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OCR Page 1 of 2NLT(Nduol Aide)256
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
the
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
October 4, 1951
By DEB
NLT, Date 9-5-85
TOP SECRET
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
EGYPT
Ambassador Caffery reports that the Iranian situation
is having an increasingly adverse effect on our chances
on finding a solution for Anglo-Egyptian differences, particularly following
the evacuation from Abadan. King Farouk says that it is possible for a
"Mosadeq-Iran tragedy" to occur in Egypt also. Moreover, he feels that
the British for their part will be more reluctant to make concessions in
Egypt because of their recent experience in Iran. Farouk says that al-
though he is aware of the deficiencies and weaknesses of the Wafd (Nationa
list) Government he is in no position to stand up against it on the British
question because it has the entire country behind it on that issue. Farouk
insists that if we are going to do anything we must act very soon.
GERMANY
Our Representative to SHAPE reports that General
Eisenhower is greatly concerned over recent develop- -
ments in the German situation, particularly the Grotewohl proposal and the
prospect that the East German regime may accept West German conditions
for holding national elections looking to the unification of Germany. His
concern stems from the obvious fact that the purpose of the Communist
maneuver is, first, to bring to a halt and then to sabotage completely the
Allied negotiations for a German defense contribution in the European De- -
fense Force, and finally to neutralize Germany and deny it to the West.
Eisenhower believes we should now be concentrating
our most intensive effort on how to meet this situation, so that we can go
ahead and conclude our negotiations for a German defense contribution re -
gardless of how the Grotewohl proposal evolves. He believes we should at
once impress on the UK and France the urgency of developing soonest an
agreed tripartite course of action which the West German Governmentmight
follow to insure the best possible chance of concluding the present defense
negotiations with Germany in the coming weeks.
TOP SECRET