Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE DÉCLASSIFIED.402 WASHINGTON E.O. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 12065, Sec. State By Dept. DEB NLT, Date 9-9-B5 March 25, 1952 SECRET SECURITY INFORMA TION SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS SAUDI ARABIA The Department has instructed Embassy London to ex- press to the Foreign Office our disappointment over the negative outcome of the Damman Conference between the Saudi Arabians and the British over disputed territory on the Arabian peninsula and our hope that the talks might be promptly resumed along constructive lines. We suggest that Churchill should send a frank and friendly message to King Ibn Saud expressing his warm personal sentiments toward the King and giving firm assurances that British Near Eastern policy is not inimical to Saudi Arabia. We suggest that the UK should take advantage of the declaration of the in early February to the effect that King Ibn Saud was his "father" and that whatever the King said would be accepted by him for this places the responsibility on the King for making a "generous settlement he has so often promised". We suggest also that the British show an early evidence in the talks of a willingness to compromise: 1) by conceding the principle of a Saudi Arabian opening on the Persian Gulf east of Qatar; and 2) by conceding or dividing the Manasir tribal area. We also wish the British to seek to reach the agreement promptly so as to derive the maxi- mum goodwill from it and to avoid arbitration, if possible, since this would cause a long delay in the settlement and diminish the goodwill impact of friendly negotiations. Failing this, however, the Department strongly sup- ports arbitration as the best possible second course, for we wish to avoid having the Saudi Arabian Government refer the problem to the UN. Embassy London is to tell the Foreign Office that we are moved to make this approach because we fear that non-solution of the problem might needlessly jeopardize the British position in the Near East to which we attach great importance; it will add that we hope the Foreign Office will not construe our purpose as supporting the Saudi Arabian position. We have instructed our Ambassador in Jidda, however, to inform Prince Feisal that US has been moved by the earnestness of his and King Ibn Saud's attitude on this problem and intend to make a serious approach to the British Government. He will add that our approach is being made out of our sincere concern for the relations between our two good friends despite the delicacy always attendant when an outsider becomes involved in a TOP SECRET SECURITY INF ORMA TION