Memorandum of Conversation with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Dean Rusk, W. Walton Butterworth, Harry N. Howard, and Representatives of the Department of Defense
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OCR Page 1 of 7TOP SECRET
124 554
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ARCHIVES all RECORDS SERVICE* of
appending b
AND
Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: April 24, 1950
SUBJECT:
Japanese Peace Treaty
PARTICIPANTS:
Department of State - The Secretary, Mr. Rusk, FE, Mr. Butterworth, s/J,
Mr. Howard, S.
166.7
Department of Defense - Secretary Johnson, Secretary Pace, Under
Secretary Voorhees, General Bradley, Admiral Sherman, General
Vandenberg, General Collins, General Burns.
COPIES TO:
(No copies made)
yes
iR
1-1493
Secretary Acheson explained that he had suggested the meeting for the
purpose of further exploring the problems connected with a Japanese peace
treaty and of bringing the views of the State and Defense Departments into
closer agreement so that he might be better prepared for the forthcoming dis-
cussions with Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman in early May. He recounted briefly
the events beginning with his discussions with Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman in
September 1949. Following these discussions a letter was sent by the
Department of State requesting the views of the Defense Department concerning
U.S. military requirements in the event a peace treaty with Japan were to be
negotiated, and Secretary Johnson sent his reply of December 23 enclosing
the opinion of the Joint Chiefs that they regarded a peace treaty as pre-
mature. The Secretary said that in view of the mutually exclusive character
of the two requirements insisted upon by the Joint Chiefs for a peace treaty,
viz, that U.S. forces remain in Japan and that the USSR and the de facto
government of China be parties to the peace treaty, he regarded the Joint
Chiefs' statement that a peace treaty was "premature" as a masterpiece of
understatement, since these requirements would make the conclusion of a
peace
treaty impossible. He referred also to the subsequent conversations with
Mr. Voorhees and Mr. Dorr and to the proposal which Mr. Voorhees had made on
March 23 that negotiations be initiated with our friendly Allies looking
toward a peace treaty covering political and economic matters but leaving
unchanged the occupation regime of control and SCAP's reserve powers for
the
purpose of assuring the maintenance of security with respect to Japan. The
Department of State had considered Mr. Voorhees' proposal and numerous other
arrangements for protecting the security of the United States and its friendly
Allies should a peace treaty be concluded. There were two aspects of the
DECLASSIFIED
security
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
12.29.75
Dept. of State letter, Aug. 9, 1973
TOP SECRET
00.0.0 67R.2.9.76
Bg NLT, He NARS Date 6.4.76
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