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OCR Page 1 of 1610/10/53 - Reel 3, track 1 - Page 1
MR. ACHESON: All right. Well, now, we have had a long digression here on.
?
MR. HARRIMAN: I don't apologise at all for starting it.
?
Mr. EARLE: Could we deal with Dr. Oppenheimer's question as to what would
happen if it hadn't been Korea. I do think we.
DR. OPPENHEIMER: My question was not was NSC 68 wrong, but would it have been
possible to put something like it into effect.
?
MR. FARLE:
I wouldn't have thought that anything like the size of the
military effort, both at home and through NATO, would have been
possible. Even the size of the effort which was agfeed to in
the summer of '50, let alone what was agreed to after the Chinese
attack.
MR. NITZE: On this point. I think this is relevant. When we were going through
NSC 68 we came to the conclusion that the order of magnitude of
the - not only of the defense, but the general security effort
whi ch was necessary, was of the order of magnitude of fifty
billion dollars a year for the United States, and that this should
be adopted right off the bat, and should be continued for a number
of years.
TRUMAN
"NATIONAL
?
MR. HARLE:
This was before Korea?
ARCHIVES & ADMIN
RECORDS
Es
MR. NITZE:
This was before April 7th. Bob came down and consulted with us
ROVERNMEN
in connection with this, and so forth, and so on. Not necessarily
on the figure, but on the general theory. When we tried to make
up our own mind as to what the order of magnitude of the effort
required was, we came to this conclusion of the order of magnitude
of fifty billion a year. Now, we didn't dare put any such figure
in the paper itself. There is no figure in the paper itself. This
was impossible. We never could have gotten these concurrences.
If we had put this kind of a figure in the paper, we never would
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