Memorandum of Conversation with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, United States Ambassador to Great Britain Walter Gifford, H. Freeman Matthews, George Perkins, Mr. Williamson, Ambassador of Great Britain Sir Oliver Franks, Anthony Eden, Charles A. E. Shuckburgh, and Bernard A. B. Burrows

8. THUMPS 3366 97 s/s DEDLASSTFIED DEPARTMENT OF STATE 5 BERVICE" 12 €. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (EI) Dept. of State letter, Aug 5-12-76 9.4973 Memorandum of Conversation By NLT- HC * NARS Date 7-1-76 DATE: January 10, 1952 - SECURITY INFORNATION SUBJECT: The Austrian Treaty PARTICIPANTS: United States: The Secretary British: Mr. Eden Ambassador Gifford Ambassador Franks Mr. Matthews Mr. Shuckburgh Mr. Perkins Mr. Burrows Mr. Williamson COPIES TO: The Secretary Mr. Matthews s/s EUR (2) American Inbassy, London American Imbassy. Vienna u. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-61120-1 I opened the discussion of the Austrian Treaty by recalling our previous conversations in Paris and Rome and called Mr. Eden's attention to the report of the British, French and U.S. High Commissioners in Vienna which had been prepared at our request. I stated that there were problems of both procedure and substance involved in the forthcoming meeting of the Deputies and that we should be guided by the recommendations of the High Commissioners concerning the tactics in dealing with the Soviet Union. In terms of procedure the chief problem vas contained in paragraph two of the High Commissioners' report concerning the acceptance of the Soviet versions of the unagreed Articles in order to obtain the conclusion of the present draft treaty. I pointed out that the High Commissioners had recoumended acceptance of the Soviet position only "as a last resort" to achieve conclusion of the treaty during the forthcoming meetings. The issue presented in this recommendation is clear; namely, should be make further concessions to the Russians to obtain the conclusion of the Treaty? I stated that I considered this to be a dangerous nove in our negotiations because we did not have any assurance that the Soviets would conclude the Treaty even on their own terms. If such an offer vere made and the Russians continued to block the conclusion of the Treaty by raising extraneous issues, the Vestern Povers would have given up their position on these articles without obtaining any tangible results. In subsequent negotiations, therefore, we vould be forced to start by accepting the Soviet terms of these articles as the basis for discussions. I stated that we felt that such action would make it difficult to introduce at any time in the future a new basis of discussion, such as the abbreviated Treaty. It would also be difficult to answer public criticism that we had given avay a great deal without getting anything in return. The second procedural question involved the problem of withdrawal of the old draft Treaty as the basis of discussion if the abbreviated Treaty is presented to the Soviets. I called the attention of - SSOURITY INPORMATION