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OCR Page 1 of 2NLT (NAVAL HOU) 422
the
OFFICE OF
DECLASSIFIED
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
WASHINGTON
State DEB Dept. NLT, Date q1085
Guidelines, March 6, 1982
November 5, 1952
By
TOP SECRET SEGURITY IIFORIATTON
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
JAPAN
We have requested the views of our Embassy in
J apan concerning overflights of Japanese territory by
Soviet aircraft, noting that General Clark intends, among other things,
to keep the Japanese Government informed of such activities and to
authorize engagement with unfriendly Soviet planes over Japan. We
have been concerned over the repercussions in Japan and elsewhere
both of such overflights and the succession of Soviet attacks on US
aircraft. We would be inclined to concur in General Clark's proposed
courses of action, but have asked our Embassy's opinion on the
Japanese attitude toward this matter and the steps we may take to meet
it. In sum, we desire our representatives' views regarding (1) the
political desirability of authorizing engagements with Soviet aircraft
over Japanese territory and (2) the most effective way of maximizing
the favorable and minimizing the adverse public reaction in Japan.
IRAN
Noting that Prime Minister Mosadeq may try to
force a decision on the US attitude toward oil
purchases by American companies, we have informed our representatives
in Iran and the UK that the question of such purchases is tied up with
the solution of the bigger problem now under active study as a result
of the recent US-British talks in London. We expect to hear further
from the British on November 6, and meantime have been working on
possible courses of US action. Should Mosadeq send us a note con-
taining an ultimatum as to certain acts by the US within a definite time
limit, we have instructed our Ambassador in Tehran to refuse to
accept it. Our envoy is to indicate in this event that the US does not
accept demarches of this character and that if Mosadeq persists he
is to suggest that the approach be made through the Iranian Ambassador
in Washington. On the other hand, if Mosadeq address a question as
the US policy on this matter without a threat or an ultimatum as to
the timing of our answer, our Ambassador is to state that he will
receive and tr ansmit the note to Washington.
TOP SECREI SECURITY INFORMATION