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OCR Page 1 of 1610/10/53 - Reel 3. track 2 - Page 1
MR. HARRIEAN: Go ahead and say what you did say then.
MR. ACHESON: Well, we will go over in detail the development of NATO operation
from the early part of 1950 on, but the important thing which
I think we ought to discuss here is the fundamental question of
and organization, and that is that in this coalition
of, in this international grouping. The only technique, the only
method which (we had) available was to have soldiers tell us what
they thought the needs were, and as they developed these needs
they were so absolutely uncontrolled by the ordinary restraints
which exist within a national state that they exceeded all
possible bounds of what could be done, and by their very magni tude
they discouraged those who clearly saw that they couldn't be
accomplished, and created a very grave political si tuation,
because on the one hand you had to do something which you couldn't
do, and on the other if you couldn't do it defense was impossible.
Therefore, a major political crisis was created through a lack
F
TRUMAND
"NATIONAL
ARCHIVENS
of organization and controls which would ordinarily exist within
RECORDS
ADMIN
.
E
a national state, and this is one of the problems of coalition
CONERAMENT
and international operations.
DR. OPPENHEIMER: Wasn't this at least somewhat exacerbated because of general
uncertainty, I would think in the air as well as among the
governments, as to whether the events in North Korea - the
intervention of the Chinese, and so on - meant that a threat
was indeed very near? And if a threat had indeed been very
near, even twenty-five billion dollars would not have been more
than (we were willing to spend).
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