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OCR Page 1 of 162/14/54, Reel 8, Track 1, Palre 1
MR. HARRIMAN: The only thing of that, that I wanted to emphasize, was that even as late as
1952 -- I can check the date when I saw Admiral Radford, it was shortly
after he'd been placed in command of that general area - that he explained
in detail why it was necessary to strengthen the Chinese forces in Formosa
they
and he indicated that if they could do that it would be serving their purpose,
which
and none of the ideas had been expressed by MacArthur, and otherwise, that
these forces could be taken off or could do very much elsewhere.
DR. OPPEHNEIMER: I think it was true that Admiral Radford liked the idea of a blockade.
VOICE:
Yes.
MR. Acheson: That is all that I am able to do at this meeting about Korea. At
the next meeting I would hope that we could finish up the discussion of Korea
and take up the negotiations and all the events which led up to the beginning
discussion --
of the armistice/and the problems which arose during the armistice discussion
and the final debates in the U.N.
MR. HARRIMAN: May I just comment on what Dr. Oppenheimer said. There is no doubt that
TRUMAN,
Admiral Radford supported the blockade idea, but he was still for substantially
NATKINAL of
increasing the effectiveness of the Chiang's forces on Formosa, so that it
ARCORDS
is
wasn't -- he wasn't opposed to the strengthening of them at all. They had
to be built up in his judgment in order to carry out their primary mission
of the defense of Formosa.
Thumang
& ARCHIVES A "VATINAL REDORDS ADMIN
For balance of Reel 8 (tracks 1 and 2) see December meeting folder
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