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5/15/54: Reel 2, Track 2, Page 1 MR. HARRIMAN: We also-al also found, that the intelligence which our embassy had was completely different from the British intelligence-the embassy intelli- gence. Our people were taken very seriously, and I thought their reports were accurate, whereas the British information was to the effect that Mossadegh wouldn't last and the thing to do was to be firm. Well, that was the general atmosphere under which these negotiations started. MR. NITZE (?) Another matter which might be interesting; I remember the words a British Middle East-Iranian expert used to participate in the discussion we had their right after Razmara was shob. He said that/ considered judgment of oil was that this whole movement toward nationalization/was "a brush fire," which would burn off. MR. HARRIMAN: That was the general atmosphere; that if they were firm, it would blow over. NITZE: MR. (2) I think this is an important point. As I think about this now, it really seems to me, that this really was a real revolution that took place in Iran during the period after Rammara's death and after Mossadegh came in. Jason And that this did have all the emotional drive that a revolution does have; it had this "pic-in-the sky" illusion as the objective. They were un going to get rid of British influence; they were going to get all these vast resources which came with oil; it was going to be a new life, and for everybody in Iran. MR. ACHESON: Yes, I think you're quite right. MR. HARRIMAN: And that included the vested interests-the people with the vested interests-the people I couldn't find very many people who didn't have that feeling that this was it, and that they were going to get rid of the British regardless. MR. McGHEE: I remember when I was in Teheren, which was about a week or ten days after Razmara was shot (I was in India when he was shot), Alà, who was one of the best friends we had therewwery Western and and Prime Minister We went to see him, and he said, "For goodness' sake,