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3/14/54: Reel 5, Track 1, Page 4 MR. RUSK: On that peninsula, yes. MR. NITZE: On that peninsula, but was that enough, really? Didn't you also need wider deployment of troops and the use of air fields scattered throughout the Japanese islands, and so forth and so on. In other words, what you needed was probably more than just Okinawa and Yatruska. Wasn't that where We finally came out? MR. RUSK: That's right. We needed bases that were in the middle of a sea of Japanese people, and you needed active cooperation from the Japanese to make those bases effective. That was the gut of the matter. But the military were under the impression that we had the choice of -that it was possible for us to maintain the conditions of the occupation indefinitely the into the future, despite General MacArthir's strong view to the contrary view of the US. and despite the/State Department that opposition in Japan would continue to deteriorate if we did not nove toward a Japanese Peace Treaty. And Jap that was the issue on which decision had to be made. MR. ACHESON: By September, 1951, a draft treaty had been pretty well worked out. The clauses, last/faxexx which were fluid almost up to the end were these reparation clauses. You had a lot of trouble from the Indonesians, the with the Filipinos and others, the lot of claims they had, and finally those were sort of compromised out at the last moment with the A lot of help of the Japanese, who talked with these various delegations.xidth this happened in San Francisco. The Japanese would recognize an obliga- tion to perform reparations, but they would do it by working on materials which these nations would purchase and give to them--that was the general area-eit was rather loesely reparations, but it was important for the home consumption of these other countries. MR. NITZE: And these reparations would not require dollar expenditure, or the surrender of foreign exchange, but the application of Japanese labor and technique to materials supplied by others, or in direct labor such as

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    "ocrText": "3/14/54: Reel 5, Track 1, Page 4\nMR. RUSK:\nOn that peninsula, yes.\nMR. NITZE:\nOn that peninsula, but was that enough, really? Didn't you also need\nwider deployment of troops and the use of air fields scattered throughout\nthe Japanese islands, and so forth and so on. In other words, what you\nneeded was probably more than just Okinawa and Yatruska. Wasn't that\nwhere We finally came out?\nMR. RUSK:\nThat's right. We needed bases that were in the middle of a sea of\nJapanese people, and you needed active cooperation from the Japanese to\nmake those bases effective. That was the gut of the matter. But the\nmilitary were under the impression that we had the choice of -that it was\npossible for us to maintain the conditions of the occupation indefinitely\nthe\ninto the future, despite General MacArthir's strong view to the contrary\nview of the\nUS.\nand despite the/State Department that opposition in Japan would continue\nto deteriorate if we did not nove toward a Japanese Peace Treaty. And\nJap\nthat was the issue on which decision had to be made.\nMR. ACHESON:\nBy September, 1951, a draft treaty had been pretty well worked out. The\nclauses,\nlast/faxexx which were fluid almost up to the end were these reparation\nclauses. You had a lot of trouble from the Indonesians, the\nwith the\nFilipinos and others, the lot of claims they had, and\nfinally those were sort of compromised out at the last moment with the\nA lot of\nhelp of the Japanese, who talked with these various delegations.xidth\nthis happened in San Francisco. The Japanese would recognize an obliga-\ntion to perform reparations, but they would do it by working on materials\nwhich these nations would purchase and give to them--that was the general\narea-eit was rather loesely reparations, but it was important for the\nhome consumption of these other countries.\nMR. NITZE:\nAnd these reparations would not require dollar expenditure, or the\nsurrender of foreign exchange, but the application of Japanese labor and\ntechnique to materials supplied by others, or in direct labor such as"
}