Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT/Naval Aide)56 the DEPARTMENT OF STATE I OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY was WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIED July 24, 1950 E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 By. DEB NLT, Date 6-5-85 TOP S E SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS GERMANY High Commissioner McCloy in Frankfort is forwarding a blue-print of US action for the next six months on the anti-Communist front in Germany. In for - warding an advance summary of the conclusions reached in the report, McCloy points out that the basic objectives of the USSR and the US toward Germany are mutually exclusive and there is no indication that the Soviets feel the situation is such as to require an equitable quadri- partite solution of the German problem. Therefore, until the empha- - sis of power has shifted, a German peace treaty cannot be negotiated with the USSR and we should not be deterred from taking steps to attain our objectives even though such steps may delay quadripartite consid- eration of the German problem. Although they have not won the battle for German minds, the Soviets are at the present time in a better posi- tion to influence developments and frustrate our efforts in western Germany than we are in relation to eastern Germany. The situation must be judged to be serious when viewed in light of: 1) the Soviet timetable which may be accelerated by developments in Korea; 2) the point of diminishing returns which will soon be reached through a con- tinuation of strict occupation; 3) the inadvisability, if not possibility, of a form of occupation intended to remake the Germans in our own image. In seeking to cast a trial balance, the most pertinent observa- tion is that the ultimate tipping of the scales in Germany will depend on deployment of power in sharper focus than either the USSR or the US has thus far brought to bear on the German scene. In an accompanying estimate of the probable Soviet moves in Germany for the remainder of the year, McCloy con- cludes that: 1) the USSR is prepared to go very close to precipitating a world war in order to win the whole of Germany within the next few years; 2) a pattern of Soviet strategy will be somewhat analgous to that employed in Korea and the timetable related to Korean developments; and 3) specific moves to overthrow the social-economic order in West Berlin and West Germany will include a step-up in subversive activities,