Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

WIT/NAVALAIDE) 311 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE the DECLASSIFIED WASHINGTON State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 By DEB NLT, Date 9-9-85 January 8, 1952 TOP SEGRET SECURITY INFORMA TION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS FRANCE Our Embassy in Paris has informed us that the fate of the Pleven Government which fell yesterday by a vote of 243 to 341 was sealed when the Socialists decided to vote against the Government. There was a majority both in the Socialist directing committee and in the Parliamentary group for refusal of confidence. Our Embassy believes that the crisis will be a long one and it is unlikely that any trends toward the selection of a new Government will become apparent before the end of this week if by then. The Socialists will be given the first opportunity to form a Government but they are expected to refuse. Some time will then be required to see whether an enlar gement of the center majority to include the Socialists, or displacement of the majority to include the Gaullists, will be possible. IRAN We have informed our Embassy in Tehran that we have explored every possible means of continuing military aid to Iran in the light of the status of Ambassador Henderson*s current negotiations with Prime Minister Mosadeq regarding assurances required under Section 511 (a) of the Mutual Security legislation. We have concluded that in the present circumstances we have no alternative but to suspend further military shipments until the matter can be worked out in some satisfactory manner. We believe that the suggestions: made to date by the Iranians would violate the clear intent of the Congress and could not be made legally acceptable. Other considerations involved in our reluctant conclusion are: (a) effect the proposed course would have upon negotiations in other countries, and (b) course would be interpreted as capitulation to Mosadeq and would increase his obstinacy on all matters. Because of widespread public interest, particularly in the case of Iran, the Executive Branch is considering informing the press on January 8 of the status of negotiations with all countries. We believe the US should not appear publicly or in discussions with Mosadeq to attach such importance to obtaining the required assurances as to give the impression that vital US interests are involved and should not pursue tactics which would increase Mosadeq's intransigence and bar gaining TOP SECRET SECURITY INF ORMATION-