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NLT(NAVAL AIDE) 429 OFFICE OF DECLASSIFIED THE SECRETARY OF STATE E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 WASHINGTON State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 By PEB NLT, Date 9-10-05 November 18, 1952 TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORIATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS JAPAN We have informed our Embassies in Tokyo and Moscow that the Joint Chiêfs of Staff have authorized action to intercept, engage and destroy combat or reconnissance aircraft in Korea, over the Japanese home islands and Okinawa or territorial waters three miles to seaward which commit hostile acts or manifest hostile intent, or which bear insignia of the USSR or its satellites and which do not immediately obey signals to land, unless properly cleared or obviously in distress. Unarmed transport planes should be forced down if feasible, but not destroyed. While the US did not "contract" by treaty to protect Japanese territory and it is undesirable to establish a precedent on the presumption the treaty contains such an automatic commitment, we believe the interception and destruction of Soviet aircraft can be publicly justified on the basis of the security of US forces stationed in Japan under the treaty "to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without". We have authorized our Embassy in Tokyo to inform the Japanese Government officially of our policy. We have also requested the Embassy and the Japanese Government's comments concerning public announcement and prior warning to the USSR either officially or by public announcement. MIDDLE The French Forei gn Office informs us that Colonel EAST Shishikli, the Syrian strong man, recently told the French Ambassador that he was on the side of the Western Powers, that he had rejected and would continue to reject Neutralist influences, and that he believes the majority of the Arab States, including Syria, would be favorable to participation in the Middle East Defense Organization. However, Colonel Shishikli reportedly felt it would be premature to ask the Arab States to express themselves now on the principle of MEDO, citing the forthcoming Iraqi elections and the desirability of not interfering with the progress being made in TOP SECRET SECURITY IFORMATION