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TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORIATION
-2-
After reviewing the disadvantages of the other British conditions,
Henderson concludes that although it is not entirely impossible that some
Iranian Government eventually will prefer to accept such terms as the
British now offer rather than permit the country to disintegrate the oil
question would remain a disagreeable factor and within at least a few
years some government would come to power which would refuse to re- -
cognize the agreement. In view of what he understands to be the British
attitude Henderson feels that we would be arousing false hopes if we should
tell our Iranian friends that in our opinion the UK is likely to assume a
conciliatory position in case an Iranian Government which is prepared to
make a reasonable arrangement on oil should come into power.
TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
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"ocrText": "TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORIATION\n-2-\nAfter reviewing the disadvantages of the other British conditions,\nHenderson concludes that although it is not entirely impossible that some\nIranian Government eventually will prefer to accept such terms as the\nBritish now offer rather than permit the country to disintegrate the oil\nquestion would remain a disagreeable factor and within at least a few\nyears some government would come to power which would refuse to re- -\ncognize the agreement. In view of what he understands to be the British\nattitude Henderson feels that we would be arousing false hopes if we should\ntell our Iranian friends that in our opinion the UK is likely to assume a\nconciliatory position in case an Iranian Government which is prepared to\nmake a reasonable arrangement on oil should come into power.\nTOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION"
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