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- Része ennek Dean Acheson Papers, Princeton Seminars Files
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OCR Page 1 of 227/9/53 - Wire IV - p.l
Quceas to what they might do in the CFM.
Q. (If there were any action) in the CFM that seems to give you reason for encourage-
ment.
Q. (When you were back from Bombay. ?)
DA.
Talking about the general effect on my mind of the raising of the blockade, it was,
we felt that
as I have said, that/we had to win that particular struggle. Therefore, we had to
stay with it, no matter what the consequences might be. The other feeling was, and the
other belief was, that as the blockade continued, it increased tension, it increased the
possibilities of trouble, and it raised very serious problems on both sides, both for us
and
for the Russians. And therefore, when we emerged from this, with the blockade lifted,
I felt that we had moved forward, that this was a success. I think we were still not clear
as to where, what the ultimate conclusion of this particular manoever was going to be. It
was
clear that the Russians had raised the blockade for the purpose of having a meeting of
the
Council of Foreign Ministers. It was clear that we were at a critical point in our
negociations - the three allies together - and with the Germans, for further developments
in
Germany. It was clear that the Russians were counting, or hoping, that the CFM would
could not
delay that very important development. Therefore, you tell, until after that took
place,
what the net of the entire operation was - whether it was going to be in our favor
or on the other side. Now, I think that is about all I have to say on that point.
Do
you,
Phil, Paul, Dean, Ed, got anything.. ?
Q. I think the point of the comment on the Berlin blockade that the rouhd table may not
fully agree with. That is, that had a decision been forced upon us in the summer of 1948,
this
as to whether we accepted the use, the rather reckless use of/force by the Soviet Union,
or tried to meet it by force, there very likely would have been a major blow up. But two
things made it unnecessary, really, to meet the question in that bald form: One was the
technical possibility of maintaining Berlin by air for a period; the other was the existance
of the United Nations, and the obligation to put questions of that sort before it, before
you faced up to the ultimate question of war. And in a sense, the obligation to put it
before the United Nations had the effect of putting some of these prestige factors on ice,
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