Telegram from Walter Gifford to Secretary of State Dean Acheson

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State RE 17 D TELEGRAPH BRANCH SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION Action Control: 2101 FE Rec'd: July 4, 1952 FROM: London 10:39 a.m. Info SS TO: Secretary of State G EUR NO: 73, July 4, Noon L UNA DMS PRIORITY SMSA DCL SENT DEPT PRITY 73 RPTD INFO PARIS 17. OLI CIA ARMY EXCON DCR DCRM Subj: Jap assn with intl security control effort. At mtg today FONOFF, Bd of Trade, def officials strongly aggued Brit view impractical, undesirable to have Jap associate with intl control effort anywhere except in COCOM in Paris. Argu- ment based on three main points. 1. Controls problem in FE inseparable from problem security controls on bloc trade generally. No (rpt no) defensible basis for differentiating between deliveries to USSR in Leingrad or Vladivostok. Unless identical controls to all destinations, the lesser controls will be ineffective in preventing (rpt pre- venting) leakages to area ostensibly covered by stricter con- trols. 2. Unless all potential suppliers of particular items, i.e., principally the WE countries and Japan, have participated in the decisions as to particular control levels or items, they wld both be free to trade in such items and certain to do so. 3. Since Japs have knocked on door asking admission existing club, we shld not (rpt not) waste time creating new club, new rules, argue about members etc. Furthermore any FE group princi- pally Occidental countries an obvious fraud. In course discussion said certain to be pressure after Korea to reduce China controls, unlikely UK will consider Peking any different kind of destination than Moscow. UN res is only thing providing basis for different standards now. Assumption apparent in any US view that UK wld be prepared to agree stricter controls against China in postaggression period unwarranted. Wld not (rpt not) under any circumstances be prepared discuss Hong Kong problem in a FE grp since matter basically source control problem which cld only be discussed with industrial countries in COCOM. Unable they said to think of any items which cld be better discussed in FE or in new organization than in COCOM. What we must do soonest REPRODUCTION FROM THIS -89 COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION PROHIBITED