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OCR Page 1 of 16KOREA - Synopsis B: The Outbreak of War, June-July 1950
(Page 1)
Guerrilla
Korean Army authorities announced on April 1 that an estimated 700
activities
guerrillas from North Korea had crossed the border into South Korea
early in the week. Efforts were made to prevent them from joining
remnants of guerrilla bands, and the army announced in mid-April that
TRUMAN
it had succeeded in destroying all but 150 of the 700. US observers
on the 15th confirmed the reports that the guerrillas had suffered
ARCHIVES AND
"NATIONAL KECORDS
heavy losses as the result of the prompt action of the Korean Army.
is
SERVICE"
Dulles visit
On June 17th Dulles arrived in Seoul for a three-day visit with
South Korean and US officials. In an address on the 19th before
the opening session of the newly-elected National Assembly, Dulles
said in part: "As you establish here a wholesome society of steadily
expanding well-being, you will set up peaceful influences which will
disintegrate the hold of Soviet Communism on your fellows to the
north and irresistably draw them into unity with you. Never for a
minute do we concede that Soviet Communists will hold permanently
their unwilling captives. No iron curtain can indefinitely block
off the attracting force of what you do, if you persist in the way
you have been going The American people give you their support,
both moral and material, consistent with your own self-respect and
your primary dependence on your own efforts.'
DGA analyzes the On several occasions during the MacArthur hearings DGA answered
pre-invasion
questions relative to how the Korean situation was viewed prior to
situation
the North Korean invasion. Byrd asked (p. 2013) : "Did that give
any concern to you and others who were watching the Korean situation
knowing it was a fallacy and might blow up anytime, the fact that
the South Koreans were so feebly armed as compared to the North
Koreans? DGA replied: "We understood that this was a dangerous
situation, and trusted in the fact that the invasion would not take
place until the South Koreans were able to handle themselves better.
Of course, there was a great deal of thought and concern which was
engendered by it."
On pp.1990-2, in answer to a question by Bridges, DGA analyzed the
intelligence received on North Korean-Soviet intentions and how this
was evaluated:
"Intelligence was available to the Department prior to the 25th of
June, made available by the Far Eastern Command, the CIA, the
Department of the Army, and by the State Deparrtment representatives
here and overseas, and shows that all these agencies were in
agreement that the possibility for an attack on the Korean Republic
existed at that time, but they were all in agreement that its
launching in the summer of 1950 did not appear imminent.
"The view was generally held that since the Communists had far from
exhausted the potentialities for obtaining their objectives through
guerrilla and psychological warfare, political pressure and intimi-
dation, such means would probably continue to be used rather than
overt military aggression. It was fully realized that the timing
of any move in Korea would be ordered from the Kremlin. Now, the
Relations
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