Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT (Have Aide) 401 OFFICE OF DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 THE SECRETARY OF STATE State Guidelines, March 9-10-85 6, 1982 WASHINGTON By. Dept. DEB NLT, Date September 26, 1952 TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS YUGOSLAVIA The British Ambassador in Belgrade has told Ambassador Allen that Mr. Eden made the strong- est possible plea to Tito and Foreign Minister Kardelj for a Trieste settlement during their final talk at Bled. Eden stressed that if the question was not settled prior to the Italian elections, the new Italian Government was almost certain to be farther to the right, and therefore it would be more difficult to deal with. Eden appealed to Tito to take a statesmanlike attitude and view the matter in a larger perspective than a mere concern for bal- ancing a handful of Slovenes in one locality against Italians in another. British Ambassador Mallet said that the foregoing arguments made little impression on Tito and that a long and heated argument ensued. Tito asked why the Italians made so much noise about a few villages in Zone B of no economic value. Eden pointed out that the Yugoslavs were making similar noises about those same "valueless" villages. Tito countered that the villages were of no value to Italy but of considerable value to Slovenia which needed an outlet to the sea. Eden said that Tito had just admitted that Capodistria, Isola and Pirano were no good as ports. Tito then switched to the question of Yugoslav national prestige, the necessity for him to retain the confidence of the public if it was called on to resist aggression, etc. The final outcome of this talk was a statement by Tito of the Yugoslav position precisely along the lines which Kardelj had made to Ambassador Allen last week namely, that while the Yugoslav Government could not propose a settlement along the present zonal lines, it could accept such a settlement if faced with a de facto situation. Mr. Eden is most anxious that this be kept in utmost secrecy for the present, and intends to get in touch per- - sonally with the Secretary before discussing it further with any. - one. If the word should get around that the Yugoslavs are will- ing to give up their claims in Zone A, Tito will have to make a public denial and it will be difficult for the Yugoslavs subsequently to change. During the final talk between Tito and Eden, Tito expressed surprise that the Western Powers had not followed up on Yugoslavia's readiness to enter into military conversations. TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION