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OCR Page 1 of 2Net (ROREA/SD) 282
Hetto
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-102
State Dept. Guideline, VOL. VII June PAGE 12, 1055
1979
THE SECRETARY
F.R. By OF NLT- U.S. HU 1950 NARS, Date 2-25-24
Copy No. 1 of 4 copies.
November 6', 1950
MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE
BETWEEN Secretary Acheson
Under Secretary of Defense
Lovet and Mr. Dean Rusk.
Shortly after ten o'clock this morning Mr. Robert Lovett came
over from the Pentagon with an urgent message from General Strate-
meyer. This message reported that the Air Forces had been ordered
to take off at one o'clock p.m. EST today on a bombing mission to
take out the bridge across the Yalu River from Sinuiju (korea)
to Antung (Manchuria). They were to use radio controlled bombs
and would attempt to bomb on the Korean side of the bridge.
Mr. Lovett expressed his view that from an operational stand-
point he doubted whether the results to be achieved would impor-
tantly interrupt traffic and that the danger of bombing the city
of Antung and other points on the Manchurian side of the River were
very great.
Mr. Rusk explained that we had a commitment with the British
not to take action which might involve attacks on the Manchurian
side of the River without consultation with them. He also said
that the British Cabinet was meeting this morning to reconsider
their whole attitude toward the Chinese Communist Government and
that il1-considered action on our part might have grave consequences.
He also told Mr. Lovett that we had filed General MacArthur's report
concerning Chinese intervention with the United Nations Security
Council and had asked for an urgent meeting tomorrow or Wednesday
at which we were going to present a resolution calling on the Chinese
to cease activities in Korea, thus attempting to get UN support for
any action which might be necessary in the event of their refusal to
accept the UN action. He also mentioned the possibility of Russian
involvement under the Sino-Russian Treaty.
After some discussion we all thoroughly agreed that this action
should be postponed until the reasons for it were more clearly known.
Mr. Lovett telephoned General Marshall, who agreed that the
action was unwise unless there was some mass movement across the
River, which threatened the security of our troops. Mr. Lovett
called Mr. Finletter and instructed him to tell the Joint Chiefs
the facts which Mr. Rusk had stated, as set forth above, and to
add that he had talked with the Secretary of State, who believed
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