Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE DECLASSIFIED WASHINGTON E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1932 December 19, 1951 By DEB NLT, Date 4-6-8 TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS KOREANARMISTICE The Department has informed Embassy London that it concurs with the British suggestion for amending the end of the draft statement of warning to be issued in case an armistice agreement is reached in Korea. However, we have sug- gested another version of the statement which would read: "Should ag- gression be committed again in Korea the consequences would be so grave that it would, in all probability, not be possible to confine hostilities with- in the frontiers of Korea. 11 We feel that this language constitutes only a plain statement of inescapable fact without the objectionable tone of an ul- timatum, and that if the statement were weakened any further it wouldlack the desired deterrent effect on China. We suggest that the Embassy dis - cuss this with Mr. Eden at the earliest opportunity. SINO-JAPANESE Ambassador Dulles advised the Departmentyes - RELATIONS terday that the British Government had instructed Sir Esler Dening, its Tokyo representative, not to pursue conversations further in Tokyo concerning Sino-Japanese rela- tions, because the Foreign Office preferred to transfer the discussions to Washington. The British Ambassador here called yesterday morning to express his government's concern over the trend of Dulles' activities in Tokyo in regard to this subject. The UK considers that the memorandum which Dulles gave to Yoshida, Iguchi and Dening last Thursday suggesting in rather forceful language that Japan should negotiate a bilateral treaty with the Chinese Nationalist Government after the coming into force of the multilateral Japanese Treaty goes far beyond the limits of the Morrison- Dulles agreement. The UK also believes that pressing Japan to conclude such a bilateral treaty prejudges its relations with China and may in the long run effect Japan's relations with the West in that it may well be alleged later that it had concluded the treaty under duress from the US. It was pointed out to the British Ambassador that it would be difficult for the US to maintain its close post-treaty relation- - ships with Japan if Japan's policy was radically at variance with that of the US, and that Japan's action or inaction in regard to China might adversely TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORIATION