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Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall

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169 DEPARTMENT OF STATE 339 FOP SECRET OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY December 4, 1950 MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION Participants: General Marshall Mr. Acheson The Secretary telephoned General Marshall at 11:30 this morning and said that he wanted to discuss an idea with him and see whether General Marshall thought it would be worthwhile to have Mr. Dean Rusk and Mr. Kennan come over and talk with General Marshall about it. Mr. Acheson said that one of the things that had been outstanding in the whole Korean situation has been the rather violent swings of optimism and pessimism which have been abroad. Sometimes the situation has been on the verge of success and other times it has been on the verge of disaster. Now we all think it is on the verge of disaster. Maybe it is, but perhaps the thing is being made darker than it really is by this violent swing of the pendulum. The Secretary said he thought that if there were any chance that by a calm military analysis, which injected a line more than logic, and had some of the dogged approach which the British had in North Africa when things were going badly for them, opinion at the Pentagon is that there was some place at which there could be a holding operation, such as a considerable bridgehead which would extend the enemy and cause him trouble--at any rate show determination and that we were not giving up when we did not have to give up - - that might be a better stance before the world than to withdraw if we did not have to withdraw and then resort to attacks on China by ourselves. We would have more support than if we started bombing or blockading China by ourselves. The Secretary asked General Marshall if he thought there was anything in this idea. General Marshall said that he thought there was. We could tell more about it when we get into the bridgehead and when we see the shape in which some of the troops get out. There were indications that the troops in the Northeast have not been severely DECLASSIFIED E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) Dept. of State letter, 3-16:76 TOP SECRET By NLT- HC NARS Date 6-15-76