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3/14/54: Reel 5, Track 1, Page 2 preferred to maintain the occupation indefinitely, in terms of their authority over Jap an. And that was the central issue; they just didn't a want to give up their right to take what they wanted, to put what troops thu us and they wanted there, to use Japan for whatever purpose they wanted to. It was a very. broad problem that was involved, not any matter of detail. MR. FEIS: That must not have been a very easy series of provisions to reach agreement on. MR. ACHESON: It was very difficult indeed. MR. RUSK: well, they did not reach agreement on it; the Secretary took it to the President, and he made a decisi on on it. MR. ACHESON: They were not worked out, as Dean says, in agreement. When we came to points where conversations K just were getting nowhere, we took it to the President, and he decided it. MR. FEIS And then, on the basis of what the President was willing to support, you found the Japanese fairly satisfied. MR. ACHESON: You had a hard time on the administrative agreement. MR. RUSK: Well, actually we had no great difficulty in getting the peace treaty and the security treaty from the Japanese. MR. FEIS: I'm thinking of the administrative. MR. RUSK: Yes, when it came to the adninistrative agreement, we were asking for far more than the Japanese themselves were willing to give, and I'll come to that in just a few moments. We might take the Japanese Peace Conference first. MR. NITZE: I'd like to say just one thing about the theoretical aspects of this. I remember very serious discussions, Dean, that you initiated with S-P as to the long-run theory of this peace treaty. And, as I remember, the British were beginning to get into trouble in Africa over the Sues Canal and the Suez base, and the question at issue really was with regard to whether control over bases in Japan was of the same nature as the very (?)

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    "ocrText": "3/14/54: Reel 5, Track 1, Page 2\npreferred to maintain the occupation indefinitely, in terms of their\nauthority over Jap an. And that was the central issue; they just didn't\na\nwant to give up their right to take what they wanted, to put what troops thu\nus and\nthey wanted there, to use Japan for whatever purpose they wanted to. It\nwas a very. broad problem that was involved, not any matter of detail.\nMR. FEIS:\nThat must not have been a very easy series of provisions to reach agreement\non.\nMR. ACHESON:\nIt was very difficult indeed.\nMR. RUSK:\nwell, they did not reach agreement on it; the Secretary took it to the\nPresident, and he made a decisi on on it.\nMR. ACHESON:\nThey were not worked out, as Dean says, in agreement. When we came to points\nwhere\nconversations K just were getting nowhere, we took it to the\nPresident, and he decided it.\nMR. FEIS\nAnd then, on the basis of what the President was willing to support, you\nfound the Japanese fairly satisfied.\nMR. ACHESON:\nYou had a hard time on the administrative agreement.\nMR. RUSK:\nWell, actually we had no great difficulty in getting the peace treaty and\nthe security treaty from the Japanese.\nMR. FEIS:\nI'm thinking of the administrative.\nMR. RUSK:\nYes, when it came to the adninistrative agreement, we were asking for far\nmore than the Japanese themselves were willing to give, and I'll come to\nthat in just a few moments. We might take the Japanese Peace Conference\nfirst.\nMR. NITZE:\nI'd like to say just one thing about the theoretical aspects of this.\nI remember very serious discussions, Dean, that you initiated with S-P\nas to the long-run theory of this peace treaty. And, as I remember, the\nBritish were beginning to get into trouble in Africa over the Sues Canal\nand the Suez base, and the question at issue really was with regard to\nwhether control over bases in Japan was of the same nature as the very (?)"
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