Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT (Naval Aide/264 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE the WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 October 17, 1951 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 By DAB NLT, Date 9-5-85 OPSERET SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS EGYPT The Department has instructed Ambassador Caffery to deliver immediately to the Egypt- ian Foreign Minister a note stating that the US greatly regrets Egypt's rejection of the proposals which we considered a sound basis for re- - solving the Anglo-Egyptian treaty question in a manner wholly consis - tent with Egypt's position as an independent and sovereign power. The note will state that the US considers Egypt's abrogation of the treaties not to be in accord with the proper respect for international obligations and believes that the action is without validity. Moreover the action constitutes a serious step backward in the endeavors of the free world to develop systems of cooperative defense and in efforts to promote world law and order. The note will express the hope that great re- straint will be shown by all parties concerned in the present situation and will make clear that we will hold the Egyptian Government respon- sible for any loss of life, injury or damage to American citizens or property which may occur because of the lack of adequate measures of public security. We have asked Caffery's advice on the desirability of publishing this note after its delivery. MIDDLE EAST We are at present coordinating with the French, COMMAND British, and Turks over next steps in the im- plementation of the Middle East Command and the questions which Egypt's rejection of the MEC proposals will raise in the Arab states and Israel. We consider it of highest importance that the four powers continue to exhibit complete solidarity and that they make clear to the world that Egypt's action will in no way deflect them from their determination to set up the Middle East Command. We have therefore asked Embassies London, Paris and Ankara to consult with the respective governments and solicit their concurrence in approaching the governments of the other Arab states concerning cooperating with the four powers in the defense of the area. We would, if the other three powers concur, let it be known to the other Arab states that they might