Interview with George C. Marshall, by Harry B. Price

General George C. Marshall - 2 30 October 1952 my speech, particularly my statement that the U.S. proposal was aimed at hunger, poverty, and chaos and not against any group and my inclusion of all Europe including the Soviet Union and her satellites. Despite their opposition I insisted on formulating the speech as it was finally delivered. 5. As implied in the speech, I insisted that "the European countires come clean" -- that is, that they come up with a workable plan for European re- covery based on actual requirements, not what they thought the U.S. would give. For this reason I insisted that we not help Europe in the formula- tion of the European Recovery Program. I was subjected to heavy pressure from Clayton (then in Switzerland), Lew Douglas and others to let them consult with the Europeans and to let them advise the Europeans on the formulation of a plan for European recovery. However, I issued "an almost arbitrary, military-type command" that they were not to participate with the Europeans in the formulation of this plan. (It is my recollection that Clayton did go to Paris to assist the Eureopeans in the formulation of the recovery plan. If my recollection is correct Clayton urged the Europeans to scale down drastically their early e stimate of dollar re- quirements to a figure which might be acceptable to the U.S. Congress - REF). 6. The plan had not been discussed with Europe in advance and Europe's prompt response represented quick foot work. Bevan and Bideault vied for leadership in the formulation of the ERP with Bevan generally winning out. The ability and character of Oliver Franks played a large part in the quality of the result. Getting Europe to agree that Britain should re- ceive "such a large plug" of the total U.S. aid was one of the major problems. 7. The selling of the ERP to the American people was an exacting task and I traveled so widely in this regard it "almost seemed as though I were running for office". I had good success in enlisting the cooperation of special interest groups although it was particularly tough to get the cooperation of those groups representing items in short supply (wheat, cotton, tobacco, etc.). Ironically, by the time the Marshall Plan was put in operation these items were in surplus supply and a reverse pressure to export these items through the Marshall Plan was exerted. 8. Senator Vandenburg was not consulted prior to the Harvard speech. He soon became a full partner in the adventure, however, and we consulted together twice weekly at the Blair House. These meetings were kept secret and this secrecy resulted in charges that I was not enlisting bipartisan support. I worked closely with Senator Mandenburg on the Vandenburg reso- lution -- in fact, the first draft of this resolution was prepared by Lovett at my request. Senator Vandenburg took the Lovett draft and "improved it %1000% on his own typewriter". I feel that Vandenburg has never received full credit for his momumental efforts on behalf of the European Recovery Program. "Wandenburg was my righthand man and at times I was his righthand man. #