Images (2)
Document
| id |
id
201944763
|
|---|---|
| contentType |
contentType
document
|
| source |
source
import
|
Source image fields (6)
Extracted text
OCR Page 1 of 2DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
By DEB NLT, Date 6-5-85
July 31, 1950
TOOP SE
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
FRANCE
Ambassador Bruce in Paris has submitted a lengthy
summary of the tentative thinking of top French
officials on the problem of building an adequate defense system for
western Europe. The proposal of French Premier Pleven to establish
a common fund under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to be made
up of national contributions based on national income is a reflection of
wide acceptance within the French Government that NATO should be ex-
panded into a real collective defense effort with central direction ade- -
quate for action rather than merely a program to step up national efforts
with coordinated planning. In general the French are of the opinion that
the NAT and MDAP have given little, if any, guidance on what military
production each country should undertake, on the amount and kind of
rearmament for the existing and additional forces of each country, or on
the general concept of interdependent, effective, modern striking forces.
Among suggestions being considered by the French to meet this problem
are 1) that a single American or a small civilian committee headed by an
American, be given practically dictatorial powers on rearmament and
military production; and 2) that NAT nations contribute all of present
military budgets, except for "police forces", to a common budget and
that a central NAT committee should direct all expenditures from these
common funds. Some of the arguments which French officials make for
such drastic changes in procedure are the inadequacy and the inefficiency
of the "national" approach; the threat of a "galloping inflation" in France
which would lead to a resurgence of Communist strength and render
France useless and powerless in a war with the USSR; the need to
spread the inflationary impact of the total military effort on an equitable
basis among all NAT countries; the possible use of Germans in an
Atlantic community or a European army; the need to dispel the defeat-
ism of the French people who see no hope in a purely French defensive
effort; and the necessity to avoid playing the "game of the USSR" which
is to try to force the NAT nations into placing their economies into real
"strait-jackets" which would reduce the net addition to the standard of
living and to the military strength that could otherwise be obtained.
E
T