Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLTCNaud. A ide ) 104 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE they DECLASSIFIED WASHINGTON E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 1982 State DEB Dept. Guidelines, NLT, March 6-10-85 6, October 26, 1950 Date S By. E SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS WESTERN EUROPE Our vice deputy on the North Atlantic Council, in discussing with UK officials the French proposal for German participation in European defense, was informed that while the UK Foreign Office has taken no definitive position on the matter pending an indication of our views, the tentative thinking in the Foreign Office was that the UK would not be prepared to participate in the proposal or even attend a conference to discuss it on any basis other than its being under full North Atlantic Treaty control. The UK officials indicated that there had been no prior Anglo-French consulta- tions on the French proposal and felt that it was designed in part to help the French Government surmount immediate domestic obstacles. They considered that the sweeping character of the proposal indicated an attempt to please the maximum number of French political elements rather than a serious expectancy that all aspects of the proposal could be realized. It seemed clear to them that the UK and the US could not flatly reject the proposal nor could we accept it in its present form, the problem being to involve the French in negotiations which could result in achieving a formula closer to that proposed in the Nor th Atlantic Council discussions in New York without the necessity of waiting for the French to hold a European conference on their proposal after conclusion of the Schuman negotiations. The UK officials added that they had received the strong impression in a conversation with Van Zeeland that neither Belgium nor the Netherlands would participate in any such scheme except within the North Atlantic Treaty framework. UNITED KINGDOM Ambassador Douglas and Mr. Bissell of ECA in discussing the question of drastically re- - ducing the ECA allotment to the UK agreed that: 1) the British economic situation is now at a point where dollar aid can and should be scaled down and where excessive US assistance would make it easier for the British Government to avoid taking steps essential to the long range economic stability of the UK; and 2) the scaling down or termination of ECA aid to the UK should not be accomplished by abrupt unilateral action but only after adequate discussions with the British, who should be given an opportunity to make an official announcement on the TOP C