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NLT (Maual Add 138 OFFICE OF DECLASSIFIED THE SECRETARY OF STATE E.O. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 12065, Sec. 3-402 WASHINGTON State By Dept. DEB NLT, Date 7-26-36 June 2, 1952 TOP SECRET SECURITY INF ORMA TION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS KOREA Last Friday our Charge in Pusan delivered to President Rhee a letter informing him of the US Government's view that martial law should be lifted immediately in the Pusan area and stating that the US approves and supports the statement made to Rhee by the UN Commission. After reading the letter Rhee commented that martial law would be lifted shortly but in reply to our Charge's request for elaboration indicated that "shortly" might mean two minutes or two months. During the ensuing conversation Rhee presented his familiar position, i.e., that he was working for democracy, that he had an internal conspiracy to cope with and that the outside world should keep its hands off. Our Charge believes it is now apparent that logical arguments such as have been made to Rhee again and again fail utterly to impress him. Our Charge thinks that we now face the decision as to whether we will permit Rhee to get away with this program or not. If the decision is not to let Rhee accomplish his purpose our Charge envisages what amounts to an ultimatum demanding immediate action to release the arrested Assemblymen, full protection for the Assembly to meet and a guarantee that Assemblymen will be protected, and warning that if such action is not carried out within 24 hours necessary protective action will be carried out by UN forces. We have informed our Charge that we recognize the force of his argument but that we continue to believe that it is essential at this stage that every effort be made through the facilities of the UN Commission and the Embassy to compose existing differences and to find a compromise formula. The gravity of our imposing martial law for political purposes is such that we must exhaust every effort short of such a step. Generals Clark and Van Fleet today called on President Rhee. General Clark made a statement to Rhee supporting the position set forth in the previous statements of the UN Commission and the Embassy but emphasizing his concern on military grounds. President Rhee was in an affable mood and promised that the situation in Pusan would in no way affect the Republic of Korea's support of the war effort. Prior to his meeting with Rhee General Clark had stressed to the UN Commission and TOP SECRET SECURITY INF ORMA TION