Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

E.O. DECLASSIFIED 12065, Guidelines, Sec. March 3-402 9-10-80 6, 19HE OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON State By Dept. DCB NLT, Date August 19, 1952 SECRET SECURITY INFORMA TION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS USSR-China: - Ambassador Kennan has submitted the following reflectionson the significance of the current visit of the Chinese delegation to Moscow. He says that the event is un- questionably of major importance as shown by the presence of three member of the Politburo, headed by Molotov, at the airport andby other details of the reception. Since the occasion is formally bilateral and no dele - gation of North Koreans is known to have arrived, it must be assumed that the formal or overt agenda of the talks will not include the Korean war as such. If decisions affecting the actual conduct of the war are reached, the Kremlin will have to be careful about their implementa- - tion lest it damage the prestige of the North Korean leaders, for which Moscow is particularly concerned. Nevertheless, says Kennan, it is inconceivable that the Korean situation should not be a major reason for this meeting or that it will not be affected in a major way by the results of the meeting. Kennan says that although each side may want something from the other, it seems evident that in general it must be the Chinese who are the supplicants and whose demands and re- quests led to the meeting -- because of the conspicuous way in which the Chinese arrived in Moscow, and because the oriental mind of Soviet diplomacy attaches much importance to the question of who comes to whom. The composition of the Chinese delegation and the Russian welcoming group indicates strongly that the subjects of discussion will center around problems of military aid, particularly with respect to the air force, artillery and communications, with special emphasis on the basis of the logistical supply in each instance. Kennan believes that the Russians intend to demand some important political price from the Chinese and they think they can obtain it; the Russians would not have let the Chinese come if they were totally or flatly unable to meet the anticipated demands; on the other hand, unless they were placing a high price on meeting these demands, the Chinese would not have had to send this high-powered delegation on its long journey. Kennan believes that what we must expect to emerge from the talks is some new understanding between the USSR and China in regard to the Korean war. He thinks it should be given most careful consideration in connection with our own diplomatic and military moves