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OCR Page 1 of 59REEL II--7/2/53--p. 1
The next series of excerpts are from a foreword which I wrote in 148--in the
spring of 1948--for the publication, "United States and World Affairs, " for the Foreign
Policy Association and their
GAG: Council on Foreign Relations
DA: Council on Foreign Relations, and there are several paragraphs which I think are
pertinent, and I'll read quickly and then go on to another thing. This has to do with
my attitude as to what the Soviet Union was up to. "Objective narrative makes it clear
that the directi on and goals of Soviet action during this period whixk were chosen and
her
desired and were not forced upon/theix rulers as defensive measures. It is ,of course, true
that
and that tactics and maneuvers were designed to
to
oppose particular proposals or actions of the Western powers to frustrate some opposition
to Russian action, But the main thrust of Soviet policy was self-generated and not a
reluctant response to the acts or omissions of others .I The policy followed made impossible,
during 1946 and 1947, any settlement of the problems left by the war on any basis other
than Soviet control of Europe, direct or indirect. The other negotiators would not and
could not accept this result. Nothing which occurred,during or after the war, forced upon
the Kremlin the achievement of this end as an essential matter of defense.
Russia!s allies were not unfriendly or uncooperative. During the war they gave her
fighting power the essential support of billions of dollars in equipment and food.
They
on
fought a European campaign based entirely on military, and not political or territorial
considerations. In the conference at yaltak they made great concessions to Russian interests.
the war
After/the rapid withdrawal and demobilization of our forces gave the most vivid assurance
of our intentions. The Pottsdam agreement on the occupation of Germany, the concessions
her
made to the Russian views ane the organization of the United Nations and to
claims
for representation in it, as well as the concessions made in the negotiation of the
Satelite and Italian treaties were stráng evidence of willingness to negotiate differences.
The attempts to place the control of atomic energy under in ternational control were
generous in their understanding of the interests of others
Russia's eneméée were defeated
Relations
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