ammunition necessary to
our defense. In most cases we have sustained setbacks solely because
of the Communist massive application of fire power and armor; on
our side our troops had to count every single shell they fire in order
to make the ammunition last.
I understand that some sections of the American public opinion have
been induced into believing that too much aid to the Republic of
Vietnam would only prolong the war and encourage us not to seek a
political solution. The record clearly shows the opposite. Reduction
of military assistance to Vietnam by the U.S. Congress has only
encouraged the Communists. Thus, they have broken off all the
negotiations in Saigon as well as in Paris and systematically rejected
all our proposals for general elections. Taking advantage of the scarcity
of our supplies and hoping that adequate aid for us will not be forth-
coming, they are once again undertaking to destroy our Government
structure by force of arms with a view of imposing a solution of their
own.
Two years ago we signed the Paris Agreement with the hope that the
elaborate structure for global peace would effectively work. We also
signed with the great conviction that should the Communists resort to
the use of force again we will be provided with adequate means to defend
ourselves.
Today I wish to appeal to you to take all necessary action to preserve
the Paris Agreement. I am aware of and thankful for the numerous
personal efforts and intervention you have made in our behalf since you
took over the highest office of your great country. I am also very
heartened by your decision last week to seek more supplemental military
assistance for the Republic of Vietnam.
I hope that you will be successful in convincing the United States Congress
and the American people that the cutbacks and restrictions in aid to the
Republic of Vietnam could undermine its very survival and eventually
make a mockery of the commitment of the United States to the defense
of peace in Vietnam.
I trust that you and the Secretary of State will not spare any effort to
preserve the Paris Agreement and to ensure that the countless sacrifices
that our two nations have made will not be made in vain.
Sincerely yours,
Nguyen Van Thieu
8L
Di
817
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
SECRET
February/ 7, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
WILLIAM L. STEARMAN
WH
SUBJECT:
President's Reply to Thieu
At Tab A is a draft Presidential reply to President Thieu's letter of
January 25, 1975 (Tab B). The draft was provided by State. Graham
Martin and I made a few minor changes.
Paul Theis has seen the draft response and concurs.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you authorize transmission of the telegram at Tab A.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
FORD
LIBRARY
SECRET GDS
KBH 3/3/00
8m
RECEIVED BY:
(Date & Time Stamp)
(Date & Time Stamp)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center
WHITE HOUSE
STATE
SI
ROOM
LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT
1
3 53
S/S #
'75 JAN 29 PM 4 :.2U
132
SECRET/NODIS
LDX MESSAGE NO.
CLASSIFICATION
NO. PAGES 2
P
,
DESCRIPTION OF MSG.
Telegram to Saigon re Letter to President Thieu
FROM:
S/S
,
.
9
Officer
Office Symbol
Extension
Room Number
LDX TO:
DELIVER TO:
EXTENSION:
ROOM NUMBER:
NSC
MRS. DAVIS
P
.
,
,
,
,
,
9
,
,
FOR:
CLEARANCE XXXX/ INFORMATION
PER REQUEST
COMMENT
REMARKS:
VALIDATED FOR TRANSMISSION BY:
2
WILCOM
Executive Secretariat Officer
FORD LIBSAN
8 n
SECRET
EA/VN: JREULLINGTON: AOA
1/29/75 EXT. 23221
THE SECRETARY
EA-MR. HABIB NSC-MR SMYSER
S/S-
IMMEDIATE
SAIGON
NODIS
HK
L.C. 11652:60S
JRB
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, VS
FCH
SUBJECT: LETTER TO PRESIDENT THIEU
WRS
S/S-
REF: SAIGON'S 924
1. PLEASE DELIVER TO PRESIDENT THIEU TEXT OF FOLLOWING
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT FORD. ORIGINAL BEING POUCHED. UE DO
NOT INTEND TO MAKE THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS PUBLIC, BUT WE
WOULD NOT OBJECT TO DOING so IF PRESIDENT THIEU BELIEVES
THIS HOULD BE USEFUL. IN THIS EVENT. THERE SHOULD BE
COORDINATED RELEASE IN BOTH WASHINGTON AND SAIGON.
2. BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
YOUR THOUGHTFUL LETTER OF JANUARY 25 COMES AT A TIME WHEN
VIET-NAM IS VERY MUCH ON MY MIND AND ON THE MINDS OF XANY
OTHER PEOPLE HERE AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. I SHARE YOUR
CONCERN ABOUT NORTH VIET-NAM'S FAILURE TO OBSERVE THE MOST
FUNDAMENTAL PROVISIONS OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND ABOUT THE
HEIGHTENED LEVEL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY PRESSURE.
SECRET
KBH 3/3/00
FORM DS 322A{0CR}
SECRET
ONCE AGAIN THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND ARMED FORCES
ARE EFFECTIVELY DEMONSTRATING THEIR DETERMINATION TO
RESIST HANDI'S ATTACKS, DESPITE THE EXISTING LIMITATIONS
ON AMMUNITION AND OTHER SUPPLIES WITH WHICH YOU ARE FACED.
I GAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED BY THE GALLANT PERFORMANCE
OF YOUR FORCES AT THE PHUOC LONG PROVINCE CAPITAL AND AT
BA DEN MOUNTAIN. WHERE THEY WERE OVERWHELMED ONLY BY
GREATLY SUPERIOR NUMBERS XNX AFTER BEING CUT OFF FROM RE-
SUPPLY AND REINFORCEMENT.
IN SPITE OF NORTH VIET-NAM'S
ESCALATING MILITARY ATTACKS, YOUR GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO PRESS FOR
XXXXXXX UNCONDITIONAL RESUMPTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
WHICH THE COMMUNISTS BROKE OFF LAST SUMMER. EVEN THOUGH
YOUR SEVERAL OFFERS TO REINSTITUTE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE ALL
BEEN REJECTED THUS FAR, THEY DEMONSTRATE THAT IT IS THE
COMMUNIST SIDE -- NOT THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM -- WHICH
IS PROLONGING THE WAR. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT, WITH DIRECT NEGO-
TIATIONS BETWEEN THE VIETNAMESE PARTIES. IS THE QUICKEST,
MOST APPROPRIATE, AND MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO END THE
BLOODSHED IN VIET-NAM; therefore, strongly support your efforts to resume negotiations.
we
UE HAVE FREQUENTLY STATED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD
PROVIDE SOUTH VIET-NAM WITH THE NEANS TO DEFEND ITSELF,
AND I INTEND TO DO EVERYTHING I CAN TO ACHIEVE THIS OB-
JECTIVE. SPECIFICALLY, AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE JUST REQUEST-
ED THE CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE AN ADDITIONAL DOLS 300
MILLION IN MILITARY AID THIS FISCAL YEAR XXXXXXXXX00X to help provide your
FORCES WITH THE AMMUNITION AND OTHER SUPPLIES NEEDED
70 TURN BACK XXX NORTH VIETNANESE ******** attacks.
THE PATH TO PEACE IS NEVER EASY. IT HAS BEEN EXTRA-
ORDINARILY LONG AND DIFFICULT IN VIET-NAM. BUT I REMAIN
HOPEFUL THAT IF UE PERSEVERE WE MILL YET REACH OUR OB-
SECTIVE OF A FAIR PEACE, A LASTING PEACE, XNX A PEACE
CHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE WILL OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE
PEOPLE. and which justifies the sacrifices of the Vietnamese and American peoples.
SINCERELY,
GERALD FORD
END TEXT. YY
SECRET
80
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. President:
I appreciate your thoughtful letter of January 25.
Vietnam is very much on my mind, and I share
your concern over North Vietnam's failure to
observe the most fundamental provisions of the
Paris Agreement and over the heightened level
of North Vietnamese military pressure.
Once again the South Vietnamese people and armed
forces are effectively demonstrating their deter-
mination to resist Hanoi's attacks, despite your ex-
isting limitations on ammunition and other supplies.
I was particularly impressed by the performance of
your forces at the Phuoc Long province capital and
at Ba Den Mountain, where they were overwhelmed
only by greatly superior numbers after being cut off
from resupply and reinfordement.
Even though your offers to reinstitute negotiations
have been rejected thus far, they clearly demonstrate
that it is the Communist side - not the Republic of
Vietnam -- which is prolonging the war. We continue
to believe that implementation of\the Paris Agreement,
with direct negotiations between the Vietnamese parties,
is the quickest, most appropriate, and most effective
way to end the bloodshed in Vietnam We strongly sup-
port your efforts to resume negotiations and, in the
meantime, will make every effort to provide the
assistance that is so necessary to your struggle.
FORD
&
GERALD
8P
Rewrite - 2/14/75
McFarlane/feb
ACTION
817
Dear Mr. President:
I appreciate your thoughtful letter of January 25.
Vietnam is very much on my mind, and I share
your concern over North Vietnam's failure to
observe the most fundamental provisions of the
Paris Agreement and over the heightened level
of North Vietnamese military pressure.
Once again the South Vistnamese people and armed
forces are effectively demonstrating their deter-
mination to resist Hanoi's attacks, despite your ex-
isting limitations on ammunition and other supplies.
I was particularly impressed by the performance of
your forces at the Phuoc Long province capital and
at Ba Den Mountain, where they were overwhelmed
only by greatly superior numbers after being cut off
from resupply and reinforcement.
Even though your offers to reinstitute negotiations
have been rejected thus far, they clearly demonstrate
that it is the Communist side -- not the Republic of
Vietnam -- which is prolenging the war. We continue
to believe that implementation of the Paris Agreement,
with direct negotiations between the Vietnamese parties,
is the quickest, most appropriate, and most effective
way to end the bloodshed in Vietnam. We strengly sup-
port your efforts to resume negotiations and, in the
meantime, will make every effort to provide the
assistance that is 80 necessary to your struggle.
FORD a LIBRARY GERALD
817
8R
SECRET
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
Reply to a Letter to You From
South Vietnamese President Thieu
South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu has written you (Tab B)
citing his concern over the recent step-up in North Vietnamese attacks,
expressing thanks for your personal efforts in seeking supplemental
aid for South Vietnam and asking that you take all action necessary
to preserve the Paris Agreement.
At Tab A is a draft reply from you to President Thieu. Your reply
thanks him for his letter, indicates that you share his concern over
the recent escalation of military activity, conveys your praise for
the gallant performance of South Vietnam's military forces, and
states your intention to do everything within your means to provide
South Vietnam with the supplies necessary to defend itself.
Paul Theis has seen the draft response and concurs.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the draft response at Tab A.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
DECLASSIFIED
B.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
By KBH , NARA, Date 3/3/00
SECRET
BS:nm:2/14/75
85
DOC
RECD
LOG NBR
INITIAL ACTION o
CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
MO
DA
MO
DA
HR
2
7
27
19
7500817
FROM: DISSINGER,H Stearman
REFERENCE:
CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE
TO: PRES
S/S
UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
KISSINGER
COLBY, W
OTHER
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NO FORN
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SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
SCOWCROFT
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SCHLESINGER, J
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DAVIS
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CODEWORD
SUBJECT: Durt her reply to LTR for Prer TS Then SENSITIVE
or South Vutnard me continued US
Ensestance
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
REC
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION
INFO
CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT
FOR
MEMO FOR HAK
(
)
STAFF SECRETARY
MEMO FOR PRES
(
)
REPLY FOR
FAR EAST
(
)
APPROPRIATE ACTION
(
)
DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / so. ASIA
MEMO
TO
(
)
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
)
EUROPE / CANADA
JOINT MEMO
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO
FOR:
(
)
UNITED NATIONS
(
ECONOMIC
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
)
SCIENTIFIC
CONCURRENCE.
(
)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
PORO
NSC PLANNING
COMMENTS INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
CONGRESSIONAL
OCEANS POLICY
INTELLIGENCE
GERALD
ABOURY
Lynn
DATE
FROM
TO
S
SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR AKENT:
CY TO
2/7
Scrott
x
Decision (2/18)
2/8
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further action per Jonka note
(2/18)
SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
2/10
Script
X
2/17
Naclb
Pres agd /tr to Three
Pres to sgn LTR To THIRU (2/19)
2/20
Scropt
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2/24
NSCIS
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2/24
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for to sym lorb Kew (2/26
2/24
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DISPATCH 2/24 STATE STATE C 137m for Hispatch 24 for DAVIS
CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:
NSC/S DISP INSTR
& DATE Leonard
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MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:
NOTIFY
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CRT 2/25/15 ID:
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(NBC-74-21)
9
COPY / OF 15 COPIL
of STATE
Department of State
-
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
SECRET
NO0451
TELEGRA
PAGE
01 STATE 042865
00
ORIGIN 0008-00
S
INFO OCT-01 1001 R
DRAFTED BY TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE
APPROVED BY EA:H.H. MILLER
732N3MH88NA/77
S/S- WHLUERS
044573
0 2523522 FEB 75 ZFF4
Fill SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE
SECRET STATE 042865
NODIS
E.O. 11632: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, VS
SUBJECT: LETTER TO PRESIDENT THIEU
1. PLEASE DELIVER TO PRESIDENT THIEU THE TEXT OF THE F01.-
LOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT FORD. THE ORIGINAL IS BEING
POUCHED. WE DO NUT INTEND TC MAKE THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS
PUBLIC.
2. HEGIN TEXT: (DATED) FEBRUARY 24, 1975
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
YUUR THOUGHTFUL LETTERS OF JANUARY 24 AND 25 COME AT A TIME
HHEN VIETNAM 15 VERY MUCH ON MY MIND AND ON THE MINUS OF
OTHER PEOPLE HERE AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. I SHARE YOUR
CONCERN ABOUT NORTH VIETNAMIS FAILURE TO DUSERVE THE MOST
FUNDAMENTAL PROVISIONS OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND ABOUT
THE HEIGHTENED LEVEL OF NORTH VISTNAMESE MILITARY PRESSURE.
I WISH TO ASSURE YOU THAT THIS GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO
SECRET
KBH 3/3/00
NOT TO BF REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION or THE EXECUTIVE SECRET
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
UNITED
Department of State
THE
SECHET
TELEGRAI
STATES OF
PAGE 02 STATE 042865
PRESS FOR THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS AGREEMENT.
S
ONCE AGAIN THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND ARMED FORCES
ARE EFFECTIVELY DEMONSTRATING THEIR DETERMINATION TO RESIST
HANOI'S ATTACKS. DESPITE YOUR EXISTING LIMITATIONS ON
AMMUNITION AND OTHER SUPPLIES, I WAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED
BY THE PERFORMANCE OF YOUR FORCES AT THE PHOUC LONG PRO-
VINCE CAPITAL AND AT BA DEN MOUNTAIN, WHERE THEY WERE OVER-
PHELMED ONLY BY GREATLY SUPERIOR NUMBERS AFTER BEING CUT
OFF FROM RESUPPLY AND REINFORCEMENT.
EVEN THOUGH YOUR OFFERS TO REINSTITUTE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE
BEEN REJECTED THUS FAR, THEY CLEARLY DEMONSTRATE THAT IT
IS THE COMMUNIST SIDE -- NOT THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM --
WHICH IS PROLUNGING THE WAR. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT, WITH DIRECT NEGOTIA-
TIONS BETWEEN THE VIETNAMESE PARTIES, IS THE GUICKEST,
MOST APPROPRIATE, AND MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TU END THE BLOOD-
SHCU IN VISINAM. WE STRONGLY SUPPORT YOUR EFFORTS TO RE-
SUME NEGOTIATIONS AND WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT 10 PROVIDE
S
THE ASSISTANCE THAT. IS SQ NECESSARY TO YOUR STRUGGLE UNTIL
PEACE COMES.
THE PATH TO PEACE IS NEVER EASY. IT HAS HEEN EXTRAUM
DINARILY LONG AND DIFFICULT IN VIETNAM. BUT I REMAIN HOPE-
FUL THAT IF HE PERSEVERE WE WILL YET HEACH OUR OBJECTIVE
OF A FAIR PEACE, A LASTING PEACE AND A PEACE WHICH IS CUN-
SISTENT WITH THE WILL OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE -,
JUSTIFYING THE SACRIFICES OF THE VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN
PEOPLES.
SINCERELY,
GERALD R. FORD
END TEXT. KISSINGER
SECRET
NOT TO EF REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRE
6:15 pm
Then Think, Emiloy
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 22, 1975
Dear President Thieu:
The current North Vietnamese offensive against your
country is profoundly disturbing and personally anguishing.
It is my view that Hanoi's attack represents nothing less
than an abrogation by force of the Paris Agreement.
This turn of events bears the most severe consequences
for both our nations. For you and your countrymen it
is a time of supreme sacrifice which will determine the
very fate of your nation. I am confident that under your
leadership the armed forces and people of the Republic
of Vietnam will continue their tenacious defense against
this new aggression. I am equally confident that given
additional external support, you will prevail in your
struggle for self-determination.
As for the United States, the issue is no less critical.
By its action, Hanoi is again seeking to undermine all
that we have sought to achieve at enormous cost over the
past ten years. Concurrently, at stake is America's
resolve to support a friend who is being attacked by heavily
armed forces in total violation of a solemn international
agreement.
I, for my part, am determined that America shall stand
firmly behind the Republic of Vietnam at this crucial hour.
With a view to honoring the responsibilities of the United
States in this situation, I am following developments with
the closest attention and am consulting on an urgent basis
with my advisors on actions which the situation may require
and the law permit.
With regard to the provision of adequate military assistance
to your armed forces, you can be sure that I shall bend
every effort to meet your material needs on the battlefield.
- 2 -
In closing, I wish to repeat my continued high respect for
your resolve and for the constancy and courage of your
people.
Sincerely,
Geord R. Ford
His Excellency
Nguyen Van Thieu
President of the
Republic of Vietnam
Saigon
NGUYEN VAN THIEU
President of the Republic of Viet-Nam
Saigon, March 25, 1975
Dear Mr. President,
I wish to thank You for Your kind letter of March 22nd,
1975.
As I am writing to You, the military situation in South
Viet-Nam is very grave and is growing worse by the hour.
The serious disequilibrium in the balance of forces in favor
of the North Vietnamese as well as their strategic advantages,
accumulated over the past two years, have let to the present
critical situation, especially in MRI and II, as you have already
known. Heavy pressures are also being exerted on all the rest of
our national territory, and Saigon itself is threatened.
It has become evident that it would be extremely difficult
for us to contain the advance of the Communist forces and to
hold the line in order to push back the invaders.
Hanoi's intention to use the Paris Agreement for a
military take over of South Viet-Nam was well known to us at
His Excellency Gerald D. Ford
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C., USA
2
the very time of negotiating the Paris Agreement. You may
recall that we signed it, not because we credulously believed
in the enemy's goodwill, but because we were certain of the
common resolution of our two governments to make the
Agreement work.
As evidence of that resolution, firm pledges were
then given to us that the United States will retaliate swiftly
and vigorously to any violation of the Agreement by the
enemy and will provide the Republic of Viet-Nam with adequate
military and economic assistance.
We consider those pledges the most important guarantees
of the Paris Agreement; those pledges have now become the
most crucial ones to our survival.
Mr. President,
At this critical hour when the fate of the free South
Viet-Nam is at stake and when the horror of the enemy's
offensive is descending upon the entire population of South
Viet-Nam, I earnestly request that you take two following
necessary actions :
- To immediately order a brief but intensive B-52
air strike against enemy's concentration of forces and logistic
bases within South Viet-Nam, with intensity comparable to
what was done in the most critical hour of 1972, and
- To urgently provide us with necessary means to
contain and repel the offensive.
3
Only with these two actions can we stop North Viet-Nam
from conquering South Viet-Nam by force in defiance of the Paris
Agreement; only with these two actions can we prevent them from
confronting us with an irreparable situation and a fait accompli.
Mr. President,
Once again, I wish to appeal to You, to the credibility
of American foreign policy, and especially, to the Conscience of
America.
I am heartened that upon assuming the Presidency, You
were prompt to renew to us the assurance of the continuity of
American foreign policy and the validity of its existing commitments.
I am gratified for Your determination to honor these commitments
in full in Your administration. As You so rightly noted, these
assurances are particularly relevant to the Republic of Viet-Nam.
Generations of South Vietnamese who will be living free
from the horror of North Viet-Nam's domination will be indebted
to Your prompt actions, and to the steadfastness of the great
people of America.
Sincerely,
INSURANCE
SECRET
SECRET
EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
SAIGON
To : General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Enclosed is original signed copy of
President Thieu's letter to President Ford
the text of which was transmitted to
you by Martin Channel.
FORD LIBRARY & GERALD
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.
same as MR 94-53.#11
By KBH NARA, Date 1/24/97
SECRET
Date : March 27, 1975
Wilholman W.U. Lehmann
Deputy Chief of Mission
W.J. Lehmann, Charge' d'Affaires ad interim
American Embassy
Saigon, Republic of Viet-Nam
VIA AIR POUCH
SECRET
EYES ONLY
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
REGISTERED
Washington, D. C.
REGISTRY NUMBER
OFFICE SYMBOL
No. 835699 DCM
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION
* GPO 1967 0-261-529
TO BE AFFIXED TO COVER
SECRET
EYES ONLY
To he Delivered by
12 GVN
amb Martin
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 25, 1975
GENATO FORD CIRRANT
Dear Mr. President:
I am very much aware of the difficult times you are
now experiencing. I have asked Ambassador Martin
to convey to you my admiration for your determina-
tion, your resolution and courage. I am convinced
that in the end the South Vietnamese people, under
your leadership, will be successful in their fight to
preserve their independence and free institutions.
I very much regret that events over the last twelve
months -- events which neither of us could complete-
ly control -- resulted in a diminution of the American
material support which your government had fully ex-
pected to receive. While I deeply regret the conse-
quent military redeployments you felt compelled to
take, I fully understand the reasons for these actions
to reduce extended lines of communication and re-
supply and permit a more effective concentration of
your military forces to defend the vital areas.
The essential problem now is to determine with pre-
cision the actions we both may take to present the
best prospects for the future. Although you may have
received a rather gloomy assessment of American
public and Congressional attitudes on the prospects
for adequate amounts of economic and military aid,
I think the situation has now changed considerably.
Your military redeployments portrayed the actual re-
alitics of the current situation in Vietnam far more
graphically than words. Consequently, there is a
2
growing awareness in this country of your urgent need
for additional aid in adequate amounts.
You may rest assured that we will make every effort
to secure from the Congress adequate amounts of
aid for South Vietnam. We fully realize that this
must be done promptly.
To insure that I am fully and completely informed and
that our military aid requests are specifically designed
to meet your actual current needs, I am asking your
old friend, General Fred Weyand, to accompany Am-
bassador Martin on his return to Saigon. I am certain
that you will review the current situation with him with
complete candor and inform him fully on those items
you and your military advisors believe to be the most
crucial at this time.
I am also aware that some members of your staff have
speculated from time to time that American interests
elsewhere have lessened the interest of the United
States in Vietnam. Ambassador Martin informs me
that you understand this could not possibly be true
since the way we discharge our commitment to the
Republic of Vietnam inevitably affects the credibility
of American interests everywhere. Therefore, our
firm intention remains to help insure the Republic of
Vietnam's economic viability and its capability to
defend its own freedom and institutions.
Achievement of these aims will require maximum
efforts on both sides. It also requires that we remain
in close and intimate communication. I have instructed
Ambassador Martin to forward directly for my attention
any communications which you think necessary.
Our peoples have both surmounted even more difficult
times in the past. You and your people may be assured
3
of my continued firm support and of my resolve to
do everything I can to help the Republic of Vietnam.
Once again, I am confident that our joint endeavors
will be successful.
With my warmest personal good wishes.
Sincerely,
Klowd R. Ford
His Excellency
Nguyen Van Thieu
President of the Republic
of Vietnam
Saigon