Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

MLTCNAval Adde/253 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 September 28, 1951 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982- By DEB NLT, Date 9-5-85 IO-PSECRET SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS IRAN On Wednesday evening Minister of Court Ala told Ambassador Henderson "in extreme confidence" that Britain's Ambassador Shepherd had shown Ala a copy of instruc- tions from Prime Minister Attlee containing an urgent message to the Shah. The message stated that, although Attlee could understand the hesitation of the Shah hitherto to intervene, Attlee thought the Shah must now appreciate that a political situation has arisen which he a- lone can redress, and that if he does not act now the situation may well be beyond our power of control or repair; Attlee trusts that the Shah will take immediate action to ensure that expulsion measures against the British technicians are not carried out. Shepherd explained to Ala, upon the latter's direct query, that by "immediate action" Attlee had in mind the removal of Mosadeq. Ala discussed this conversation with the Shah just before he saw Henderson. The Shah feared that, despite the growing opposition to Mosadeq, Mosadeq might, by open denunciation of the Shah, and by appeals to religious and national fanaticism, create such an atmosphere that the Majlis would be completely cowed and the Shah's position irretrievably ruined. Ala thought that it would be unfortunate if the expulsion order were carried out, but that the elimination of the Shah, who was just now the main stabilizing element in Iran, would be even more disastrous. Ala said the Shah had hitherto thought it prefer- able that Mosadeq himself be responsible for such agreements as might be made with the British, so that Mosadeq and other extreme nationalists would not later be in a position to attack them. However, in view of the apparent British determination not to deal further with Mosadeq and Mosadeq's determination to go ahead with his plans regardless of the effect on Iran, the Shah and Ala both believed it would be better for Mosadeq to get out now. Henderson said that if responsible Iranian leaders considered this to be in the country's best interests they should take TOPSECREI