Memorandum of Conversation with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Ambassador of India Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, George C. McGhee, and T. Eliot Weil

4620 s/s DEPARTMENT OF STATE M.A. Memorandum of Conversation 393 313 conf 313 DATE: December 29, 1950 SUBJECT: Factors Entering into Consideration of Indian Request for Food Orains PARTICIPANTS: Madame Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Ambassador of India The Secretary Mr. McChee, Assistant Secretary - NEA Mr. Weil, SOA COPIES TO: s/s, U, s/A, a, FE, UNA, EUR, E, CIA, DRN, NEA, GTI, NE ARCHIVES MATIOMAL RECORNE Embassies: New Delhi, Karachi, London, Moscow, Taipei SERVICE* u. s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-61120-1 Madame Pandit called at 3:05 P.M. and remained approximately fifty minutes. She said she was going to London only because of the situation here-i.e., the state of US-Indian relations. She said Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Secretary- General of External Affairs, had written her saying there were "little misunder- standings" between the US and India, but that the Prime Minister and the late Deputy Prime Minister had never had any real doubt about the ability of the two countries to get along. She said little things occurred to give the public "handles" with which to create difficulties and the Prime Minister was particularly anxious to know how we could come closer together in view of "the threat which faces us"; perhaps there was now "a little more awareness" in the US of India's motives, and she would appreciate having something to take back. I said differences must not be magnified but that China was one of the matters I thought we ought to discuss. I pointed out that as the situation be- came more tense the American public would be nore likely to jump to conclusions regarding attitudes of other governments; it would therefore be wise for us to analyze these attitudes. I said it was my guess that the Chinese Communists would attempt to push the UN forces out of Korea and to extend their aggression to Indochina and to other parts of Asia; the American public, in view of the numbers of US troops involved, would be directly affected and there would be a heightened sensitiveness here. I said it would not be possible to brush it off and it was important that we avoid saying things about each other. We must bear two things in mind: (1) both India and the US should appraise realities and watch the main threat--the USSR, while regarding China as of secondary importance; DECLASSIFIED (2) India DE"T. TA LM.3.21.83 Authority NTT SECITET By AIL NLT Date 5-16-23