Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Jarvis, John D. Hickerson, U. Alexis Johnson, and Mr. Raynor

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION NCT(KOREA/SD) 546 DEPARTMENT OF STATE (6) DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 Memorandum of Conversation State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 By DEB NLT, Date 5-7-85 DATE: December 17, 1951 SUBJECT: Declaration by the 16 States Participating in Korean Military Action PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Jarvie, South African Embassy Mr. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary, UNA Mr. Johnson, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, FE Mr. Raynor, Director, BNA Bureau of COPIES TO: EUR - Nessrs. Perkins and Bonbright FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS UNA - Mr. Hickerson FE - Mr. Johnson DEC 20 1951 SECRETARY BNA - Mr. Raynor Department of State GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-61120-1 Mr. Jarvie called this morning at our request. Mr. Hickerson reviewed the same ground with him which has been reported in detail in a memorandum of conversation of today's meeting with Sir Carl Berendsen of New Zealand. Mr. Jarvie inquired as to the possibility of an extension of the 30-day period. Mr. Hickerson, in replying stressed the importance that there should be no indication of a possibility of an extension. He said that if the two sides were very close to agreement at the expiration of the 30 days, probably a short additional period should be made available. However, if the sides were not close to agreement he thought it would be quite difficult to extend the time period. Mr. Jarvie inquired with respect to the situation in Manchuria and as to what we knew about a build-up of the offensive potential which made us think the situation might be so serious. He was told the US considered the air build-up in Manchuria to be serious. It was explained, however that the problem is this. The Communists have a very large force of troops in Korea that will stay there. They also have supplies in Korea sufficient to initiate an offensive. If during the armistice rail and highway transport is repaired and supplies built up in Manchuria, the needed supplies could then go foreard to Korea which could sustain an offensive for which the potential now exists for initiation. In reply Ato. Jarvie's question as to how long a statement of the type we have in mind would remain in force he was told indefinitely. It was explained that even if troops were withdrawn from Korea, if aggression was renewed TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION a